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REMARKS
ON THE
SCOPE AND USES
OF
MILITARY LITERATURE
AND
HISTORY

Quos utinam qui legent, scire possint, quam inritus susceperim scribendos
quo facilius caream stultitiæ et arrogantia crimine, qui me mediis interpo-
suerim Cæsaris scriptis.

A. Hirtii Comm. de Bell. Gall.—L. VIII.



PART I.

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P R E F A C E.

THE following pages were written at the instance of an esteemed friend, a very able officer of the Indian Army, who proposed their subject, as an apposite one for the opening article in a projected Military Review. Circumstances having intervened, which caused the abandonment of the intended periodical, after the bulk of this work had been completed, it was suggested to the writer that he might at any rate take an author's recompense for his labour, by putting the useless MS. in print. He trusts that no part will be taken as offered *ex cathedrâ*. Nothing in it presumes to be instructive, but merely suggestive of instruction.

The points of military history referred to in the following chapters, do not include any consideration of those important and interesting questions, which have to do with the mechanical arts as applied to the practices of war. These, together with a review of the change produced in the history of warfare by the introduction of the use of gunpowder, will be taken up in the Second Part of the work.

It is obvious that as neither this treatise, nor its proposed sequel, can bring the study of the subject to a period later than the end of the sixteenth century, a full review of the scope and uses to the soldier, of history and literature as applied to his profession, will demand a work more extended and elaborate in proportion as the matter considered grows in interest, and in intricacy. Whether it is possible to undertake this so as to bring down the consideration of the subject to a later period, remains dependent upon too many contingencies to enable the writer even to form an opinion, much less enter into an engagement, as to the future. The work, however cursory, will nevertheless complete in two parts a sort of running commentary upon the history of war and warlike inventions up to the period when the mode of conducting hostilities underwent a total revolution; and its very incompleteness may perhaps provoke a more competent writer to recast what has been done imperfectly, and supply what may have been left undone altogether.

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ON THE SCOPE AND USES
OF
MILITARY LITERATURE AND HISTORY.

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PART I.  
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CHAPTER I.

OF THE VALUE OF STUDY TO THE SOLDIER—OF THE SCIENCE
OF WAR, AND ORIGIN OF MILITARY RULES—OF THE ÆGYPTIANS
AS TACTICIANS.

IN the correspondence of one of the most right judging Englishmen* that ever earned the meed of literary eminence, there are certain letters between himself and a son of his, who held a commission in our navy, then (towards the end of the 17th century) beginning to assert its superiority over that of the other European maritime powers. The young man gives in brief but very characteristic language, the account of his voyages, engagements, and adventures, his studies in nautical science and general literature, while the father replies in a very grave, and for

* Sir Thomas Browne.

the most part impassive manner, with sound remarks, and sage counsel, directing the youth's attention to this, or to the other author, mathematical or classical;—now to the *Speculum Nauticum** for navigation, now to Plutarch or to Lucan for the experience of wars, or the description of battles. The young Lieutenant, for he held that rank, seems to have profited not less by his own courage and good sense, than by the wise advice of his father. He was present at the action in 1665 off Lowestoft when the Dutch under Opdam were so signally defeated; he distinguished himself under Lord Sandwich in the unsuccessful attempt on the Dutch East Indiamen in Bergen, and also in their subsequent capture :—he had a share in all the actions of 1666, and was at the great fight of that year between the Duke of Albemarle's ships, and the entire Dutch fleet under De Ruyter, as well as in the four days' action in July after the Duke had been reinforced by Prince Rupert. This young officer, destined unfortunately to an early death, seems to have acquired a character, says the biographer of his father, “for the most able conduct, and the most undaunted bravery.” The severe and grave nature of the philosopher appears to have been completely overcome, touched even to woman's softness, by the tidings of his

* By Wagenar, translated into English by Ant. Ashley, U. S. 1588.

son's honorable deeds and well-earned reputation ; and in a letter positively affecting from its earnest manly tenderness, and the outpourings of paternal pride, he at last gives vent to his feelings of delight over the success of him whom he had helped to train by his counsel in letters and in arms.

" Although," says he to his son, " you bee not forward in commending yourself, yet others have not been backward to do it for you, and have so earnestly expressed your courage, valour, and resolution ; your sober, studious, and observing course of life, your generous and obliging disposition, and the notable knowledge you have obtained in military and all kind of sea affayres, that it affordeth no small comfort unto mee. And I would by no meanes omitt to declare the same unto yourself that you may not want that encouragement which you so well deserve." He then goes on to enumerate the various parties from whom he had heard these praises ; the " sober and learned chaplaine, Mr Scudamore." " Mr W. B., a stout volunteer in the Dreadnought," with others not named, and lastly Sir Thomas Allen (a high officer of the fleet). All in their several ways speak highly of the young Lieutenant ; but to the evidence of one particular individual named only by an initial letter, the philosopher seems to have lent special attention. The words deserve it ; for they are indeed most

remarkable, and to those likely to give their attention to the subject of these cursory remarks, fraught with peculiar interest—"Mr J. told mee you were completely constituted to do your country service, honor, and reputation; as being exceeding faythfull, valiant, diligent, generous, vigilant, observing, very knowing, and a scholar."

In this noble catalogue of the merits of a gentleman and a soldier, the talent for observation, and the habit of its exercise, general literary attainments, and such a knowledge of the higher branches of literature, as admits of the attribute of scholarship, are placed emphatically last, as the climax of desert. The subject of this admirable eulogy had been encouraged to attach himself, as his father might have said, to Mercury as much as to Mars, and while diligently employed in the practical part of his profession to study the history, nay—the very poetry, of war, thereby to make himself the better master of its science. Whether strategy or navigation be the study, whether the knowledge of attack and of defence by sea or on shore be sought after, it is not less true that in a military point of view, all the separate and subordinate branches of this study are, as it were mere arts, the just application of which to great ends constitutes a science.

This fact had doubtless struck the mind of Sir Thomas Browne, and with this idea he urged his son to mass together in his reading, every

thing not only that could inform him as to his profession, but also all that was calculated to excite in him a military spirit. His wise prescience, saw use and profit in the pages of Plutarch, and the energetic though turgid verses of the Pharsalia, and the issue proved that he was right. Captain Fenne, "the meere rough seaman," who in his honest phrase declared, "if hee were to choose, hee would have Browne's company before any hee knewe," doubtless did his own duty in his own rough way, but not in the way that leads to eminence : yet this man is, we find, one of the first to bear testimony to the merits of his young lieutenant, simply because superiority makes itself acknowledged by friend as by foe ; and that the cultivated mind with all its energies called into action by knowledge, speculative as well as practical, commands respect from those with whom it comes in friendly contact, like as in emergency, it overcomes the efforts of those who oppose it. The great arts of moral command,* and of military expedients, whereby armies are controlled, and armies are defeated, are based upon the possession of this superiority. He that has most mental resources at his disposal ; he that has learned to discipline his mind to coolness and self-possession ; he that in the moment of danger can recall a precedent as to his posi-

* See Lieut.-Col. Rolt's excellent elementary work on this important requisite in military efficiency.

tion, and modifying his experience of the past by the exigency of present circumstance, can by the justness of his observation time his measures to the crisis which must bring with it defeat, and victory,—is worthy of the name of a great, and a good General. Some minds there are heaven-born to the possession of many of these requisites, but they are by no means of more frequent occurrence in this department of science than in the other branches,—indeed, they are less numerous, as it so often happens that circumstance diverts, in England especially, the man who has “the making of a soldier” in him from the profession in which he might have succeeded. The day is past when any man at any time might be a soldier; and as one, hope to do good and win distinction. The field therefore, whence great names are to grow being limited, there is surely the greater reason that it should be well and carefully cultivated; and as a Cæsar or a Charlemagne, a Tilly or a Gustavus, a Napoleon or a Wellington, spring into life, not by man’s will, or of his creation, he would be wise to remedy the evils which the default, on emergency, of talents such as their’s, might occasion to him, by providing that those to whom are commissioned the safe custody of the land, and the maintenance of its interests and its honour, should train themselves in the study of their profession by having recourse to every source of information which

comes within the extended scope of Military Literature.

The field of this study might perhaps be divided into two portions, carrying out the idea above expressed regarding the essential difference between the art and the science of war. In the first, would be naturally placed all those works of a technical or professional character, having reference to practical duties or particular branches of the profession. All tactical books, and the study of military geography, teaching the application of certain arms and certain tactics to certain lands; the study of languages; the knowledge of projectiles; of castrametation; and of fortifying places, whether as regards a attack or defence; as also a number of subordinate matters having to do with the practice of the profession of arms would be embraced in this division; in which it will be observed, that some branches of positive science are looked upon only as arts in a military light. In the second division, would be placed the works of all writers of military history, biography, voyages, and expeditions, in all languages, ancient or modern;—all poets who have written on war; all critics who have examined the military conduct of great men, tracing out the causes of their success, or the reason of their failure; all military writers of an abstract or reflective character who have speculated upon the moral constitution of armies, and the

science of command with reference to national character. In the former of these two classes, have been placed those branches of acquirements which may render the student capable of action ;—in the latter are ranged those which may give him experience in the power of application : in the first he studies an Art, in the second a Science.

The Science of War as we understand it, is perhaps with that of Astronomy, the first that possessed a Literature. It was of course an oral one in the first instance ; but in this shape it must have existed long before the use of letters permitted any written record to be made of it, at least which has come down to our day. In the oldest book extant, however, that of Job, we have evidence of military divisions, of military arrangements, of the use of instruments of music in war to encourage or command, of the authority of appointed chiefs, and of the use of defensive armour, nay—even of cavalry, a point of much interest as will be shown hereafter. The Chaldeans, we find “ made out three bands (Job. I. 17.) and fell* upon the camels,” showing that their predatory attack was not unaccompanied by a show of rude discipline. Job again himself in his nobly figurative language complains of the Almighty that, “ His troops

* Or “*rushed*,” a more Military term.

(Job. xix. 12.) come together, and raise up their way against me,* and encamp round about my tabernacle." In the description of the ostrich, (Job xxxix. 18.) it is said, "she scorneth the horse and his rider," showing that horses had already been trained to the chase (as with the modern Arabs) of this swift-footed bird, and leaving us in no doubt but that the war-horse so gloriously described immediately afterwards was not attached to a chariot, as has been suggested, chariots being found in use ordinarily long before cavalry,—but actually a battle-steed mounted by a warrior. "Hast thou given the horse strength? hast thou clothed his neck with thunder? can'st thou make him afraid as a grasshopper? the glory of his nostrils is terrible. He paweth in the valley and rejoiceth in his strength: he goeth on to meet the armed men. He mocketh at fear and is not affrighted; neither turneth he back for the sword. The quiver rattleth against him, the glittering spear and the shield. He swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage: neither believeth he that it is the sound of the trumpet. He saith among the trumpets 'Ha ha': and he smelleth the battle afar off; the thunder of the captains, and the shouting." This sublime description shows us not only that

* The writer does not pretend to understand this: it is most likely a Military term mistranslated.

the horse was mounted, but that his rider carried a bow, lance, and shield, for these latter arms and the quiver "rattled against him,"—the horse: he is about we find to engage at "the sound of the trumpet," an order to battle which excites the noble brute's scorn and defiance; while on the side of his own party, as well as of the enemy, the imperative commands of appointed leaders, so admirably given as "the thunder of the captains," control, and encourage the engaging troops. In another part of the same magnificent poem, we find the "habergeon" (Job xli. 26.) or defensive coat of proof mentioned, and "the dart" which continued with the Arabs* a favorite weapon down to the time of the Crusades, and later. It is wholly out of the question to suppose that bodies of men, equipped and commanded as above described, could have gone

* Mr Terrick Hamilton's translation of *Antar*, an Arabic heroic poem; also Lamartine's fragments of the same in "*Impressions de Voyage en Orient*."

The exact parallel afforded between the military manners of the ancient, and modern Arabs may be further studied by reference to Bruckhardt's "*Notes on the Bedouins*," comparing them with the ancient poem above noted. The proof afforded of a deeply rooted peculiarity of discipline existing time out of mind among a particular people, in a mode conformable to their national character, their armament, and the nature of the country they inhabit, is highly interesting as showing the judgment and sagacity which of old have been exercised in the device of a scheme of warfare, so durable because so well adapted to its locality.

to war without some military rule of practice, oral doubtless, and traditional, but still bearing testimony of the early application of definite principles to military operations.

In the history of the earliest nations by which civilization was carried to a high pitch, the Egyptians, we have the amplest proofs of a very careful and elaborate study of the principles of military science. These are afforded in their monuments and tombs, the sculptures and paintings of which give evidence of the state of discipline to which their troops had been brought; while the hieroglyphic inscriptions which accompany them, show in so far as their characters have been decyphered, that the natural consequence of good discipline, military efficiency, met with its usual result—success. As to the nature, the scenes, and the extent of these successes, the sculptured, and pictorial remains give some clue, but still no very direct one.* The names in Egyptian, of which the modern Coptic is a dialect, of certain of the nations subdued by the ancient

* My authority for nearly the whole of the Ancient History of the Egyptians is Sir J. Wilkinson's excellent work to which I refer my readers: it is a compendium of research. Should the book however not be easily attainable by the student, he is referred to any of the Modern Encyclopedias, under the head "Ægypt." In that elaborate, and useful publication, the "Illustrated Commentary on the Holy Bible," constant and most interesting reference is made to Wilkinson as also to his authorities.

inhabitants of the Nile-valley have been decyphered without throwing much light on the subject, except in a case of the *Shetu*, a nation whose nominal affinity as well as certain other peculiarities, seems to identify them with a tribe of Scythians. The figured representations of the nations, who were sometimes the enemies, and sometimes the allies of the Egyptians, are however more conclusive; as the sculptors and artists have been careful to preserve, not only the characteristics of dress, but of feature with respect to every one of the many people against, or in concert with whom, the Egyptian military power was exerted from about 1600 to 1200 years before the Christian *Æra*. Some, red-bearded and blue-eyed, prove themselves at once a Northern people; others show the most marked peculiarities of the Negro; one or two nations whose names are read *Shairetana* and *Tokkari*, appear to have in feature and equipment a resemblance to the Medes of Persepolis, while the eye of any resident in India can detect in the head-dresses of two other of the conquered races, the undoubted characteristic costume of the Parsee and the Armenian. There is independent of all this, ample and excellent authority to prove that the conquests of the Egyptian were extensive, and their military power great and formidable. "They over-ran," says Tacitus, "all Libya and Ethiopia; and subdued the Medes and Persians,

the Bactrians, Scythians, with the extensive regions inhabited by the Syrians, the Armenians, and the Cappadocians; and by this conquest a tract extending from Bithynia on the Pontic Sea to the Coast of Lycia on the Mediterranean was reduced to subjection." (Ann. II. 60.) The much more ancient authority of Herodotus, and of many other writers, corroborates this account, taken from histories that have perished, but witnessed by monuments extant to this hour.*

All that we have to do in the study of our subject is to satisfy ourselves, that the high military discipline, of the existence of which among the Egyptians antique remains furnish us with ocular demonstration, had actually that success in war which we are taught to believe it should ever command. The great and polished nation which practised, and perhaps invented it, have left sufficient evidence that their progress in the science of war was accompanied by, not only a written, but an illustrated military literature. From these illustrations we learn; 1st. That they disposed their troops in regular battalia of heavy and of light armed infantry, the arms and equipment of each battalion being of one kind, so

* One of the tablets set up, as Herodotus states, was the practice by the Egyptian conquerors, seems to exist in Syria near the river Lycus (Nuhur oo'l Kulb) bearing the name of Rameses II. B. C. 1355. (Wilkinson M. & C. of Eg. Vol. I. 98.)

as to preserve discipline and uniformity, 2d. That their favorite weapons were a short broad sword, cut and thrust, about two and a half feet long, which I think, as will be here-after shown, may be reasonably taken as the original form of the well-known Roman legionary sword; and a stout pike, or short spear, which is carried always with a shield. 3d. That their formation for action consisted of a deep phalanx covered by light troops armed with darts, by bowmen, and slingers, and supported by their substitute for cavalry (for of this arm I conceive they had none,) charioteers. 4th. That their dress and equipment was for the neither man a waistcloth exactly similar to the *Dhotee** of the Hindoos, while the upper part of the body was protected by a sort of tunic with short sleeves covered with metal plates well fastened upon it; this was often handsomely and gaily coloured, and in some cases a surcoat without sleeves having the figures of animals upon it, seems to have been used by leaders and men of rank. This

* This identity is so remarkable, that I am surprised it should have been left to the writer to notice it. The *Dhotee* was the national dress of the Egyptians, the upper part of the body being left among the lower orders, entirely bare. The Hindoos are the only people, who, so far as the writer's observation goes, seem from time immemorially to have adopted the same costume, and this curious fact constitutes another of the strange affinities in customs observable between them and the ancient Egyptians.

defensive armour is in material similar to the hauberk of the middle ages: the head was protected by a helmet of which there were many varieties, according to the troops that wore them; some are fitted with a kind of crest, nearly all appear to have been padded or quilted, and not of metal, and they varied according to the description of troops in shape and size. They also had the bow which they must have used with great effect, drawing it to the ear in the manner of the old English bowman, and shooting some times in a rank by volleys, or, to use an old English term of archery, "wholly together;" the *lissan* or curved baton, still used as a very effective weapon by the Ababdeh and the Bisha-reen; a curious cutting weapon which Sir J. Wilkinson calls the *faulchion*, together with clubs, maces, hatchets, and pole axes, which last seem to occur unfrequently. In the attack of fortified places, they used the *testudo* or tortoise, under which the assailants approached the walls sheltered from the stones and missiles of the defenders. This invention passed to other nations, and continued in use as is well known until the invention of gun-powder; it was known to our ancestors as the *sow*: in like manner do we owe to them the invention of those huge shields termed in the middle ages *mantelets* and *pavisses*, from behind which the bowmen cleared the walls of the place previous to, or during an assault; they

also used scaling ladders, and the battering ram. The strength and pride of their army, however, was evidently their force of chariots, which being excessively light*, but compact and strong built, and drawn by two horses yoked to them, carried two individuals, the driver and the fighting man, with great rapidity, from place to place. The latter carried his bow in a handsome case, and quiver fastened to the chariot, together with two or three javelins, besides other arms. He stood up in the chariot, which being very low, and open behind, he stepped in and out of, with the utmost readiness. The driver had to maintain the same position, but of course could never leave the vehicle. It was in fact a mere frame of wood on wheels, the front of which barely reached to a man's middle ; its advantages in war were that it enabled an expert man at arms, practised to balance himself in an erect posture upon the twisted thongs or net-work which framed the bottom of the light car, to use both hands, and consequently his bow, with effect ; to transport himself while so doing with speed from one point to another ; throw himself from the vehicle, and act on foot ; and then in an instant, resume his place, and retreat as rapidly as he had made his advance. He was the dragoon of the Egyptian armies, according to the original conception of

* In the paintings, a man is represented with one on his shoulder.

this description of soldier,—a mounted man, but trained to fight on foot ; and he had the additional advantage of being relieved from the management of the horses to which he owed the celerity of his attack, and his general rapidity of movement.*

Such were the far famed “chariots of the Egyptians,” such it will be shown were the

* There is an oft quoted and excellent description of the use of the war chariot, the *essedæ* of the Gauls, in Cæsar’s Commentaries (De Bello Gallico, lib. iv. xxxiii). The peculiar mode of managing this arm could never have differed materially in whatever age or by whatever nation it was employed. I therefore give it entire, noticing, which however it is hardly necessary to do, that the Romans never made of use of their *currus*, or car, in war ; it was reserved with their other wheeled vehicles for civil purposes, or else used in their favourite race of chariots.

“The manner of fight from war cars is this wise : they first drive about in all directions, and cast weapons, and by the very dread of the horses, and rattle of the wheels, not unfrequently disturb the ranks : and so soon as they shall have thrust themselves between the squadrons of the cavalry, they leap down from the cars, and fight on foot. The drivers meanwhile draw off somewhat out of the fight, and so place themselves with the chariot, that if the combatants be pressed by the number of their foes they may hasten to take them up. Thus in battles they afford the moveable qualities of cavalry, the stability of infantry ; and so skilful do they get by daily use, and exercise, as to hold up their horses at speed in a sloping and precipitous place, and check them and turn short, and run along the pole, and lean upon (or stand upon) the yoke, and thence with utmost speed regain their chariots, and this customarily.”

“splendid cars” of Homer’s heroes,*—such, as the writer understands, mounted and managed as above described, were “Pharaoh’s chariots,” with which he pursued the children of Israel. As to another important part of his armament, his horsemen, we are left uninformed, for, strange to say, in spite of the repeated allusions to *horsemen* in the armies of Egypt, which are found in the Scriptural writings, there does not appear in any of the sculptures, paintings, or antiquarian remains as yet found in this country, the slightest reference to Egyptian cavalry as a body; while of the use of the horse by an Egyptian for equitation, there is only *one* instance, and that it is supposed in a painting of the Ptolomean age, comparatively modern. Sir S. Wilkinson is of opinion, that in spite of this absence of almost all evidence of their riding, the Egyptians did do so, because they were nevertheless accompanied by large bodies of cavalry in war as noted by Diodorus in his account of the expedition of Sesostris, and elsewhere. This is perfectly possible, but it by no means follows that these should be Egyptian cavalry, and here I think lies the easy explanation of the difficulty. “The horse and his rider” in the song of Miriam, “the horsemen” of Isaiah (xxxvi. 9.) for which we are “not to trust to Egypt,” are explained as being foreigners

* The resemblance is confirmed on examination which my limits do not permit me to enter into here.

attached to the Egyptian army in one of the very passages which Sir S. Wilkinson quotes to prove they were Egyptians (2 Chron. xii. 3.) "With twelve hundred chariots and threescore thousand horsemen, and the people were without number that came with him out of Egypt; the Lubims, the Sukkims, and the Ethiopians." Now this host of Shishak, King of Egypt, was composed of his own troops and of his allies, among whom the Lubims (Lybians?) and the Ethiopians doubtless furnished their contingent of that famous cavalry, which became afterwards so well known as the Numidian or African horse to the Roman Armies. Isaiah also speaks of "the Lubim" as equestrian allies of Egypt. Should, however, these considerations not prove the point, let us look more closely to the pictorial record which this accurate and observant race have left of themselves and of all they did; and we shall find, that although they never represented themselves as mounted warriors, they did not fail to depict the cavalry of their opponents, the *Sheta* or Scythians; which instances of the use of the horse, says Sir S. Wilkinson, (vol. I M. and Cust. p. 66), "seem to be introduced to shew a peculiarity of Asiatic people." Let this be so, the Egyptians would certainly have introduced it into the pictures of their every day life, had it been a peculiarity of their own. But again—let us judge of them by those to whom

they were the models in letters, arts, and arms, the Greeks, and we still find in the writings of the great poet as exact in depicting the manners of his countrymen in immortal verse as were the Egyptians in recording their own in paintings and hieroglyphics far older than his poems,—but one allusion in the *Iliad* and none in the *Odyssey*, to the use of the horse for purposes of equitation. It is in the 15th Book, and as there is no occasion to be verbally critical here, I will give it in the loose, but beautiful paraphrase of Pope : the simile, it should be mentioned, is applied to the rapid passing of Ajax from ship to ship at the Greek camp on the sea shore.

“ So when a horseman from the wat’ry mead ;
 (Skilled in the manage of the bounding steed),
 Drives four fair coursers, practiced to obey,
 To some great city, thro’ the public way ;
 Safe in his art, as side by side, they run,
 He shifts his seat, and vaults from one to one ;
 And now to this, and now to that he flies,
 Admiring numbers follow with their eyes.”

Now as Troy was taken about 1200 years before our æra,—as Homer did not exist, it is supposed until three centuries later, and as the books, or rhapsodies of his noble poems were recited separately by bards and minstrels until the time of Pericles, who united them, thus admitting of such interpolation and alteration of the original as the best critics allow did occur,—it will be considered a remarkable proof of the

unequestrian habits of the Greek (and by implication of those of their model nation), that during the lapse of so many centuries, no allusion whatever should have crept into the poem in addition to this single record of a feat of horsemanship, which, critics, I believe, generally consider to refer to the antics of a tumbler or athlete. It is of consequence to mark all these facts, as they help us to determine the real quarter whence the use of cavalry proceeded, a point of much interest in the history of an arm, which has played so important a part in the subjugation of nations, and the development of military science.

With this knowledge before us of the armament, and strategical system of this great and ancient people, we as military students, are naturally desirous to arrive at some idea of the evolutions of the Egyptian troops, and of that degree of previous training in use among them, which enables a body of men to take up ground, or change position, without breaking their order in presence of an enemy. That they must have possessed a system in this respect rests, apart the reasonable supposition, upon two chief grounds:—1. That the Greeks, who were civilized by Egyptian and Phœnician colonies* had such a

* The writer does not encumber his treatise with citations of authorities to these well known facts: an excellent Compendium of them, including those of Rosellini and Spineto, will

discipline as I shall hereafter shew, so early as the Trojan war, or within 600 years of their first civilization. 2. That among some of the unknown or doubtful enemies of the Egyptians, there existed a degree of military skill, which must have demanded superior tactics on the part of their opponents in order to break and overcome it. The first of these arguments is an evident one, on which there is no need now to expatiate. The second I found upon the irrefragable evidence of the sculptures (Remeses I, B. C. 1850,) in one which (at Thebes, *vide* Wilkinson's M. and C. vol. I., 382), the Sheta or supposed Scythians are placed in position with a regular reserve, consisting of a double phalanx of sword and spearmen, having their right flank protected by a fortified place with double ditches and bridges, and their front covered by a ditch or small river.* This nation had chariots as well as cavalry, and opposing the Egyptians with equal arms, and evidently as above proved, considerable military judgment, must have been hard to beat; but they were beaten as the paint-

be found in Mrs Hamilton Gray's History of Etruria, Chap. V. on the Pelasgi.

* "Their troops appear to have been disciplined, and the close array of their phalanxes of infantry, the style of their chariots and the arms they used indicate a great superiority in military tactics compared with other eastern nations at that early period." (Wilk. vol. I., 381.)

ings shew us, and as the evidence of many historians conjointly proves ; and hence we establish the peculiar superiority of the military character of their conquerors. It is exceedingly probable that these enemies had adopted the use of chariots and the formation of their troops from the Egyptians themselves, finding the necessity, as usual in the history of war, of opposing tacticians by an imitation of their proper tactics : and there is ample evidence to prove that much military regularity and order existed among other nations of antiquity contemporary with the latter greatness of Egypt. The Persepolitan remains, and the many other sculptured relics scattered throughout the ancient territory of the Chaldeans, Assyrians and Medes, proves this with evidence nearly as strong as that afforded to us in Egypt* itself. Circumstances have, however, hitherto been very hostile to accuracy of research in these regions. We are doubtless† destined to know much more regard-

* For easy reference, see Kerr Porter's *Travels*, and Heeren's *Researches into the Politics, &c., of Ancient Nations*, vol. I. II. Persepolis.

† Signor Botta, son, I believe, of the celebrated historian of that name, has discovered at a village called Khorsabad, near the site of ancient Nineveh, by excavation in a mound composed of the debris of ancient buildings, a series of paintings accompanied by long and elaborate inscriptions in the cuniform character. These represent the triumphs and the battles of a great and mighty people, riders on horses as well as

ing them, but our means of comparison are as yet limited. This much is certain, that the armies of the Persepolitan Kings had received quite as great an infusion of discipline as comported with that general advancement which they had made in the arts ; and the sculptures show that the fragments of Ctesias, as also the later authorities of Xenophon and Arrian, have not recorded more than the truth.

This eastern people seem to have been the first which adopted defensive armour for horse as well as rider, a practice common also to the Medes, and imitated by the Greeks, in their use of the catafracti or fully-armed cavaliers. The Hyrcanians and Bactrians are stated by Herodo-

users of a war car, very similar to the Egyptian, who must have attained a very high degree of civilization. The drawing of the figures is very correct, something on the Persepolitan style ; their action spirited ; the colours of the paintings still very vivid and the sculptures in bas-relief, which have as yet been found boldly and skilfully executed. Signor Botta has given specimens of his discoveries first made in April, 1843, from time to time, in the *Journal Asiatique* published at Paris. The latest were given in the No. for February and March, 1845. As the cuniform character has been in a great measure decyphered, we may look to receive from this quarter information of the most interesting and instructive description, as soon as the exploration of these ruins shall have been undertaken on an extensive scale. It will easily be conceived that at such a time vague speculation upon the character of the former tenants of these ancient realms would not only be valueless, but even impertinent.

tus to have followed the Persian method of arming, and we conclude that the fashion set by this rich and powerful nation was, in a greater or less degree, the model upon which the majority of their allies and dependants moulded their military habits. Among the bas-reliefs at Tuckt-i-Bostan (Porter's Travels,) is a very remarkable representation of an ancient Persian heavy-armed horseman with conical helmet, a visor, and tunic of mail—the head-dress adorned with streamers, after the fashion adopted during the 13th century in Europe, and the whole forehand of his horse protected by armour, giving the exact idea of the Persian knight of a very remote era. At Nakshi-Roustan is a spirited bas-relief of the attack with the spear, as practised by the horsemen of that day, in which the conical helmet again occurs. The Dacian cavalry of a later date covered both horse and man with a close fitting scale armour, which must apparently have been of shaped leather, as did the Sarmatians also. These precautionary defences for the horse seem long to have obtained in the East, and they were thence eventually adopted by the chivalry of Europe after the second Crusade. I merely touch upon them here to point out, that in all ages this weight of defensive armour was, as will be shewn more particularly hereafter, destructive of real military efficiency. “Ammianus Marcellinus (Lib. xxiv.) speaks of a multitude of horses rode

by the Persian cavalry, entirely defended, *operimentis scorteis*, with leathern housings. Heliodorus observes again (Lib. ix. *Æthiopicorum*) that the heavy armour worn by the Persian horses rendered them immoveable when they lost their conductors.* In that case they could not have been very moveable when they had them, thereby leading, to a natural inference, which will be established more fully in another place.

In comparing, however, the remains which these ancient people have left us with those of the Egyptians, an element of success is discoverable, which has not escaped the acuteness of Professor Heeren—I mean that of the superiority of national character as respects fitness for war. He observes in speaking of the Persepolitan sculptures:—"How different are these historical relievos of Persia from those of the Egyptians, the favourite themes of which are battles and triumphal processions! There the object has been to exhibit the characters of action and energy, here those of repose."† It is as interesting to us as students to trace the partial origin of Egyptian victory in the vigour of national character, as to discover generally by our researches into the Military History of these ancient periods, the general antiquity of the principle of dis-

* Meyrick's Ancient Armour. Introduction, vol. i.

† Heeren's Researches, vol. i. 238. Talbot's (translated) edition.

cipline. It is instructive to us to reflect that in all ages national energy properly maintained, and military skill properly perfected, have produced—nay, must ensure success.

“Next to the forming of troops,” says Marishal Saxe, “military discipline is the first object that presents itself to our notice; is the soul of all armies; and unless it be established among them with great prudence, and supported with unshaken resolution, they are no better than so many contemptible heaps of rabble which are more dangerous to the very state that maintains them, than even its declared enemies.”* The nations of antiquity, who derived their military system directly from Egypt, imbibed this great principle together with the rules of practice which their leaders, or their founders carried away from the land, which was long the focus of all western civilization. These nations were the Phœnicians; and through them the Carthaginians; the Hebrews; the Greeks generally; the Etruscans; and through them the Romans. As to other nations more ancient than these, who may indirectly have either participated with the Egyptian in their knowledge of the science of war, or have gained experience of it by subsequent collision with them, we shall have hereafter, a few brief words to say, more, however, in

* *Reveries*, chap. viii.

the way of speculation than enquiry. These remarks being likely to prove more interesting to the antiquary than to the military student will be given in an appendix.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PHœNICIANS AND CARTHAGINIANS—OF THE HEBREWS
—OF THE GREEKS WITH REMARKS ON THE USE OF THE
CHARIOT AND ELEPHANT IN WAR.

The Phœnicians, a Semitic race, are well known as the most eminent of maritime and commercial nations among the Ancients. They extended their power by colonial establishments with the object, however, not of conquest in the lands where they settled, but of the extension of their trade. Although a highly enterprising and brave people, they were from circumstance not land warriors. "The extent of their population," observes Professor Heeren, "did not allow of their raising large armies among themselves: they very early adopted the system of carrying on their wars by means of hired troops, a system which all commercial states have had, and always must have, in their continental wars,* and one

* This is true not less of the English than of other commercial nations in spite of their maintaining (in war) so large an Army. Their subsidies to Allies on the continent to ensure co-operation, is virtually mere an engagement of foreign mercenaries. The employment of Hessian and other German mercenaries in the war of independence with America,—of Greek and Sicilian troops in the Levant during the last war with France: and the maintenance of immense native armies in the East, and of Negro troops in the West Indies are cases in point.

which their colonists the Carthaginians carried on to a much wider extent." (Vol. II. Researches 27).

Now without going out of our way to multiply authorities, let us take our stand upon this known fact; and having proper consideration to the equally well ascertained one of the dependance which the Egyptians, that military race, placed upon the Phœnician naval skill and daring,* let us reflect as to the natural converse of this arrangement, that they namely, availed themselves in engaging mercenaries, of the military training and experience of their allies of the Nile Valley. Phœnician history is, as to almost all detail, so excessively meagre, that we are driven to argument and to inference when we desire to explain the anomalies which we find in it, and in that of their descendants. How otherwise can we account for the extraordinary military successes of the most eminent of these latter, the Carthaginians, atchieved chiefly with mercenary

* The instance of Pharaoh Neco's employment of the Phœnicians to effect a voyage of discovery which led to the circumnavigation of Africa, is a familiar illustration of this fact. (Herodotus iv. 42.) The father of history unconsciously bears evidence against the soundness of his own opinion where he says, relating how these navigators sailed from the Red Sea to the Pillars of Hercules, "and turning them came back to Egypt; and they said things incredible to me, though perchance not to another, how that in sailing round Africa, *'they had the sun on their right.'*"

troops,—the management whereof we know to be a sort of science in itself,—but by supposing that the Egyptian discipline became transfused through* Sidon into Carthage, and that the victories of Hannibal may be thus traced to the military skill which distinguished the armies of the Pharaohs. The pages of Livy and Polybius give us an insight into the military formation of the Carthaginians, in which the troops were regularly classed and divided according to their armament, and where in addition to the formidable Numidian cavalry, elephants were used in battle, the chariot being latterly excluded.† The Carthaginians, however, used them in their early times, taking the practice from the Libyan tribe of Zauces (“whose women drove their chariots

* I do not insist upon a recent theory which makes the Phœnicians, *Hyksos* or “shepherds;” when fully exhibited it will render our argumentative process needless.

† I lay little stress in this place upon the detail of the Carthaginian tactics, what we know of them being so much mixed up with the history of Roman warfare as to render more than a casual notice of them in this place, superfluous. The Chevalier de Folard in his commentaries on Polybius is of all more modern military authors, the one who has treated the subject most at length. His work is in the original voluminous and diffuse, and is now rarely met with. It was composed about 1720, and containing, as Frederic II. of Prussia quaintly expressed it, “diamonds in dung” has been abstracted in a work termed *Espirit de Folard*. The Chevalier served under the Dukes de Vendome, and Burgundy, and with Charles XII. of Sweden.

of war:" (Herod iv. 193,) according to Professor Heeren. I see no reason why they should not have taken them from the same quarter whence the use of chariots must have had reached the Zauces themselves, Egypt.* In their Army, however, as in others, chariots of war were exploded, so soon as the preferable use of the horse in the ranks of the cavalry, became apparent, by their being placed in contact with an equestrian people. Upon the use of elephants we will speculate hereafter; we know for certain that the practice did not reach the Carthaginians from the Nile, the elephant being only shewn in the paintings of the tombs as brought young by some southern or eastern subject nation, as part of their tribute in produce of their land.

The Hebrews in their connection with Egypt have been easily identified as one of the foreign races which from time to time settled in the land, these being "the shepherds, which were an abomination to the Egyptians." All foreigners who sojourned in the Nile Valley, whether as peaceful inhabitants (the Hebrews), or as conquerors,

* It is right to mention in explanation of Professor Heeren's opinion, that he with Mr Hope, and some other authorities, holds that Ægypt was peopled from Æthiopia, deriving thence its knowledge, and consequent civilization. The idea is by no means generally received, but as the process of philological discovery must soon put us in possession of the truth, it is idle to lose time meanwhile in speculation on the subject.

(the Arabs and Assyrians whose dynasty in Lower Egypt is well known as that of the Shepherd Kings), were termed as has been read from the hieroglyphs, "*Hyksos*," which has been discovered to signify *stranger* and *wanderer*, and thence *vagabond*, *beggar*, or *slave*. These people were of different races; some as we know "the children of Israel"; others, Assyrians with whose dynasty the Rasena, or supposed ancestors of the Etruscans seem to have entered Egypt, whence, as will be shown, they derived their knowledge of arts and arms. There were others besides whom it does not concern us to notice; suffice it to say, that these separate nations were induced to emigrate from Egypt at different periods, some expelled by force, while others like the Israelites, left the country upon an understanding. The ancient historian Manetho has left fragments, purporting that in the reign of Rameses the Third, 2,40,000 of these Hyksos left Egypt, and took the road to Syria. This is supposed to have been the great emigration of the Israelites, under Moses, as recorded in the book of Exodus, the number 2,40,000 appearing from its frequent use in the hieroglyphs, to mean no more than indefinitely a very great multitude.*

* Without multiplying authorities in a matter when the object is to simplify study, I beg to refer to Mrs H. Grey's Etruria, chap. ii. where Rosellini, Wilkinson, Bunsen, and Champollion, are quoted to these points.

It was the fate of the Israelites to attract the suspicion of the then ruler of Egypt, who pursued and set upon them in their peaceful journey. Although they were some 600,000 adult men headed by a wise leader, and one as we know from his previous history, conspicuous for his personal daring, no attempt at resistance seems to have been made. It was not until after their entry into the Wilderness that Moses, at the suggestion of Jethro, his father-in-law, (Exod. xviii.) established a sort of (civil) discipline among them by a decimal allotment of "Judges" to tens, fifties, hundreds, and thousands of the people.

As the same system came to be adopted by the Hebrews in their military divisions, it seems not unlikely that this original distribution of these "Hyksos" or *wanderers* under proper leaders, served from the very first a double purpose. The people were mustered in due course (Numbers i.), and assigned standards, one to each tribe (Numbers x.) They then marched to take the promised land, but terrified at the report of the stature and might of the sons of Anak, cried out to return to Egypt rather than dare the danger of an attack. These men, multitude as they were, had fled from Pharaoh without striking a blow, and now feared, marshalled and arrayed to the amount of many thousands, to engage an enemy, the very vague report concerning whom struck them with panic. They were *Hyksos*, a

despised, degraded race in the land they had left, and as we would express it, they wanted national vigour to second the judicious military arrangements made by one, who was "learned in all the learning of the Egyptians," and who of course had not omitted, constitutionally bold as he was, to improve his resources as the leader of a nation, by the study of military science.

When after forty years in the Wilderness, the generation which left Egypt had died out, their sons, *Hyksos* no longer, but free men, inured to bear arms by preliminary conflicts (Numbers *xxi. xxv.*) with the men of Canaan, the Amorites, and the Midianites, were ready to carry out the great military revolution, which it was their destiny to accomplish, and win their inheritance of the Promised Land with the sword. When the troops of the Hebrews, "all that were able to go to war in Israel," (Numbers *xxvi. 2.*) were again mustered, they were an united and energetic people, animated by great confidence in themselves, and the cause in which they were engaged. That obstinate and uncompromising spirit which has ever since distinguished this remarkable people, seems then to have been fully developed ; and influenced by skilful leaders, regulated by a proper discipline, it was an excellent temper for insuring the success of an invading and exterminating army. Whatever of military system the Hebrews had, we cannot for an

instant doubt, but that they borrowed from the Egyptians. In all things in which the books of Moses do not represent them as following the dictates of a divine will, and preparing for the reception of a theocratic constitution, it is possible to trace a close and intimate connection with the usages and customs of the nation with which they had so long sojourned. "This is not the place for a comparison of this kind," observes an intelligent author* when speaking of this point without reference, however, to the military question which we are discussing; still less is it so to us than to him: employment of the argument by analogy, however, will be seen to be not without its use in directing us.

One remarkable point of resemblance between the hosts of Israel and Egypt is their want of

* Heeren, v. 294. It is now some years since the last edition of the *Researches* of this author was published (1826,) and I am open to objection for quoting what in these days may be scouted as an obsolete authority. As he, however, wrote of the Egyptians according to what must remain text books, namely the classical authors of antiquity as well as Denon, Hamilton, Danville, and Champollion, it is better sending the military student to so compendious a work as well as one so easily obtained, and composed in so agreeable a style, than referring him to isolated authorities, which speak to single facts instead of generalising upon the mass of all that is or was known in Heeren's day. Our object is to falcitate study, to encourage towards it, and to make it agreeable; pedants only take any other course. As to the detail of the Jewish military history, the student's hand-book is Josephus,

cavalry: the first of these nations appears indeed, (as will be more specially noticed hereafter) never to have used the horse in war, not even for chariots. It is easy to explain to ourselves the reason of this peculiarity, by referring to the destiny they were doomed to fulfil, and which making of them a stationary people in Palestine, was best accomplished by dissuading or preventing them from the adoption of an arm whereby they might be tempted to extend their military operations beyond their own immediate frontier. Their arms were the bow, the spear, sword, sling, and shield; their tactics seemingly an impetuous charge for the purpose of engaging at close quarters. Their subsequent history as a military people it is rather a delicate task to touch upon. The religious fervour by which they were animated was no doubt sufficient in itself, at first, as we have it fully proved in the case of other people, to render their hosts victorious. Whether this may have led them to despise discipline, and whether their subsequent misfortunes may have arisen in part from the apathy of overconfidence, and a total neglect of military order, I leave to others to reflect upon; the point, as a question of example in the history of arms is not without interest. In the latter days of their independent national existence, we see their old soldier-like spirit fully roused by those resolute and capable leaders, the Maccabees and, should

we require yet a further proof that national energy once developed may slumber, but is ever to be awakened on fitting occasion, and at the call of a bold and active spirit, let us only look to the achievements of the Hebrews at the siege of their holy city by Titus, a heroic defence carried on simultaneously with the conflicts between the three hostile factions which separated the defenders! The Jew of our day is often to be found in the ranks of European continental armies, particularly among Polish troops. He is said to be a slovenly soldier, but by no means a bad one. Whatever limited experience we have of him in our own army, whether among English troops, or as he occasionally appears in the army of the Bombay Presidency, is said to verify the observation.

Continuing to trace the origin of military science to the ancient source of civilization in the West, we now come to a much more easy and agreeable branch of our task, a consideration of it's condition among the tribes and states of Greece. It would be idle to linger over the threshold of our subject by stopping to prove the source of the civilization of that land to have been Egypt. Herodotus, whose testimony the progress of research is daily proving to be more and more trustworthy, roundly states that Danaus, the fable of whose fifty daughters refers to the colonies he founded, was an Egyptian, who brought the knowledge of arts and arms

among the barbarous Pelasgi, whom he calls Thessalians, nine centuries before the Trojan war, and two before the advent of the Phœnician Cadmus (Herod. Euterpe.) He is constantly connecting Grecian with Egyptian history, and even gives the story of Helen an Egyptian turn, speaking of her being carried first from Argos to the Nile. It matters not to us here what were the historical details of the early intercourse between the two countries ; we know that it existed in the earliest historical ages, and that as the one country was barbarous, and the other in the zenith of its grandeur, knowledge of all kinds must have been conveyed from the one to the other by whatever settlers, over-population, discontent, or a love of adventure, induced to try their fortune in a new and strange territory.

Ælian, whose treatise on the tactics of the Greeks, written in the reign of the Emperor Adrian and for his special amusement,* is the only Greek work purely devoted to the art of forming troops that has reached us, declares in his first chapter that, "Homer seems to have been the first of those we know, who acknowledged the tactical theory, and held great account of those who practised it, as with Mncestheus,"—

"To whom no man that treads the earth lives equal,
To marshal horse and buckler-bearing men."

* See Ælian's prefatory letter to the Emperor ; I have said the *only* work as Arrian's treatise is a mere abbreviation.

The quotation is from the second book of the Iliad. The author goes on to enumerate various authors who have written works "concerning the Homeric tactics." He does not here put forth his own work as superior to their's, but we find that he has already implied it in his prefatory letter to the Emperor: "Many," says he, "have written of this science *who knew not mathematics*, in which I am supposed to excel." The passage is of value to us, showing how at all time scientific and literary attainments have been considered as qualifying men peculiarly for a just understanding of the science of war. His reference to Homer, however, as a military writer, and to the Homeric tactics as conveying a principle of formation, is a little far-fetched. The great poet, it is true, gives us fully to understand that discipline prevailed among the Greeks, and that their opponents were destitute of it. In the following lines (Il. B. 3,) he repeats a favourite simile to express the crowded, noisy confusion of the Trojans, and contrast it with the quiet serried phalanx of their opponents:—

" Thus by their leaders' care, each martial band
 Moves into ranks, and stretches o'er the land.
 With shouts the Trojans rushing from afar
 Proclaim their motions, and provoke the war.
 So when inclement winters vex the plain
 With piercing frosts, or thick-descending rain,
 To warmer seas, the cranes embody'd fly,
 With noise and order, thro' the midway sky ;

To pigmy nations, wounds and death they bring
 And all the war descends upon the wing.
 But silent, breathing rage, resolved and skilled,
 By mutual aids, to fix a doubtful field,
 Swift march the Greeks : the rapid dust around
 Dark'ning arises from the labor'd ground.
 Thus from his flaggy wings, when Notus sheds
 A night of vapours round the mountain heads,
 Swift gliding mists the dusky fields invade,
 To thieves more grateful, than the midnight shade ;
 While scarce the swains their feeding flocks survey
 Lost and confused amidst the thicken'd day :
 So rapt in gath'ring dust the Grecian train,
 A moving cloud, swept on, and hid the plain.
 Now front to front the hostile armies stand,
 Eager of fight, and only wait command."

Here is given the image of two great essentials to the discipline of a large body, close order and silence. The following passage (B. 13,) for which as the most agreeable mode of quotation, I still employ Pope's paraphrastic, but most poetic, rendering, is however in a military point of view still more graphic :—

" So close their order, so disposed their fight
 As Pallas' self might view with fixed delight ;
 Or had the God of War inclin'd his eyes,
 The God of War had own'd a just surprize ;
 A chosen phalanx, firm resolv'd as Fate,
 Descending Hector and his battle wait :
 An iron scene gleams dreadful o'er the fields,
 Armour in armour lock'd and shields in shields,
 Spears lean on spears, on targets, targets throng,
 Helms struck to helms, and man drove man along :
 The floating plumes unnumber'd wave above,
 As when an earthquake stirs the nodding grove ;

And levell'd at the skies with pointing rays,
 Their brandish'd lances at each motion blaze.
 Thus breathing death, in terrible array
 The close compacted legions urge their way."

This is a noble description of a mass of armed men drawn up exactly as we find the Egyptians were: in this order they stand; in this they advance; in this, however, they cannot fight, that is actually use their weapons, save the front ranks who of course could lower their spears, and fringing the advance with a hedge of steel, bear down upon the enemy pressed by the weight and impetus of the mass behind. This was the main body of the army with the best men, and the best armed in front, the rabble, useful only for their physical impetus, ranged deep behind. The better class of combatants, the chiefs and their immediate friends, occupied the chariots, at least those did whom youth, and skill, and courage, rendered fit for such service, and skirmished with the enemy; while on the flanks of the mass, or scattered over the field were the bowmen and the slingers. It is the exact repetition of the Egyptian system with perhaps a less refined formation as to battalia of separate arms: it is the origin of the famous Macedonian phalanx, with which half the world was vanquished; it is the rude prototype of that "attack in column covered by clouds of skirmishers," by which another Alexander bid fair to have subdued the world of modern times.

As to the identity of the Greek with the Egyptian war-car, let us take the unconscious evidence of the author of an *Essay on Homer's Battles* published some forty years ago. The reader will bear in mind that nearly all which we know with exactitude as to the shape and nature of the ancient Egyptian war chariot, its size and construction, has been ascertained since the following conjectural remarks were written.* "The chariots were in all probability very low. For we frequently find in the *Iliad*, that a person who stands erect on a chariot is killed, (and sometimes by a stroke on the head,) by a foot soldier with a sword. This may further appear from the ease and readiness with which they alight, and mount on every occasion; to facilitate which, the chariots were made open behind. That the wheels were but small, may be guessed, from a custom they had, of taking them off, and setting them on, as they were laid by, or made use of. Hebe, in the fifth book, puts on the wheels of Juno's chariot when she calls for it in haste; and it seems to be with allusion to the same practice, that it is said in *Exodus*, chap. 14. "The Lord took off their chariot-wheels, so that they drove them heavily." The sides were also low, for whoever is killed in his chariot, throughout the poem, constantly falls to the ground, as having nothing to support him. That the whole machine

* Wakefield's, *Pope's Homer*, London, 1806.

was very small and light, is evident from a passage in the tenth Iliad, where Diomed debates whether he shall draw the chariot of Rhesus out of the way, or carry it on his shoulders to a place of safety. All the particulars agree with the representations of the chariots on the most ancient Greek coins; where the tops of them reach not so high as the backs of the horses, the wheels are yet lower, and the heroes who stand in them are seen from the knee upwards." The writer has here, as unconsciously as accurately, given an exact description, out of the Iliad, of the Egyptian war chariot. He again in the matter of cavalry assists us in identifying the Grecian with the Egyptian system of war, bearing testimony to the fact already stated of Homer's silence as to mounted warriors. In the quotation I have given literally respecting Mnestheus, it is the marshalling of *horse*, not *horsemen*, for which he is famous, that is, of the animal harnessed, not mounted; and by a similar ellipse the horse is constantly used in the Iliad, as indicative of the harnessed chariot: it is exactly analogous to our own European *Cavalleria*, *Cabaleria*, *Chevalrie*, or *Cavalrie*, or, in literal honest English, *horsery*, used to express the mounted animal, and his rider. The Greeks in Homer's day, however, were not unacquainted with the attack of mounted men, if by "the shaggy Centaurs," that rude Thessalian tribe, whom Nestor (Il. B. I,) remem-

bered the ejection of, and who had been driven from Pelion (Il. B.2.) on the birth day of Polypætēs, we are to understand that some invading Nomad tribe, the earliest of the migrating Huns perhaps, had actually threatened from the north to overwhelm the states of infant Greece.

Mitford (Hist. of Greece, l. 38.) is against this opinion, and we may safely refer the general introduction of cavalry in the Grecian armies to a period in which, to repeat the phrase, they come into collision with an equestrian people, that is, to a date subsequent to their invasion by the Persians.

The formation of the Egyptian phalanx, for so we may call it, was rapidly introduced among all the Grecian nations; but it is on the Macedonian system that it is most mentioned and remembered. Philip, the father of Alexander, is said to have been the author of this description of phalanx, which was armed with the *sarissa*, a spear from eighteen to twenty feet in length, so that when formed in close order, the levelled spear heads of the four first ranks were in advance of the file leader. Ælian, who writes on the phalanx generally, gives it a depth of sixteen men with six feet to each man in open order; in close order, three feet, or at pleasure eighteen inches.*

* It is remarkable that the recorded experiments of a modern tactician much given to prize the phalangic or columnar formation for troops, should lead to the conclusion, that the

It consisted of two divisions, or wings called technically the horns of the phalanx, one of which seems to have acted occasionally as a reserve to

Greeks may or must have had practical reasons for their adoption of a file of sixteen. The French Marshal Turpin de Crissè, author of a Treatise on the Art of War, and of some excellent and elaborate Commentaries on the text of Montecuculi's Memoirs written about 1760, relates (Comment. vol. i. p. 132,) that after repeated experiment he found any deep column put in movement break at the sixteenth file. He found for instance, that a column of 432 men, with a front of 18, and 24 deep, maintained a sort of cohesion (*une espèce d'accord*) to the sixteenth file; but that thence to the twenty-fourth, disconnection was evident (*la disunion étoit sensible*.) This was the result of repeated trials. He also discovered that when directed against an opposing force, the impulsion of the column was uniform up to the sixteenth file, but no further. He formed a body of troops four deep in front of his column, and moved the one upon the other at a distance of sixty paces between the two. The material force of the column broke the line before it, but in the advance even for so short a space, the disconnection at the sixteenth file had occurred, and although when the head of the column was arrested by an opposing body, the files in its rear closed up (*joignit aussi*), yet the impulsion of the mass had taken effect without the assistance of their weight, and the line in front had been broken.

Hence this writer concludes that the column of sixteen deep, though useless as to fire (*qui ne vaut rien lorsqu'on veut faire feu*) is in an attack supported on its flanks by troops deployed, the best of formations. It is curious that he does not cite ancient authors in support of this principle established apparently solely on personal experience. I regret that I have been unable to meet with his Treatise on the Art of War, in which it might have been more developed. The book was translated some years ago into English, as well as the continental languages, but I have never met with it.

the other ; these were divided and subdivided with much care and accuracy, and it supposes a full complement when perfect of 16,384 spears (*Ælian*, chap. viii.) Its evolutions, which were confined to changes of front by countermarch, doubling the front on its own ground by advancing from the rear when at open order, extending the front from the centre, forming a sort of oblong square, and one or two more formations, must have been performed with great deliberation, and must have required for their execution an open unencumbered plain. "It was dangerous," says *Arrian*, "to attempt them in presence of an enemy," doubtless from the time they occupied. In action, the light armed troops with the slingers and bowmen were placed as the case required in advance, or on the flanks of this unwieldy mass, while the cavalry formed on the wings. The system of evolutions was not always the same : there were three modes for instance, the Cretan, the Spartan, and the Macedonian, of reversing the front, and it seems that the phalanx sometimes formed in close order, and wheeled, as with us, on a pivot.*

It need hardly be noted that this disposition of troops was excessively faulty, except where the enemy were either undisciplined, or adopted a similar system of tactics. One would suppose that

* Analogous to the modern wheel of a close column introduced by Sir Henry Torrens,

in action on broken ground, or in a pass, the Commander of a force formed on the phalangic tactics, would have to depend almost wholly on his light troops. That this however with an intelligent leader was not always the case, we know in the remarkable instance cited by Xenophon in his Account of the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, where the Greeks had to attack the Colchians, who were very advantageously posted.* Describing a council of war held on the occasion, and speaking of himself in the third person, as, with the modesty characteristic of a brave man and true soldier, he always does, this graphic writer says,—“Xenophon observed,—it was his opinion they ought to change the disposition ; and dividing the heavy armed men into companies of a hundred men each, to throw every company into a separate column, for,” says he, “the mountain being in some places inaccessible, and in others of easy ascent, the line will presently be broken, and this will at once dishearten the men; besides if we advance with many men in file, the enemy’s line will outreach ours, and they may apply that part of it, which outreaches us, to what service they think proper ; and if with few we ought not to wonder, if they break through our line, wherever their numbers and weapons unite to make an impression ; and if this happen in any

* *Anabasis*, or Expedition of Cyrus, book iv. near its conclusion, I follow Spelman’s Translation.

part, the whole line must suffer. To avoid, therefore, these inconveniences, I think the several companies being drawn up in separate columns, ought to march at so great a distance from one another that the last on each side may reach beyond the enemy's wings; by this means, not only our last companies will outreach their line, but as we make our attack in columns, the bravest of our men will charge the first; and let every company ascend the mountain in that part where it is of easy access; neither will it be an easy matter for the enemy to fall into the intervals, when the companies are placed on each side, or to break through them when they advance in columns; and if any of the companies suffer, the next will relieve them, and if any of them can by any means gain the summit, the enemy will no longer stand their ground."

Here we have an instance of true military genius, rising superior to the routine of recorded tactics. It is a very useful example of that intuitive spirit of expedience whereby a good soldier will always remedy the defects of a faulty formation, even before the enemy, and adapt the order of his attack to circumstance and the nature of the ground. We should call it an advance by open column of battalions* at quarter distance. It

* The word *companies* used by Mr Spelman, is calculated to mislead: it is put as the translation of the word *λόχος* which was the lowest subdivision according to Ælian of the

is a modern manœuvre performed by a body of Ancient Greeks in defiance of the rules of their strategy. Xenophon's apprehension, lest the extension of the enemy's front should overlap the flanks of the Greeks were their advance made in phalanx (column), will not escape the notice of the student. Modern generals of higher name and pre-

phalanx, or a file of sixteen spears. Now as it is as impossible to imagine that a body of ten thousand men could advance in open column of companies in our acceptation, as that it could do so in open files of sixteen, we must conclude that the λόχος of Xenophon in this place meant neither 16 nor 100, but represented simply *a detached body acting out of the phalanx*. I have taken it as our battalion to which one of the divisions of the phalanx was very analogous. *It would be an excellent thing were the translations of classical Military Authors re-edited by Military men with notes explanatory of all the formations, and corrective of the school-master blunders of the translators.* The writer during a collegiate life of more than four years, was not fortunate enough to meet with more than one lecturer, who illustrated ancient by modern tactics; but that this is necessary before the science of war can be historically developed, I need not here insist upon.

As regards the confused usage of military terms among the Greeks arising from their differences of dialect and separate nationalities, there is a remarkable instance in Thucydides, (Hist. Peloponnesian War) who uses λόχος as a military term for the word μορὰ which we know by Ælian to have been properly a phalangic subdivision of about 400 men, or a battalion. This employment of the word would justify us at once in emending Spelman's translation by using the word battalion, where he says *company*. The student may consult a note on this point to the 2d vol. of Thirlwall's History of Greece.

tensions than this adventurer with the Ten Thousand, have failed to make the reflection, because they went on the erroneous notion of the *certainty* that an extended line struck by a heavy body at a particular point must give way. They did not take into consideration the material the line was made of; whereas Xenophon with all the confidence he had in the tried and trained value of his fellow-soldiers, was wise enough to remember that their adversaries might be as good men as they were. There are other passages in his account of the astonishing retreat of the gallant band with which he served, which tend to prove that he was a reformer in the tactics of his day, (about 400 B. C.) and was fully alive to the real weakness of the phalanx, except when it could command the choice of its own ground. Directly it was opposed to an enemy who could maintain himself in extended order, such as the legionary formation of the Romans provided for, the boasted superiority of this ancient system was at an end. Polybius, the remains of whose writings, show him to have possessed an eminent degree of military talent, has a Dissertation on the properties of the Phalanx, (Book xvii.) as opposed to the legionary formation. The whole deserves attentive perusal,* but I extract one

* It is very well translated, entire in the Appendix to Spelman's Xenophon. In illustration of the movements of the phalanx, and of the remarks of Polybius, let me refer the

passage as instructively showing as the spirit of a truly practical soldier.

“ I desire no judgment be formed of my assertions from what I say, but from what has already happened ; since the Romans do not engage the phalanx with all their legions drawn up in a line parallel to the former ; but some divisions of them lie behind in reserve ; while others are engaged ; so that, whether the phalanx forces those who are opposed to it, to give way, or is itself forced by them to give way, the property of it is destroyed for in order to pursue those who fly, or to fly from those who pursue, some parts of the line must leave the rest ; which no sooner happens than an opening is given for the reserve to take the ground they left, and instead of attacking those who remain in front, to break in upon their flanks, or their rear, since therefore it is an easy matter to avoid the opportunities and advantages of the phalanx, but impossible for the latter to avoid those which the Romans have over it, how is it possible, there should not in reality, be a great difference between them ?”

student to the 1st book of Arrian's Expedition of Alexander, particularly in the action with the Triballi, also, at the battle of the Issus (see Rooke's translation of Arrian, *Corpus Historicum*) and Livy's Account of the Engagement of the Romans with the army of Antiochus of Syria, (book vii.) which had a perfect phalanx on Ælian's rules, “16,000 auxiliaries armed after the Macedonian fashion, called Phalangites.” The rout was as complete as the formation.

With the successes of the Romans, the phalanx died, and disappeared in ancient tactics ; but before we dismiss the subject, let us take some account of another exceedingly interesting matter to us, now that we have proved the antiquity of discipline in a most elaborate and complicated shape, and that is the antiquity of drill. I cannot myself conceive the idea of massing men together to move them, without a corresponding necessity of impressing into the union a unity of motion ; neither can I frame to myself large bodies of infantry making long marches in bat-talia, and keeping together on the line of march, without having had the pace of the men regulated. We do not of course intend to speculate upon the precise step in use* under a Remeses, or a Sesostris, but a very little reflection brings us to the conclusion that their troops must have had such a measure of motion, or something like such a one. Drill and discipline go hand in hand, and it is impossible to separate them, where troops are to move in concert. It is true the Greeks called their system no more than $\tau\acute{\alpha}\xi\iota\varsigma$, a setting in order, a formation ; but when we hear of intervals, close and open order, counter marching, and facings, we are aware that the soldier can form no idea of keeping the one, nor going

* I have seen, I think, but where I now fail to remember a painting from the Tombs of Egyptian soldiers keeping step in rank.

through the other without having received two notions—1st.—That of a measure of distance. 2nd.—That of balance and steadiness under arms. The Romans we know were exceedingly exact in their drill, and as I shall go on to prove that the origin of their military system, is traceable to the same common head with that of the Greeks, I am inclined, although there is, I believe, no direct authority for it, to establish that they too had some sort of drill. It was a lax one, I doubt not, for they were naturally of a careless temperament, and we know, thought it dangerous to move in face of the enemy. Their discipline, however, was in other respects severe, as is shown by Xenophon's character of Clearchus (Book 1. Exped. Cyrus) in which many a military student will recognize the type of a strict commanding officer ; and in the account of the courts martial at the end of the 5th book, particularly that upon Xenophon himself for striking the men in the ranks.

In the use of machines in war, and in the knowledge of projectiles, the Greeks made very great progress, both the mother country and her colonies ; her first mechanicians contributed the stores of their knowledge to the perfection of the arts of war, and Archimedes himself was proud to serve his country by making mathematics, military. The operations for a Grecian siege are perhaps best described in that of Platea by Thu-

cydides, (Book 11. Hist. Peloponesian war), and also in the ill-fated expedition against Syracuse, although that is more naval than military. The use of the tortoise (testudo) and of scaling ladders and other Egyptian, (and Assyrian ?*) implements for assault were adopted, and improved upon, and moving towers, earth mounds, and fascines to fill the ditch of a fortified place came into use. As all these contrivances of war continued in use, until the invention of gunpowder came fully to complete its revolution of all things warlike, I shall do no more than refer to Potter's well known work, (which with Adams on Roman Antiquities should have a place in every military library) where in the 11. vol. the student finds an excellent illustrated compendium of all he wants to know.

The war chariots of the Greeks seem to have been disused at an early period. The nature of their country was ill adapted for them, and Ælian, although he enumerates, not only this arm, but also gives the technical divisions, and commands of a body of chariots, mentions them only as "in use with the ancients." Their lowest sub-division was two, and their phalanx, for the phalangic system prevailed in all Greek tactics, sixty-four. He also gives the technical divisions and commands of a phalanx of elephants, which consisted

* In the paintings discovered by Signor Botta, (see chap. i.) a siege with the use of the scaling ladder occurs.

of the same number as did the chariots, but their lowest sub-division was one.

It may not be inexpedient for us to consider here, once for all, the use of the elephant in war, constituting as that animal did for many years, the substitute in an ancient army for the heavy full armed, or barded horse of the middle ages, or for the weightier kinds of field artillery of our own. We are many of us in this country able to form some idea by practical experience of the value of the elephant when opposed to an object animate or inanimate, whereby he may be injured, or of which he is afraid. He is the most sagacious and intelligent, but at the same time the most sensitive and impressionable, of all unreasoning animals : he is timid because he knows or thinks he knows, his danger, and can rarely be forced, or encouraged into a hazardous position, except by a man perfectly master of him, and of himself. He is sometimes reckless from fury, or from that insane raving, which may be called the courage of cowardice, as dangerous to friend as foe : but at all times when exposed to excitement, he is uncertain, for which there is more reason than lies in himself alone. The driver of the elephant, like the rider of the horse, rules the animal he is mounted on by the superiority of his volition, but all *he* has to do is to guide, direct, and encourage that animal ; if he has to face danger he cannot protect himself : he

is dependent upon others, or another, for safe guard while he does his duty : he cannot, like the equestrian, fight for himself, his business being solely to drive for another. Now put the case of an advance into action with an embattled elephant, and we shall find that the success of that advance, depends upon a perfect moral sympathy, and confidence between the animal, his driver, and the fighting man, or men, upon his back. If these men be not such in courage, or in skill, as the driver can depend upon for his own preservation, the doubt he has of them will instantly, from the consequent irresolution of the driving, communicate itself to the beast he directs. To use the most familiar Indian instance, if your mahout has to take you up to a tiger, and has no opinion of your nerve, or your aim, it is ten to one you will find your elephant turn ; the same mahout, and the same elephant are notoriously different in their conduct with different sportsmen ; and the behaviour of both depends upon the mutual confidence, each have upon the persons by whom they for the time are ordered. Now what is related of the elephant's training for combat* by the ancients as well as his consciousness of the impenetrability of the armour he carried,† may have rendered him a good deal more formidable than we may, with our opportunities of observa-

* See Polyænus. B. V.

† See for an interesting detail. Maccabees.

tion, conceive possible to have been the case; but at the best the animal must have been dangerous to a degree, to friend as to foe, at close quarters. Like the heavy column, the elephant, if the enemy awed by his approach, retired, was of value for the moral effect he produced; but we find even in the wars with Pyrrhus, the first in which the Romans saw this animal, instances of the easy method in which the mighty beast was frightened into turning on his own party in order to escape the terror of that before him. It has been said that cavalry are less certain than infantry, as their success depends upon two minds, man's and horse's; but what must success have been with the elephant, when in his case it depended upon three minds, or more,—the beast's, the driver's, and that of the man, or men whose business it was to protect both, or with their aid assail the enemy? It might, however, be supposed* that with time and knowledge of the animal, skill in his management would increase; but such does not seem to have been the case. A

* The most graphic, and apparently accurate descriptions of the use of elephants in battle with reference to their value as trained or untrained,—and on the other hand the most detailed account of the process of accustoming soldiers to meet, and combat these animals, occur in cap. xxviii., and lxxii. of Hirtius Commentaries on the African war, while cap. lxxxii. and lxxxiii. report the result of Cæsar's method of inspiring his legionaries with confidence against them. "Scipio (c. 27.) directed a system

writer on Military Stratagems* in the time of Antoninus and Verus, to which Emperors, his book is dedicated, heaps together authorities proving the dangers of trusting at all to these uncertain animals, which "at one time fly at the sight of a horse, at another at the grunt of a

of training elephants in this way: he drew up two bodies, one of slingers occupying the place of the enemy, and casting small stones at the forehead of the animals: then the elephants in line, and his own troops behind them so that when stones began to be slung by the adverse body and the elephants terrified would turn upon their own party, these drove them back again upon the enemy with stones from their own front; this was slowly and barely done; for elephants are hard to manage, scarce to be called well-trained after the teaching of many years, and long continued practice, still are they taken into battle at a general risk." "The magnitude (c. 72,) and number of the elephants kept the minds of the soldiers in dread; for which matter, however, Cæsar found a remedy: for he had elephants brought over from Italy, that our soldiers might learn to know both the kind, and merits of the beast and what part of the body a weapon would easily affect; and what part too of the elephant, was left exposed, when the animal was trapped and caparisoned, so that weapons should be aimed there: besides, that, the horses might not be startled by the appearance, the odour, and the noise of the beast: hence happened there great results: for the soldier learned to handle the animal, and estimate his unwieldy nature: while the horsemen cast blunt darts at them, and used their horses to endure the animals."

In the combats that ensued the fifth Legion gained, like our own regiments that served in Egypt, the honorary badge of an elephant for their gallant conduct in driving back the trained beasts of the foe after a fight at close quarters.

* Polyænus. Lib. 4 and 8.

pig :” while the Byzantine historian, Zosimus, (A. D. 425) in describing one of the Emperor Jovius’s actions with the Persians, states that, after an impetuous on rush, the many elephants of the enemy, “when they felt the smart of their wounds fled *in their usual manner*.”*

It is a matter of some surprise that they should ever have been used on service with disciplined troops, especially in the intervals of the infantry according to the Carthaginian method. They have been of very late years brought on the field by native leaders and princes in this country, but not positively into action; their use in war having in all probability ceased for ever except for dragging heavy guns on the line of march.† It would be difficult to trace the era of the first use of the elephant in war, but it must have been coeval with his being trained for the use of man. Frequent mention is made of him in the Mahabharata, and it is obvious that the origin of his domestication was during the ancient highly civilized state of the land, India, in which that great

* Book iii., near the end. Corpus Historicum.

† A Field Battery drawn by elephants was brought to act with a brigade of Infantry before Sir Henry Hardinge, at a review at Barrackpore in 1844. The animals were so impatient when file firing commenced, that the Governor-General condemned them as dangerous and useless in action.

Note.—One of these animals is said to have excited the wrath of Lord Ellenborough in the fight of Maharajpore, in 1843, by being brought so near him as to “draw the shot.”

poem was written. The African elephant* which is supposed to be less tractable, and more ferocious than the Asiatic animal, and which is not now tamed, must have supplied the Carthaginians,—such is at least the received opinion, I believe, of naturalists, and historians,—with those which Hannibal used in Spain, and Italy. As however travellers, who have partially explored Central Africa to the Southward and Westward of the ancient Carthaginian territory, do not appear to have met with traces of the elephant, we must conclude either that he has been extirpated from those regions, or that the Carthaginians drew their supplies of the animal from the lands of the Galla, or the distant banks of the White Nile. It can be hardly imagined that they had access to the sites in which the elephant is now found in Southern Africa.

On the subject of the Grecian cavalry, we need not dwell, as it may be more convenient to take

* “ The African elephant is distinguished by a round or cylindrical head, with the face more protruded than in the Asiatic species, a convex forehead, and enormous ears which descend as far as the legs.” Cuvier iii., 349.

Note.—Le Chevalier Armandi, a retired Colonel of Artillery in the French service, has written a curious treatise on the Military History of the elephant: it is reviewed and abstracted in the Foreign Quarterly No. III. 1843: the information is very extensive and may be usefully referred to: the author however is unfortunate in having no practical knowledge of the animal he writes of.

up the general question of cavalry and the use of the horse for equestrian purposes in war hereafter. It is certain that the Greeks had no bodies of Cavalry until after the Persian war, when their collision with an equestrian people made them aware of the value of this arm. Xenophon complains on the occasion of the celebrated retreat (Exped. Book III.) that "the Greeks had no horse," and that they underwent serious annoyance in consequence as must always be the case with infantry situated as they were, by not being able to pursue the enemy, or keep off the insults of skirmishers, "for the Barbarians (Persians) wounded them even as they fled, *shooting backward from their horses.*" This is the first mention we have on record, of that which has been since called the Parthian manœuvre. Ælian gives regular rules for forming cavalry, and in particular praises the *ἐμβολος* or wedge as a good formation for a charge, the point being formed by a rank of eight horsemen, and care being taken to put the best men in front. He forms his wedge of cavalry, either massed together, or in imitation of the phalangic open order with every alternate trooper reined back a horse length. They had latterly, in imitation of the Persians, mailed cavalry or men at arms termed *catafracti*, or fully armed, but these never seem to have been of much use. The Greeks, as their sculptures show us, rode well, and gracefully;

they were a people who could do nothing ill, but their turn was decidedly not equestrian. The states were, all but Arcady, maritime by position, and their people inhabiting isles, and a hilly peninsula, were generally more conversant with ships than horses. It is as maritime nations that the Greeks are perhaps seen most to advantage, and we do not embrace the full scope of their ingenuity, enterprise, and gallantry in war unless with their military achievements on shore, we also occupy ourselves in the study of their naval actions. The best of military historians, Thucydides,* himself, like Xenophon, an actor in

* A near female relative of the Historian of the Peninsular war mentioned to the writer years and years ago, that "her brother, Major Napier," was learning Greek that he might read Thucydides in the original. The sequel of such study has since appeared, and certainly if not in style, yet in truth, in earnestness, and in reality, the narration is Thucydidean. A stronger proof cannot be given of the commanding nature of its merit than in the oblivion to which even Tory England has doomed Southey's work to fall, that master of mellifluous phrase. All, however, and may they be many, who desire to study the great work of the father of military history, need not go through the penance of learning a language for the pleasure of perusing a *chef d'œuvre*. Smith's translation I have never looked into, but it is a modern one, and I believe good. Hobbe's is very exact, but in quaint English, which some persons do not like, and over literal: he it is who makes Nicias cross the bay of Syracuse "in a light horseman," (κελητης a sort of swift galley so called). In reading up the general history in aid of these detached studies, Thirl wall, not Mitford, should be chosen.

the scenes he describes, has recorded both, in the history of a war that struck a blow from which she never rose, at Athens, first of all Greece in arts and arms. This book is a model of style as to perspicuity, and a truthfulness pervades it, such as insensibly makes you feel that though its author may, like all men, be capable of an error, he never could deceive by a misstatement. This writer may be said to embody the science of military operations among his countrymen, while Xenophon is illustrative of the arts of war as practised by them in the open field. To Englishmen the study of the military history of the lands which owned such spirits as were these, must ever possess a peculiar interest. In her maritime character, in her scanty territory, in her insular position, in the enterprise of her colonial undertakings, England is morally the modern Greece,—may her sons learn to excel, as they have so often emulated, the skill, and science of those who made the grandeur of her prototype!

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ETRUSCANS, ITALICANS, AND ROMANS.

We commenced our reflections upon military history with the position, that a knowledge of the science of war can only be coeval with considerable progress in other sciences,—whether physical or moral, whether relating to things or to men, to abstract questions, or to social and political constitutions. I think that as far as we have gone, it will have been found that this view is a sound one, and no individual interested in the profession of arms can be other than gratified in the conviction that it is so.

I feel, however, that up to this point there may very naturally have existed an under-current of opinion in the mind of the military student who has accompanied me in my cursory review, counter even to the evidence of the facts he has seen established, and to the general principles he has heard maintained; and this, owing to the early impressions we are all of us allowed to imbibe of the self-created greatness of Rome, of her indigenous skill in arms, and in the science, not of war alone, but, we may say, of victory. So constant does she appear in the onward march of her military successes, so admirable in discipline, and warlike skill even in those early days, when

a Dictator was called from the guiding of his yoke of oxen to the ruling of an embattled host,—that a sort of military inspiration appears invariably to attend her generals, while her legionaries seem to fall into their ranks, soldiers by intuition. Were we compelled to admit such things as facts, we might bid adieu, not only to the result of our previous researches, but also to the evidence of our actual every-day experience. We should, as soldiers, be obliged in that case to look upon the Romans as a race of divine men, superior in all matters military to every human weakness or defect, and starting Minerva-like all armed into the family of earth's nations, ready at once to subdue the world,—and waiting to fulfil this destiny, but until the progress of population gave them numerical strength to back their individual skill and moral courage.

Such, indeed, is the view Livy would have us take of Rome, and something like this is the impression which his Romance of History has produced until quite of late years. There have not, for centuries past, been wanting learned and observing men who disbelieved and disproved those idle garbled tales which constitute the early part of his first Decad, and consequently, the mass of our school boy “Roman Histories;” but the time was not yet come for their small voice of reason to be heard. Opinion bowed servilely to Authority, and while she played the despot, Truth

lay gagged and chained. The day, however, arrived when, to use Sheridan's phrase, the world began at last "to take the trouble of judging for itself." Niebuhr and Arnold, wrote and reasoned, and were read and understood. The tales of early Rome, which Livy termed history, and which his countrymen complacently received as such, were shown to be the prose rendering of old ballads, and bard-like recitations, framed on lying family traditions; — nay, as if practically to prove the truth of their ingenious reasonings, a modern Bard* arose inspired by the reality of the discovery, and re-converting those traditions into song, poured forth such strains of martial verse as might well, had they been sung two-thousand years ago, have stirred the future masters of the world to deeds of arms that none could stand against. Discoveries of a positive and practical character both subsequent, and cotemporaneous, as well as a just application of things already known, but up to a certain time misapplied, and misunderstood, — have confirmed our knowledge of the truth; and on these I shall take my stand to carry out the reality of the principle we began by enumerating; and to prove that the science of arms which percolated, I may say, through other nations to the Romans, had its origin in that land

* I need hardly name the author of the *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

whence came the knowledge of almost all ancient science—Egypt.

The Etruscans, Etrurians, or ancient inhabitants of Tuscany, are dimly but positively alluded to as a great and mighty people by the most ancient of Greek poets, Hesiod and Homer ; and by the earliest, and as is now daily proved, generally correctest Grecian geographer and historian, Herodotus. This last author reports of them that they arrived in Umbria, which included Tuscany, in the mythological ages, from Syria ; but this origin was combated and disproved by later writers. Amid the cloud of opinions and authorities, it has been finally determined that they were settled in Italy about the end of the thirteenth century before our æra, and that as early as 1180 B. C. they were a powerful people, “celebrated for their dominion of the sea, their commerce, and their piracy.” The real name of their king, or leader, on their reaching Italy seems to have been Tarchun, and in their inscriptions they term themselves the Rasena, or people of Resen ; or, to tell their story as a Roman would have written it,—“Tarquinius came to Italy leading the Tyrseni.” Whether or not they belonged to those Hyksos, or shepherds, who seem to have been an Assyrian race, and according to Herodotus,* built the Pyramids of Egypt,—whe-

* II., 25. “The Shepherd Philites and his cotemporaries, Cheops and Chephenes, built the Pyramids.”

ther actually they were of the people of Resen, that great Assyrian city ("Resen between Nineveh, and Calah; the same is a great city" Gen. x. 12.), of which Moses speaks, I shall leave the curious in pure history, and the etymology of nations, to enquire into. All that we want to know is in the words of that able* writer who has collected all the authorities bearing on the history of this people, that—"On examining the feasts, the dresses, the ornaments, the manners, and customs of the Etruscans as they are depicted in their paintings, and on their precious utensils, we at once recognize an Asiatic people. While in the style of their art, in their sacred rites, and in many of the objects of their religious veneration, we discern with equal accuracy, the impress of eminent Egypt." With arts, we know, go arms, and with the other sciences, the science of war. These Etruscans, who taught, it is declared, the Pelasgi of Italy to fight, and subdued the Umbrians, have left behind them in their recently discovered tombs, the very arms and equipments with which the conquest was effected. These seem to have been all, including chariots, all but the shield†—Egyptian; while in their defensive armour, the higher classes more than emulated

* Mrs Hamilton Grey. History of Etruria.

† The shields are circular, of bronze. The Egyptian shield was never of this shape: it is worth remark that the shields of the combatants in the paintings found near Nineveh by Signor Botta, are also circular.

the splendour and luxury of the great in that chief land of early civilization. Their breast-plate, for instance, was of the purest gold, beautifully wrought, while the chains by which it was hung round the neck, and across the shoulders are equal in workmanship to the most delicate we are in this day acquainted with.* Their paintings, some of which are copied in the book I am about to quote, found in tombs on the site of the ancient city Tarquinia, as elsewhere, throughout the old Etruscan realm, of which that city was the capital, are thus alluded to in another work† of the accomplished authoress, who has, as it were, introduced the real knowledge of this great people to the English public.

“Constant points of resemblance, or of difference struck me in every tomb between the Etruscans and the Egyptians, or the ancient Greeks, and constant evidences of those customs which the Etruscans afterwards taught to Rome; the Circus, for instance, with its games, and the Velarium or covering which they folded over unroofed buildings to protect them from the sun and rain, and which has generally been considered as a most ingenious invention of the Romans. It is much more remarkable that in the tombs of Beni Hassan, belonging to the reign of Osortasen, B. C. 2082, or according to the lowest

* They are likened to those of Trichinopoly.

† Tour to the Sepulchres of Etruria, in 1839.

computation B. C. 1740, many of the very same subjects are found represented, such as funeral games, wrestling, foot-racing and (what we afterwards saw at Chiusi) leap-frog. Also in the tomb of the General Neophtha, processions of prisoners, in size, form, dress and armour exactly like the Etruscans, according to the testimony of Rossellini. As far as I could learn, the coloring is much the same, but the Etruscan ochre paintings are done with more ease and spirit, than the Egyptian, and the frescos are in a much higher style of art."

The tidings of the discovery of these wonderful remains when first communicated, startles and surprises. It is like the mode by which one of the most remarkable of them was actually brought about in 1826—save that the image of reality rests with us,—when while having a road (the Via Romana) repaired under his superintendence, Signore Avolta, a distinguished antiquarian, saw one of the workmen break through a stone with his pickaxe, which proved to be part of the roof of a cavern. "I looked down," to use Signore Avolta's words, "and what was my amazement to see through this hole a warrior lying in state upon a bed of stone; he was clothed in full armour, and looked like a living man; but whilst I gazed his figure trembled, and he vanished away. I stood for some minutes, hoping the illusion would return, but when I saw it was gone for

ever, &c., &c.” (Appendix to Tour to Sep. of Etruria by Mrs Hamilton Grey.) The frame of the old Etruscan King had of course crumbled under the external air, and like the nation he once ruled over, wasted shapelessly into nothingness. When though it is remembered that this tomb had escaped the spoliation (and that for near thirty centuries) which had apparently rifled contemporaneous structures adjoining it, and that with the other admirable reliques of a great people, it had remained silent and forgotten, while another nation rose upon their greatness, occupied their territory, thence subdued half the countries of the known world, played out its part, and in its turn, was crushed, vanquished, and absorbed,—we ought indeed to marvel at the strange coincidence which enables us to read the real history of that intermediate race by the mute eloquence of the graves of those, whom in fancy it had eclipsed, and obliterated. I refer the student to the authorities I have already mentioned for the amplest proof of the Etruscan element in the early constitution of Rome*. Two

* See also Donaldson's Varronianus, chap. i., but he makes the Tuscans, Pelasgians: Niebuhr holds this opinion also, and an English critic in the *Quarterly Review* is somewhat pleasant upon those who maintain a contrary view: with all possible respect for such high authority, I cannot help opposing the evidence of visible relics, to the tenets of ingenious arguers:—Niebuhr was no more, before the most remarkable of these

of her very Kings were but noblemen of the Etruscans, unless, indeed, the truth were that she was a mere vassal city to Tarquinia; while the most gigantic works that are found in or about her to this day, the Fossæ Cluiliæ, and the Cloaca Maxima, are purely Etruscan. Without dwelling longer on this interesting question, for information respecting which the student will have daily more and more ample opportunities as the knowledge of it advances, I proceed with the immediate subject of our enquiry, the military influence of the Etruscans upon the destined masters of the then known world.

Niebuhr, in his real history of Rome,* has two chapters peculiarly interesting to the military student, "On the earliest constitution of the Manipular Legion (vol. III. p. 97) and "On the Roman and Macedonian tactics" —(vol. III. p. 466). In one of these, he quotes the often quoted passage in Livy (Book VIII. 8) that the ancient military order was that of the phalanx, and in both he cites Cicero's authority that "they took their arms from the Samnites." This nation, which was of Sabine origin, was certainly the most military, excepting the Romans them-

singular discoveries became generally known, and it is to be doubted whether the candid character of his enquiring mind would have assigned a Pelasgian, or European origin to relics left by a mighty nation stamped with the type of Ægypt.

* I use the Cambridge translation.

selves, of the tribes then inhabiting Italy, and inflicted upon the Roman arms a disgrace so marked (the defeat at the ravine called the Caudine Forks) that even Livy's art, and effrontery have failed to gloze over, and feared to deny, the known and glaring fact. But the rise and progress of the Samnites was, as a nation cotemporaneous with that of the Romans. "In Samnium," says Niebuhr (vol. i. 85), "not a single relic is found of a time anterior to their's." They were a free and warlike hill people, living originally without towns and fortified places on the steeps of the Apennines. Is it more probable that the Romans should have taken the idea of their armament from these mountaineers, than that both Romans and Samnites should have borrowed their military system from that great people, which had been even then for six hundred years eminent in Italy for arts and arms? But the matter needs no argument. The prototype of the Roman arms, is found in the tombs of the Etruscans, and is depicted on the fading walls of their extraordinary sepulchres. In every point, except the shield, it is formed on the Egyptian model, and its most remarkable weapon, that short cut-and-thrust sword, afterwards so formidable in the hands of the Roman legionary, is exactly what you would have supposed improvement might have effected on the blade in use of old on the banks of the Nile. "Whether," says

Niebuhr, "this (the borrowing of their arms from the Samnites) be the case, cannot be ascertained in any way, but so much is certain that the Italians (Italian nations) were at the time, (about 460 since Rome was built) armed and drawn up like the Romans." This admission is all we require; for the source whence came the Roman arms having been discovered since Niebuhr wrote, and the original formation on which the Italian tactics were formed being known, the chain of evidence is complete, and our point of an Egyptian origin stands proved. The Romans affected to look upon the Etruscans (Niebuhr vol. 1) as mere artists, and soothsayers. It was a convenient system, and one that has constantly been employed, before and since their day, to blind the world to the commission of a plagiary. All their arts they owed to the Etruscans; their arms, after the thirty years' war until time brought about the gradual subjugation of Italy to their yoke, they rarely ventured to turn against Etruria. The Romans hated the Etruscans, and feared them,* inert though they were in their tranquil superiority, an ancient nation passing quietly away; and as is constant in such cases, they pilfered from, and they abused† them.

* See Niebuhr, vol. iii., 431, to the end of the chapter, for the honorable peace and high position of the Etruscans after the 30 years' war:

† See Tiraboschi on the Etruscans; *Literature of Italy*, vol. i.

The military genius which suggested the division of the phalanx of sixteen deep, into three separate extended formations of heavy armed soldiers, the young and agile in the first, the steady tried men in the second, and the veterans in the third with clouds of skirmishers, javelin-men, bowyers, and slingers, on the front and flanks, and a small but picked force of such cavalry as they possessed on the rear or in the intervals,—contrived the best formation that perhaps could be adopted for an army equipped as were the Romans, and whose strength lay in their infantry. “When they were beaten,” observes Polybius in his dissertation on the phalanx, “by Hannibal, it was not owing to their arms, or their disposition, but to the superior genius and conduct of Hannibal.” When they had a general at their head fit to cope with this superior mind, they were victorious; “but Hannibal,” he continues, “and Pyrrhus of Epirus alike adopted the Roman arms and discipline,” although both had achieved successes against these with their own. The Roman legionary formation was an instance of an acknowledged perfection in the arts of war,* which only re-

* The peculiarities of this formation as opposed to other systems are critically considered in Guischart’s *Memoires Militaires*, with reference to the opinions held by Folard, Feuquieres, Saxe, and other writers. “In spite of change of armament and the discovery of gunpowder, the art military of

quired a corresponding amount of the higher or scientific element in the application of it, to render success certain. But, to profit by the lesson given in the above reflections as to the commanding superiority at all times of military skill and science,—let us not fail to mark that this confessedly perfect organization did no more than furnish the means; it could not, and never can in any age attain the end. Hannibal, like a good soldier, amended his own organization, although it had done him good service, by adopting the better one of his beaten enemy,—because he felt the value of the military implement, so to say, there offered to him; but surely not because he distrusted his own genius. Pyrrhus of Epirus again who in the well formed force with which he invaded Italy, had taken the old Greek tactics as the basis of his formations, did no more than anticipate the art of the great Carthaginian, so soon as the troops of the malcontent Italian nations flocked to him: only he, unwilling to disturb the military habits of his veteran Epirots, intercalated the legion-

the Ancients must ever be the school for good officers.”—So thought, not only Guischartt (see his Preliminary Discourse), but Maurice of Nassau, Rohan, Montecuculi, Puysegur, and Folard. An anonymous writer (*Quarterly Review*) has lately declared that no campaign older than those of Marlborough need be studied. On this assumption we must also suppose that war had never, since the world began, been made before Marlborough's time.

ary force of his allies, and his mercenaries, with the phalangic array of his own army, thus making a disposition of alternate bodies in close column and extended order. The innovation was attended by no happy results; it could have been only in the case already cited of talent to back discipline.

It is not however to be assumed as a general rule that the Roman soldier under Roman discipline was incapable of supplying the defects of faulty measures on the part of his commander in the actual occurrences of a single action. There have been no brave and disciplined troops that at some time have not done this, and won a battle in the teeth of all probability, and in despite of their general's imbecile, or infatuated dispositions. This may in petty warfare occasionally decide a contest; but in war as we understand it, the battle won may be victory lost. The soldier gains the day, but crippled by his own exertions in a fight ill-timed and ineffective as being fruitless of consequences, he is unable to act when again called upon, and for the brief honor of a field of butchery, the general loses the campaign. Constant instructive examples of this occur in the military history of the Romans, whose talentless leaders in the early wars of the republic seem to have been prone to depend on the soldier rather than themselves. It has been the crying sin too often of like generals in modern days. Many

have pranked themselves in honors bought with the blood of brave men, who should have been visited with punishment instead of reward, for unmilitary conduct in the guidance of the devoted troops that won the fight, which they had blundered into. Courage, discipline, and the vigour of national character are material elements in the history of military successes, as has been observed before, but the general who depends upon these alone is not fit to command an army. Who knows, (to revert to our instance) but that both Pyrrhus and Hannibal owed in part their disasters subsequent to their change of armament and discipline, to that mingled feeling of over-confidence, and of dependance on something out of themselves, which has incapacitated so many a leader from performing his duty as a general should do, towards the troops entrusted to him?

The composition and discipline of the legion is too well known to require that we should pause over it. It is worth however remarking that in the Roman army that system of drill* of which we seem to detect a vestige at a very early period, attained a great pitch of perfection; it was accompanied by athletic exercises, which while they

* The detail of these and all other Roman military usages is compendiously given (with due reference to authorities) by Adam (Roman Antiquities); while the student will find in the first chapter of Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Empire, an admirable general view of the Roman Military system.

amused the soldier, must have greatly strengthened and developed his muscular powers. No nation appears ever to have understood more perfectly the art of making Soldiers than did the Romans. They seem to have had no separate corps of Engineers. The study of every department of military literature therefore was with their officers as constant as profitable, while their practice of castremetation kept officer and man ever employed, and in field works made them unrivalled.* They were essentially practical soldiers; they looked to equipment, not to dress,—to field, not to parade manœuvres; and in these last made use so much more than show, their object, as to bring the men to exercise under more weight than they would have to carry on service.† The very word *exercitus*, their *army*, expresses as Gibbon observes, the idea of a body of men whose whole military merit and martial being arose from their constant and habitual training; while moral discipline was so acknowledged a portion of their military system that even in the time of the elder Cato, who wrote a work upon it (now lost,) the

* Guischart—Mem. Mil. vol. i. c. i.

† This excellent practice was continued perhaps traditionally, as part of the training of soldiers during the Middle Ages, and is no doubt the best expedient which could be adopted to induce them literally to make light of their ordinary weapons. Sir J. Meyrick (*Ancient Armour*, vol. i., 168) quotes two treatises, the one supposed to be written about the time of our

subject engaged serious attention, and afforded almost the earliest topic on which their military writers touched. On the other hand, they never failed to set before themselves in later times the practical consideration of how fields were won by their ancestors. "The knowledge of things," says

Edward the 1st, in French, the other apparently translated from it in English rhyme about the beginning of the fifteenth century. "It is entitled, says Sir J. Meyrick," *Knyghthode and Battayle* and the author describes the attack of the pel in the following curious manner:—

"Of fight the disciplyne and exercise
Was this. To have a pale, or pile upright
Of mannys hight, thus writeth old and wise,
Therewith a bacheler, or a yonge Knyght
Shal first be taught to stonde and lerne to fight,
And fanne of doubil wight tak him his shelde, (a)
Of doubil wight a mace of tre to welde."—

Both treatises recommend the use of arms of double weight upon these occasions in order to acquire strength, and give the warrior greater facility in wielding the weapons of ordinary size; to which the poet adds at page 9:—

"And sixty pounds of wight 'tis good to bear."

This is about the weight carried by our troops in heavy marching order. The question suggests itself whether a fighting man who is to carry in action the equivalent of that "doubil wight" formerly adopted for exercise merely, has not most need of training to enable him to bear it with any thing like ease.

(a) This fanne, or fan of wood, was double the weight of the real shield: it was in shape oblong with a handle projecting at each end. The "mace of tre," or wooden mace was proportionably heavy.

Polyænus,* "is the best instructress to those who follow arms,—the knowledge of deeds which must be done in emulation of those who vanquished in old time." The record of these deeds written in the pages of authors both prose writers and poets, whose names are household words with us, may best bespeak what sort of soldiers were, in the prime of their national existence, the stern warriors who performed them.†

* Book v. Preface addressed to the Emperors Antonine and Verus—see also Frontinus (Scott's translation): he wrote A. D. 85.

† It would be wrong in even so cursory a sketch as this to omit noticing the appearance of the first author, C. Julius Cæsar, (or the writer who composed the commentaries under his direction) who holding the exalted rank of General-in-Chief, condescended to write of *military economy*. The same particularity in noting the detail of camping, the disposition and carriage of the baggage, and that important matter, the supplies, is not observable in the commentaries by Hirtius on the above great leader's later wars. I cannot therefore but incline to believe that Cæsar himself, and by the record of his own hand, left impressed upon every successor in arms that great lesson which inculcates *caring for the Soldier*. The first thing ever in Cæsar's mind while on a campaign, is the "*res frumentaria*"—the commissariat; the next the advantageous position of his troops during their halt, so as to secure them from disturbance by desultory attacks: in both appears the fore-thought of the true soldier, of the kind and prudent leader, who seeks to make himself not only the soldier's Captain, but his friend! These peculiarities, independent of an admirable style of succinct narrative, render the commentaries on the Gallic and Civil wars the most interesting, and instructive by far to the practical military

They filled the world with the impress of their name, and even in their days of decadence could boast of having trained in their school such generals as Belisarius and as Narses. They in their greatness are still our masters in the art of war, while the very decline of the Roman and Byzantine military power as related in the splendid pages of Gibbon, offers to the military student a succession of lessons of the most instructive character. It displays the various stages of military decadence and corruption with their causes; the decay of national vigour; its final disappearance; the assumption of a right to dispose of the chief authority by an insolent soldiery; the disruption thence ensuing of all political consistency in the state; and last of all, the degradation of owing a precarious national safety to the hireling arms of foreign mercenaries! The picture of these things stands out strongly on the ground of a purely military constitution such as we may call the Roman after the Empire, and every man who considers them as he should do, will perceive what a world of warning rests in these stories of the past for all who hold power, no matter where, by a Military tenure.

student of any Latin work of military history. Cæsar's works have been often translated, though I cannot refer to any good general translation of them.

CHAPTER IV.

OF THE MILITARY HISTORY OF THE HORSE—OF LARGE
EQUESTRIAN ARMIES—OF THE MORAL CHARACTER OF WAR
IN EARLY DAYS.

I have avoided it will be observed in the above brief comments almost all mention of the Roman cavalry, as it will be perhaps most advantageous to those who take a merely general view of the scope of military literature, to mass together, as I have all along proposed to do, the general question of the organization of cavalry with that of the employment of the horse in war. This may be best done at the present stage of our enquiry after the short examination we have instituted of the progress of military science among those celebrated ancient nations with whose history we are best acquainted.

It will not have escaped observation that I have laid peculiar stress upon the distinction between those nations, who used the horse in the car only; those who both rode him and drove him; and those which were purely horsemen. The differences in the mode of applying the services of this noble animal arise from the character of the people who use him, and the country they inhabit. The nomad races who roam throughout vast plains, where the change of seasons requires a

migration of the tribes from one pasture ground to another, are riders of the horse. These are the latter occupants of the great Asiatic plateau, "High Asia," as the Germans* call it, whence in so far as investigation has hitherto enabled us to go,† the nations which have to our knowledge peopled and occupied the ancient world, descended. The second class of riders and charioteers, comprises those who seem to have united something of the erratic, or nomad character with that of the settled dweller in a close country, as the people of Nineveh, the Lydians, and tribes of Asia Minor, the Gallic and Cimbrian races, and the Brahminical civilizers of India. The third class consists of nations like the Egyptians, and the Greeks, and perhaps the Etruscans, who were only charioteers. This division is a very natural one; it is almost the same as that adopted by Colonel Hamilton Smith in his excellent treatise on the horse,‡ and had suggested itself some years ago to the writer before he saw the work in question. And yet it is not satisfactory,—seeing that we omit in it the most remarkable horse-masters and riders in the world, the Arabs.

This primæval people, the Cushites, and the Midianites of the Hebrews, have already been

* Ritter's Geography.

† Prichard's Physical History of Man.

‡ Vol. xii. Naturalist's Library: See also an interesting essay on the horse in the Library of Useful Knowledge.

shown on the grounds of fact and argument to have been, independently of other nations, users of the horse in war from a period anterior to the most ancient of written histories. They were among the earliest colonists of the earth, and seem to have been in possession of the land they now inhabit before the Chaldæans, that most mysterious people (Heeren. Researches, vol. ii. p. 147) had a national existence.* Modern investigation has of late actually put it into our power to establish the early habits of the Arabs in the very land that Job inhabited, that of Aws, or Uz, by evidences "belonging to a period of the world whose remoteness is appalling to the mind and almost eludes the grasp of the imagination." (Forster's Geography of Arabia, vol. ii. p. 377.) These consist of inscriptions found on the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula, one of which in particular records the warlike deeds of the ancient tribe

* After identifying the Arabian tribe of Beni Khaled with the Chaldæi spoken of by Pliny the geographer, in his description of Arabia, Mr Forster (Geography of Arabia, vol. i. p. 54) reckons up the learned authorities who have lost themselves in conjecture on the origin of the Chaldeans, and then turns triumphantly to the literal explanation given in Isaiah (xxiii. 13.) "Behold the land of the Chaldeans: the people was not, till the Assyrian founded it *for them that dwell in the wilderness.*" The Assyrian (Nebuchadnezzar) like every eastern conqueror down to Nadir Shah colonised one land with the in-dwellers of another, and made "*of them that dwell in the wilderness,*" sons of Khaled, the Chaldeans of the Euphrates.

of Ad, a mighty and highly civilized race, which is known to have perished in, there is every reason to suppose, the same dreadful famine mentioned in Genesis which "was over all the earth," but whence Egypt was delivered by the providence of Joseph. The tradition of this destruction of the Adites owing to a judgment upon them by reason of their idolatrous practices, and their neglect of the preaching of the prophet Houd, (whom the learned identify with Heber,) was current among the Arabs from the earliest periods, and has been embodied with other similar ones by Muhomed in the Koran. Their inscriptions at Hasan Ghorab in Hadramaut so unexpectedly discovered by Lieut. Wellsted (see his Travels in Arabia) in 1843, have been decyphered from the ancient Hymarite character, and translated. The most remarkable of them, recording a victory, concludes with these words :—

" With our swords: still wounding and piercing our adversaries :

Until *charging home* we conquered and crushed this refuse of mankind.

While another runs as follows :—

" With hostile hate, the men of crime

We assailed : *onward rushed*

Our horses, and trampled them under foot."

We have here an evidence of the early military habits of the Arabs, in the very earliest of all historical periods, and of their use of the horse at

that time, written literally "in the rock with a pen of iron." To borrow the observations of Mr Forster—

"The most curious fact in the poem, is the circumstance, that the combat was fought on horse-back : that while, so many centuries after, the barbarous heroes of the Trojan war (like the savage Britons) knew no other use of this noble animal than as the drawer of the chariot, . . . these Adites already exemplified the historical fidelity of the Book of Job, when it describes "the horse and his rider" . . . already managed "the proud war-horse, whose neck is clothed with thunder, the glory of whose nostrils is terrible ; who paweth in the valley and rejoiceth in his strength, and goeth on to meet the armed men."

The horse is well ascertained to be an animal of Eastern origin. His proper habitation in a wild state is the central Asiatic plateau, in parts of which he is still found in herds, a free tenant of the wilderness. He can be traced in the migrations of the Celtic and Gothic tribes of the great Indo-Germanic family of nations into Europe from the North East, and into India with the Brahminical conquerors from the North :—his introduction into Assyria, Chaldea, Arabia, and Egypt, there is no authority to trace, nor to account for. Colonel Smith, it is true, with regard to this last named country boldly supposes, that the horse was introduced to the civilized Egyptians by the Hyk-

sos or Shepherds, among whom he reckons the Jews, who neither brought horses into, nor took them out of, Egypt.* He concludes that the Egyptians having got rid of the Jews amicably, availed themselves of their newly acquired knowledge of the horse to retaliate severely upon the Assyrians, who were the other "Hyksos," and that the splendid victories of Remeses the Great (about 1350 B. C.) were achieved principally with the aid of the horse. He states positively, however, that the Egyptians used no cavalry in their campaigns. He then enlarges upon the well-known evidence of the care taken by the ancient Egyptians in breeding the horse, noting that they were the first people who seem to have done so with any reference to perfecting the purity of the race. The "multiplying of horses" being particularly

* The passage in Deuteronomy (xvii. 16) respecting the restrictions to be placed upon the king, should Israel elect, or accept such a ruler, points specially to the unesquestrian character of the Hebrews.—"He (the king) shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt to the end that he should multiply horses." Is this the language of a nation, or of one of a family of nations (the Hyksos) whence according to Colonel Smith the Egyptians derived the horse?

In a later day Solomon transgressed the law by having "horses and many chariots," but these are again specially stated to have been "brought out of Egypt" (1 Kings x. 21.) their price even being noted,—"the price of the chariot 600 shekels and of the horse 150 shekels"—as in the case of costly articles of foreign luxury.

noted as an Egyptian characteristic, in the book of Deuteronomy, he supposes the Arabs to have received the pure and perfect blood of their noble breeds from Egypt; but we may well ask, whence then did the Arabs learn to ride them?

The fact is, that whereas the dominion of the Hyksos came in with the "Pharaoh that knew not Joseph," an Assyrian usurper of Lower Egypt, it could not well have been before, at the utmost, 1,600 B. C.; and as the compendious authority (Wilkinson) upon which Colonel Smith goes, does not countenance so late an introduction of the horse into the valley of the Nile as that, we must look to some far different source for the origin of the Arab-blood, in all ages so famous, and in our own day acknowledged as being the basis whereon the breed of our English thorough-bred, the finest horse on earth, has been established. The proof of this is facile. Our earliest written knowledge of the horse is in the Book of Job. This ancient work has been calculated on the astronomical data afforded by the mention therein of certain of the heavenly bodies, as having been composed 2337 B. C., or by another reckoning, independent of the former, B. C. 2136.* I leave aside the

* Illustrated Commentary on the Holy Bible. The calculations are by Doctors Hales and Brinkley, and the French Astronomers Goquet and Ducontant; for further authority and argument, see the book cited.

other and the many arguments, for the fixation of the æra of the Book of Job at a very early date, and I again take my stand with the above simple facts upon the description of the animal as therein given, to prove, that it was written by one that knew,—ay, and loved a horse, hundreds of years before the bare knowledge that such a beast existed, could according to Colonel Smith have reached the Egyptians,—and yet this people, says he, gave the horse in his purity of blood to their Arabian neighbours!

If such communication existed between the two nations, how comes it that the camel, the national type-animal of Arabia, should never have found his way into the painted records of the Egyptians, that careful and observant people? It is a most singular fact, that the camel never has yet been found pourtrayed upon any of the paintings or sculptures extant in the Nile valley. The native habitat of the horse was in high latitudes, thousands of miles distant from the spot in which he most appears to have been cultured: the indigenous site of the camel was in the sandy wastes of the children of Ishmael immediately adjoining the land of Egypt:* yet are its inhabitants supposed to have transmitted the equine animal to the masters of the camel, and with all

* Gibbon (Misc. Works) quotes Diodorus Siculus, iii. c. 44, to prove that the camel was extant in his day as a wild animal in Arabia.

their curiosity, science, and observation to have asked for, or admitted of, no return in kind? We can only conclude that the horse was brought by the original colonists of the Nile valley, a race so singularly coincident in customs and practices with the Hindoos from Central Asia, at a period beyond our power to calculate upon any date now in our possession; that another tribe or race must about the same time have carried the same animal into Arabia where the nature of the country suggested, as in the case of Egypt, the manner of his use, and the purposes to which he should be applied. The one people amid wide open plains, and scanty pastures, rode, as became a nomad race; the other, in a low, narrow, deep, and plenteous land, pampered their steeds in stables, and yoked them to a car, a vehicle so light that two powerful horses could easily drag themselves and it through the fat loam of the muddy country in which a mounted man would sink to his horse's hocks at every stride.

Granting then to Egypt pre-eminence in the production of good horses indigenously* so to say with Arabia, we account for the excellence of that Numidian horse of which such honorable mention is made in the Roman annals, whether for Carthage or herself; and connecting our acquaintance with the dependence of Greece on

* It has even been maintained owing to this fact that Africa is the native land of the horse.

Egypt for civilization with this fact, we find in the mythical story of the "horse being given by Neptune," nothing more than a proof that horses were first imported into Greece by sea, and doubtless from Egypt. The insular position of Greece shut out from the mainland of Europe by the almost impassible barrier offered in all ages, by the population of the Albanian hills,* prevented the introduction of the horse by the early nomad invaders from the North East, although indeed the fable of the Centaurs is by many admitted as the vestige of an attempt at any rate to do so.

Such was not the case in Italy. The Gauls, a people equestrian in both senses of the word, in chariots and horses, made themselves known by successive emigrations into the Cisalpine territories, and from them doubtless the system of riding the horse in war was adopted by some of the Italian nations.

"Mid all the praise lavished on the art military of the Romans," says Guischart (Mem. Mil. ch. ii. p. 31) "one is ever obliged to pause in order to inculcate the blindness of the consuls who, for the most part, fixed the same detail of cavalry to every Legion, and that too indiscriminately whatever country were the seat of war. They made no difference between the plains of

* See an excellent note on Greek topography, Classical Museum, No. 1.

Lombardie, and the Ligurian hills. In Spain they had quite as numerous a mounted force as in Africa; and in the Alps the same number of squadrons, as in the flat country of the kingdom of Naples." This exceeding inaptitude in the management of cavalry, and in its proportional allotment to a force of foot soldiers, completely confirms our position as to the comparatively recent introduction of the mounted arm among the Italian nations. The Romans did not improve in this respect until after collision with the Greeks, who excelled them in this arm owing to the example these latter took, as we have already noted, from the Persians, a truly equestrian people. The Carthaginian cavalry again under Hannibal was composed exactly as we would have supposed from what we know of the character of their mercenary troops, each nation arming after its own fashion. Guischart has in his commentary on the cavalry action between Scipio and Hannibal on the banks of the Tesin, (Polyb. iii. c. 65.) enlarged upon the constitution of cavalry in that day so much to the purpose, that I ask no pardon for translating the passages with the omission of a notice of the *cataphracti*, or fully-armed horse, to the same effect as we have already taken on the authority of Ælian. Passing over therefore this little more than nominal force, he says, (Mem. Mil. ch. v. p. 97.)

"The real Grecian cavalry, which served as model to all other nations, used un-barded horses. The trooper's defensive arms were a coat of mail so made as not to cumber his movements,—an iron helmet and leggings on his lower limbs, with the buckler slipped on the left arm so as to leave the hand at liberty. The lance was of a different description to our's, the staff of it resembling two elongated cones joined at their basis, at which point was the gripe; so that one of these cones longer than the other, constituted in fact the weapon. When this in the onset snapped, or gave way, the trooper made use of the remaining staff which he still held, armed as it was with an iron at the butt, and which he used swaying it with a loose arm. He was besides equipped with a long broad bladed sword slung at his belt. The ancients used neither saddle, nor stirrups, trapping their horses with leathers and ample housings. The Persians, says Xenophon, used more coverlets to their horses than to their beds. The ancient Germans despised all cavalry that made use of even housings, and saddles came into use only in the Lower Empire. The first exercise set to a recruit was how to mount and dismount, and in their schools were wooden horses whereon youths learned to vault." The above armour described after Polybius, Ælian, and Arrian suited only the cavalry of the line. All the other varieties of armament, offensive or the contrary, belonged to

the irregular horse, of which there were several descriptions according to the genius of the different allied nations, who warred with less system than the Greeks, such were the Armenians, Scythians, Parthians, Thracians, Cætocians, and latter still the Sauromatians, and the Alans. In the Greek armies were bodies of troops composed, either of these nations, or according to their practice,—bowmen on horse-back, or troopers without body armour, having but a round buckler and a javelin.

“The best light cavalry was that which charged home with the sword or battle axe after delivering its missiles. These were called *Tarantines* of whom Polybius makes mention. At the battle of Mantinœa, Hannibal made use successfully of the light cavalry called Numidian of whom Livy says—“nothing to look upon could be more contemptible, man and horse being alike sorry and diminutive, the horsemen ill equipped with nothing but their javelin, the horses bridleless moving gracelessly with the neck stiff, and the head stretched out.” All the merit of this cavalry consisted in the speed of the horses, and the address of their riders in the use of the javelin ; they managed their horse with a little rod, and after having cast those darts of their’s, which almost always told, they retreated so precipitately as to set pursuit at defiance, coming down again

to harass and outflank the enemy until he were thrown into confusion."

* * * *

"During the war, Hannibal made much use of the Gallic cavalry. Though then better equipped than their foot, who fought even at Cannæ naked, and with their sword alone, these troopers had not attained as yet the reputation they were destined to. It seems that Hannibal disciplined them with care so as to enable them to take up ground with his Spanish cavalry trained on the Greek model, then held a pattern for all armies. Since that, however, the Gauls surpassed even the Greeks themselves, so that in Arrian's time all terms of the *manège* were Gallic."

"The Roman cavalry was numerically inferior to that of the Greeks, and Carthaginians. Three hundred troopers seemed to them sufficient to support a legion, consisting ordinarily of some five thousand men, the legions of their allies however being provided with six hundred horses. Both fought in squads of thirty or thirty-two troopers drawn up four deep. Their arms resembled those of the Greeks, although there was a time when they carried lances pointed, but unshod and used no cuirass. * * * The Romans had originally little opinion of light cavalry, nor was it till after the first war with Hannibal that they acknowledged its use, and then formed troops, armed like the *Tarentines*. In the days of Marius,

when old prejudices were exploded, Roman leaders entrusted with the conduct of great wars, took special care to maintain in their armies considerable bodies of foreign cavalry."

Both the Gallic or Celtic and the Cimbrian tribes are traced to an eastern origin, and a recent author (*Histoire des Gaulois* by Amédée Thierry) has with great care and research followed out their various migrations in the character of nomads, with their cattle, their chariots, and their horses. Livy represents them in one of their latest inroads (B. x., c. 26.) about 300 years before our æra as savagely bearing the heads of the slaughtered Romans, "stuck on lances or hung to their horses fore-hand;" while in one of the decisive engagements which broke their invading force, they had, says Thierry, quoting Livy, and Paulus Orosius, at Sentinum, "their infantry supported by a thousand war chariots, besides a numerous and serviceable cavalry." Nothing is more reasonable than to suppose that as the Etruscans seem to have been principally if not entirely charioteers, the nomad use of the horse for purely equestrian purposes became general in Italian warfare only after the first Gallic inroads about 600 years before our æra.

It does not appear that the success of this cavalry, was ever commensurate with the value placed upon it. The *equites* or knights in the

early days of Rome, were able-bodied youths of good family, who performed their military service aristocratically on horseback. The discipline of such troops we cannot suppose to have been very exact, while their equipment as cavalry was certainly not such as to ensure their acting in a body. They rode like the Greeks without stirrups, and ambitioned in the later days to emulate their Numidian mercenaries, who rode without a bridle.* It is idle to speak of such troops as cavalry, and Colonel Smith has not scrupled, I think with justice, to term them "contemptible." They as often fought on foot as on horseback. Their regiment of cavalry attached to a cohort, did not consist of more than three hundred mounted men, which body we cannot suppose to have been without some such

* I cannot however look upon this as other than the mere wish to excel in a feat of horsemanship. On service a marked distinction, evidently with allusion to their comparative efficiency, is made in the muster of cavalry with and without bridles. Juba hastening to reinforce Scipio (Hirtius *Comment. de Bello Africano*, c. xviii.) is noted of having "eight hundred of bridled cavalry; and of unbridled Numidian horse a great number," little account being justly taken of these wild skirmishers save as irregular troops.

As to the feat of riding bridleless, the writer has known it performed for a wager by good horsemen in England even in the streets of a town; perfect command was retained over the animal who was however unprepared by previous training, the bridle being taken off, and the horse cantered in any direction, turned, and stopped at will.

principle of formation as was in use among the Greeks. The Roman cavalry seems to have been principally employed at a critical period of the action in annoying the enemy's flanks, and frequent instances occur, in which their charge is noted as having decided the fate of the day. How far we should in these days deem such a charge effective, it is impossible to calculate.

The true equipment of a cavalier seems however like the use of cavalry in masses, to have been the invention of those eastern equestrian nations who first subdued the horse. It is only very gradually, that we see the saddle, the stirrup, and the sharp bit introduced in Europe ; indeed the period at which the two former were adopted by the Romans, is not known. Their equipment continued for very many years to be merely the *ephippia*, a sort of *chuharjámah*, as an Indian would call it, without stirrups ; and wherever opposed, as in the Parthian war, to a really equestrian nation, the Romans seem severely to have felt their deficiency in this arm.

It is curious to turn from the contemplation of the horse thus used, or thus misunderstood, to lands in which he was all in all in war, and whence he bore the tide of conquest, rolling forward surge upon surge, from age to age, till the moving mass submerged all opposition. The countless tribes whose advance forced forward those who at last swallowed up the Western Em-

pire in the beginning of the fifth century, like the onset of that fierce people which annihilated the relics of the Byzantine throne in the thirteenth, were of one type, more or less nomads, warring to desolation, sweeping all before their rapid march, and carrying with them a vague idea of vast enterprise and reckless lust of destruction. With these nations the horse is power, movement, and victory in one. They have no idea of a soldier unless he be mounted. It is not in their armies the man they count, but the horse ; and it is the horse, not the man, by which the soldier's pay is reckoned.* In the host of the great Tartar hordes, every trooper must have had two horses ; each officer five, or ten, according to his rank,—ere he could be reported effective. The armies were so vast, that Timour seems to lay down rules for the formation of none under 12,000 horse ;† while the foot soldier he mentions

* Institutes of Timour, Langles, p. 51. This book is my authority for all which follows : there is an English translation of Timour by White and Davy, 1783 : as a curious instance of the enduring nature of the *hippie* principle among original nomads, the Sikhs (Jats) divided their conquests in Sirhind (1770 to 1790) by *horse shares*.

† The imposing relations, if taken literally, of these immense armies of cavalry, as well as the exactitude said to be observed in requiring a complete equipment of chargers from the soldiery before enrolment, must, I think, be modified by comparing them, and their composition with those of other equestrian forces of the time. Doubtless the best and really effective troopers were mounted and equipped as described by

without assigning him any place or duty in the battle. Their tactics were a formation on a centre and reserve, with wings, consisting, according to the number of the force, of from seven to thirteen divisions which attacked in succession. The number of divisions varied with the strength of the army. It is curious and characteristic, that Timour makes no mention of, nor provision for, a retreat; he only notes in treating of bringing the foe to action; the following four points as requisites in the choice of a field of battle: 1.—Water. 2.—Ground large enough for the army to take up position. 3.—And which commands the enemy, care above all, being had, that the sun does not shine in the men's faces. 4.—A wide and level battle field.

Timour; but a great proportion of the force, must, as with the modern Mahratta armies, have been composed of a body of inferiorly mounted men, a sort of Pindarees, mere stragglers and plunderers. The chronicler Villani (*Istorie Florentine*) says (vol. ii. c. 72) of the army with which the King of Hungary assailed him of Bohemia (A. D. 1270,) that it was composed of "more than 80,000 cavaliers. But mark, that all ride on any so sorry a nag (in su ogni ronzino) shod or unshod, reckoning him as a horse (contandolo per uno cavallo); but amid these there were seven thousand with good horses, both well armed and well caparisoned." This enormous disproportion in so vast a mounted multitude between the well equipped, and the rabble of the army, of so equestrian a people as the modern Huns, leads us to entertain a very different idea of cotemporaneous cavalry hosts from that which the accounts of their panygerists, and sycophant chroniclers would endeavour to convey. On this point more hereafter.

The great element of success in these enormous equestrian armies, the massing troops upon one central point of attack such as the capital of the country invaded, seems to have been carefully attended to by the later Tartar conquerors in strict adherence with the practice of Timour. A historian of the last Tartar invasion of China (A. D. 1643) says :—"The conduct of the Tartar in so swift an expedition is very remarkable. He went directly with the main body of his army, and fell upon the capital city of the province, without ever dividing his forces, or diverting them upon any other design. His opinion was that no General of an Army though he should leave behind him some places less considerable, which he might have possessed himself of, and some bodies of the enemy's troops which he might have defeated, yet he need not distrust his victory. Thus this prince with his numerous and potent army, presented himself before the capital city, of the province which in a short time he always either carried by storm or else presently obliged it to surrender upon articles. By these means as soon as he had made his entrance into the city, he took possession not only of it, but of the whole province, and then he established all convenient orders both for the war and peace."*

* History of the Conquest of China by Palafox, Bishop of Osma, Viceroy of Spanish America, and the Philippines under Philip IV. translated. London, A. D. 1676.

Such were in our own day the tactics of the great modern innovator in war, whereby the enormous numerical force of the Austrian armies, and the supposed advantage they derived from the possession of a frontier line of fortresses was turned to their discomfiture.

Among equestrian nations of smaller numbers and scantier geographical limits, the contest before the introduction of fire-arms seems to have been carried on by champions who advanced to the front and engaged until the melee became general. The Arabs, like all the European cavalry of an early date, used the dart or javelin; the Eastern horsemen, the bow and the lance, but the latter sparingly in early days. With all, the horse was, and is, held in higher honour and esteem.

"Seek not to purchase my horse," says the Arab, "for Jirwet is not to be bought, nor borrowed. I am a strong castle on her back, and in her bound are glory and greatness. She flies with the wind without wings, and tears up the waste and the desert!"* "On, on, my Kyrat,"

* From the Poem of Antar in *Illust. Comm., Holy Bible*, the striking opposition in equestrian habits between Eastern and Western nations is shown in nothing more than in the use of the mare in battle by the Arabs, and the repugnance of our European chivalry to allow their saddle ever to be placed upon one. This prejudice against the use of mares was carried out even in the muster of the light troops of an army in Europe. A writ of our Edward II. (A. D. 1324) directs the Bishop

sings the Turcoman, "carry me to my stronghold; thy body is as round, as slender, and as smooth as a reed. Show what thou canst do, my horse; let the foe behold, and be struck blind with envy. Art thou not of the race of Kohlou? Art thou not the great grandson of Duldul? Oh! Kyrat, carry me to my brave ones. I will have thee wrapped in velvet trappings. I will shoe thy fore and hind feet with pure gold. Oh! my Kyrat, my chosen one of five hundred horses—on, on, carry me to my stronghold."*

I could multiply instances and quotations, but what needs it? We have before us the instructive spectacle of the masters in the science of war, according to their several fashions, respectively misapplying or over-estimating that noble animal, surely superior, as Colonel Smith says, "to every other quadruped." (P. 187.) "Strong and beautiful, endowed with great docility and no less fire; with size and endurance, joined to sobriety, speed and patience; clean, companionable, emul-

of Durham to raise within his diocese the best men at arms, hobilaris (or light horse), and infantry he can find, adding—"Des hobelars convenablement appareillez, monter a chivaux autre qe jumentz"—"of Hobilaris suitably accoutred, mounted on horses, not mares." In the burlesque poem written in ridicule of chivalry before A. D. 1456, called "the Tournament of Tottenham," (Percy's Reliques of Ancient Poetry, vol. ii.) the humour is intended to be the more bitter by mounting the plebeian knights on their cart mares.

* From the Poem of Kurroglou: see Popular unwritten Poetry of Persia, translated by A. Chodzko.

ous, and even generous; forbearing yet impetuous, with faculties susceptible of very considerable education, and perceptions which catch the spirit of man's intentions; lending his powers with the utmost readiness, and restraining them with as ready a compliance; saddled or in harness labouring willingly; enjoying the sports of the field, and exulting in the tumult of the battle; used by mankind in the most laudable and necessary operations, and often the unconscious instrument of the most sanguinary passions." (P. 193).

What an instrument of power if properly applied! What a source of disaster if misunderstood or misused! In the cursory glance that we will take at the military institutions of the chivalrous ages, we shall have ample proof of the truth so well established in modern days by our own success in India, and by the French in Egypt,—that a force whose strength is cavalry, may over-run, but cannot hold a country—may turn the tide of battle, or assure the fruits of victory, but cannot alone cope with even a small body of good infantry well posted. No army is effective without cavalry, but bad cavalry is as we unfortunately know too well, worse than none at all. It is of all arms the most difficult, to form, to equip, to maintain efficient on service, and to command; but for that very reason, the one to be observed and studied with the most careful scru-

tiny. But it is not thus alone that the horse is to be valued in our armies : we too have our war chariots, gun-mounted, which it tasks the best powers of these noble animals to take into battle, or to set in position before the beleaguered place of strength. We have besides a train of munitions and appliances, all needful in modern war, useless to us without the horse. Can there be in the wide scope of military literature, a branch more interesting than that in which we study how best to produce, how best to rear, and train, —how best to mount and equip, the creature without which the gun might rust in the shed, the sword on the wall, and man be content to hold his own as best he may, renouncing the use and glories of offensive war !*

Resuming the general view of our subject, we should not omit to take a glance at the moral character of war as waged by early nations, and its effects upon the people of the land in which the scene of mortal strife occurred. The spectacle is painful : it is that of a rude struggle, in which mercy was rarely shown ; extermination or en-

* I beg to be understood (writing in India) as in no sort desirous of disparaging that respectable animal, the bullock, useful as he is for heavy gun draft in this country, and highly vaunted by experienced officers as affording a certain means of transport, though slow. There is, however, little doubt but that the breed of gun cattle has much degenerated of late years, and that for all field artillery, we should depend upon the horse alone.

slavement was the assailant's object, while the party attacked fought with the energy of despair; *væ victis!* was the cry with both. Battle in ancient times was the simple wager of life against success, of death or victory; while in some instances, victory seems to have been considered as nothing unless attested by the bloody trophies of actual slaughter. The further we go eastward, the less appears the value men set on life, the less the care with which they regard human suffering; and in the most ancient times, the same rule in this respect, seems to have obtained, as we observed to exist in our own day. Even the highly cultivated and civilized Egyptians, rejoiced in celebrating their triumphs by heaping before the victor-monarch, evidences of the extent of the slaughter which his troops had effected, hewn from the bodies of the slain. Among the Hebrews war was equivalent, when accompanied by success, to extermination, or the exaction of a surrender without condition. With the Greeks, the character of war varied somewhat according to the spirit of the particular people by whom it was waged, and although all were to a certain degree hard and unfeeling, yet there does not appear among them a systematic, and still less a wanton, cruelty towards a vanquished foe. The Tyrians and Phœnicians again, and in succession to them the Carthaginians, were as malignant in revenging the injury of

attack as desperate in opposing to it all the energy of resistance. The Etruscans we know less of, but judging of their customs by the horrible rite of human sacrifice which in early days they practised, we cannot suppose them to have been other than fit predecessors, as respect harshness in the conduct of hostilities, to the Romans, a cold, stern, and cruel race at all periods of their history ; their gladiator fights, most fondly followed in the most polished of their æras, offer sufficient proof of the sanguinary nature of the people, to whom such things were sport and enjoyment. It would however be unjust to cast, as has so constantly been done, a stain of obloquy upon the nations of antiquity, for their cruelty in war on a large scale, as if such were peculiar to them among the race of mankind, and unheard-of in days when the spirit of mercy was not abroad upon earth. The spirit of mercy and kindness was preached, and went forth, doubtless with profit to millions ; but hardly so on the battle field. We may have occasion in our review of the military systems of afterdays, to point out the existence of a stern and ruthless lust for bloodshed, as strongly developed in the thirteenth century as in the third, tempered by no element but that of interest. Men became merciful in early times, only because they found it more profitable to enslave than to slay—a living bondsman being of more value than a dead foe ; whereas afterwards

when the system of ransom was fairly introduced, the combatants sought much less to kill than to disarm and disable, in order that their opponents subdued and captive but scarcely harmed, might be in a position when the fight was done, to purchase their freedom in lieu of rendering up their life. We must not be too hard upon human nature, in judging of these deeds of times past. So long as war, whatever the extent of science exhibited on either side, admitted of no other ultimate settlement than the positive collision of man to man, prefaced occasionally by some slight interchange of rude projectiles from a field artillery,* and the casting of hand missiles at short distances,—men met with their blood up for mortal conflict, and it was a mere question of kill or be killed. So long as the use of cold steel remained the great and only resource for the obtainance of victory, slaughter among the combatants was inevitable to an extreme degree, much in fight, but more in flight,—great during the moment of the struggle for superiority, greater

* The *balista*, or machine—bow is mentioned in the field, in, I think, the African campaign of Cæsar; the invariable use of similar machines at sieges and in naval warfare by the ancients, leads to the ready inference that such valuable implements of aggression were taken advantage of in field warfare whenever circumstance permitted of their movement in a state fit for immediate service. I do not deem it necessary to cite authorities to this self-evident fact, leaving the subject generally for future treatment.

when the weaker side, broken and dispersed, became a prey to the victorious party, maddened by the sight of blood and by the flush of success.

Doubtless we are in these days superior infinitely in the civilization of warfare to our forefathers, and those who were their prototypes in strife, of centuries further back. The moral character of war, with us is no longer either sanguinary nor (as to person) mercenary ; we neither subdue to slay, nor vanquish to plunder, as far as individuals are concerned ; but we should be very wrong in attributing this amendment as many do, to ourselves rather than to circumstance ; we should be unjust in condemning as is commonly done, the barbarity of past ages on comparing it with the military polish of our own. Events unfortunately occur every now and then to prove to us that human nature, in war as in all else, remains ever the same ; its accessories only are different in different ages.

We are fortunate in warring with a description of weapon which throws the balance of success rather to the side of the skilful tactician than to that of the daring combatant, and hence our pitched battles are more decisive when conducted by a great general, and less bloody than the standing fights of former times. We are also happy in finding infused amongst us, men of that real christian philanthropy, which by its influence, can soften much that is harsh and bad in

the inevitable duty of every soldier. Yet let us not deceive ourselves,—this will not alone avail with rude men in a moment of excitement. You cannot then call upon them to reason, for it would be vain; nor attempt at such a moment to touch their sympathies, destroyed for the time in a gush of violent passions. All that can be done is to exert the power of discipline, to compel obedience, to enforce the restoration of order, and make compulsory the maintenance of the principle of mercy. The moral character of war in the days of what are called the classic nations, seems (to recapitulate our views,) to have admitted of the soldier being hounded on to slaughter and to pillage, which his very armament encouraged and, so to say, induced. The mere inculcation of the spirit of mercy produced little effect in after-days, and indiscriminate massacre was chiefly checked, by a feeling of self-interest.*

* On this point, however, it is right to observe, that the making prisoners for ransom's sake, as introduced by the practice of chivalry, was sometimes under particular circumstances the cause, instead of the preventive, of bloodshed, as at Agincourt, and elsewhere: "At the same time the third division of the French seemed to rally, and raise their banners afresh. Henry—believing himself about to be enveloped, gave orders that every man should kill the prisoner or prisoners he had taken. As the ransom of captives of rank was one of the soldier's best gains, many were unwilling to obey this mandate: but Henry sent two hundred archers who knocked the French knights on the head without compunction." (Pict. Hist. of England, b. v., c. i.) Shakespeare (Henry the Fifth) leaves in

But in later times knowledge, and mental cultivation, having had their due influence on the educated classes, who held command in armies, they used discipline to prevent excess in the lower ranks, and restrain the soldier in his ignorance from disgracing the profession he belonged to and the colours he served under. The moral character of war, therefore, bettered in the first instance by self-interest, next by circumstance, and lastly by a spirit of mercy, the effects of which are to be enforced by discipline, is dependent for its improvement upon the mu-

his graphic way a curious intimation of the spirit in which such an order would be received by a disciplinarian of the day, such as he makes his Welsh Captain Fluellen, and Gower the Englishman, who holds a similar rank. The dramatist adopts the chronicler's account which makes the sanguinary order of the king arise from an attack on the English camp. Act iv. scene vii.

Alarum : enter Fluellen, and Gower.

Flu.—Kill the boys, and the luggage ! 'tis expressly against the law of arms : 'tis as arrant a piece of knavery mark you, as can be offered in the 'orld : In your conscience now, is it not ?

Gow.—'Tis certain there's not a boy left alive ; and the cowardly rascals that ran from the battle, have done this slaughter ; besides they have burned and carried away, all that was in the king's tent ; wherefore the king, most worthily, has caused every soldier to cut his prisoner's throat. Oh ! 'tis a gallant king !"

Monstrelet, the French Chronicler, writing of this action speaks of the massacre as induced by "*the disgraceful conduct*" of the French leaders, who made so treacherous an attack, whom he names.—c. 146.

tual progress of both the agent, and the instrument in this the last of its positions. The higher the intellectual cultivation of the Officer, the greater his power and influence over the Soldier who serves under him ;—the more intelligent the soldier, the better does he understand the benefit of the wholesome discipline, which coerces him, and which by the very repression of the passions to which he would otherwise give way, raises him in his own opinion, and sensibly increases the sum of his effectiveness and utility.

The science of war must, however, have been very highly cultivated, before we can approximate to discipline of this description, having its base on moral influences, and the soldier's own self-respect. Before reverting to it let us take a cursory view of events which annihilated that science together with all others, which destroyed soldierhood for a time as a profession, and let loose upon civilized Europe those desolating bands, which were appointed to sweep away all but the memory of the effete and decadent Roman Empire.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE DECADENCE OF MILITARY SCIENCE—OF THE BARBARIAN INVASIONS OF EUROPE—OF THE AGE OF CHARLEMAGNE—OF THE FEUDAL MILITARY PRINCIPLE, AND ARMAMENT—OF THE MILITARY SPIRIT OF CHIVALRY—OF ITS EFFECT ON THE MORAL CHARACTER AND SCIENCE OF WAR.

It is fortunate for the English military student, that the eventful history of this dark period is given in the great work of the best historian England has produced, and it is a singular advantage possessed by this writer, that having applied himself practically to the study of military tactics with a strong bias towards them, he has been enabled to take up the consideration of every movement, in the endless wars recorded in his history, with the eye of a soldier.*

When therefore the decline and fall of the Roman Empire is quoted as an authority to military readers, this may be done in a double sense, as a faithful record of events on the one hand, and on the other, as a treatise upon war. This history is thus a valuable standard work in the military literature of England, giving at its

* See Gibbon's Misc. Works for his own remarks on the advantages which he derived (Fragment of Auto-Biography) from this source in writing his history: quoting from memory I cannot cite the volume.

commencement a sketch of the military constitution of the most distinguished warrior nation of the universe, tracing subsequently the disruption of the system,* and, finally, the total extinction with it of the science of war as practised in the ancient world.

The capital of the Eastern Empire, which served as a last refuge for whatever remained of literature and science in Europe, contained to a very late date professors of the science of arms, who propounded a system apparently mixed; their pedantic adherence to antique practices, and their Grecian bias leading them to revive in part the phalangic formation, which they incorporated with the legionary system, the value of which had been too firmly established to admit of any thing like a formal supercession. It must not be forgotten that the Byzantine Greeks were in possession of a missile power not dissimilar to that of gunpowder as regards combustion, although it seems to have been incapable of propelling any other substance than itself. This was, I need hardly observe, the Greek fire, a composition, according to Procopius (*Hist. of the Gothic War*), of naphtha, sulphur, and bitumen. Various other accounts are given of its ingredients, which together with its value in war may be best considered hereafter in connection with the general question of military projectiles, and the introduction of gunpowder.

* Chap. xvii. iii.

It suffices for our present purpose to remark, that the use of this important arm must necessarily have induced some alteration in the tactics of the day, and have created a new class of soldiers, artificers, namely, who knew the peculiar mode of working this fire, and propelling it through copper tubes. Almost the latest I believe of the Byzantine tactical authors, the writer of the work known as the *Tactics of Leo. VI.*, otherwise called the *Philosopher*, at the end of the ninth century, has a chapter (c. 19) upon the use and management of this missile (Meyrick, vol. 1, 73), proving its recognized value as a military arm.* It is however remarkable that in enumerating the component force of an army of the period, he does not include mechanists, or artificers, although surgeons are for the first time noted as regularly attached to the troops: ("those who following the host look to the wounded like as do medical men, and restore them to health," c. 3, 15); and though there appears direct mention of what we should term a Quarter Master General's, and a Guide and Intelligence department. Progress had evidently been made in one great branch of mili-

* Following Gibbon, who says of Leo's works (ch. xlviii.) "Several books of profane or ecclesiastical science were composed by the pen, or in the name, of the Imperial *Philosopher*," I cite the treatise as that of a private tactician. The only portion I have seen of it is an extract, the third chapter from which I quote above, appended to an old edition by Francis Robertellus, of Ælian.

tary efficiency, the classification and division of duties; but the time was unfortunately at hand when the decadent Empire was to look in vain for the men to do them. It exhibited in arms, as in politics, and practical government that miserable evidence of weakness, punctiliousness of prescription combined with inability to execute. The nation was effete, and with it died the last practical application of the great principles of ancient tactics.

It can give little pleasure, and small profit to the military student in so far as his peculiar objects are concerned, to follow out the successive irruptions of barbarous hordes which desolated and destroyed the whole of civilized Europe.* The last ray of enlightenment in the West expired with Cassiodorus the minister of Theodoric, whose Gothic empire in Italy was replaced by that of the Lombards; but in that replacement we cannot look for any restoration of constitutional harmony, or general order. The successive waves of hostile incursion encroached upon the Byzantine as well as what remained of the Western Empire, all proceeding from the North; while at the same time a new invasive

* Documents illustrative of the social state of these tribes, and of their relations with the Empire, are scarce and scanty: the reader will find a curious notice by an eye witness of the habits of Attila and his Huns—well translated in Guizot's *History of Civilization in France*, vol. iii. Appendix.

element appeared in the Saracens and Arabs, who from the East and South possessed themselves of Sicily, mastered the sea-board, and much of the interior of Southern Italy, and vanquished Spain, whence striving to penetrate still further, their progress was arrested by the prowess of Charles Martel on the Frankish border. The Franks who had meantime established themselves, and their feeble dynasty of Merovingian Kings in the Roman province of Gaul, had achieved enough of social union and national power to resist, and as it were, turn back the onflowing gush of invasion proceeding from the advance of Thuringian, Frison, German, Bavarian, and Saxon tribes, who sought to possess themselves of the lands before them on the other side the Rhine. Almost simultaneously (about 750 A. D.) appeared from the North, a new and still more terrible race of plunderers, ruthless and cruel for the very love of cruelty, who infested the maritime countries from the Danish Sound to the Straights of Sicily. These were the Vikingr or Sea-Kings, those restless rovers whose boast it was,* "never to sleep under a

* Sharon Turner—History of the Anglo-Saxons, book iv. ch. ii, (from Snorre p. 43.) The practice of casting infants from spear to spear was common with these merciless plunderers; Mr Turner cites several of our English Chroniclers in proof of this, and history has even recorded the name of the pirate who put a stop to it, Olverus, also called from this act of clemency, *Barnakall*, or "him of many children" (*barnæ*, *bairn* of the

smoky roof, nor to indulge in a cheerful cup over a hearth." They were in fact, in a more barbarous condition, the same Northmen or Normans,—who afterwards established themselves in the province that still bears their name, and

Scotch—is in old English, a child.) I have observed that with undisciplined invading tribes, among whom intrepidity is not a national attribute, there is very commonly a class of desperados to lead the attacking parties. The Mahratta *ekkas*, or champions, the immortals of the Burmese, the Akalees of the Sikhs are in the East familiar modern instances of this. The Goorkahs, a nationally brave race, seem to have had no such troops. Those who have seen a Sikh Akalee in his paroxysm will trace a modified resemblance to the sea champion of the ancient pirates. One branch of the Vikingr is said to have cultivated paroxysms of brutal insanity, and they who experienced them were revered. These were the Berserkir whom many authors describe. "These men, when a conflict impended, or a great undertaking was to be commenced, abandoned all rationality upon system; they studied to resemble wolves, or maddened dogs; they bit their shields, they howled like tremendous beasts; they threw off covering; they excited themselves to a strength which has been compared to that of bears; and then rushed to every crime and horror which the most frantic enthusiasm could perpetrate. This fury was an artifice of battle. Like the Indian War-hoop, its object was to intimidate the enemy. It is attested that the unnatural excitation was, as might be expected, always followed by a complete debility. It was originally practised by Odin. They who used it often joined in companies. The *furor Berserkicus*, as mind and morals improved, was at length felt to be horrible. It changed from a distinction to a reproach, and was prohibited by penal laws. The name at last became execrable." (Turner b. iv. c. ii.) See also Thierrys' excellent History of the Norman conquest of England.

thence by conquest of our island infused perhaps into the first colonial nation of the world, that spirit of energy and enterprise which has hardly left a sea, or shore without some token of its prowess.

It is under the Merovingian Kings of France, and among the Frankish or Franco-Gallic-people that we may observe the first faint germ of that military system, destined to arise out of this social chaos, and exercise for so many years the strongest influence over men and manners throughout all Europe. The keenest observers into the history of these dark times, seem to be of opinion that the aristocratic, not the monarchic principle, being that to which men most inclined, the King ("Rex, Regulator, *Roi*: King, *Konning*, which means *can-ning*, Able-man"*) originally elected and afterwards King by inheritance and succession, was disregarded in favor of local chiefs of conduct and bravery, who placing themselves at the head of a voluntary subject community, shadowed forth the first sketch of feudal system. Even in the palace, the king became as nothing, when there stood a more real "Able-man" by his side, and when at last the *Maire du Palais*, Pepin, thrust aside the sleepy rule of "the sluggard sovereigns," he left as his successor, Charlemagne, whose genius in

* Carlyle's *Hero Worship*, p. 316.

war shone conspicuous as in all else, and who first in arts as in arms, appeared "to bridge the way" (*jéter un pont*), as Monsieur Guizot has happily expressed it,* between barbarism and the feudal system.

The student will readily comprehend the real magnitude of Charlemagne's military talent, when he considers the political position of the country as he found it entrusted to his charge. It was invaded and assailed on all sides; in addition to existant foes, rumour still spoke of new tribes which threatened to overwhelm the land, the tide of assault setting against it in every quarter. In this dangerous and desperate position, Charlemagne shewed a perfect comprehension of one of the first of the now-received dicta of the science of war; for, abandoning defence, he boldly assumed the aggressive, and carried hostilities into the enemy's country. Between the years 769 and 813, he is known to have made in person, or by his generals, fifty-three expeditions or regular aggressive campaigns,† besides many others of minor note, the memory of which is not preserved. He was victorious in all; his rule

* History of Civilization in France, vol. ii. sect. 19.

† One against the Aquitains: eighteen against the Saxons: five against the Lombards: seven against the Spanish Arabs: one against the Thuringians: four against the Avars: two against the Bretons: one against the Bavarians: four against the Slaves beyond the Elbe: five against the Saracens in Italy: three against the Danes: two against the Greeks.

extended from the banks of the Elbe to the Ebro, from the North sea to the borders of Calabria. With this great mind died, it is true, the great empire which it had established; but the fruits of Charlemagne's military exploits were permanent and indelible; his mighty kingdom was broken up, but the vigour of his mind, and his prowess in arms exerted continuously for the long course of forty-six years, arrested for ever the progress of barbarian invasion into the Franco-Gallic realms, and gave the nation time to form itself, and model new institutions suited to the newly created conditions of society.

While this truly great, and daring soldier rolled back the tide of devastation, and saved by his protecting influence the people he ruled over, he was as careful to foster the arts, as then imperfectly practised, and to develop whatever there was extant of the principles of knowledge, as to elicit the military powers of the land he governed. He created an empire by military skill and science, destined to die with him *as empire*, but in its effects upon the constitution of European society to live for all time. "Nothing," says the able author of the History of Civilization in France, "nothing looks less like feudalism than the sovereign unity at which Charlemagne aspired, and yet 'tis he who was its real founder:—like as the empire crumbled into separate states which have continued to live on stoutly

and durably, so did the emperor's central sovereignty part itself into a multitude of local powers, which had, so to say, drawn from its force their individual vigour, and acquired beneath its shade the properties of real strength, and lastingness." (Vol. ii. section 21.) It is in its military consequences more than in itself that the career of this great conqueror is more particularly interesting. When we learn that his peculiar tactics were the massing simultaneously on one point of attack, bodies of men moving from different quarters, that great secret of success which the modern Charlemagne, Napoleon, so well comprehended ;—when we study his judicious dispositions on the marches, or frontiers of his enormous empire, confided to the charge of those Counts, whose names became subsequently those of the imaginary heroes of poetic chivalry ; when we study the vigilant care which could establish a naval force to protect his sea-board, against the Vikingr ; or sympathise in the paternal feeling which made him weep for the future fate of his people, when these marauders ventured even in his life time to menace the sea-port in which he sojourned,*—we do not as with other instances of wise kings and good soldiers, conceive the idea of Charlemagne solely in connection with these reflections. Even Gibbon could

* Chronicle of the Monk of St. Gall *apud* Guizot Hist. Civ. Fr. vol. ii. 24, also Hist. Memoirs.

declare in his day that, "The appellation of *great* has been often bestowed, and sometimes deserved, but Charlemagne is the only prince in whose favor the title has been indissolubly blended with the name."*—Subsequent research and a closer analysis of history have proved that in this tacit cession of pre-eminence to his memory, there lived an innate consciousness that his acts and deeds perished not with him, but that "bridging the way" to that military constitution of society by which in due time the sciences and useful arts were to be re-developed on a scale more perfect than of old, this great and good soldier has been one of the chief benefactors of those lands which now form the focus of modern civilization.

To make our cursory review as complete as our means will allow, let us briefly recapitulate what the best and latest authorities have assigned as the origin, and cited as the result, of this new species of military constitution. The word *feod*, whence our term *feudal*, is, according to the most probable derivation, a compound of the old German, *fe*, (English *fee*), and *od*, property; it signified consequently a property given as fee, or salary. It first appears, barbarously latinised as *feodum*,† in certain grants by Charles the

* Chap. 49.

† It was also latinized in the sense of perquisite, "*marescalli feodum sunt listæ*" (the lists are *the fee* of the marshall):

Bald about the end of the ninth century, specifying the assignment of such and such lands to a particular person, or persons for his, or their use and behoof. Monsieur Guizot in his admirable analysis of the History of this tenure (*Hist. C. Fr.* vol. III. *passim*) shows how the wandering Frank, possessed perhaps of some property in the spoils of successful war, and respected for his prowess by his companions, collected round him a small knot of followers and dependants whom he led, and maintained. His tribe having arrived in a country, where all might with advantage seize, and take possession, the wanderer according to his means, and power, secured himself in the course of his military service a share of the land, and either built or appropriated a tenement of size enough for himself, and dependants. He owned still an allegiance to his chief, but he was already himself almost a petty sovereign : he himself assigned lands to his followers for military service, which he himself by the tie of national obedience was yet called upon to render as heretofore to his chief, or sovereign. But it by no means followed that he would do this : on the contrary his position tempted him to assert his independence ; for who was to coerce him in case of refusal ? He was

Statutes for judicial combats by Richard II. Spelman's Glossarium. p. 103 in voc. *Campus*.

surrounded by lordlings like himself, each with his separate band of followers; the indigenous people of the soil tilled the land, and laboured for them: they had each naught to think of but the maintenance of their own rights, the adjustment of their own quarrels, and the aggrandisement of their personal fortunes. The king, while the tribe was poor and erratic, and had need for their conservation as a body, of the direction of one able head, was possessed of real power: when however he found himself directly controlling no more of the land than the mere crown lands, or those seized and held by his own immediate followers, and family, as was the case with his chiefs, —his regal power became in a great measure titular. In the case of imminent danger from external aggression, a Charlemagne might, in the infancy of this new form of society, compel the motley half-amalgamated nation, to rise and render service for the common weal; but without the stimulus of such risk or the influence of such moral superiority, what was the probability as to ready, or general obedience? The constitution was imbued with the elements of strife, and resistance; it was essentially an antagonistic one; it stipulated for service while inviting the assumption of independence, and was in every way perfectly opposed to the developement of any thing like true science in the conduct of those wars which formed, it may be said, for centuries, the

business of life, with the kings and nobles of Europe. The opposition between king and noble called into existence a new power, the free towns who held of none, but ruled themselves under their own Charters. These communities bought the royal protection and countenance by rich contributions, and heavy taxes, while many individuals beginning to acquire property, bought off their service to the crown by a commutation in money. By the acquisition of these revenues, the crown was in a position to dispense with the necessity of depending for troops upon the military service of unwilling nobles—nay, it could even turn the arms of the independent companies, whom these revenues maintained, against the recusant vassal, who hesitated to fulfill his duties to his liege lord, making thus the first step towards a trained body of troops, constantly under arms, and subject to professional discipline.

It is merely in sound, not sense, paradoxical to say that these warriors of the feudal times, though always fighting, knew of the art of war little or nothing, while of its science they were as ignorant as of all others. The chief or leader at the head of his vassals, was no more than the best armed and the best mounted man among an armed crowd of undisciplined troops. He and his immediate followers, friends, and favorites, constituted the hope and strength of the army, when massed together with the other heavy armed

horse. The crossbows and archers, and the *hobilers*, or light horse, were posted in the van or on the wings, while the rest of the force was little more than a motley rabble, that made in after a successful charge of the men at arms to hough horses in the *melée*, and master the horseman encumbered with his heavy panoply.

The use of defensive armour was of course readily adopted among nations with whom a heavy weapon, and a downright blow constituted half of the art military; and the hauberk, or full panoply of ringed mail, with hood, leggings, and sabatons, or shoes of iron rings set edgewise, and sewed on leather or strong cloth, constituted the equipment of the knight as early as the eleventh century.* This was the armament of the Normans at the time of their conquest of England, and this with the wambais, gambeson, or quilted woollen tunic, the plastron or breastplate worn between it and the mail shirt, a conical helmet, and the steel shield,† continued with little variation to be the defensive equipment of the full

* Grose's *Military Antiquities*, and Meyrick's *Ancient Armour*, will not only give much information but direct to further authorities: Strutt's *Pastimes of England* is also excellent for itself and its references; a general study of history is requisite however to give a good idea of ancient warfare. See *Pictorial History of England* in particular.

† The curious in eastern arms will not fail to see the counterparts of the wadded cotton *chupkun*, the *chuhar aenu*, the *sillah*, *khod*, and *sipur fouladee* in these accoutrements.

armed knight until the introduction of chain mail from the east, during the second crusade, and, subsequently, of plate armour during the fourteenth century. Esquires and men-at-arms were not permitted the use of this complete equipment: they were but part, or half armed, while the archers, cross-bowmen, and the feudal rabble of infantry were in the earlier period of the boasted times of chivalrous warfare, still more imperfectly defended. Among these soldiers armour of metal plates sewed on leather or stout stuff was used, but hacketons, gambesons, jacks, and such like quilted coats of proof were most common.

The offensive weapons of the knight were, as is well known, the lance, that "noby l weaponne," a heavy clumsy sword or sometimes two, the cutting, and the *estoc* or stabbing blade, a stout dagger, and the steel axe, or the mace, which must have been the most dangerous and effective arm in a *melée* of these mail covered men, as it would dint in a helmet, or (when plate armour came into use) batter, and break the metal, which the edge of the sword would turn upon. The knight's steed was *barded*, or armed with chafron, criniere, poitraille, flancons, and croupierre, for head, crest, chest, flanks, and croup, of iron or boiled leather. Thus equipped,—but in place of our own let us take Captain Grose's view of the far-famed knight of feudal days.

“Thus envelopped and loaded with such a number of weighty encumbrances, it is by no means wonderful, that in the midst of summer, in the heat, dust, and press of an engagement, men at arms should be suffocated in their armour, an event which we learn from history has sometimes happened; besides the inconveniency arising from the heat, a man thus swathed up like an Egyptian mummy, could have but small powers of action. Indeed in a charge of Cavalry, very little exertion is required on the part of the rider, the success chiefly depending on the strength of the horse. All that the ancient knights had to do, was to keep their seats, and direct their lances; but how they were able to use the sword or mace to any effect, seems incomprehensible, though indeed this in some measure accounts for the small number of knights slain in many engagements between cavalry only, in some of which we read not one knight was killed; probably, as ransom was so great an object with soldiers of those days, they rather wished to capture, than to kill their adversaries; for this purpose therefore they endeavoured to unhorse them, as a knight when overthrown was immoveable; and lay on the spot, till remounted by his friends or seized by his enemies.” (vol. i. p. 104.)

The writer of the above shrewd remarks does not, I think, bear sufficiently in mind the training which the persons destined to bear this mass

of panoply underwent from their earliest days. I remember to have seen some years ago in Sir S. Meyrick's splendid collection, a singular proof of this in the shape of a complete suit of plate armour, which could not have been intended for any wearer older than a well grown boy of fourteen.* The knights were doubtless much hampered in their harness, and the remark of James the 1st, which Grose quotes, in praise of armour, that "it not only protected the wearer but prevented him from injuring any other person," may have been true when thick plate armour came in fashion, and the higher orders had abandoned the rigour of their martial exercises. I cannot however think, when studying Froissart with his thousand tales of personal knightly prowess, the result of great activity joined to much courage, that we are right in judging of the power of a full armed horseman of the 14th century by the capacity of a strong trooper of our own day to bear

* The following extracts from an inventory of arms delivered from the Tower in the time of Henry VI. (A. D. 1455), speak to the early use of armour to render its weight customary.

"*Item*, a lytyl harneys that the Erl of Warwyk made for the Kyng, or ever he went over the sea, garnysshed with gold.

Item, iii. lytyl cote armours, which been the sergeants fee of the arm'rye (armoury), and delyv'd by the King's comaundement to hym by cause that they were so lytyl, and wole serve no man for they were made for hym when he was but vii. year of age."—*Meyrick* ii. 144.

armour. It is to be remembered that the full armed knight was an individual of the better orders, prince, priest, nobleman, or gentleman, well fed, and tended from his childish days, and used from boyhood to the most violent exercise. He had little else to care for than to attain personal skill in the use of his weapons, and to learn, in Scott's phrase, "to make his hand keep his head." This he was sent forth to do while still a boy. Chaucer's Squire in the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales gives one an idea of the physical power of the military aspirant—

"Of twenty yere of age he was I gesse.
Of his stature he was of even length,
And wonderly deliver, and gret of strengthe."

He was well grown, singularly active and very strong, which at twenty argues a good deal of previous steady training, a consequence but natural, as we learn,—

"And he hadde been sometime in chevachie,
In Flanders, in Artois, and Picardie,
Had born him wel, as of so litil space,
In hope to stonden in his lady's grace."

Although but twenty he had been sometime on active service, or chivachie (*chevaucher*, to ride, old Fr.), and considering his years had one dwell in hopes of pleasing the lady of his love.

This proves that about sixteen or seventeen, a youth was stout enough to bear light armour at any rate, which must have been considerably

more weighty* than the breast and back pieces of a modern cuirass, which, we think, it takes a strong grown man to carry. By following out the argument we see that with all his paraphernalia, the knight in the early days, when he personally bore the brunt of battle, could not have been so helpless while mounted, as might at first sight appear. It was when he fell from his horse that his accoutrement told against him, and how completely let the following passage prove from DeComine's account of the battle of Fornova A. D. 1495. (Memoirs, b. viii. ch. vi.) "We had a great number of grooms and servants with our wagons, who flocked about the Italian men at arms, when they were dismounted, and knocked most of them on the head. The greatest part of them had their hatchets (which they cut their wood with) in their hands, and with them they broke up their head pieces. and then knocked out their brains; otherwise they could not easily have killed them, they were so very well armed; and to each there were three or four of our men to do their business. The long sword also, which our archers and servants wore, did very good execution."† The man at arms however on foot

* The experiment of the weight of body armour is easily tried in India.

† It must be however remembered that these chevaliers were Italians, A. D. 1495, who carried to excess the practice of wearing heavy armour, in so much so, that what with this and

when his lance was cut short, was by no means ineffective : Froissart gives constant instances of this, and none can come more home to the apprehension of a British soldier than that of Cressy. In this position, however, it still needed much acquired knack to wield a weapon with effect, while the mere habit of sustaining the chill produced in inclement weather by so much cold steel about the body, must have been the result of constant practice. I have heard from officers of our household cavalry, that the cuirass in winter adds exceedingly to the sensation of cold, and what then must be the effect of a full panoply ?

Heavily accoutred, however, as he was, the knight was well equipped for his main and principal service, tilting or careering against his opponent with the lance in rest. It is natural to sup-

the bourdonasse or hollow-staved lance they bore, they were nearly as harmless as helpless. The mercenaries, or *condottieri* employed by the Italian states in their internal wars often fought, a whole day without a victory won, or among the cavaliers, who were at one time comrades in the same service, at another nominal opponents, a man killed. The historian Guicciardini in his account of this same battle mentions particularly (*Istoria d'Italia*, l. ii.) that the assault of the cavalry was " by the *melée* (*alla mescolata*), not according the practice of the Italian wars which was to fight squad to squad, and to substitute a fresh one in place of one broken, or which began to retire, never composing save till the last a body of troops (*squadron*) of several squads, so that most engagements the casualties being very trifling, lasted near the day long, and often ceased at nightfall, the victory being uncertain."

pose that this use of the lance was adopted in place of the former practice of cavalry, throwing or giving point with it, directly such defensive armour came into use as was impervious to an ordinary thrust. The lance I think there is reason to believe, would be ineffective against the gambeson or quilted surcoat, unless the point of the weapon were carried with the weight and impetus of man and horse upon it.* The practice of tilting once adopted, plate armour came into general use, which from its even surface and the shape that could be given to it, best resisted such a mode of assault, and with it came the *rest*, a projection from the cuirass against which the butt of the lance could be steadied, instead of being awkwardly held under the arm. For the ingenuities and refinements of defence which followed, I must refer the student to his reading.

It is enough that we in our brief sketch have arrived at a competent idea of the feudal lord, mounted on a heavy powerful charger,† which strong as he was, yet never sustained the iron burthen of his rider save just before action commenced. On this "great horse," (as the war horse was subsequently termed) he bore down

* The 16th Lancers in the skirmish before Bhurtpore in 1826, found their weapon points would not penetrate the wadded jackets of the Jât horsemen with the simple thrust.

† Bred from the Flanders or Black Stock. See Hamilton Smith.

amid his knights, armed and accoutred as himself, like a moving tower of steel, in such a gallop as we may fancy a dray horse could atchieve hung round with heavy trappings, cased in iron and leather with some two and twenty stone upon his back in the shape of rider, and his (the rider's *plus* the horse's) harness.* If his foe were armed like himself, it was a question of weight, tough ashwood, and seat on horseback as to which went down ; if he charged the serried pikes of the burgher force of some free town, it was a matter of weight and impetus on his part,—of endurance, and of courage with the infantry before him as to which had the victory ; but if his attack were upon the “villay ns,” the rabble rout of foot soldiers, or bowyers whose arrows were expended, he was greatly glorious in his iron shell, and slaughtered with impunity so long he had strength to wield his weapon, or his horse wind to stand under him. The English archer, or the Genoese cross-bowman was his worst opponent : the cloth yard shaft of the one,

* The spur used by the chivalry of Europe gives sufficient evidence as to the nature of the animal it was intended to stimulate. Up to about 1350, it was a simple prod or goad of iron with a circlet or guard, to prevent its being driven too far home, and “when,” says Grose ; “the rouelle or wheel (rowell) spur come in fashion,” superseding the ancient or point spur, “some of these rouelles were six inches in diameter,” (v. i. p. 103.) There is an excellent specimen given in the xi. volume of the *Archæologia*.

and the quarrel or square bolt shot by the other, made naught of horse armour, while the former required that even the rider's should be admirably and faultlessly tempered to resist it.* When he came within range of these, the knight was the exemplification of brute force helpless against skill : and yet this was the position in which chiefs and leaders were placed, they, like the men they led, warring not to make war, but to fight. What there is edifying to the soldier, or great, or glorious, in this spectacle, reducing the head to rank with the hand, and making a general do in this clumsy cowardly fashion, the butcher's work of personal conflict, I cannot and never could comprehend.

* Carew (Survey of Cornwall) so late as 1602, says of the Cornish archers " for long shooting, their shaft was a cloth yard in length and their butts twenty-four score paces, equal to four hundred and eighty yards, and for strength they would pierce any ordinary armour."

Strutt's Pastimes.

" An arow that was a cloth yarde long
To the hard stell halyde he ;
A dynt, that was both sad and soar
He set on Sir Hugh the Mongon-byrry.

The dynt it was both sad and sar
That he of Mongon-byrry sete ;
The swane-fethars that his arrowe bar
With his bart blode the wear wete."

Ancient Ballad of Chevy Chase about 1400.

See Percy's Reliques, vol i.

Poetry and romance have thrown a halo of glory around the days and the institutions of chivalry, and doubtless the principles by which a good knight ought to have been actuated, were essentially those of a gentleman and a soldier, as we in our day understand them. Chaucer, from whom we took a while ago some of the characteristics of the squire of his day, is exact and accurate in reckoning up in his description of the knight, (Prologue of *Canterbury Tales*,) all the merits which could fall to the lot of a warrior of the time, alike experienced and daring. Among the companions of his pilgrimage, says the shrewd and observant poet—

“ A knight there was, and that a worthy man
 That fro the time that he first began
 To riden out, he loved chevalrie
 Trouthe and honoure, fredom and curtesie.
 Ful worthy was he in his lordès werre,
 And therto hadde he ridden, no man ferre
 As well in Christendom as Hethenesse,
 And ever honoured for his worthinesse.
 At Alisandre he was, when it was wonne;
 Ful often time, he hadde the bord begonne
 Aboven allé nations in Pruce.
 In Lettowe hadde he reysed, and in Ruce,
 No Christen man so ofte of his degre.
 In Gernade at the siege eke hadde he be
 Of Algesir and ridden in Belmarie.
 At Leyès was he, and at Satalee,
 When they were wonne ; and in the gretè see.
 At many a noble armee hadde he be.
 At mortal batailles hadde he been fiftene
 And foughten for our faith at Tramissène

In lestes thries, and ay slaine his fo.
 This ilkè worthy knight hadde been also.
 Sometimè with the Lord of Palatie,
 Agen another heathen in Turkie :
 And evermore he hadde a souveraine pris ;
 And though that he was worthy, he was wise,
 And of his port, as meke as is a mayde.
 He never yet no vilainie ne sayde
 In all his lif, unto no manere wight.
 He was a very parfit gentil knight.

We have here unquestionably the sketch of a travelled gentleman and soldier ; he had ventured to Egypt with St. Louis, to judge from the mention of Alisandre (Alexandria), and had "the bord begonne," or sat in the place of honor at the table-head among the confederacy of the Teutonic Knights who assembled out of "alle nations," to wage a war of extermination against the savage tribes of Pruce (Prussia) who still in the fourteenth century were idolaters. He had "reysed" (German, *reisen*), or travelled, in Lithuania, and in Russia, served at Grenada against the Spanish Arabs, and at Algesiras, encountered a variety of other adventures with honour to himself, but still without losing the quiet self-command of a true soldier," "meke as a mayde" in Chaucer's phrase and guiltless of having ever "sayde vilanie," or used abuse, to any sort of person.

This is the beau ideal of a chivalrist.—This is the sort of soldier trained from among the higher orders by the rudest personal toil, but animated

by the most exalted notions of religious devotion, of patriotic duty, and of emulation to deserve well of the chaste object of a semi-platonic attachment. As early, however, as the middle of the twelfth century, the fopperies of chivalry had commenced to elicit themselves. Sir S. Meyrick quotes John of Salisbury's indignant animadversion (Polycraticus 181,) against the effeminate warriors of his day, "some of whom think that military glory consists in this: that they shine in elegant dress, that they make their clothes tight to their body, and so bind on their silken or linen garments as to seem a skin coloured like their flesh," with much more to the same effect. But to tell the truth, the abstract ideas of chivalry exacted too much of its professors in a semicivilized age. If the true merit of a knight were according to the Troubadour, Arnaud de Marveil, (St. Palaye's Hist. Troub. vol. i. p. 81,) "to fight well; to conduct a troop well; to do his exercise well; to be well armed; to ride his horse well; to present himself with a good grace at courts, and to render himself agreeable there;" the writer adds, "*seldom are these qualities in the same person.*" He may well say so as respects his own time, judging from the knowledge history affords us of what men were then; and in later days even, the various perfections have been but rarely united. Sir Philip Sidney, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, (see his Auto-biography published by

Chambers), and the gallant Earl of Peterborough, (see Southey's Life of him in Lives of Eminent Commanders), I have heard called *the last of the chivalrists*, thus bringing down the knightly spirit to the days of William III. and the war of the Spanish succession.

Why the essential requisites of a good and gallant soldier, which are the same in all ages, should by this arbitrary assertion, be allowed to descend no lower, I am at a loss to comprehend. The spirit of chivalry is the spirit of soldiership. To be brave, active, manly; skilful in the field, courteous and educated, is no whit more difficult, but less so now than in ages more remote. "The hood makes not the monk," as the old saying has it, no more than the knight is made by the lance and steel visor. It is moral force which constitutes the base of all human action, and it is the cultivation of a chivalrous soldier which in this age as in every other, must ensure honour and success in war.

These principles of old were vaunted and were praised by all, and by many were professed, but the question is, how were they practised? History tells us that from the end of the eleventh to the commencement of the fifteenth century, which is termed the age of chivalry in connection with feudalism, crime of all sorts was never so rife, honour was never so disregarded, nor war conducted so brutally. The principles of chivalry are no

doubt admirable, and they were in those days highly valued; but it is exceedingly often the extreme scarcity of an article that is the reason of its excessive estimation, and on this ground I explain the anomaly before us. It is very plain that when the higher orders make skill in the use, not the science, of arms, the only business of their life, and take every occasion of rushing from the dull and stately seclusion of their castles to the brutal enjoyment of sanguinary personal conflict, they can in very few instances attain a moral standard above that of ignorant rough-handed swordsmen.* The tilt yard and the pageant again

* A very cursory glance at cotemporary history gives us convincing evidence of this fact. Supposing that the principle of chivalry had taken firm hold of the better orders, a practical result must have appeared in the better ordering of society at a date certainly previous to 1400; but what do we find really the case?—that the worst crimes which disgraced Europe during the middle age, were as nothing compared to the treachery, ferocity, and general lawlessness displayed in the 15th century in England and France. The murder of the Duke of Orleans, and the excesses of the Armagnacs, of whom it was said—"never in the memory of man, had a Christian army commanded by such great princes, and composed of so many noble knights committed such horrors." (Sack of Bourdeaux, 1414, Pict. Hist. of England): the retributory massacre of John of Burgandy under breach of the most holy pledges, were fit events in the one country to usher in the miserable reign of our Sixth Henry in the other, and the disastrous wars of the Roses, disgraced by every species of un-knightly, and unmanly excess, in defiance of all laws, divine or human, moral or social. Yet these were the acts of "*great princes and noble knights.*"

were no very edifying places of resort for the fair sex, and although female virtue was never at a higher premium than in those days, it certainly never had stronger reasons for being so.

It is not our province here to go into an analysis of the causes whence, notwithstanding what we have observed, it so occurred that female influence had so great a share in eliciting whatever practical good there existed in the chivalric system ; still less are we called upon to trace the institution to its Germanic origin, or consider the value of the religious element it included. Its effect in war was to call forth many individual acts of fantastic daring which could have little value as to the result of a campaign, and to induce (from the misapplication of its tenets) acts of aggression as wanton as they were unjust and profitless. Doubtless many a man fought the more bravely under his obligations as a knight, than he would have done otherwise, while the courtesy and kindness it inculcated, confirmed the suggestion of his interest as to the treatment of prisoners capable of buying their liberty. But it hardly ever softened the barbarity of war, and the garrison of a place of strength were rarely spared from any chivalric sympathy for the gallantry with which they had defended it. Froissart, a priest, and the warmest admirer of noble and gallant knights, makes sometimes a passing moan over the death of a noble or a valiant gentleman,

but records with the most stoical composure the murder in cold blood of the commonalty by scores and centuries, if not thousands; whether it be as ransomless prisoners after a battle, as a flying foe, or the garrison of a place taken by assault, or often forced to capitulate.

Monstrelet, another churchman, who continued Froissart's History, but in a style much less graphic, shows if possible still more unconcern, when recording the violent death of any one under the grade of a noble, while murder in cold-blood is narrated in such terms as the following: "The constable," (Count D'Armagnac, who was then, A. D. 1418, besieging Senlis,) "sent a summons to surrender the town according to promise, but on the town's-people answering that the time was not yet expired, he caused the heads of four of the hostages to be cut off, their bodies quartered and hung on a gibbet. Of these four, two were gentlemen, namely, Guillaume Manchelier and Boudart de Vingles; the two others were citizens, named Guillaume Escallot and Master John Beaufort, King's Advocate in the town. The remaining two, for there were six in all, were carried to Paris. In revenge, the besieged beheaded sixteen of the constable's men: two were hanged, *and two women were drowned.*" (Chron. book 1, c. 184.) In a passage taken almost at random from the second book of this same Chronicle, giving an account (c. 111,) of the taking of

Guetron, a castle in Champagne, from the French by Sir John Luxembourg, the garrison, about sixty to sixty-four in number, are noted as having surrendered on terms made for them by their Governor, "being given by him to understand that they were to march away in safety," the truth being, that he had compounded for his own life and that of four or five companions, giving over the rest of the men under his command as prisoners at discretion. "But when the castle was surrendered, all were made prisoners. On the morrow, by orders from Sir John Luxembourg, they were all strangled and hung on trees hard by except the four or six above mentioned,—*one of their companions serving as executioner.*" Such acts of treachery and cold-blooded murder recorded without a comment, are among those which, "I, Enguerrand de Monstrelet, have taken a laborious pleasure in putting into writing in the manner of a chronicle, (being) the marvellous adventures and valorous deeds of arms worthy of praise and record, which have happened in the most Christian kingdom of France, the neighbouring countries and distant parts — * * * This history comprises accounts of battles, the desolation of many churches, cities, towns, and fortresses; the depopulation of a great extent of country and other marvels, piteous to behold: of valiant and prudent men as well nobles as others, who in consequence of their valour, or by

some unhappy misadventure, ended their days : such should be esteemed happy in having their courage, renowned actions, and noble deeds recorded,—and should be held by the living in perpetual memory.” (Preface to Book 11) !

That the profession of chivalry did in individual cases, produce much benefit during the chivalric age is indisputable, and that its consequences in after-times were valuable is certain, but that it improved during that period the moral character of warfare, or advanced the practice of war as a science, cannot be maintained for an instant.*

* Should the Student not have ready means of consulting Guizot's Analysis (vol. iii.) the Article *Chivalry* in the Penny Cyclopædia will give him an (unacknowledged) translation of its substance.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE GENERAL MILITARY DISPOSITION OF A FEUDAL
FORCE—OF THE CRUSADES IN THEIR EFFECT ON TACTICS
—OF WAR AS PRACTISED BY THE EARLY MUSSULMANS—OF
THE USE OF STANDARDS AND BANNERS WITH ARMED BODIES.

The tactics of those days displayed themselves as might be well imagined, much more by skill in partisan warfare, as we should now term it than in the manœuvring of large armies. The mode of conducting hostilities was at the best, to use Marshall Saxe's distinction, a mere "*method of fighting*:" there was nothing of what he terms "*the sublime branch*" of war (Reveries B. II. c. XII.) in the military operations of the period.

The disposition of troops seems, with the English at least invariably, to have been a vaward, or advance, a centre, and rear; but in pitched battles, the system pursued appears to have been dependent much more on the bent of national character, or the accident of circumstance than any rule of practice. The English in this respect show to some advantage. Fighting as they usually did in bodies numerically inferior to their opponents, they adopted the plan, in their continental wars, of provoking the attack of their enemy. When their military position was well chosen, they derived on this system, an immense

advantage from the steadiness of their infantry, strengthened by their men at arms on foot, and the great and commanding skill of their archers in the use of the long bow. The Swiss and Genoese infantry disputed, in some sort, the palm of pre-eminence with them as respects a European reputation up to the end of the fifteenth century, after which the Spanish foot soldiery composed of pikemen and arquebusiers intermixed, took for a time the first place in the great battle-fields of the continent.

This however has reference to a period far advanced beyond what may be termed, the later chivalric. In it for the most part, surprises, ambuscades, and the attack and defence of isolated castles, and places of strength are the exploits on which the ingenuity of the able military men of the time loved most to exhaust itself. There was in the constitution of large bodies of troops too little of mutual dependence and subordination to ensure anything like combined action, or to enable the general in chief to risk a change of position in face of his enemy, when circumstances prevented him from venturing on an attack upon the ground he held at the time. In such a case it was not unusual for propositions to be made on either side to change the ground by mutual consent, and meet on a certain day at a particular spot to try the event of a general action. Challenges were even sent in form by one sovereign

to another, advising of an intention to commence hostilities by a certain day. Robert the Bruce for instance did this in 1327 ; and in the operations which succeeded, the English army, following the Scotch in their retreat after wasting the country south of the border towards Durham, "lay," says Froissart, "eighteen days together before the position which their foe had taken up," unable to induce them to leave it to fight on level ground, and unwilling to hazard the risk of an attack in their position.

A similar challenge was dispatched in 1337 by our own Edward III. to Philip the Sixth of France, which was followed by similar inaction. Edward was aided by his allies, the Flemings under Von Artaveldt, the Emperor of Germany, the Dukes of Brabant, and Gueldres, the Archbishop of Cologne, the Counts of Hainault and Namur, the Lords of Juliens, Fouguesmont, and Baquen, and others, many of them subsidized by the English: while on the side of the French, says Froissart—"There were eleven score banners, four kings (France, Bohemia, Scotland, and Navarre) six dukes, twenty-six earls, upwards of five thousand knights, and more than forty thousand commonmen. It was a fine sight to see the banners and pennons flying in the plain, the barded horses, the knights and esquires richly armed. The French were formed in three large battalions, each consisting of fifteen thousand men at arms

and twenty thousand men on foot." (B. i. C. 41.) The head quarters of the two kings were on the plain between Vironfosse and La Flamengrie within two leagues of each other, when the Duke of Brabant advised, that "a herald should be sent to the king of France to offer him battle, and to fix the day. To this king Philip answered willingly, and appointed Friday following to be the day, this being Wednesday." (Froiss. B. i. C. 40.) "When the Friday morning was come, the two armies got themselves in readiness, and heard mass, each lord among his own people, and in his own quarters: many took the sacrament, and confessed themselves." (C. 41.) The English according to their custom, formed "three battalions" (properly *battailles*, or in modern parlance, divisions), all on foot, their horses and baggage in a small wood in their rear "fortified" or strengthened with field works; the first division of eight thousand men, consisted chiefly of the Hainaulters, and Germans; the second of the Brabanters, and Flemings, seven thousand strong: the third contained six thousand men at arms, and as many English archers under the King in person, supported by a reserve under the Earl of Warwick of cavalry "to rally those that might be thrown into disorder, and to serve as a rear guard." "When every thing had been thus arranged, and each lord under his proper banner, as had been ordered by the Marshals, the King

mounted an ambling palfrey and rode along the line of his army, and right sweetly entreated the lords and their companions, that they would aid him to preserve his honour, which they promised."

"It was a matter of much wonder," observes Froisart. "how two such fine armies could separate without fighting. But the French were of contrary opinions among themselves, and each spoke out his thoughts. Some said it would be a great shame, and very blameable, if the King did not give battle, when he saw his enemies so near him, and drawn up in his own kingdom in battle array, in order to fight with him according to his promise: others said, it would exhibit a singular instance of madness to fight, as they were not certain, some treachery was not intended; besides, if fortune should be unfavorable, the King would run a great risk of losing his kingdom, and if he should conquer his enemies, he could not be the nearer to gain possession of England, or of the land of the allies. Thus the day passed until near twelve o'clock in disputes and debates. About noon, a hare was started in the plain, and ran among the French army who began to make a great shouting and noise, which caused those in the rear to imagine the combat was begun in the front, and many put on their helmets and made ready their swords. Several new knights were made, especially by the Earl of Hainault,

who knighted fourteen, and they were ever after called *Knights of the Hare*."

The whole of the above description is valuable, showing as it does the immense difficulty of uniting a large force in those days, which could be effected but by a general muster of all the indigenous and allied chivalry disposable at the moment; the helplessness of the army so composed which could only hope for an action by prevailing on the enemy to accept a challenge, and agree to a sort of monstrous duel between the hostile forces: the powerless position of a general in chief, who when his subordinate leaders demurred or objected to fight for this or the other consideration, political or military, was compelled to forego the advantage of his immense numerical superiority, and see his adversary, after braving him in the field, march off, as did the English king, to waste his territory, and lay siege to his towns; (the disastrous political results of such inaction emboldened Edward III. to assume, as he then did at the instance of the Flemings, the title of King of France); and lastly, the loose discipline of an army, the front ranks of which while under arms for battle, commence, for any idle trivial cause, a clamour so excessive, as to induce those in the rear, equally ill-governed, to prepare in confusion to meet the enemy whom they think engaged.

It is right, however, to say that this inertness

in large bodies of troops before the use of fire-arms, has been observed as common even to disciplined armies, which Guischart attributes (Mem. Mil. c. 1. p. 21.) to their armament and practice of entrenchment before an enemy. We may in fairness concede the partial truth of this; but it bears little on the general argument, as we might multiply instances of the fact, did space permit, or the subject need it. What the writer would wish to impress upon those curious in the matter is, the difference, as fully exemplified in the military history of these times, between war, and mere fighting; and the inability in those days of the commanders of large armies, faulty in their composition, to gain any tactical advantage, so as to force the enemy either to engage,—or to retreat, beaten without an action, which is the real object of the science of war; nay, to secure even the co-operation of the troops under them for the purpose.

It might be supposed by persons not conversant with the military constitution of the period that any great aggressive movement undertaken by the nations of Europe in common, such as the early Crusades, might have been productive, by showing the needfulness of unity of action for the attainment of a common end, of a better military principle. Such however could not be the case among bodies in which the influence of feudality prevailed. The knight, for a crusade,

mortgaged, or sold his lands, surrounded himself with his peculiar body of dependents, and followed the banner of his king; like as the king summoned his vassals to take the cross, and himself followed the leader of the expedition, named by the Papal chair; but in the army so composed like as with the feudal state, it was a mere succession of will within will. Rules of discipline were imposed, it is true, but ineffectually, as there was no power to coerce, while there was much in the spirit of jealousy and international opposition to disunite; and consequently though millions were sacrificed, nothing was won save a brief tenure of part of Palestine from which not even the holders profited.

Thus though the Crusaders were indirectly of infinite service to the civilization of Europe, they taught nothing as to war, unless indeed a better knowledge of its arts as applied to military machines, and the projectiles from them as used at that period, which they obtained from the Byzantine Greeks. The Arabs in Palestine could teach little, being inferior to the Crusaders in their mode of engaging. I have now before me two accounts, by an Arab,* and a European† historian of the time, giving their im-

* *Life and Deeds of Saladin*, by Ibn Abas Ghazee, chap. 88. Schultens.

† *Chronicle of William of Tyre*. Book v c. ii. *Gesta Dei per Francos*.

pression of the onset of their respective enemies. The latter thus sketches the desultory assault of the Saracens—"The hostile forces thus moving forward little by little against each other, their foremost array began to rush in upon us with excessive vigour, and having discharged a very hail of arrows, to fall back again on their own force. But our men not heeding the assault," &c. &c. The Arab chronicler on the other hand, gives the following description of a charge of Frankish cavalry. "Now there detached itself against them (the Arabs) a matter of two hundred horsemen, and drove down upon them, fully equipped, in complete armour, on mighty horses, in exact order, and perfect accoutrement, and made towards them; and amongst these not a single foot soldier." The contrast is remarkable, and shows (as I shall instance more particularly further on) that in so far as disposition for action goes, in small bodies under, most likely, a single banner, as well as in mode of attack, the Franks were markedly superior. The observation of the Eastern chronicler as to the absence of infantry among the horse, proves the converse to have obtained with his own people, and that the formation known in India as the *gole*, a confused shapeless mass of horse and foot in Eastern armies, was apparently prevalent then in Palestine, as it would be now, but for the affectation with native powers of European discipline, in this country. From a

foe like this, little could be learned except as to the use of light troops; and in spite of their holy object, such appears to have been the relaxation of every thing approaching to discipline* among the Crusaders, that a campaign with them must have tended to deteriorate from the moral qualities of the soldier more than it may have added to his experience in the field.†

In a treatise of so very general a character as is this, it would be useless to attempt any thing beyond a passing review of military habits; as it may however be expected that something should be said of the Arabs of Spain, so constantly and so fiercely warring with our Christian chivalry, I will take such brief notice of them as time and space allow. Tactics and discipline are, I need hardly say, things almost unknown to Moslem warriors, more especially so in the earlier days of the Hejra, when the seeking aid in a holy war by resort to any human devices, was in itself a sort of impiety in the swordsmen, who believed their arms nerved for victory by a special and superhuman vigour. The

* Circumstances induced this by reason of the destitution in which the crusading armies were constantly placed owing to incompetence in their leaders, and bad faith in allies. There was a great attempt at singular rigidity of discipline in the armament under our Richard I. whose military code on the occasion is one of the earliest extant in Modern History.

† Mills History of the Crusades is the most compendious account whence an English reader may derive a fair opinion of the Military value of these expeditions.

Mussulmans subsequently adopted certain rules of war such apparently as befitted their armament, and the country they acted in. The Spanish Arabs were distinguished by no apparent superiority of tactics over their Christian opponents. Some care seems to have been taken in classifying by equipment and dress, the different troops composing the immediate followers of their kings*, and great pride was had in making a splendid display of their arms and accoutrements. In the desperate action between Al-Mutamid, king of Seville and Alphonso the VI. (A. D. 1085) which resulted in the defeat of the latter, his rout was occasioned by the attack of a picked body of Nubians, the guard of Yusuf Ibn Tashifin, Ameer of Morocco, the ally of his antagonist. Al-Mutamid himself is represented joining in the combat like our own princes of that day, "and he performed such feats of arms as no warrior in his army could equal," and he was "thrice wounded" and "had three chargers killed under him." The only peculiarity in those wars seems to have been that the camel, introduced by the Yusuf above named into Spain, was used in battle to terrify the horses of the Christian chivalry.

Should any one be curious on the subject of Mussulman tactics, the Memoirs of the Emperor Baber, who was opposed to the Oosbegs, and Af-

* See a review of his forces by Alhakem II. A. H. 962 Pascal Gayangos Hist. Mussulman Dynasties in Spain vol. ii. p. 157.

ghans, as well as the Indian Mussulmans and the Hindoos, will be found interesting. The remark as to the helplessness of a large ill-composed army is exemplified in the East as in the West, in his memorable campaign against Rana Sanka of Oodeypore, who was at the head of the Hindoo confederacy, which opposed him. Both armies remained many days motionless. Baber at last provoked his foe to fight, and engaged him with his artillery, lashed gun to gun with chains, and cowhides. The same indecision was remarkable on the last occasion on which the Hindoo and Mussulman armies contended on a large scale, the battle of Paneeput between the confederate Mahrattas, and Ahmud Shah Abdallee with his Afghans. Weeks elapsed during which the hostile forces remained in position. The manœuvre of chaining the guns, was, I think, again employed here, as it was used at Laswarree in later days.*

The internal economy and military array of an army of this period depended wholly upon one very important usage, especially important among semi-disciplined troops, the display, namely, of an ensign, flag, or banner, under which the soldier should be taught to assemble, and, in action, to rally. I have deferred up to this moment enlarging upon it as a general practice in war. The idea of such a signal is universal, and the exter-

* For an excellent account of the battle of Paneeput, see Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. ii.

nal cause of its adoption obvious. However little accustomed men may be to act in concert, it is always possible to unite them in one mass by the conspicuous display of a striking object in a central position. If the uplifting of this ensign be accompanied by the shout of a strong-voiced man, or the commanding tone of a loud instrument, the appeal to two organs of sensation, both the ear and the eye, must be followed by an increased degree of alertness on the part of the troops so summoned. It would be hard, or impossible, to determine (and certainly profitless to enquire), which of the two, standard, or trumpet, held the earliest place as a signal of command in the records of ancient warfare. We have mention of the latter, to recur to the Book of Job, in the earliest of written histories; while the former suggests itself as a practical method of uniting a dispersed and disorderly body, as probably in use before art had gone so far as to invent a means for the production of sound in the shape of any thing like a musical instrument.

The tradition of almost every nation gives, if well examined, some homely origin for the standard which it subsequently adopted. In the poem of the Shah Nameh, the great Persian epic, affecting to recount the history of the heroic ages of that ancient people, many of the old military traditions of the land have doubtless been preserved, mixed of course with an unlimit-

ed amount of fable and exaggerated poetic imagery. The raising of the banner, however, under which the hero Feridoon delivered the country from the oppressions of the tyrant Zohák, deserves attention as pointing to a very early use of ensigns in war, and indicating the great value attached to them. The immediate agent, my readers will perhaps remember, in the revolution above alluded to, was one Gaveh, a blacksmith, who assembled the indignant and outraged populace by raising his leathern apron on a spear point. With this gathering staff in his hand, the daring artisan made his way to the presence of Feridoon, whom he prudently invited to take the command of the popular outbreak. Feridoon accepted the offered authority, and adopted, for a good omen, the blacksmith's apron as his standard, richly adorning it. The eight lines in the Shah Nameh describing this might be given as follows :—

He came to the hold of the new chief in war,—
 As they saw him the tumult arose from afar :
 When the chief had that skin on the spear-head espied,
 A star of good omen then fell him beside :
 He bedecked the rude apron with silk of Byzant,
 Of gold, sea-gems, and jewel-work made he no scant ;
 Red, yellow, and purple hung mingled and crossed,
 And the name they then called it was *Gleam-of-the-host*.

It is curious enough to find in this appellation, a sense so analogous to that of the great national banner of France *The Oriflamme*. The similarity affords a practical proof of the identity of habits

and feelings among men of all races when placed in like circumstances. By assembling armed bands about a conspicuous, and it may be even, an intrinsically precious object, some degree of unity of action is secured, when the men are easily stimulated to the impression that their honour lies in the honourable defence of this, the banding sign of their array. It matters not what be chosen as the ensign ; the more familiar perhaps the object in early days, the better. The Persian artisan, heading a tumult in a populous burgh, bethought himself, very happily, of his own apron by way of standard: the Roman agriculturist, surprised in his fields by the approach of a predatory enemy, raised a bundle of hay on a pole, this being the earliest standard of the rude manipular bands (Ovid. *Fast.* iii. 117) : the Turk again took the readiest emblem, which offered itself to him as one of an equestrian nation, and made his standard of a horse-tail. There have been many other similar ensigns made use of from habit or association as rallying points for troops. These have varied at different times, and according to the feelings of different nations. The Janissaries, strange to say, attached their idea of military credit to the defence of their campkettle, while their European opponents held for a long time that their honour was comprised in the safety, not only of their colours, but their drum.

Of this last military conception, Shakespeare has left an instructive and amusing record in the play of "All's well that ends well," wherein, before his discomfiture, Parolles vauntingly declares of a drum, lost by the force to which he is attached,—“ It is to be recovered : but that the merit of service is seldom attributed to the true and exact performer, I would have that drum, or another, or *hic jacet*.” It is curious to see the interchange (“ *or another*”) admitted as an honourable satisfaction. The importance once given to this instrument is still perpetuated in our own practice of figuring on the drum the national arms, thus making it, as it were, a supplement to the standard itself.

This last, as either a national emblem, or the gathering point, almost sacred in its character, of a band assembled for a particular service, was universally employed throughout Europe from the twelfth to the fifteenth century. Sir S. Meyrick assigns to it (Ancient Armour, vol. i. p. 49,) an Asiatic origin, an opinion in which I do not think he is borne out. We know, it is true, that standards and banners were in use of very ancient time in the East, and the familiar instance of the assignment of such ensigns to the different tribes of Israel by Moses, will occur to every reader : but it is too much to say that we owe the use of the standard to the Saracens. Villani (Istorie Florentine B. v. ch. xiiii,) tells us that the

men of Florence took part in the Crusade of 1188, "and were among the first at the taking of the city of Damietta ; they took the country, and for token of it, got possession of a scarlet standard, which is yet extant in the church of St. John." He evidently speaks casually of a warlike trophy, with the nature of which his countrymen were already acquainted before their capture of this one : and again (B. v. c. xxxix,) when speaking of the military divisions of the Florentines in 1250, he merely notes that the people were distributed under twenty *gonfalons* or banners, and that Herbert of Lucca, "the first Captain of Florence," had "as captain of the people, a gonfalon of a red cross on a white ground."

The Italians are the first nation among which we have recorded instances of the use of a very conspicuous standard mounted upon a car, as was their fashion, drawn by bullocks, and appointed as the rallying centre of their military array. It was termed the *carrocio*, but, as is observed by Spelman (Glossary in Voc. *carrociū*.) this was no more than an adaptation of the *Labarus*, or great central standard, customary with the later Romans, both of the Western, and of the Byzantine empire. The Milanese were according to the authorities he quotes (Sigonius, Life of Frederick the First, and Burchard,) the earliest of the Italian nations, who made use of this method of preserving order and unity in their armies in the

times known to us as the middle ages. Sir S. Meyrick who has taken great pains in collecting authorities on this point, cites the author of the *Manipuli Florum*, to show that Heribert, Archbishop of Milan, invented the standard-car, or *carrocio* drawn by bullocks, about the year 1124, and states, on what grounds I am unable to discover, that he plagiarised the invention from the East. Few readers of English history will forget the celebrated Battle of the Standard, fought by Sir Walter Espec with some English troops against King David of Scotland, and his army in 1138, and they must bear in mind the value on this memorable occasion of the conspicuous ensign hung round with holy relics, which in reality, by keeping the disorderly force united round one central point, procured victory for the English combatants. Now at a time when communication between one nation and another, separated more particularly by the sea, was so tardy and imperfect as we well know it to have been, the idea of the infusion of a plagiarist, taken from the East, established in Italy, and copied in the north of England, within a quarter of a century, is too idle to be admitted.

The *carrocio*, or moveable standard on a car drawn by bullocks, supplied as it was with the means of accommodating, not only heralds and trumpeters, but warriors, who mounted on it as a place of vantage, could never have owned an

origin in the East among an equestrian people. We see at once that the conception of a standard on a car, was due to the old Gaulic habit of using the heavy wains of the army as at once a sort of field work, and a rallying point, in the manner so often described by Cæsar in his Commentaries on the war with the Gauls. The standard was a sort of mast raised on a substantial waggon, held in its position by stays, and lashings of rope, and capable of being commodiously advanced on the line of march in accordance with the progress of the troops. Of this we find the most convincing proof, and at the same time the most certain refutation of the eastern origin of such an ensign, in the Life of Saladin, already quoted, by his secretary Ibn Abbas Ghazee. This writer in his 116th chapter describing the movement of Godfrey of Boulogne with the army of the Crusaders on Ascalon, says, speaking of the Christian host—"In the midst of them appeared a sort of bulwark upon a carriage, *even as I have described before*, like to a lofty minaret with a flag upon it. * * * *

* * * *

This-wise they slowly pursued their journey, sedulously holding together, and supporting one another." Now this passage I took upon as conclusive against the eastern origin exclusively, of the great central and moveable standard in war, round which the troops of an undisciplined army

might assemble as to a rallying point. Had such a standard been usual with the Saracenic tribes, the intelligent and observant writer above quoted could not on re-iterating his mention of the practice, have failed to notice the plagiary committed upon them by their European adversaries.

Other and more portable ensigns were doubtless employed as the rallying points for troops, coterminously with this cumbrous central standard, the use of which appears with the English to have been merely occasional, and which as a general practice in war, must have been laid aside before the end of the fifteenth century. It is I believe hardly possible to establish with exactitude, the period at which devices, or armorial bearings, were depicted upon the banner of chiefs who selected them as their national or personal badges. The use for instance of the raven as their device by the Danes, or the white horse in the same manner by the Saxons, may reasonably be referred to periods of their early savage existence, in which these emblems of the tribe were casually adopted; like as in our own day we see the indigenous races of North America distinguish themselves by the typical representation of some animal. The systematic application of these bearings and devices which resulted in Heraldry, an art which however frivolous and fantastic had once its uses, was serviceable in war after the adoption of complete panoply as

enabling the soldiery to recognize by his banners the enemy, as well as know those of their own immediate leaders. These flags or ensigns were very numerous in armies of cavalry, the lowest subdivision of which under one of them was a constabulary, or constable's command, for the formation of which Grose (vol. i. p. 205,) quotes a writ of Edward III. of 1324; this does not appear to have exceeded a squad of thirty men at the utmost. The leader of a constabulary held what we might term military rank as such by appointment,—his *army* rank was with that of the esquires, and his pay, when he was paid, (see authority of Edward's time in Grose, *ibid.*) was the same as theirs, with the right to display, like them, a pennon, if he had sufficient means to maintain it, or in other words, could furnish a sufficient quota of serviceable men at arms. The title of constable, degraded now with us to very common uses, was applied to the commanders of small bodies of men as early as the reign of King John, while the High Constable, an office the shadow of which still exists, represented the highest army rank which a subject could hold.

Before going further in discussing the division of feudal armies under banners and pennons, it may be well that we should clearly understand the existence in such armies of two descriptions of rank, the one chivalric, the other military. The one depended upon personal ability and

prowess in war, whereby the aspirant who had served as page in some noble or high knightly family, might, after having been admitted to the rank of squire, *win his spurs*, (the golden ones of knighthood), and take his share in the duties and privileges of chivalry. The duties were by his knightly oath, to "defend the church, to attack the perfidious, to venerate the priesthood, to repel the injuries of the poor, and to shed his blood, and if necessary, to lose his life, for his brethren:" the privileges involved freedom from all gelds and taxes, and from all services and burthens.* The germ of this order is to be detected in the form and ceremony with which, according to Tacitus, the full-grown youth of the ancient Germans were solemnly invested with their offensive and defensive arms: its gradual development is to be traced in later times, in the more solemn engagements which the christianised Anglo-Saxons required of their aspirants to military honours. The authorities which (Sharon Turner. Hist. of Ang. Sax. b. vii. c. 12,) have been collected in proof of the latter point, leave no doubt but that the chivalric degree, or grade of knighthood, was perfectly acknowledged in England at any rate, nearly a century before the Norman invasion; and it was consequently some-

* John of Salisbury in Meyrick An. Arm. vol. i. p. 60: for a full account of chivalric institutions, see St. Palaye's History of Chivalry, well known.

thing wholly independent of any military system which the Normans might have attempted to introduce. It was a honorary degree, irrespective of personal property, or the influence of social position, to which any valiant and well-born man might aspire. It conferred no rank of itself in an army, nor did it permit of the display by any party who professed it, of his guidon, or pennon, unless he were named to the command of a constabulary, or squad of horse,—or else brought a sufficient quota of men as his feudal contribution in aid of the general service.

The other, or purely military rank in a feudal army was one which a squire might hold, with permission of the chief in command, provided he supplied the stipulated number of men and horses, which by his landed tenure, he was bound to give. Thus, says Du Fresne, as quoted by Grose, a pennon might be displayed by a constable even although he were not a *knight bachelor*, by which term the graduates in chivalry were designated; although it nowhere appears that promotion from the pennon to the higher grade of the banner, despite of the qualification by property or supply of men, could be attained by any who had not the chivalric degree of knighthood. As in chivalry, the grades were three, page, squire, and knight bachelor, so in the feudal military system may we trace also,—knight bachelor, or one whose unquestioned right it was to

display his pennon if qualified;—knight banneret, or (as some say,) baronet, who might on permission convert his triangular pennon into a banner, as will be hereafter explained, proving his power to maintain it;—and baron, or feudal magnate, by accident of birth, fortune or desert, holding an influential military position in right of the large quota of troops he supplied to the army.

Spelman (Glossary in voc. *Baro. Barronettus*) has set forth with much curious research the origin of these terms of feudal rank, the first of which seems in its original signification in more than one of the Teutonic languages, to have meant nothing more than *man*. The Gothic mercenaries of the Byzantine Greeks would appear to have introduced the word in the sense of *a strong man*, and *a hired soldier*, to their masters, by whom it was adopted, and subsequently made use of to express, *a retainer*. In the Gothic Latin dialect it was equivalent to *freeman*, and thence came to signify a freeman, holding of the king for feudal service: the transition from this to its application to the major and minor vassals of the crown, was simple and immediate, so that on the authorities Spelman quotes, the term, *Baron*, was as early the middle of the eleventh century used generically for Duke, Marquis, Count, Viscount, or any magnate holding in fee under the king.

The diminutive form of the word, Baronet, or, as sometimes altered, Banneret, would appear to have had in either shape the same signification, that is, a knight bachelor who having sufficient means, is permitted to raise his banner of arms at the head of his vassals. This he could not do until he had achieved experience and distinction in the field; having held a command and borne his arms on a pennon for a competent time, and having it in his power to appear at the head of twenty-five lances according to some authorities, or fifty according to others. The "lance" consisted of one man at arms, two half-armed men, and (by rights) two others, a yeoman or archer, and a boy, or servant: the rule however was not general, and three or five were the complement as the case might be. Taking the smallest number, the knight banneret must have been able to appear at the head of seventy-five mounted men before he could claim to raise his banner.

It has always occurred to me, that the existence of two grades of military complements entitling to this rank, may explain the somewhat anomalous term, Baronet, as applicable to the knight banneret, who furnished the higher of the two, fifty lances, or one hundred and fifty men, and who thus appeared as a *lesser Baron*. When during the reign of James 1st., baronetcies were created hereditary titles in 1611, the royal charter expressly provided (I give it from the law Latin

in which the act is written,) that "the aforesaid Baronets take place, and precedence in all letters patent, &c., &c., and in all sessions, &c. &c., before all knights, as well knights of the Bath, as knights bachelors, and also before all knights bannerets, now created or to be created hereafter, those knight bannerets alone excepted to whom it may happen to be created under the royal banners displayed, in the royal army, in open war, and the king himself being personally present." Here we have evidence of the departure which had already occurred from the ancient practice, whereby a knight banneret could only receive that rank in the field at the head of his proper contingent. The following account of the raising of a banner, and the mode of transforming the guidon or pennon into one, is taken from a chronicler who recorded the expedition of the Black Prince into Spain in the 29th year of Edward III. The occurrence described took place before the battle of Navera, or as Froissart, who describes the same event, calls it, Navaretta (c. 241.)

"As the two armies approached near together, the Prince went over a little hill, in the, descending whereof he saw plainly his enemies marching towards him; wherefore, when the whole army was come over this mountain he commanded that they should make an halt, and so fit themselves for fight. At that instant the

Lord John Chandos brought his ensign folded up, and offered it to the prince saying, "Sir, here is my guidon; I request your highness to display it abroad, and give me leave to raise it this day as my banner, for I thank God and your highness, I have lands and possessions sufficient to maintain it withall." Then the prince took the pennon, and having cut off the tail, made it a square banner, and this done, both he and king Don Pedro, for the greater honor holding it between their hands, displayed it abroad, it being Or, a sharp pile gules: and then the prince delivered it into the Lord Chandos, again saying, "Sir John, behold here is your banner. God send you much joy and honor with it." And thus, being made a knight banneret, the Lord Chandos returned to the head of his men, and said, "Here gentlemen, behold my banner and yours. Take and keep it to your honour and mine." And so they took it with a shout, and said by the grace of God and St. George, they would defend it to the best of their powers: but the banner remained in the hands of a gallant English esquire, named William Allestry, who bore it all that day and acquitted himself in the service "right honorably." (Joshua Barnes in Meyrick, vol. ii. p. 54.)

That however the ceremony was not always the same, is evidenced by Froissart's account of another banner-raising previous to the fight before

Troyes (A. D. 1380,) between the armies of the Earl of Buckingham and Duke of Burgundy. "All who were desirous of knighthood were called: first came Sir Thomas Trivet with his banner rolled up, to the Earl of Buckingham, and said, "My Lord, if you please I will this day display my banner; for thanks to God, I have a sufficient revenue to support the state which a banner requires." "It is highly pleasing to us," said the Earl: then taking the banner by the staff, he gave it back into his hands, saying, "Sir Thomas, God grant you may show your valour here, and everywhere else." Sir Thomas took his banner, and having displayed it, gave it to one of his esquires in whom he had great confidence and went to the vanguard." (Vol. II. c. 53.)

It will be borne in mind that both Chandos, and Trivet were leaders of approved courage and experience, and that the distinction they obtained was independent of their chivalric rank, involving the military qualifications of established service, and of known and evident ability to serve at the head of a body of men properly armed and equipped. The editor of Johnes' Froissart observes that books of heraldry mention the order of knight banneret as conferable only after a battle, an assertion which these instances confute. Edmondson in his body of Heraldry is said by the same authority to represent this order as originating in 736, although general belief assigns

it to the age of Edward III. The last knight banneret created in England was Sir John Smith who received the honour after the battle of Edgehill in which he rescued the royal standard.*

* It will, I think, be evident from the above brief review of the military grades of Knighthood, that, except in entirely recent days, the grade of banneret was not, as Meyrick states (Vol. ii p. 3), a reward for valiant prowess and deeds of arms, but a regular military rank conferred, it is true, only upon experienced and tried warriors, but not until these were possessed of sufficient property to enable them to furnish a certain quota of men and horses to be marshalled and arrayed under the banner which was to serve as their rallying point.

CHAPTER VII.

OF PETTY WARFARE IN THE MIDDLE AGES—OF THE ANTI-CHIVALRIC NATIONS—OF THE TOURNEY, AND MILITARY HABITS OF THE TIME—OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE TOURNAMENT AND JOUST.

The banner, when embattled, has been noted as the rallying point of a body of cavalry, which varied numerically with the means of him who displayed it: but it is curious enough that the requisite complement for both the lesser, and the larger contingent attached to it, was respectively a very near equivalent as regards number, to the troop, and the squadron, of horse, as generally in use in our own day. We by no means, however, find the use of the banner or pennon confined to the assistance they must have given in affording something array like to the motley order of a feudal army. On the contrary the leaders of such troops, or pelotons of horse as were gathered round them, were on all occasions anxious, as must ever be the case with proud, ill-trained, and insubordinate soldiers, confident in their strength and armament,—to separate themselves from the influence of a central authority, and endeavour to achieve individual honour and distinction by some daring and desperate act of personal prowess. Such are termed by the chroniclers of the chivalric age,

“feats of arms, and wonderful enterprises.” They were not uncommon at all times on the frontiers of adjacent countries, whereon, among a turbulent people, impatient of peaceful labour, national enmity was urged as the easy excuse for constant aggression. The instances afforded to Englishmen in the condition, even up to James the 1st’s time, of our Scottish borders, give a familiar example of this state of society ; while on the continent of Europe even more than in the interior of our own island, the habit of “ private wars,” or hostilities carried on within the realm by its great feudatories on the argument of their individual differences, fostered and maintained in an extreme degree the achievements of partizan warfare.

It was however during the long occupation of the fairest provinces of France by the English, inducing hostilities which invited to them mercenaries and adventurers from all parts of Europe, that the spirit of partizan warfare among these “gentle knights and gallant squires” was perhaps most especially developed. The internal feuds of the robber barons of the Rhine, or the bitter differences of the Italian nobles, afford less forcible examples than do these, of what may be termed the true chivalric recklessness in war, of a personal, rather than a national, character. The German held nationally to his soil ; when he fought, save in the Crusades and the Italian wars,

'twas for a domestic quarrel;—when he plundered, his booty was laid up in strongholds mid rock and forest, fastnesses in which Rudolph of Hapsburgh found and destroyed (1280) the feudal plunderers, a sure and constant refuge while life or fortune lasted : while again, if party question, or the hope of gain, were put aside, he was too phlegmatic for much active ferocity ; his worst troublousness had something quiescent in it, as if in his warring, rude soldier as he was, he were rather habitually and dully ungentle, than wantonly violent. The Italian chivalry again was, to a certain degree, crushed as a national element of military consequence by the prowess and high reputation of the Free States, their merchant nobles, their gallant and well appointed force of mercenaries, and in the case of Venice and Genoa, their maritime importance and colonial power : thus the feudal importance of a noble and warlike race was not sufficient in Italy to create a military pre-eminence of itself : the head of the house had to avail himself of popular differences, and court the aid of malcontents and adventurers to eke out his own resources, before he was in a position to assume the tone of a military chief ; even when he did so, his authority was much more that of a popular leader than of a feudal Baron, a case illustrated by the early history of the Visconti family in their connection with the Milanese (about A. D. 1270). At a

later date when Italy was inundated with foreign mercenary troops, the "free lances" so celebrated in the wars of the period for their unbounded license, and ferocious daring, it is not the power of the feudal chivalry that we see opposed to them, but that of mercenaries indigenous to Italy. It was perhaps a sort of professional jealousy which excited these patriot adventurers to endeavour at the ejection of the strangers; they effected it however after the sack of Cesena in 1377, with the aid of the burgher forces of Milan, Florence, Bologna, and other towns, the people of which exasperated by the atrocities of John Hawkwood, leader of a band called the Breton Company (then with other foreign mercenaries in the pay of Pope Gregory XI.), attacked these troops at Marino in the Papal states, and annihilated them. Alberico Barbiano, who commanded the patriot mercenaries, assumed the title of "Liberator," and bore on his standard the motto "Italy freed of the Foreigners." It was on the memorable occasion of this engagement that this leader bestowed on one of his chief officers Jacopo Attendolo, who had been in his youth a common labourer, the name of "Sforza," destined after this bold and daring soldier had played out his part in war and politics, to be known in the persons of his descendants, as the family appellation of a sovereign dynasty. A state of society in which military

operations were carried on by townsmen banded with paid troops, and the son of a day labourer could cut his way to a ducal coronet, was, I need hardly observe, incompatible with the conduct of war on the system of feudal contingents.

The other nations of Europe, during the feudal-chivalric epoch, all of them, except the Flemings, the Swiss, and the Irish, adopted in a greater or less degree the style of fighting of the time. Of these exceptions, I need hardly mention that the first named, as from their social constitution, necessarily composed in war a mass of burgher infantry; they were stout soldiers, well equipped, and often did good service. The Swiss, being mountaineers, were also, with very rare exceptions, foot soldiers only, but they were the best troops on the continent of Europe. They had a peculiar armament, two-handed swords, which the Germans learned to use from them, and halberds, which they are said to have invented (Meyrick II. 244). The proper mode of using this peculiar arm is preserved in an old treatise on the art of war by Mons. de Bellay (about 1640), who says—"I have been told by a Switzer that the antient manner of using this weapon was to tell off the front rank of halbardiers alternately into pushers and strikers, so that while one half charged out with their spears, the others struck and cut with the axes of their halberds." The two-handed sword required space

to wield it in, and its exercise was probably not dissimilar to that still practised in this country with the *bana*, an equivalent weapon.* The Swiss drew up their force in regular and orderly array : Mons. de Barrantes (Hist. of Dukes of Burgundy. B. vii.) thus describes their advance at the battle of Granson (1476). "The Swiss moved onwards in square battalia, making a rampart of their long pikes and halberds. Their banner-men carrying their standards, kept in the centre of the battalions : in the interval, were the guns which kept up an unceasing fire. On the flanks Felix Schwarzmurer of Zurich, and Herman of Mullinen, at the head of infantry, armed more lightly, prevented the Burgundians from attempting to turn the main body under Scharnachtal." At Morat in the same year, when the Swiss attacked and defeated the Duke of Burgundy in his strongly-entrenched camp defended by a large train of well-served heavy artillery, they advanced in the same order, and their steadiness and discipline may be estimated by the fact, that although twice repulsed, they still made head against the Burgundians, until their advanced guard under Hans of Hallwyll, having marched parallel to the entrenchments, turned them, when camp, guns, and baggage became their's. On

* There is an animated description exceedingly well conceived of the use of the Swiss two-handed sword in the 1st vol. of Scott's *Annals of Geierstein*.

this occasion, the Swiss were supported by King René of Provence, with his chivalry, and the Lorrainers under their Duke: Charles of Burgundy had also his allies with him, among others a body of English under the Duke of Somerset who fell under the Swiss halberds.

Neither, however, on this occasion, nor in the action of Nanci (1477) in which these brave mountaineers achieved their final victory, which cost Charles of Burgundy his life, did they derive any solid assistance from the chivalry of their allies. The Provençals indeed in this last battle sustained a signal overthrow, and were saved only by the advance of the Swiss battalia. These were the first instances in which the superiority of a disciplined brave infantry to every other arm, was fairly, and incontestably established. The Duke of Burgundy was celebrated in Europe as a skilful general, who prided himself upon a knowledge of all military details, and on the maintenance of a discipline rarely seen in armies of those days. He employed the most expert engineers and had the best artillery of any monarch of the time, while his knights and barons were certainly not inferior to any on the continent of Europe in courage, skill, and military equipment. All proved ineffectual when opposed to a description of troops as yet unknown to modern warfare, the *re-creation*, so to say, of the Legionary formation on an improved principle.

The English had, it is true, given striking instances of the value of infantry, and their peculiar tactics to which I shall advert hereafter, had even found imitators in Europe. Still however it was the fashion of the day to attribute their successes with a mere handful of troops against large armies, to the weapon, the dreaded English bow, with which the majority of their infantry was equipped; and as they had in all cases awaited attack with their dismounted knights and infantry in position, the victories they had achieved were looked upon as casual, and in some sort the result of circumstance. At Granson, at Morat, at Nanci, Europe witnessed for the first time an army of infantry of not less than twenty thousand men move itself to the attack of the best and bravest cavalry, the most formidable batteries, the choicest arquebusiers, commanded by one of the first leaders of the day, and gain in succession victories as complete as have ever been achieved. It is easy to conceive the astonishment and dismay of the chivalric school of soldiery, who saw the prestige of their fancied superiority destroyed for ever. It is in fact from about this period that one may trace the introduction of a new system, whence, as we will endeavour to trace hereafter, was evolved the school of modern tactics. There was much sad truth in the sorry jest of Duke Charles's fool (that same Lagloire immortalised in Quentin Dur-

ward), as they fled precipitately six leagues without drawing bridle, from the field of Granson.* "Ah ! your grace, here we are, *well Hannibal'd* !" Well might the Swiss show the bone heap of the slain at Morat, and point out, as they did, as late as the end of the last century, the marks visible on the blanchéd relics, "of the mighty sword cuts that their forefathers had given to the soldiers of Duke Charles."† They were mighty cuts indeed, for with them hewed they down the military system of five centuries.

After this notice of a nation which played so great and conspicuous a part in its military opposition to the feudal-chivalric school of warfare, it may appear too great a contrast to make special mention of the third people, whom I have recorded as not adopting the panoply and warlike tactics of the day—the Irish. As however they are said to have scouted the use of mail and plate armour, as an unmanly and un-

* "Eh Monseigneur," lui disoit son fou pendant cette triste retraite, "nous voila bien Annibalés !"—*De Barrantes* vol. xi. p. 26.

† This bone-heap called *l'Ossuaire des Bourguignons* contained the corpses of between eight and ten thousand men, and bore a motto in latin signifying that the army of the High and Mighty of Duke of Burgundy slain by the Swiss, left this as its own monument. One of the armies of revolutionary France, passing by Morat in 1798 to subdue Switzerland, thought they perceived in this bone-heap an insult to their national glory. The soldiers destroyed the chapel near it, and scattered the bones.

worthy safeguard, the anecdote is worth citing, shewing as it does, that the spirit of the nation has ever been the same, and that the Irishman in his saffron-dyed tunic, his glyb, and mantle, the old national garb,—was the true prototype of the gallant soldier who now fights bare-breasted, shoulder to shoulder, in manly brotherhood, with the Celt, the Scot, and the Saxon. I should not omit to mention that the mountain troops of Wales seem to have also avoided the use of heavy defensive armour, although their chiefs and barons of the plain country, rank among the chivalry of the day. The Welsh did good service as light troops with the English armies in France, and few inhabitants of the Principality can have forgotten the honorable mention which Shakespeare makes of the way in which they gained their national emblem (King Henry V. Act 4, Scene 7.)

Flu.—"Your grandfather of famous memory, an't please your Majesty, and your great uncle Edward, the plack prince of Wales, as I have read in the Chronicles, fought a most prave pattle here in France.—

K. Hen.—They did, Fluellen.

Flu.—Your Majesty says very true; if your Majesties is remembered of it, the Welshmen did good service in a garden where leeks did grow, wearing leeks in their Monmouth caps; which your Majesty knows to this hour is an honorable padge of the service, and I do pelieve your Majesty takes no scorn to wear the leek upon St. Tavy's day.

K. Hen.—I wear it for a memorable honor, for I am Welsh you know."

Shakespeare has further mentioned the leader of the Welsh at Agincourt, following the chroniclers of the day, with honorable distinction, among the slain in that great battle:

"Edward, the Duke of York, the earl of Suffolk,
Sir Richard Kettly, *Davy Gam, Esquire* ;
None else of note : "

Irish troops are spoken of as accompanying Edward III. in his campaigns in France acting as light troops.* I have made this incidental men-

* "With the English, sixteen hundred Irish Kernes were enrolled from the Prior of Kilmainham, able men, but almost naked; their arms were targets, darts, and swords, their horses little and bare no saddle, yet, nevertheless, nimble, on which upon every advantage they plaid with the French in spoiling the country, rifling the houses, and carrying away children with their baggage upon their cows' backs." (Speed, in Meyrick, vol. 2. p. 117.)

(A. D. 1259) "Shortly after the King himself (Henry 2d) renewing hostilities with the Welsh prince, Llewellyn, sent to ask for troops and supplies from Ireland, against the very cause she had lately so warmly espoused." (Moore's History of Ireland, vol. 3d. p. 26.)

(A. D. 1247.) "In the year 1244, on the renewal of hostilities with France, the King had addressed a writ to the magnates of Ireland, summoning them to join him with their forces; and in the present year, the Earl of Kildare, went with thirty men at arms and forty hobellers, to serve the King at the siege of Calais, where for his gallant conduct, Edward bestowed upon him the honor of Knighthood." (Moore's History of Ireland, vol. 3. p. 102.)

"The Irish despised armour, as being burthensome and

tion of the military character of the Irish and Welsh, simply in illustration of their relative position to the chivalry of the period. The question of national character will be taken up in detail, after noticing some further peculiarities of the feudal-chivalric military system.

The passing mention made above on partizan warfare as practised in the feudal-chivalric æra, whence I digressed to a brief consideration of the anti-chivalrist nations of Europe, cannot be followed out, unless we take some account of those military sports and pastimes so favourite in the middle ages, which, in peace, imitated actual warfare even to the sanguinary conclusion of deadly strife; and in war, on the other hand, caused very frequently the single encounter of detached bodies of cavalry to resemble, in the courtly observance of chivalric formalities those grave and stately fashions which distinguished the tournament and the joust. In both the mimic and the real combats of the period, "love of ladies," to use the herald's cry, was oftenest the cause of "death of knights;" for whereas the jousts were held in honour of the fair sex, who reigned "as judges paramount over the sports" (Strutt. Past. p. 143), so in war also did one knight call upon another to meet him as he

coward-like, and used merely, black woollens,"—(Giraldus Cambrensis. Meyrick, vol. i. p. 55.)

loved his lady, for "it seems," to use Mr Strutt's words, "to have been an established doctrine that love made valour perfect, and incited the heroes to undertake great enterprises."

Thus do we read in Froissart (Book II. c. 27.) how, in Guienne, and not far from the fair city of Bordeaux, the English, having at that time (about 1380) a strong party in the country and many castles held by them,—“The Lord de Langarant, being a knight eager for battle, was riding out one day attended by some forty lances: he advanced near to an English garrison, called Cadillac, which belonged to the Captal de Buch and his brothers. He posted his men in ambush in a wood, telling them he would ride alone to the castle to see if any one would sally forth against him. His men obeyed; when, riding to the barriers of Cadillac, he spoke to the guards, asking, “Where is Bernard Courant, your Captain? Tell him that the Lord of Langarant wishes to tilt with him, and since he is so valiant a man at arms, he will not refuse my request for the love of his lady. If he should not consent, it will turn to his shame and I will publish it every where that he has refused to break a lance with me through cowardice.” One of the valets of Bernard at that time at the barriers, replied, “Lord de Langarant, I have perfectly heard what you have said: I will go and inform my master: for cowardice shall never be a re-

proach to him, if you will be so good as to wait.”
 “By my faith,” answered the Lord de Langarant, “that I will.” The valet went to his master, whom he found in his chamber, and told him what you have heard.”*

* The rest of this spirited description is too characteristic of the times to be omitted.

“When Bernard heard this, his heart swelled within him and he fiercely exclaimed, ‘give me my arms, and saddle my steed for he shall never return with a refusal.’ His orders were promptly obeyed; being armed, he mounted on horseback with his lance and buckler, and having the gates and barriers thrown open, advanced into the plain. The Lord de Langarant was much pleased when he saw him: lowering his spear he placed himself in the position of a good knight, as did this squire. They were both well mounted, and spurring their horses, their lances struck with such force on their shields, as shivered them to pieces. At the second pass Bernard de Courant gave such a deadly blow on the shoulder of the Lord de Langarant as to drive him out of the saddle and fell him to the ground. When Bernard saw him fall, he was rejoiced, and turning his horse upon him, as the Lord de Langarant was raising himself up, Bernard who had great strength, caught him with both hands by the helmet, tore it off his head, and flung it under his horse.

The troops of the Lord de Langarant, who were in ambush noticing all this, began to advance to rescue their Lord. Bernard perceived them, and drawing his dagger, said to the Lord de Langarant “surrender yourself, my prisoner, my Lord de Langarant, rescued or not, or you are a dead man!” The Lord de Langarant, who trusted to his people for assistance, was shy, and made no answer. When Bernard saw that he would not make any reply he was inflamed with passion, and fearing lest he might suffer from delay, struck him with his dagger on the head which was bare and drove it

Here we have one of the many direct instances that might be cited of mortal combat, which in this case led to a fatal conclusion, provoked, not as between antagonists holding different sides in the strife of two great nations, but as by mere fantastic tourneyers breaking a lance for the bright eyes of their lady. Such duels however were not confined to cases, in which the one party summoned his adversary to the field from his leauser or his stronghold, but were frequent even when troops encountered on service in the open country. Thus, to take an instance almost contemporaneous with the one that has just been cited,—thus happened it when the brave Sir William des Bordes “maintained the garrisons in Normandy and Valogne, of which he was Captain,” having with him the seneschal of Eu, Sir Braque de Braquemont, Sir Percival d’Ayneval, the Bèque d’Yury, Sir Lancelot de Lorris, with other good knights and squires, “who, day and night, employed their thoughts in devising how they should damage

into him: then drawing it back, he put spurs to his horse, galloped within the barriers, where he dismounted and put himself in a posture of defence, if there should be a necessity for it. The Lord de Langarant’s people on coming to him found him mortally wounded: they were very much enraged at it, and having bandaged his wound, as well as they could, carried him back to his castle, where he on the morrow expired. Such was the end of the Lord de Langarant in Gascony.”

Cherbourg, of which Sir John Harlestone was governor." (Froissart, Book II. c. 32). "It fell out that both garrisons made an excursion the same day without knowledge of each other, and by accident met at a place called Pastoy-ès-Bois. When they met, like knights and squires desirous of fighting, they all dismounted except Sir Lancelot de Lorris, who remained on horseback, his lance in its rest, and his shield on his neck, requesting a tilt in honour of his lady. Several heard his demand: for there were also among the English some knights and squires who had bound themselves in like manner by vows of love to their ladies. I believe it was Sir John Copeland, a hardy knight, who accepted his challenge. Then spurring their horses, they charged very gallantly, and gave dreadful blows on their targets. Sir Lancelot was however so severely struck by the English knight, that his shield and other armour were pierced through, and himself mortally wounded. It was a great pity, for he was an expert knight, young, handsome, and much in love. He was there, and elsewhere sincerely lamented."

The curious picture herein given of the practices of hostile encounter in the field, regulated by the observances of the tilt yard, both being governed by the influence of female domination,—affords us means of accurately estimating that irregular, romantic, and passionate spirit, which

possessed the chivalric soldiery (as the knights and squires may be termed) of the period,—which made the business of war, and the ends for which it was waged, subservient to the impulse of personal excitement; like as even in peace, it caused the mimic representation of an inimical contest, acted in earnest though in all courtesy, to be looked upon as the main object for which men of honour, birth, and reputation, lived, moved, and had their being.

Among the higher classes of those days, observes Mr Ellis (*English Poets*, v. i. p. 334), “much time must have been devoted to the practice of fighting, both in jest and in earnest; because romance is principally employed in describing the one, and history contains little more than their exploits in the other.” Now the habit of the day was to surround the scene of chivalric pastime with all the splendour of which the times were capable, like as in actual warfare it admitted, wherever occasion allowed, of a sort of imitation of the pompous ceremonial which accompanied the mock-reality of strife, shown in the joust and tournament. In whatever social phase the knight, professing arms, found himself, whether for peace or war, he was equally liable to be placed in a situation which concentrated his ideas as a soldier, on himself. The feats to be performed in mimic warfare were of course essentially personal:—the costly dis-

play* by which he was surrounded in it, provoked ostentation, and incited the emulative efforts of an individual vanity; while, again, the hope of success with the fair sex, as de-

* "At the celebration of these pastimes, the lists were superbly decorated, and surrounded by the pavilions belonging to the champions, ornamented with their arms, banners and banerolls. The scaffolds for the reception of the nobility of both sexes who came as spectators, and those especially appointed for the royal family, were hung with tapestries and embroideries of gold and silver. Every person, upon such an occasion, appeared to the greatest advantage, decked in sumptuous array, and every part of the field presented to the eye a rich display of magnificence. We may also add, the splendid appearance of the knights engaged in the sports; themselves and their horses were most gorgeously arrayed, and their esquires and pages, together with the minstrels and heralds, who superintended the ceremonies, were all of them clothed in costly and glittering apparel. Such a show of pomp, where wealth, beauty, and power were concentrated, as it were, in one focus, must altogether have formed a wonderful spectacle, and made a strong impression on the mind, which was not a little heightened by the cries of the heralds, the clangour of the trumpets, the clashing of the arms, the rushing together, of the combatants, and the shouts of the beholders: and hence the popularity of these exhibitions may be easily accounted for.

The tournament and the joust, and especially the latter, afforded to those who were engaged in them, an opportunity of appearing before the ladies to the greatest advantage, they might at once display their taste and opulence by the costliness and elegance of their apparel, and their prowess as soldiers; therefore these pastimes became fashionable among the nobility; and it was probably for the same reason that they were prohibited to the commoners." (Strutt's Sports and Pastimes. B. iii. c. i. xxix.)

pendent on prowess in the lists, nerved his individual arm for achievements of surpassing power, and endurance. The knight taught in this school, entered the arena of actual war, tutored to the doctrine of military excellence by means of individual acts of prowess: he was ignorant, by his training, of the value of the combination of force, and could only learn the real principles of war, while on service, under a captain whom experience had made wise. The effect of this necessarily was to carry out amongst the individuals composing an army, the same spirit which we have already noted as existing among the divisions, under banner or pennon, in a force of the time: each was actuated by a wish to win honour alone: and among those nations whose character tends to vain-glory, the result of this selfish irrational ambition upon the occasion of great pitched battles, was, again and again, disastrous in the extreme.

During periods of general tranquillity, the knight desirous of achieving renown, would have been reduced to a miserable state of inaction, had he not had the option of either going forth to seek the occasion of exercising his prowess, beyond the limits of his native land; or on the other hand, of fixing on some place within convenient reach, at which he might for a certain term of days, challenge all comers to a trial of skill and strength with the weapons, and under

the conditions duly appointed. "The land of Burgundy being,* at peace," says Mons. de Barrantes, (whose history I quote as the most graphic as to social and national habits of any by a writer of our own day) "and the duke without any dread of being attacked, he took particular pleasure in seeing his knights occupy their leisure time in tournaments." The author, following exactly his authorities, the old chroniclers, and with a most happy adaptation of their style, goes on to cite "the enterprise of the Fair Pilgrim," in which the lord of Hautbourdin appeared under the fabled arms of Launcelot du Lac, one of the imaginary heroes of the old chivalric romance called *La Mort d'Artur*—holding his lists at Saint Omer against all comers. The gallant challenger was on this occasion disappointed in finding opponents within the term announced, for which annoyance however he soon had amends, the brave Jacques de Lalaing, called by common consent, "*the good knight*," having met with an adversary in England, with whom he was to hold a solemn joust at Bruges; this afforded the lord of Hautbourdin an opportunity of meeting in public Bernard de Bèarn, whose tardy arrival at Saint Omer had led to the disappointment above noted.

* A. D. 1442. De Barrantes. Hist. Ducs. de Bourgogne. vol. vii. p. 277.

The opponent of Jacques de Lalaing, who had after signalling himself by a gallant feat of arms at Ghent, visited France, Castille, Arragon, Portugal, and Scotland, with good success and credit in all his enterprises—was a certain squire of Wales named Thomas Kar. This valiant squire had in default of the royal permission, allowing him to accept the general challenge of De Lalaing, and without which none dared fight,—put off from the port of Sandwich to the vessel on which the Brugundian knight had just embarked, and offered to combat the challenger where he pleased. Hence was the place of battle fixed at Bruges, whereat the Welshman specially requested “that the ladies might be present; and present they were, save the Duchess (of Burgundy) who took no pleasure in this description of divertisement and never frequented it.” The amusement (*divertissement*) commenced on this occasion by a combat between the champions on foot with axes. They wielded their weapons stoutly, until the Welshman struck the knight of Burgundy at the joint of the gauntlet, and disabled his left arm. All then thought the duke would interpose to stop the battle, but he would not, fearing lest he should seem to side against the foreigner. Meanwhile De Lalaing had slipped his axestaff, under his left arm, “like as a women carries her distaff,” and swaying it with his right hand, parried the blows aimed at him. His peril was ex-

treme, thus engaging, partially disabled, a strong and skilful adversary, but in spite of the anxious sympathy of the spectators, the duke, "cost him what it might, would fain fulfil his duty as a judge of the combat, trusting in God, and the chivalric bearing of his dear Jacques de Lalaing." His trust was not disappointed, for the Burgundian with singular readiness and presence of mind : closed upon his adversary, and, with the weight of his body, threw him, so that falling on his face, the encumbrance of his armour prevented his rising, and the victory, against all expectation, remained with Jaques de Lalaing.

In the combat which followed between the Lord of Hautbourdin, and Bernard of Bèarn, nothing remarkable occurred, save that the Gascon knight was armed with an axe, the staff of which had a long and sharp point peculiarly adapted for entering the apertures of the visor. He of Hautbourdin perceiving this, instead of objecting to the weapon, took his visor off, and offered himself thus with his face exposed. He took down however, at the same time his device of arms as Lancelot of the Lake, and assumed his own proper arms of Luxembourg. I will not continue to follow up the chivalric progress of the good knight, Jaques de Lalaing, who "having a vow to appear thirty times in the lists for battle before he had attained his thirtieth year," went on to Chalons on the high road for Italy,

where, it being the year 1450 and the jubilee occurring at Rome he hoped to encounter many valiant knights.* Nothing can I think give a better idea of the restless and indomitable passion for warlike excitement which prevailed throughout the feudal-chivalric period than the above-cited casual instances, affording us, as they do also, an insight into the habits of thinking of the distinguished chivalrists of the day. The result

* Consorting with one Pierre de Vaseo, a Spanish knight, did he set up on the banks of Saone a goodly tent having before it a fair picture of the Virgin, holding the Infant, and below it the figure of a woman richly dressed, who seemed in deep distress and whose tears fell into a fountain. Near the fountain was a unicorn bearing the three shields, which were to be touched according as the axe, the sword, or lance were selected for weapons. These two knights remained a whole year at Chalons, to engage all comers in the name of the Lady of Tears. The duke of Burgundy sent Toison d'Or, his herald, to judge the lists, and many knights and squires of Burgundy, Niverne, Savoy, and Piedmont entered them. When the enterprise was accomplished, the good knight gave a grand banquet to all the noble combatants, and placed upon the table an *entremets*, as it was termed (or to translate it in the English of the day) a *sotyltye* (subtlety, or ingenious device) bearing the representation of all his combatants painted with their arms. Beneath the figure meant for himself were certain verses, in which he expressed his gratitude to all the noble knights who had done him the grace to take him as their opponent, and offered to serve them, in body and goods on all occasion henceforth as their brother in arms. Then having courteously saluted the Lady of Tears, and kissed the feet of the Virgin, he caused the picture, the woman's figure, and that of the unicorn to be borne with much state into the church of Chalons, and went to joust in Italy.

is not, as it seems to me, favourable to them ; for under a show of extraordinary delicacy in the exercise of a judicial function, we see one of the leading warriors of the time, expose a man he loved, and the best lance at his court, in a disabled state, to the attack of an unharmed assailant, thereby inhumanly perilling a brave life, and most certainly acting with injustice towards the wounded combatant. "He," says the chronicler, (Lamarche—Vie de Lalaing,) "from time to time raised up his wounded hand whence one might see the blood dropping ; it seemed as though he would show his lord the condition he was in." The duke however did not proclaim cessation of the combat *lest he should seem partial against the stranger* : one does not however perceive what partiality *against* him would have been shown in the very simple course of declaring *him* victor, and saving the Burgundian's life. The judge in this case, either for his own reputation's sake among the vain people of a weak and silly age, made an ostentatious adherence to a fantastic punctilio of unreal honour, in contravention to the duties attaching to his judicial character ; or else, he never wished to see "his dear Jaques de Lalaing" leave the lists alive. The vain-glorious temper of the times gives exceeding probability to the first of these considerations, while the jealous disposition of Charles the Bold favours the latter.

In the second combat again, the conduct of the lord of Hautbourdin in depriving himself altogether of the defence of a most necessary portion of his armour, because his antagonist appeared so armed as to show that he intended to make it the peculiar object of his attack, is marked with the same unreasoning, and irrational ostentation. In acting as he did, he yielded entirely to the suggestions of a senseless vanity. His engaging thus imperfectly armed was fool-hardiness, not courage,—not bravery, but bravado. This affected contempt of danger is as distinct from true valour, as is the insensate daring of a madman from the cool and wary conduct of a real soldier. This however was the general spirit of the famed warriors of chivalry. Like as their war, was for the most part, mere fighting, so were their personal acts of prowess conceived in an analogous form. To compel themselves to the performance of such acts, they took vows, and underwent self-imposed fantastic privations, among which the wearing a patch over one eye until the deed had been accomplished, was by no means uncommon; there is a strain of exaggeration in all they undertake, which borders on the ridiculous, and we might be tempted to smile at the folly of their feats in war, did not the brutality which accompanies them move our disgust.

It will be our business in another place to trace out the manner in which all of this, bad and absurd as it was, became destined to produce eventually, its sum of military benefit. What I would at present endeavour to impress upon those who may take interest in the matter, is that the soldiers of the feudal-chivalric days were, in peace and pastime, just what we have seen them in war and mortal conflict. The apparent polish and magnificence of their mode of life, their exaggerated courtesy, and seeming self-denial, must not impose upon us. We will judge them by themselves out of the writings of the courtly chronicler, who has highest praised them, and we shall find them in the history of private life, and in the record of their individual actions, marked personally with the same stamp, which we have already seen reason to assign historically to the days they lived in. Gaston de Foix, a count and magnate of Bèarn, royally allied, held himself a sort of regal state, and was, in Froissart's estimation,* after all his experience of many courts, and royal households, master of the best regulated and completest establishment, and exhibited in himself the acme, as we gather from the chronicler, of what was considered in those days, the social virtues,—although he had indeed, had the misfortune to kill his eldest son with his own hand : (this unlucky occurrence however

* Book iii. c. 13.

was partially a mistake,—but indeed there was some excuse for it, as the youth was more than suspected of an attempt at parricide by poison.) In the princely hall of this princely noble, remarkable for his intellectual attainments, and the somewhat staid quiescence of his manners, we are somewhat surprised at finding Christmas night celebrated by the excellent joke of roasting, or burning, a donkey alive! The pleasantry was impromptu, devised by a burly strong backed squire for the amusement of his lord, but it was successful, tending, as we find it chronicled, to excite “*the delight*” of Count Gaston Phœbus de Foix.*

* “Three years ago, I saw him play a ridiculous trick, which I will relate to you. On Christmas day, when the Count de Foix was celebrating the feast, with numbers of knights and squires, as is customary, the weather was piercing cold, and the count had dined with many lords in the hall. After dinner he rose and went into the gallery which has a large staircase of twenty-four steps: in this gallery is a chimney where there is a fire kept when the count inhabits it, otherwise not; and the fire is never great for he does not like it; it is not for want of blocks of wood for Bearn is covered with wood in plenty to warm him if he had chosen it, but he was accustomed himself to a small fire. When in the gallery, he thought the fire too small, for it was freezing and the weather very sharp, and said to the knights around him, Here is but a small fire for this weather! Ernauton d’Espagne instantly ran down stairs; for from the windows of the gallery which looked into the court, he had seen a number of asses laden with billets of wood for the use of the house, and seizing the largest of these asses with his load, threw him over his shoulders, and carried him up stairs,

It was not this squire, though it deserved to be, but another, a Limousin by birth, named Amerigot Marcel, noted as having performed "many excellent deeds of arms," who was guilty of what by the tone in which the story is told, was considered as a very witty jest indeed. I cannot but let the chronicler tell his inimitable tale, his own way. "Amerigot made one day an excursion, with only twelve companions to seek adventures: they took the road, towards Aloise, near St. Flour, which has a handsome castle, in the bishopric of Clermont: they knew the castle was only guarded by the porter. As they were riding silently towards Aloise, Amerigot spies the porter sitting on the trunk of a tree without-side of the castle: a Breton, who shot extraordinarily well with a cross-bow, says to him, "would you like to have that porter killed at a shot?" "Yes," replied Amerigot, "and I beg you will do so." The cross-bowman shoots a bolt, which he drives into the porter's head, and knocks

pushing through the crowd of knights and squires who were around the chimney, and flung ass and load with his feet upwards on the andirons of the hearth, to the delight of the count, and the astonishment of all, at the strength of the squire, who had carried with such ease so great a load up so many steps!" (Book iii. c. vii)

This story was told to Froissart by one Sir Espaign du Lyon, "a prudent and valiant knight, handsome in person, and of about fifty years of age," who was one of the knights of Foix, and evidently professed as delicate a perception of a jest as did his chivalric and accomplished lord.

him down. The porter, feeling himself mortally wounded, regains the gate, which he attempts to shut, but cannot, and falls down dead. Amerigot and his companions hasten to the castle which they enter by the wicket, and see the porter lying dead, and his wife distracted beside him: they do her no harm, but enquire where the constable of the castle is: she replies, that he is at Clermont. They promise to spare her life, if she will give them the keys of the castle and the dungeon, which, when she had done for she could not in any way defend herself, they shut her out, having given her what belonged to her, and indeed, as much as she could carry away." (Book II. c. 33.)

The humour of this brutal cold blooded murder had evidently struck Froissart forcibly:—the excellent jest of killing the porter as he sat at the gate at one shot, and then gaining the castle with no tenant in it but the still-warm corpse of its unoffending guardian with the woman, late his wife, by it "distracted!" This was doubtless exceedingly amusing in the estimation of those whom he addressed, and the use of the present tense in his description, to give the more graphic effect, shows what his own opinion was of this passage of his chronicle. But he evidently desires to give you a favourable impression of the actors in this tragedy, who although their style of

practical joke were a little mischievous, or so, are yet, he conceives, good fellows in the main, in spite of their turn for bloody pleasantry. It is expressly noted that they "do the porter's wife no harm," (what a world of reflection as to the practices of the day does not that specification engender!) and they promise (kind and gallant soldiers!) to spare her life if she give up the keys, which she, poor defenceless creature, having done, they generously make her a present of her own property, and of part of their plunder!

But this Amerigot Marcel was not only humorous, according to the habit and temper of the times, but also exceedingly ingenious in war, as we find exemplified in the instance of his capture of the strong castle of Balon by surprise soon after the little incident at St. Flour. "The governor was asleep in the great tower, when he scaled the walls, for the place was not easy to be taken by force: but by means of this tower the castle might be gained. Amerigot therefore thought of a subtle trick; having possession of the father and mother of the governor, he ordered them to be led in sight of the tower, making every preparation to behead them, if the son did not surrender himself. These good people thought they were instantly to be murdered, and cried out to their son to take compassion on them, bewailing most lamentably their unfortun-

ate lot. The governor was much affected: he could not suffer his parents to be put to death: he therefore rendered the tower, when the whole family were thrust out of the castle." One cannot but admit that in spite of the alledged deep policy of this subtle trick, Froissart just allows us to perceive, that after all, our friend Amerigot, in his old humourous way, meant most likely nothing beyond a jest, when he threatened to cut off the heads of an unoffending old man, *and woman*. The governor, however, their son, appears to have been a more matter-of-fact person: perhaps he knew of the pleasantries of Amerigot of old, and might by some accident have heard of the excellent jest of the porter of St. Flour: *he* seems to have seriously believed that he purchased the lives of his parents by the surrender of his stronghold, and by what we know of the soldiers of that day, we may, I think, as seriously allow that his belief was well founded.

In a system of society, which required, in military matters, personal prowess from men of all ranks, it is clear that the animal principle must have prevailed over the intellectual, and in order to understand what the real condition of that society was in a military sense, recourse must be had to a process by analysis, conducted on some such scheme as that pursued in these cursory chapters. We have examined the nature of the military spirit which animated the soldiers of


the feudal-chivalric armies;—we have taken a brief view of the constitution of their main pride and strength, the knights and men at arms;—we have partially glanced at their tactics, and internal composition; and have endeavoured, tracing the intimate connection between the practice and the pastime of war in those days, to follow the soldier, knight, or squire, into positions in which we may judge of him, not as historically in the mass, but individually in the man. The writer would beg to be understood as not professing to attempt the disabuse of any previously conceived impressions, by the mere general reflections, and isolated instances which occur in these pages: their object is not to satisfy doubt, nor regulate opinion, but simply to awaken a desire for enquiry by showing the vastness of the field it offers, and the absorbing as well as varied interest of the subjects it may embrace.

A close inspection of the realities of the feudal-chivalric constitution of society, achieved at the expense of not very much, and yet most interesting, study, cannot fail to create a just appreciation of moral, as opposed to physical, force in war, and establish on more certain grounds the truth of the position, that intellectual cultivation is as necessary to ensure excellence in it, as in all other sciences. The period we have been considering was one in which letters, save for mere amusement, were

lightly prized, in which ignorance was almost universal, and, when strange to say, to be ignorant was even accounted to a certain degree honourable,—as distinguishing the knight from the clerk, the lord from the merchant. The natural consequence was that those of highest rank were often the most coarse, brutal, and ungovernable in character and manners,* an evil barely palliated by the rules and observances inculcated by the profession of chivalry, and, as we have in some sort seen established, the lords, the knights, and squires of the day, carried with them into the field, which constituted their “public life,” the impress of the feelings and habits which characterised their private one.

Before finally taking leave of the subject, it may perhaps be interesting to the reader though not quite germane to the general scope of our enquiries, to illustrate the history of the tilt, by an instance or two of the manner in which challenges were given and accepted, and by a brief exami-

* I take the following curious passage from an account of the coronation of our Richard III. and his queen, cotemporary with the event, in illustration of the indelicacy common even at that comparatively recent date (1483). “And in the means whyle that this servyce was doinge, the Kyng and Quene put of their robes, and there stode all nakyd from the medell upwards, and the Bushope anone anoynted both the Kyng, and the Quene.” *Excerpta Historica*, p. 381, London, 1831. The book is a collection of documents illustrating English history, and is rare.



nation of the occurrences at an actual tournament. Scott and other writers of fiction have familiarised the public to the general idea of the practice of jousting, and the well known tournament in *Ivanhoe*, which I have heard criticised as containing incidents which must have been fanciful, is an exact and real picture of that description of combat, plagiarised, but very allowably, from the tournament in the 17th canto of the *Orlando Furioso*,* and therefore as accurate as may be. I will do no more than observe that the practice of the joust has been severally claimed as a French and a German invention. Strutt (*Sp. and Past.* p. 132,) quotes an authority from the *Encyclopédie Française*, which speaks of the existence of a military game resembling it as early as 862. "Most of the German writers however," says he, "make the Empereur Henry I., surnamed the Fowler, who died in 936, the

* Sir Walter Scott has elsewhere in his works borrowed from the Italian poets in describing combats. The engagement between the knight of the Leopard and Saladin in the *Talisman* is taken from a passage of arms in the *Orlando Innamorato*, the remarkable stratagem on the part of the christian knight, of falling as if slain, from his horse, to induce the light armed Arab to approach within arms length, being detailed to the letter in the poem. Sir Walter's intimacy with Mr Stewart Rose, who gave an abstract with specimens of Berni's continuation of Boiardo's *Orlando Inn.to* and who translated the *Orl. Furioso*, suggests the source whence these useful hints reached him.

institutor of these pastimes: but others attribute their origin to another Henry at least a century later. The French on their side quote an ancient history, which asserts that Geofry, Lord of Previlli in Anjou, who was slain at Ghent in 1066, was the inventor of the tournament."

It has been already observed in the course of this enquiry, that the solidity of the defensive armour, which came into use about the ninth century, naturally suggested the practice of tilting at its wearer, as being the only method by which it might be penetrated; hence in that case arose the tournament. Whatever the era of its introduction, the habit took firm possession of the public mind, and for nearly five centuries occupied it with remarkable tenacity. Jousts were not only the sport of the great and wealthy, but all classes indulged after their fashion in the prevailing mania. The young men ran at the quintain, a block on a pivot carved like a *Soldan* or Saracen; or sometimes a bar similarly balanced, having at one extremity a board or shield, and at the other a sand bag: striking this with their staff (if they could), they had to avoid by their nimbleness and dexterity, the thump that awaited them from either the outstretched arm of the figure, or the loaded bag swinging from the bar. One of these stood on every village green, and a specimen still exists, (Pict. Hist. of England b. III. c. VI.) at the village of Offham in Kent,

being maintained for right of tenure.* Persons, whose business took them on the water, tilted standing in their boats, which their friends rowed swiftly against each other to imitate the knightly career: there were varieties, however, in this water-tilting.† Boys sitting in swings tilted at

* "The youths of this city, and other young men, time out of mind, have left off to practise the disarmed lance and shield on horse back, in the fields, man against man; but in their city they have used on horseback, to run at a dead mark, called a Quinten. For note whereof I read, that in the year of Christ, 1253, the 38th of Hen. G. 3d, the youthful citizens, for an exercise of their activity set forth a game, to run at the Quinten, and whosoever did best, should have a peacock, which they had prepared as a prize."

"I have seen a Quinten set upon Cornhill, by the Leadenhall, where the attendants on the lords of merry disports, have run and made great pastime; for he that hit not the broad end of the Quinten, was of all men laughed to scorn; and he that hit it full, if he rode not the faster, had a sound blow in his neck, with a bag full of sand, hanged on the other end." (Stowe's Survey. b. 1. c. 29.)

So also in "As you like it," Orlando says—

—"My better parts

Are all thrown down: and that which here stands up,

Is but a quintain, a mere lifeless block."

† In Easter holidays, they fight battles on the water. A shield is hanged on a pole, fixed in the midst of the stream, a boat is prepared without oars, to be carried by the violence of the water, and in the fore part thereof standeth a young man, ready to give charge upon the shield with his lance. If so be, he break his lance against the shield and doth not fall, he is thought to have performed a worthy deed. If so be, without breaking his lance he runneth strongly against the shield, down he falleth into the water, for the boat is violently

each other with one foot extended, and representations are found in illuminated manuscripts of children bestriding switches, and tilting in most knightly fashion with their toy lances: nay, the wealthier classes supplied play-things to their children, representing mounted knights, made of brass, with lance in rest, and so fashioned, the knight and horse being separate, that if two of these figures set on little wheels were run against each other, the one whose shield was truly and centrally struck by the lance of his opponent, would be dismounted: some of these curious toys still exist in antiquarian cabinets.* It was about the middle of the sixteenth century that the practice of the tourney began to wear out, and the death of Henry II. of France, in 1559, by a wound received from a lance splinter in the tilt yard, is said to have hastened the desuetude of this mode of engaging, which in England according to Stowe (*Survey of London*, b. 1. c. 29,) was practised to the end of Elizabeth's reign. A more rational cause may be assigned in the growing use of fire arms, and disuse of defensive armour, added to the supersession of the lance by the petronel, or long wheel-lock pistol.

forced with the tide; but on each side of the shield, side two boats, furnished with young men, which recover him that falleth, as soon as may. Upon the bridge, wharfs and houses by the river side, stand great numbers to see, and laugh threat." (*Stowes's Survey of London*. b. 1. c. 29.)

* Strutt and Meyrick.

While the fashion of the tournament prevailed, not the knights themselves could have shown greater interest in it, than did the ladies of the period. I cannot better instance this than by citing the account given by a gallant knight, of the mode in which he, Sir Anthony Woodville, Lord Seales, was honoured by the ladies attached to the Queen Elizabeth, wife of our Edward IV., with what he terms "*a Floure of Souvenaunce*," a sort of keepsake in the shape of a jewel which he understood to be intended as the prize of some chivalrous action, to the performance of which the gift was intended to stimulate him. This occurred at the palace of Shene near Richmond, on the 17th April, 1465, Sir Anthony being then twenty-four years of age, and of great reputation as a skilful and gallant knight. What has been preserved as his own narrative of "The fortune of themprise of the saide full noble, and valerious knyght Sir Antony Wodevile," bears, I think, internal evidence of having been written by another person. It must, however, have been corrected and approved by himself, and is so curious a memento of the manners of the times, that I make no apology for extracting largely from it in describing this remarkable combat.

"The Wennesday nexte," says Sir Anthony, or his chronicler, "aftir the solempne and devoute feste of the Resurrexion of ourc blessid Savvoure and Redemptour Jh'u Criste, for soome of my

besynesse, at the dep'tying from the highmasse, I drewe me to the Queene of Ingland and of Fraunce and Lady of Irlond, my sov'aigne lady, to which I am right humble subyet. And as I spoke to hir lad'ship on knee, the bonet from myne hede, as me aught, I wote not by what adventure nor hou it happennyd till the ladies of hir compaigne aryvid aboute me, and they of theire benyvolence, tied aboute my right thigh a coler of goolde, garnysshid with perre, and was made with oon letter. And whan I had it, it was nerr' my heart than my knee. And to that coler was tied a noble Floure of Souvenaunce, ename-lid, and in maner of an emprise. And than oon of them saide to me full demurely that I shulde not take a woorth,' as at that tyme. And than they withdrewe them all'yhone in their places. And I abbasshid of this aventure rose me up, and went to thank them all' of theire right grete honoure that they did that tyme : and as I tooke up my bonet, that I had lette fall nygh to mee, I founde in hit a bille writyn in smale pchemyn, rollid and closid with a litell thred' of goolde and seallid. Than thought I well that therein was the countenaunce that by them was yoven me."*

Having been honoured with this "emprise," as the enamelled jewell was termed, Sir Antony

* Narrative from the Lansdowne M. S. 285, of the tournament between Sir Antony Woodville, Lord Scales and the Bastard of Burgundy—Excerpta Historica, p. 177.

proceeded at once to the presence of the King, and delivering to him the small parchment roll which he had received with it, requested his Majesty to permit him to undertake whatever feat of arms might be found described therein for his accomplishment. The king opening the scroll caused it to be read in his hearing, and graciously gave permission to the undertaking. Lord Scales, however, before giving us the contents of the scroll indulges in what he terms a "prolog," in which he acknowledges having received the collar and jewell, and declares himself in a somewhat prolix manner, ready to perform what was required of him, "in the wurship, reverence and helpe" of divine aid, "and of the gloriouse Virgyne, and Seint George, very tutor, and patron and cry of Englisshemen, in augmentation of knyghthode and recomendacion of nobley," further for the study of arms and display of valour, "to voide slewthfulness of tyme loste," and, of course, to obey and please his lady. After this preamble we arrive at "The chapitres conteyned in the seide bill for the Armes of horsbakke."

"First—I shall be bounden by expresse commandement to appere at the noble citee of London, at the day and houre that me shalbe lymetid, and ordeyned in the moneth of Octobre next comyng, before the Kyng, my seide soveraigne lorde, or his commissarie depute, my jugie in that ptie; ayenst a noble man of foure lynages,

and withoute any reproche at my choice, yif he will presente hym ayenste me.

"The Seconde Chapitre.

The seconde chapitre is, that we shall assemble on hors : armed ych at his pleasure, in sadill of werre, withoute arrest avantaugeny or malingyne. And we shall ren withoute any toille with groundyn' spere hedis oon course, ych with spere oonly. And than we shall sett the handes to the sharp swerdis, and shall fight, be it with the foyne or with othir strokes, to the vauntage of every pties to the complisemet of xxxvii.; strokes be smyttyn betwene us two.

"The Third Chapitre.

"The thrid chapitre. I shall doo delyver speres and swerdis, of the which my felowe shall have the chois.

"The Fourth Chapitre.

"The fourth chapitre. And yif it happenyd (that Godd defend) that oon of us two be borne to the erthe oute of the sadill withoute fall of the hors, and with stroke of the spere or of the swerde ; the Armes than shalbe holden to be accomplisshid.

"The Fifte Chapitre.

"The fifte chapitre ; that yif any of as two be hurte (that God defende) as weele of the spere and the swerde to the noon power of hym that may not fournysshe, the Armes shalbe than holden to be accomplisshid as above is saide. This is touchyng the first Armes."

The stipulations as regards the second Arms, as they were termed, I do not give, as it suffices to say, that they were used on foot, and consisted of the spear, axe, and dagger ; the conditions as respects the supply of them, and the terms of the engagement being the same. It may be here observed, that the sword and lance were held to be noble weapons, of which, however, the sword stood highest, as the sword, the weapon of the tournament, was held to free (*affranchir*) the lance, the weapon of the joust. A knight, who paid the herald's fee for privilege to joust, had to make a further payment for leave to tourney, whereas having paid for the latter, the joust was open to him of right.

These conditions, together with a letter to the address of the Count de Roche, Bastard of Burgundy, who was held to be one of the most accomplished knights of the day, were duly prepared, and supplication made to King Edward that he would suffer Chester Herald to bear the same together with "the emprise" to the Court of Burgundy. The object of the letter may be easily conceived. The cordial and affectionate manner in which the good Sir Anthony requests his chosen opponent to do him the honour of cutting his throat "for love" is a curious comment upon the strange and high-flown manners of the time, covering, as we know they did, a reality of coarseness, which belied the frivolous and fantastic sem-

blance of civilized behaviour as completely as did the bloody purpose for which, in this instance, its holiday terms were employed. I give the principal portion of the letter in a note,* for those curious in studying the literary style of these amiable cut-throats, and highly-polished ruffians. However let us in this case judge them leniently, the fair sex being the real authors of the mischief; blows "to the complisement of xxxvii," and all

* "I have sent unto you in all affeccion and concordiall requeste, Chestre, herauld and s'vant unto the King of Eng-lond and of Fraunce, my soverayn lorde, to p'sent you in my behalfe theis lett's, theis chapitres, with the right noble Floure of Souvenaunce that hath ben takyn me, and chargid for an emprise; you besechyng and requirynge that it please you to shewe me so muche honoure and frendeship for to touche the seide floure, myne emprise, and to accomplishe the Armes conteyned in theis p'sentz chapitres. The which floure I sent ovir the sea unto you, as unto the moost renowed knyght, and unto the most rediest and determyned in such noble workes to accomplishe; without eblasyng of any other; and that by counsell' nor by enquerrie made, I knowe no choise, nor knowe noone such in any region. And for evir I binde me, and myne, in as much as God hath geve me of gode fortune to be youre as long as the honoure, the lyfe, the goodis may bere. And when the seide herold officier of armes, berer of this emprise above seide, shall retorne unto me, and have made his reporte, and yolden the seide floure worshippid and touchid with so dygne and knyghtly hand as yours is; than shall the seide floure (be) joyously by me takyn agen, and shall make me redy, and bere it as my moost derrest thing, and the cause wherefor I truste to drawe moost frute of worship in this world, and unto the tyme that I have fornysshid and accomplissid theis p'sent armes ayenst you."—*Narrative*, &c. &c. &c., *Exserpta Historica*, p. 185.

the current of a heady fight having been planned, and predevised by the gentle dames for their own special pleasure and glorification.

A solemn and curious ceremony ensued in the King's presence, and before a large assembly of the chief persons about the court, whereby Chester Herald was empowered to proceed on his mission, arrayed in a tabard of Lord Scales' arms; whereon, "the seide Chestre receyved the same emprise named the Floure of Souvenaunce, and it set upon a kerchewe of pleasaunce, (and) tooke the charge of the delyvering thereof, and so departed." Not less formal, nor less brilliant, was the mode in which "the seide Chestre" was received at the court of Burgundy. Heralds and pursuivants went to meet and lead him to his lodging in Brussels, and on the first of May 1465, "ther was comaundid that all the harauldes, and p'sevauntes in the comte of Bourgon, shuld come to Chestre logyng," and thus bring him to the Duke. The ceremony of touching the emprise by the party challenged, which was a necessary sign that the challenge had been accepted, was then performed after Chester had formally announced the reason of his presence in the court. The emprise was displayed by letting fall the lower edge of the kerchief in which it was wrapped, after it had been raised by the bearer on high between both hands. The Bastard of Burgundy having duly and reverently touched it, the heralds covered it

again by raising the lower edge of of the kerchief, wrapping it up in the manner it was when brought into presence.* It was then placed "in a chambre aparte, *as appteyneth*," the last words showing how regular and ordinary these fantastic observances were, while Chester awaited nine days the answer to the letter of which he had been the bearer. On the tenth day the reply was delivered, of which the narrator (whom I rather suspect to have been

* "Than the seide haraldes of the courte and percevauntes went unto anothir chambre, besides the Dukes chambre, and take the Lord Scales' cote of armes upon his body, and the emprise borne on high betwene his hondes in a kerchief of (pleasaunce) honorably, the emprise beyng fastid unto the upp'moost border of the seide kerchief, and coverd with the lowist border of the kerchief, and thus bringyng hit honorably makyng iii. obesaunce in the approchyng of the presaunce, and after the third obesaunce lattyng fall the lowir bourder of the kerchief which covird th' emprise, and stode up upon the right honde of the prynce theire beyng in estate.' *Excerpta Historica*, p. 192.)

"And than the seide Lord Bastarde came unto the emprise, seying unto the heraulde Chestre, I pray you recomaunde right humbly unto my Lord Scales my brothir as hartly as I can: I thank hym right highly of the honoure that he dooth to me by his wrytyng, to the edyfing and encresyng of honoure; and to the fulfillyng of his honorable request, I take upon me by license of my prince to touch this emprise, and oblishe me to accomplishe thes his articles: and with that touchyng; makyng a reverend obesaunce. And than Bourgon toke the nethirmust egge of the kerchief of pleasaunce in the which th'emprise was borne, and Charols the oothir partie: and so covird the seide emprise worthly as it came unto the presaunce aforehersid."—*Narrative*, &c.

no other than Chester himself) gives the following enigmatical abstract:—"and as broth'(er)ly he desireth say Lord Scales to take hym in any thing that is possible and honourable for him to doo, as well afore his complisshyng of his acte as after his seide acte." Chester Herald having received from the Bastard "a rich gowne furrid with sables" which he had worn at the touching of the emprise, together with a doublet of "blak velewet, and the slytes of the doublet sleeves claspid with claspes of golde, and xl. reynes gilderus" (Rhenish guilders), took his leave, and departed.

The upshot of all this solemn foppery did not come off until two years afterwards, the Burgundian knight having occupation on his hands in the shape of a siege of Dinant and other military transactions, which detained him in the field. On the 29th day of May however 1467, did he reach Gravesend, accompanied by about four hundred lords, knights, squires, and others, embarked on four handsome vessels, "richly apparail'de, and enforcid with all maner abilmentes of werre, pennons, banners, gytons, stremers: his gabon also hangid with arrasse," or, in other words, his very cabin hung with tapestry, so splendid was his equipment. Garter King at arms, had been waiting at Gravesend three weeks to receive him, and having "apparailde a barge clenly beseen," was desirous that the illustrious combatant should make his way to London in it. This however he

declined, and sailing on the 30th towards Greenwich, was met "at the Blak Wall," by the Earl of Worcester, Constable of England, with a large concourse of noblemen and knights, as also, "many aldermen, and riche comeners of the citee of London." This gallant company, when he and his "caste ankre a litill benecathe Seint Katyns,* resceyvid hym and his feliship into theire barges, and londid at Byllynges Gate." Passing onwards thence on horseback, he found himself handsomely lodged at the Bishop of Salisbury's palace in Fleet-street.

Shortly after his arrival, King Edward rode in solemn procession from Kingston to, and through London, being met by a vast concourse of dignitaries and wealthy persons, lay and clerical, offered at St. Paul's, and then passed through Fleet-street to the intent it was supposed, that the Bastard should see his adversary, for Lord Scales bore the King's sword before him, riding between the Earl Marshall, and the High Constable of England. The King proceeding to Westminster, the Bastard was that day presented to him, and asked that a date might be appointed for the combat.

"The Kyng callyng his counsell to him, commaundid his sherefs of London to make the barrers to be made in Smythefeld; the which by thavice

* The present site of St. Catherine's docks, where until within the last few years was a hospital of that name, now removed to the Regent's Park.

of the Constable, callyng to hym the kynges of armes, the seide barriers were made: in length the conteyned of iiijxx. and x. yerdes, and in brede iiijxx yerdes of assise; the feld made ferme, and stable assigned: the day to kepte between them the Monday nexte ensuyng, on Thursday Seint Barnabee day, the xjth day of the moneth of Juny."

Mention is then made of the solemn entry of Lord Scales in his character of champion into London, and of his sojourn "unto the bisshopes palace of Ely in Holborne." It is curious that each of the combatants should have had his quarters in an episcopal palace, and affords a singular illustration of the foolish and frivolous manners of the time in which the heads of the church gave up their residences to persons about to engage in a combat, perhaps mortal, upon no more serious cause than the woman's whims of a parcel of idle court ladies. Not less curious is it that the Lord High Constable of England, an officer who held the place of our Commander-in-chief, should have held a military chapter at St. Paul's for the purpose of hearing counsellors on the part of either of the two combatants as to the exact terms of the conditions of fight between them. A very grave disscussion occurred as to each possible point that could be mooted involving an uncertainty as to the issue of the encounter, on each of which counsellors were heard, and a decision

given. As a specimen of the matters disscussed, I take at random the following :—

“Also moved by the counsell of the Bastarde, yif any of them (either of the combatants) wolde charge with an hors the which were terrible to smyte or byte, thorough which the toon ptye myght prevaile ayens the toothir, and take avauntage by the hors ; which the seide Bast’d counsell seide that he never entendid.”

It may readily be supposed that Lord Scales disavowed any intention of taking the field on a charger trained to such unfair practices, and so this deep question among others like it, was duly disposed of. To argue and maintain the respective rights of their several principals, Earl Douglas, and two other gentlemen appeared for the Englishman, while the Burgundian had no fewer than eight knights to defend his interests, all of them his own countrymen. These matters being disposed of, a final order was issued for the preparation of the lists which were enclosed according to the dimensions already noted, by barriers, seven and a half feet high, sunk three feet in the ground, “the field sufficiently sandid as apptyneth, and the Kynges place judicciall vj. spaces neerer the weste ende than the este ende.” When all was ready the Lord Scales took horse the 10th of June, and rode with a large company, “with mynstrelx” playing before them to St. Bartholomew’s in East Smithfield, where he lodged, to

be ready for his undertaking on the morrow. On that eventful day, the lists where kept by Serjeants at arms, the barriers by their men; the High Constable and Marshal looked to the clearing of the ground, which when completed, was maintained by a man at arms at every second post of the lists, while in each corner was set a King at arms crowned, with a herald to take note of what was done.

The king having taken his judicial seat, and all being ready, Lord Scales came to the barrier, two helmets borne before him by the Duke of Clarence and the Earl of Arundel, with two swords and two lances by four other magnates of the English chivalry, and with nine followers richly equipped. Having been stopped and questioned at the barriers as to the reason of his coming, he was admitted to the lists, on which, after coming before the king and saluting him, he retired to his pavilion in the south-east corner of the enclosure. This pavilion, "of double blew satin embrowdir'd with his letters," was decorated with banners, as was every alternate post in the barriers, all being arms of the lordships of his house. The nine horses he brought with him were splendidly trapped, and equipped; and as a very exact description is given of their housing, I am tempted, at the risk of being thought a little prolix, to modernise the report of the chronicler in order to give a sufficient

idea of the extravagance and ostentation of these times.

The first horse ("his owne hors") was trapped with a demi-trapping of white cloth of gold with a St. George's cross of crimson velvet, with a fringe of gold half a foot long.

The second had a close-fitting trapping of tawny velvet hung with many large bells.

The third was trapped to the hoof in russet damask, studded with two letters of his device in jewel work, and studded richly.

The fourth had a demi-trapping of purple damask, "*sumyd with gentilwoomen gyrdill enforcid with goldesmythwerke*" (?), bordered with blue cloth of gold half a foot broad and more.

The fifth was trapped to the hoof in blue velvet, subtly made with plaits of crimson satin down the trapping, decked throughout with jewel work with a border of velvet on green velvet "*prillid golde*" (?) half a foot broad.

The sixth bore a demi-trapping of crimson cloth of gold furred with fine sables, and trimmed a foot and a half deep with the same.

The seventh was housed to the hoof in green damask, "*sumyd with thatire of gentilwomen of Fraunce*" (?) ornamented with jewelry, bordered with russet cloth of gold of half a foot broad.

The eighth was in a demi-housing of tawny damask,

The ninth was trapped in a long-trapping of ermines, trimmed with crimson velvet, and dotted with gold tassels. On each horse was a page, dressed in a mantle of green velvet with jewel work, richly made.

One cannot peruse the list of these costly equipments without being forcibly impressed at once with the magnificence and the frivolity of the time. The great outlay necessary for providing rich cloths, furs, and ornaments of bullion, such as above described, was lavished by Lord Scales, as by other wealthy nobles of the day, for the purposes of ostentation and parade, because there was literally hardly any other mode in which money could be applied so as to produce effect, combined with personal gratification. It was a barbarous splendour indulged by a race that knew not the meaning of comfort, domestic convenience, nor cleanliness, save as regarded the person only. The furniture of the stateliest castle, consisted, even so late as the time of which we treat, of—"but a few oaken benches and tables, raised on strong trestles sometimes mortised into the floor, and sometimes with folding legs, a pair of andirons, or dogs, with their accompaniment of tongs, or a chafer (chafing dish) as generally the whole inventory of the best furnished apartments." (Ellis—English Poets, 1, p. 334). Even upwards of a half century after this period, the well known letters of Erasmus

reacquaint us with the filthy domestic habits of the highest classes of our countrymen, their floors, strewn with rushes, under which lay unmolested a putrid mixture of beer, stinking fragments of food, and all sorts of nastiness. It is therefore necessary that we should look upon the exceeding costliness of display, characteristic of the times, as any thing but characteristic of their state of civilization, and that we should learn to find in this "barbaric pearl and gold," the corroboration of the conclusions at which our previous enquiries have enabled us to arrive, as to the comparative barbarism of those who were so fond of making use of it. There is one very singular indication of the rude fashions of the day, in the list above quoted, of which I do not remember to have met with any other instance, showing, if I read the words which I have given as in the original, aright, that the knights of those days decorated their housings with ladies' favours: what else can be understood from the trappings *sumyd* (seamed?) with gentlewomen's girdles, or with the attire of gentlewomen of France? The tokens of esteem which ladies in those days gave their favoured knights to wear, were by no means confined to scarfs, gloves, or the like, but consisted literally of parts of their attire, which they also were in the habit of taking as mementos from their lovers. Thus in Shakespeare's *Troilus and Cres-*

sida, the sleeve given by the lover to his mistress is faithlessly transferred by her to Diomed, who is represented as being, to use the words of Ther-sites in the play, "that doting foolish young knave *with a sleeve on his helm.*" The railing cynic goes on to express his hope that "the Greekish villain with the sleeve may be sent back on a sleeveless errand," a conventional phrase which doubtless took its origin from the practice of giving rewards, or tokens in this manner. It may be as well to observe that the false, or hanging sleeve was for many years a favourite appendage to dress, and was often made the object of lavish expenditure.

The display made by the Bastard of Burgundy, to resume the subject of our chapter, was no less splendid than that of his adversary. He entered the lists with eight horses, ridden in like manner by his pages, save one which bare housings of his arms: all were decorated with the same lavish outlay. With this gallant array he came to the barriers, and having been admitted, presented himself before the King, and received leave to accomplish his enterprise. He then put on his helmet and made choice of a sword and lance, after which a proclamation was made at the four corners of the lists forbidding all men from approaching the lists or making "any noise, murmur, or shoute, or any other manner signe, or tokyn" whereby the combatants

should be, "either troublid or comfortid." When this was done, the cry *Lessez aler* was given by a herald, and the knights ran a course, "*and failed bothe unhit*," a somewhat sorry, but not unfrequent issue after so much costly preparation*. Lord Scales then threw away his lance and cast off his bever from his helmet as also his† garde-brace, and vambrace, as did also the Bastard, but not so speedily as his opponent "who sought hym ferthir on the grounde," or passed from his own near the other extremity of the lists. The English knight thrust at the Burgundian, in the neck, which was answered by "an egge stroke uppon the helmet," but at the same moment, unfortunately, the Bastard's horse struck the

* It may illustrate this remark to give the result of the tilting of four days by three knights against all comers, at St. Inglevere near Calais. 1st day 9 knights challenged. 2d day 11. 3d day 11. 4th day 10: they performed as follows.

	Courses.		Hit.		Unhorsed.		Unhit.
1st day	— 33	—	22	—	2	—	9
2d day	— 34	—	26	—	1	—	7
3d day	— 38	—	32	—	1	—	5
4th day	— 29	—	22	—	4	—	3

Thus, of 134 courses, 110 were effective as regards the *at-taynte* or hitting, the knights sometimes losing their helmet, or stirrup, breaking their lances, or getting wounded, or thrown: 24 courses missed by the swerving of the horses. Thus on these results, it was about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 against a miss, and 17 to 1 against a fall. In all these tilts only one knight, a Bohemian, behaved against the rules, and perilled the forfeiture of his horse and arms.

† Tilting armour for the shoulder and fore-arm.

chamfron, or steel spike, with which his frontal was armed into Lord Scales's saddle, and fell upon his rider, dead, as Lamarche, who was present, declares, although our chronicler makes no mention of more than the fall, and inability of the Burgundian to rise again.* Having been taken up and brought before the King, he was asked if he would have another horse, according to the conditions allowed at the chapter of arms: "his answer was, that it was no seayn. Then the Kyng comaundid hym to go to their log-gyng." It will be charitable to suppose that the Bastard was stunned or hurt by his fall, otherwise his reply does not satisfy one as to his resolution, and under any circumstances, the preparations of two years, and the muster of half the chivalry of two great nations, resulting in nothing but two blows and a tumble, is somewhat contemptible.

The next day Lord Scales appeared in the lists with his horse trapped to the hoof in crimson velvet, "sumyd with gartirs richly made, and bourd'rid with frence of golde," and hung round with seven targets, having his arms painted on them, and one with the whole arms, blazoned, on his back. He was followed by eight

* The way in which the result of this famous encounter is generally reported in our histories taken from the English chronicles, Fabyan and others, gives the *chamfron* to Lord Scales, which the account before me expressly denies.

coursers harnessed in harness of one suit, so that the display of equipment was entirely different from that of the day before. The arms to be used, two casting spears, two axes, and two daggers, were brought in with him. The Bastard dismounted at the barriers, and came before the King, "syttynge in his magestee justifieng the feeld," in a long gown of blue velvet, having his body armour in his pavillion, which was of white and purple damaske, and the valance of green velvet. The same solemn fopperies of asking the combatants wherefore they came were repeated, when,—“The kyng beholdynge the castynge speres right jep’dous (jeopardous) and right plious (perilous), saide, inasmuche as it was but an act of pleasure, he wolde not have noon suche myschevous wepens used before him; and commaundid the seide speres to be leide aparte, and ordeyned the toothir wepens, that is to say, axes and daggirs; the Bastarde to have the chois, accordynge to the Articles conteyned in the chapitre.”

It might have been supposed that after thinking about the matter for two years, his Majesty, might have come to the conclusion that casting spears were specially mischievous, in time to prevent their being produced: as this, however, would have interfered with the show and formal ceremony, which appears to have been the life

and soul of these ostentatious pageantries, the weapons were permitted to be brought in; but their exclusion from the actual service of the day under the terms said to have been used by King Edward, gives significant evidence of the dread which even the mail-clad men of those days entertained of missile weapons. The combatants accordingly, after many formalities in the shape of visitings of them in their several pavilions by the high Constable, and punctilious reports made by him to the king, were confronted in the lists armed with their axes. "And then" says the Chronicler "they avaunced; and so right afore the Kyng, either assaillid other in suche wise, as the Lord Scales at the rencountre with the poyrte of his axe stroke through oon of the ribbes of Bastardes plates; as the seide Bastarde shewid hym aftir the felde. And so they fought togidire; the Lord Scales with the hede of his axe afore, the othir with the small end; and smote many grete combres and thik strokes; till' at the laste that they fell' towards a crosse, at which tyme the Lorde Scales stroke hym in the side of the visern of his basenet. Then the Kyng perceyvyng the cruell' assaille, cast his staff and with high voice, cried" Whoo'! Notwithstandyng' in the departing, there was yoven, ii. or iii. grete stroke; and oon of the ascotes* stafes brake betwene them."

* Scouts—men at arms placed within the lists to keep them.

Thus ended this tournament, which led, as was always the case, to other challenges among the knights assembled, and further battles. We must be content with this single instance of them. The subject is popular, and the authorities which might be quoted, curious and plentiful, but they must not tempt to too long a digression from the general object of our research. I will merely mention that the thirteenth chapter of the fourth book of Froissart's Chronicles contains the completest and most spirited description of a joust that is perhaps extant. It is very much too long for even a partial extract, and an analysis, which I had intended making, would destroy the spirit of the graphic original, and do injustice to its writer. From the days of early boyhood to the present time, the writer has again and again recurred to this passage of the worthy chronicler with constant interest and unvarying pleasure, and to it he would wish the reader to refer. Whether as a record of past habits, an illustration of the laws of the joust, or, with all its quaintness, as a model of descriptive writing, the chapter of the tournament of Saint Inglevere is equally interesting, instructive, and worthy of attention.

Y

CHAPTER VIII.

OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND INTERNAL ARRANGEMENTS OF
AN ARMY IN THE FEUDAL-CHIVALRIC PERIOD.

It is very evident that the result of our enquiry, as far as it has gone, has not as yet put us in possession of a proper estimate of the nature of more than the purely chivalric element in armies, as constituted prior to the sixteenth century, save of course as respects the Anti-chivalric nations. We have ascertained that the principle of military strength did not, and could not exist in that element; for an attentive examination has shown us that individuality, so to say, was the pervading tendency of all the feudal-chivalric habits of war. The leader of a body fought for his banner, while among the very knights who were supporting him, not one but conceived his first duty as a chivalrist was to fight for himself. Personal renown and personal advantage, in prisoners, and plunder, was the motive object of the great majority of combatants in these unwieldy masses, and the great military axioms, unity of action, and obedience to one head, were, if not wholly lost sight of, at any rate greatly disregarded.

We cannot suppose that the practical inconveniences arising from such a state of things, failed to have their effect in suggesting a pal-

liative, if not a remedy, and we accordingly find at a very early date, that in most European countries, high military officers were appointed with rank and authority irrespective of their feudal consequence, to command under the King, or for him, when his army took the field. Such were the High Constable and Earl Marshal in England, the latter of which offices was as ancient as the Conquest; — such was the Constable of France, whence doubtless we derived the idea of the appointment. These officers enjoyed peculiar perquisites, and privileges, for the performance of the staff duties of the army, and one of these was to see that every man who came to perform feudal service for forty days in the field, did not leave head quarters without a certificate of service performed :* this in itself was a virtual delegation of the signorial right to exact this service by the King, to a person holding military power

* “ Item.—The Constable ought to have from the army horses for himself and suite; and the Marshall, and a Clerk of the King’s wardrobe, ought to receive all the persons who come to serve the King for forty days, who, when they have performed their services, cannot depart from the army, until they have letters from the Constable and Marshall, testifying that they have duly performed them : and the Marshall ought to appreciate the horses, which are to be prized ; and his Clerk ought to act as counter pleader, against the clerks of our Lord, the King.

(*Earl Marshall’s Droits and Fees : Grose, Mil. Hist.*—vol. i. p. 228.)

under him. But this was by no means the only infringement of the semi-independence of feudality; for both Constable and Marshal held courts wherein military offences were adjudicated, and punishments assigned;* they also kept musters of the effective strength of the force in the field.

Now the first of these privileges involved a direct supercession of the feudal authority of the liege lords of such soldiers, their vassals, as were brought before the military tribunal; while the right of mustering the men, of forfeiting their equipment in default of service, of valuing their horses (the worth of which, if lost on service, the King made good) points at a species of direct military interference with the soldier, equally incompatible with the existence of the soldier-vassal's immediate dependence upon his lord. Such, however, were the powers which,

* "Item.—The Marshall should be at the ordaininge of the batailles, before the King and council, respecting their arrangement into constableries; and he ought as well as the Constable to have a roll of all the men of arms in the army, and of all the infantry, to be the more able to appoint the watches, sentinels and scouts, for the safety of the army; and when the batailles are arranged, the Senaschal ought not to meddle with the pleas in the army, which belong only to the Constable and Marshall, of which the Constable is to have the fines, and the Marshall, the amercements and forfeitures of all those condemned, and the profit of all those committed to prison.

(*Earl Marshall's Droits, &c. &c.*)

with others as complete, the Marshal Thomas de Brotherton, claimed to exercise in the time of our Edward I. This nobleman seems to have been nominated to the high office after the direct refusal of both the High Constable and the Earl Marshal of England in 1297, to leave the country, when thirty bannerets and fifteen hundred knights, destined to form the strength of two armies for Guienne and Flanders, immediately followed these high officers, the Earls of Hereford and Norfolk, and abandoned the King. The proud answer of the latter feudal magnate on this occasion to the king's imperious requisition, has been recorded in our histories. "By the everlasting God, Sir Earl, you shall go, or hang!" "By the everlasting God, Sir King, I will neither hang, nor go!"

There can be little doubt, but that Edward, who was a thorough soldier, had required from both the chief military functionaries of the country, the exaction of a discipline inconsonant with the constitution of a feudal army, which neither they would incur the odium of imposing, nor the lords and vavasours agree to submit to. The record of this fact remains in the curious document, already above quoted in a note, and which Grose gives at length, setting forth the arbitrary but wholesome authority, which the new Marshal (the King's son, and doubtless a disciplinarian like himself), arrogated to himself in

virtue of his high office. The result is curious, and instructive. Edward, having by persuasion as much as by the exertion of arbitrary power, induced the monied classes to submit to the imposition of further taxes, was enabled to sail for Flanders, where he subsidized allies in Germany and Brabant, and with his (paid) troops, attempted to take the field. The mariners of the Cinque Ports, and Yarmouth, however, attached to his fleet, quarrelled, and fought, burned twenty-five of their own ships, and, according to Holinshed, carried off three large vessels, one of which was freighted with treasure, an act of direct piracy; while his troops on shore fought with their allies, the Flemings, for the division of the spoils of Bruges (as yet untaken), and broke out into sanguinary conflicts with the people of the towns they were quartered in. The army, if it deserved the name, was in a sort of transition state,—unfeudalised by Edward's attempt to establish a system of general discipline; but deprived of its accustomed leaders in the process, and as yet wholly undisciplined by those to whom in default of those officers, new and unwonted authority had been delegated. The epoch is important in the history of the military constitution of troops, and we will recur to it.

I have never, to the best of my recollection, met with the mention in historical record prior to the sixteenth century, of any other officers

than those above named as holding high military authority in a feudal army. The High Constable and Earl Marshal appointed subordinate officers even to the leaders of the small pelotous of horse termed *constabularies*,—and fulfilled in their own person, or by their deputies, the whole of the staff duties of an army in the field. The subdivision of the duties of the staff must have occurred at a comparatively late period, and quite at the close of the epoch which this part of our enquiry relates to: for in the Ordinances,* or General Orders issued at Maunt in 1419 by our Henry V. for his army then in the field, and which are almost a repetition of those of Richard II. published in 1386, there occurs no title or denomination of officer other than the Constable and Marshall, except the “herbergers,” who answered to our Quarter-Masters.†

Grose gives the Master of the Ordnance as the officer next in rank in the English army to the Constable and Marshal, but notes that the ap-

* *Excerpta Historica*. See Appendix to these pages, where these orders with those of John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury in Henry VI.'s reign are printed at length.

† Thus in Chaucer—

—Upon this argument of *herbergage*,
Wel sayde Solomon in his langage;
Ne bring not every man into thin house,
For *herberwing* by night is perilous.

Prologue to the Coke's Tale.

pointment was necessarily of late creation ; Ralph Bigaud, appointed in the first year of Richard III, being the first who held it. This of course proves that the titles of military functionaries found in MS. of uncertain date, such as the Provost Marshal, the Serjeant-Major-General, (who appears to have been a sort of Adjutant-General) the High Harbinger, or Herberger (Quarter-Master-General), the Scout Master, and others, were of comparatively modern creation, the term *General* being known to have been introduced, as a military one, into English not before the reign of Henry the 8th. The simplicity of the military constitution of a feudal army is thus evident from the paucity of its superior officers. In France the High Constable*, the

* " When the King takes the field with the army, he ought to march in battalia ; and first, the Constable should command forth the scouts, who should be good soldiers and well mounted ; after them a Mareschal, or other vaillant man, leading a squadron of choice men, having a sufficient number of archers, for the protection of the scouts ; and there should be the masters of officers, prevosts, fourriers and their people, for distributing quarters after these, comes the Constable in the van-guard, with a sufficient number of barons, and good soldiers, and there are their pennons, banners and standards, and their body of archers, who go before.

" After them comes the master of the cross-bows, with the archers ; then comes the first esquire of the esquierie who carries, or causes to be carried, the royal standard. until it is wanted for service ; and after him are the pages on bar-

Marshal*, and the Admiral of France, held the chief authority in the field ; next to whom was the Master of the Crossbows, a large force of whom, chiefly Genoese mercenaries, was employed customarily when the army took the field. The Italians for their burgher forces, appointed a sort of Commandant-in-Chief termed *Gonfaloniere*, while with the Spaniards,† Germans, and other Chivalric nations, the office of

dex war-horses and the King's horses who bear rich bacinets, helmets, lances, salades and hats ; after them come the trumpets, and then the King's banner, which the first Chamberlain, surrounded by Kings of arms, heralds and pursuivants is to bear, or cause to be borne, till it is wanted for service ; after all these comes the King in person, accompanied by dukes, counts, barons, and princes, and other noble and powerful men ; and the first groom carver should be next behind him, carrying his pennon, which should move to and fro, every where the King goes, in order that every one may know where he is ; and the banner pennon, and standard horses are at the conclusion of the campaign, the right of those who have borne those designs ; the two wings of the corps de battail, and their archers, should be commanded by two princes, admirals, or marshals, or other wise and valiant captains, who should speedily send some good and able cavalry, to reconnoitre the way and country ; after all these comes the rear guard, commanded by a duke, count or mareschal, well accompanied by valiant men, and the archers belonging to them, who behind them, should have a little square of good troops ; and after them, some horsemen well mounted, to prevent their being attacked in the rear."

(*Ordonnance of Philip le Bel*, A. D. 1306—in Grose, vol. i. p. 221.)

* Monstrelet. i. c. 15.

† Froissart. iii. 15.

Marshal, or one equivalent to it, was commonly in use for the guidance and ordering of their feudal levies.

Two great causes intervened to effect a complete subversion of the feudal military constitution, prior to that still greater change, which was to alter the whole character of war by the introduction of gunpowder: these were the substitution of paid troops for feudal levies, and the discovery, already partially illustrated, of the true value of infantry.

The first of these alterations was evolved in Italy and in England: in Italy, partly from her social constitution, the effect of which on her military habits has been already noted, and partly from her mercantile prosperity which gave her the means of employing hired soldiers; —in England from the political institutions of the country, which was never perfectly feudalised, and which in consequence possessed an agricultural commonalty or yeomanry, a set of "free men in no respect bound to the soil or otherwise subjected to a qualified servitude, as the villains were. They held apparently the same legal position that all commoners hold in the present day, modified only by the very different state of society, and of the law generally which then prevailed."* Parts of England were oppressed, it is true, to a grievous extent by the

* Condition of the people before 1214. Pict Hist. of Eng.

result of the Norman conquest.* The state of serfage to which the Saxon population had been reduced, deprived them indeed of all right to possess property, or command the disposal of their own person. "It is customary in England,"† says Froissart, "as well as in several other countries, for the nobility to have great privileges over the commonalty whom they keep in bondage; that is to say, they are bound by law and custom to plough the lands of gentlemen, to harvest the grain, to carry it home to the barn, to thrash and winnow it: they are also bound to harvest the hay, and carry it home. All these services they are obliged to perform for their lords, and many more in England than in other countries. The prelates and gentlemen are thus served. In the counties of Essex, Kent, Sussex, and Bedford, their services are more oppressive than in all the rest of the kingdom." The populace of these counties, instigated in some degree by certain mal-content citizens of London, and, it is surmised, not without the connivance of some of the nobles, rose in 1381, in the well-known insurrection under Ball, and Tyler; while many in Cambridge, Suffolk, and Norfolk followed their example, endeavouring to obtain Sir Robert Salle, Governor of Norwich, as their leader. "He was not a gentleman by birth," the chroni-

* Thierry's Norman Conquest.

† B. ii. c. 73.

cler observes, "but having acquired great renown for his ability and courage, King Edward had made him a knight: he was the handsomest and strongest man in England." The miserable rabble of serfs, not one in twenty of whom, according to one authority,—according to another not one in a thousand, had arms, appealed to the popular prejudices of a knight, whom they looked on as in fact one of themselves, saying,—“We know who you are: you are not a gentleman, but the son of a poor mason just such as ourselves.” These instances establish on the one hand, the unarmed and defenceless condition of the great mass of the lower orders; but on the other they show that there was so much of a sort of social freedom prevalent, as not to institute a positive disability against one of this degraded class, raising himself by courage and conduct to a high rank in the profession of arms. Salle, the mason’s son, as military governor of a great city in England, is a sort of counterpart to Sforza, the labourer, in Italy, as the leader of armies, and the counselor of magnates of the land.

But if the people were indeed the defenceless multitude we find them here described in 1381, to whom was the Statute of Winchester addressed in 1285, commanding every man to provide himself with armour “according to his station, the poorest with bows and arrows at the least?”

They were no other than the yeomanry, or free soldiery of England, classed as early as 1193 as a separate and acknowledged body in the commonwealth, when, "the King's messengers came to England with his letters, addressed to all Bishops, Barons, Clerks, and *Free-tenants* :—"*—they were the very pith and nerve of the military power of the country;—they were the descendants of those sturdy Saxon Yeomen who took to the green wood, rather than submit to the grinding oppression of their conquerors, when, to use the peculiar expression of an old legendary poet,—†

"Robyn Hode was a *proude* outlawe."

The race he belonged to spurned the law which a foreign domination would impose, and refused

* Sic Hoveden in An. 1193. pa. 725, *venerunt in Angliam Nuncii Regis cum literis illius missi ad omnes Archiep.—. Barones, Clericos, et Francos tenentes.* (Spelman in voc. FRANCUS.)

† The line occurs in an old metrical legend quoted by Bishop Percy (*Reliques*. i. p. 85.) in his preface to the ballad of Robin and Guy of Gisborne. It speaks directly to the grade in society which this celebrated outlaw occupied—

'I shall tell ye of a good *Yeman*,
His name it was Robyn Hode.'

I note this because in later times there was an attempt to aristocratise Robin which Thierry exposes the futility of. He with his followers in the midland counties, like the northern out-laws, Adam Bell, and his two associates in the forest of Englewood near Carlisle, are the type of the Saxon free-men, who banded together to avenge the injuries inflicted upon

to render an enforced service. Hence ensued it that at a very early period the English obtained the grant of what may be called, their military charter. We have already seen how military service on any but their own terms, had been in Edward the First's time, repudiated by the English lords and knights in words equivalent to a declaration of immunity from feudal obligations, and how that monarch was compelled to have recourse to the commonalty for funds wherewith he might raise soldiers out of their own body. It was left to the Third Edward in 1337 to emancipate the English of all classes from all military obligation save in extreme cases, and establish among them a freedom as respects the necessity of military service, analogous to the liberty which already even existed, as to the attainment of military rank and advantages by any man, when serving.

them by their Norman oppressors, and visit on their heads the perjury of the Conqueror who swore to restore the laws of the good Confessor, Edward, and thereby won the insurgents under Frithrik to trust to a compact he never intended to abide by.

'They were outlawed for venyson
These yemea everichone;
They swore them brethren upon a day
To Englyshe wood for to gone.'

(Ballad of Adam Bell, Clym of the Clough, and William of Cloudeslee. Percy's Reliques, i. p. 161.)

“Edward, immediately on his accession though of comparatively a tender age, was so impressed with whatever was connected with the martial character of his country, which he knew would be cherished by nothing better than liberty, that in the very first year of his reign, a statute was passed, respecting the *posse comitatûs*, which might be termed a declaration of individual freedom. The section of the act to which I allude, runs thus: “Item, le roy voet desormes nul soit charge de soi armer, autrement qu’il ne soleit en tems de ses auncestres roys d’ Engleterre; et que nul soient distreintez d’aler hors de leur countez, si non par cause de necessité de sodeigne venue des éstranges enemys en roialme, et adonques soit fait come ad este fail avant ces heures par defense du roialme. “Also the King wills from henceforth that no one be at the charge of arming himself otherwise than has been the custom in the time of our ancestors, Kings of England. And that no one shall be compelled to go out of his county except on account of necessity arising from the sudden invasion of strange enemies in the kingdom, and then the same shall be done as formerly in defence of the kingdom.”

This King too, introduced a practice, which was constantly followed by his successors, of engaging with his subjects and other persons by indenture, to furnish soldiers at certain wages.

Most of our armies from this time, therefore, consisted of stipendiary troops.”*

It must not however be inferred from the above, that the system of employing hired men, or *soldiers*,† in war originated in England with this monarch, as Sir J. Meyrick’s somewhat careless expression seems to imply. “Stipendiary troops both national and foreigners, existed in the English armies and garrisons at all times from the Conquest downwards ;” says Grose, “the first hired by our Kings with the money paid by persons for commuting feudal service, and employed in castle guards, foreign garrisons, and in protecting the marches or borders next to Wales and Scotland : the foreign-

* Meyrick’s Ancient Armour. Vol. ii.

† The old German word *SOLD* or *SOULD* which means *stipend*, is the origin of a term which has passed into most European languages as the generic one for a man of military calling or habits. Its English form is due to the corruption of the latinized rendering of the original ; *SOULD* became *soldum*, in gothic latin, i. e. a *fighting man’s pay*, and he who drew it was termed *soldarius*, or *solidarius* : the Italian and Spanish terms formed on the original root, are *soldato* and *soldado*, whereas we have taken a secondary application of the original, as our derivative. Spelman quotes (in voc. *Soldarius*) a passage from Hovenden (536, l. 52) which may illustrate the mode in which the word became familiarised to us,—“*cum 300 militibus solidariis Regis*”—which, literally to be rendered as “three hundred of the king’s *paid fighting men*,” would easily suggest a convenient abbreviation for the three underlined words ; *solidarius* becomes *soldier*, (*paid man*), and the specific mention of the duty for which his pay is given him, needless.

ers were paid out of the privy purse, or suffered to live at free quarters." Foreigners were employed by the Kings William Rufus, Stephen, Henry II., and John, and seem to have been Brabanters, Provençals, Germans, and Flemings, at least such are names under which these mercenaries are mentioned. Henry the First, who is said not to have employed foreigners, seems on the contrary to have afforded, observes Grose, the first instance in our history, of the engagement of soldiers by contract, an agreement being extant in which the Earl of Flanders for the consideration of four hundred marks in silver per annum, engages to provide five hundred men for the King's service either in England or Normandy, each having three horses.

But even in countries strictly feudal, one encounters at a very early date direct instances of the payment of bodies of soldiery, when large armies are assembled for continuous operations in the field, giving evidence of the impossibility of depending, even in the full working of the system, upon feudal levies summoned for forty or sixty days' service. It was found even then necessary to create a nucleus in the army, of real military efficiency, in the shape of troops, whose service was as to period unlimited, and who owed obedience to the military commandant of the whole force, not to the intermediate power of their feudal leader. We find, to give

a familiar instance of this, that at the battle at the ford of Blanchetaque, which preceded the great fight of Crecy, Sir Godemar du Fay, who commanded the French, had "certain knights and squires from Artois and Picardy *in his pay*." He had also some of those Genoese mercenaries armed with crossbows, fifteen thousand of whom fought at Crecy; "he had collected in his march great numbers of the country people: the townsmen of Abbeville also accompanied him, excellently well appointed:"* besides these his force consisted of a thousand men at arms and six thousand foot. The force so constituted contains all the elements of a continental army of the period: 1. The feudal chivalry, and their contingent of horse and foot: 2. The foreign mercenaries whose peculiar armament supplied a notorious defect in the French armies, weakness in missile power: 3. The burgher troops of the nearest town, well found and armed: 4. And lastly, the *levée en masse* of the people, a useless rabble who contributed much to create a fatal confusion. "All the roads," says Froissart, "between Abbeville and Crecy were covered with common people, who, when they were come within three leagues of their enemies drew their swords, bawling out "kill, kill;" and with them were many great lords that were eager to make show of

* Froissart, B. i. c. 124.

their courage: there is no man unless he had been present that can imagine, or describe truly the confusion of that day: especially the bad management, and disorder of the French, whose troops were out of number."

Who can refrain from pausing a moment to take a glance at their opponents—nay, the digression is in place, for are they not the yeomanry of England, the very subject of our present thoughts? In face of the Genoese, "banditti accustomed to pillage and murder," who could not be trusted the previous night in Abbeville, lest they should plunder the town,*—in face of the roaring, yelling rabble, with which the country seemed as covered—in face of "those kings, earls, barons and lords of France,"† so proud of their individual prowess that they "did not advance in any regular order, but one after the other, or any way most pleasing to themselves," were "the English in three divisions, seated on the ground, who, on seeing their enemies advance, rose undauntedly up, and fell into their ranks." I do not think it in the power of language to express more forcibly the contrast between the character of the opposed forces than do these simple words. In the chivalric portion of the English army, we can,

* Beltz's Inquiry into Hist. of the Battle of Crecy. *Archæologia*, v. 28, ix.

† Froissart. B. i. c. 129.

save that they are our countrymen, have little more interest than in any other of the fantastic fighters of the day, waging war in a bad cause for the mere fighting's sake ; but I confess that my sympathies are always deeply moved by the contemplation of that noble infantry, all free soldiers, each man there of his own free will, ready to take each his share in the bloody business of war with the same deliberation with which he had made his election to incur its risks. They were a handful of men as compared numerically to their foe, but they were calmly confident in their strength and courage ; the English knights, and men at arms from the proudest to the poorest, had, according to the national custom in the field, dismounted, and all fought on foot, thereby giving heart and encouragement to this gallant infantry, every man feeling he was there to stand to the last. The attack that ensued, and how it was induced, I copy in the words of the old translator of Froissart,* Lord Berners ; nothing can to my mind be more admirably descriptive.

“Whan the Genowayes were assembled toguyder, and beganne to aproche they made a great leape, and crye to abasshe thenglysheimen, but they stode styll, and styredde not

* The editor of Johnes' Froissart quotes this remarkable passage as apparently translated from a M.S. slightly differing from Mr Johnes'.

for all that. Than the Genowayes againe the seconde tyme made another leape, and a fell crye, and stepped forward a lytell, and thenglyshmen remeued not one fote : thirdly againe they leapt, and cryed, and went forth tyll they come within shotte : than they shotte feersly with their crosbowes. Than thenglysshe archers stepte forthe one pase, and lette fly their arowes so hotly, and so thyeke that it seemed snowe. Whan the Genowayes felte the arowes persynge through heedes, armes, and brestes, many of them cast downe thir crosbowes, and dyde cut their strynges and returned dysconfited. Whan the Frenche Kyng sawe them flye away, he said—" Slee these rascals, for they shall lette, and trouble us without reason ;" than you shoulde have sene the men of armes dasshe in among them ; and ever styll thenglysshmen shot where as they sawe thyekest preace ; the sharp arowes ranne into the men of armes and into their horses, and many fell, horse and men, amonge the Genowayes, and when they were downe, they coude not relyne agayne ; the preace was so thicke that one overthrewe the other. And also amonge the englysshmen, there were certayne rascalles that went a fote with great knyves, and they went in among the men of armes and slewe and muredde many as they lay on the grounde, both erles, barrones, knyghts and squyers, whereof the Kyng of Englaunde

was after displeased, for he had rather they had been taken prisoners."

It will not fail to be observed that a special distinction is drawn between the rascals (light troops and camp followers), and the yeomen, and knights, who, it is said afterwards, "never quitted their ranks in pursuit of any one, but remained on the field, guarding their position." We here see the conduct of the national soldier placed in strong contrast to that of the foreign mercenary, contrast not less strong than in the case of the Swiss at Granson and Morat when opposed to the Italian hirelings attached to the Duke of Burgundy's Army. It cannot, however, be denied that the Genoese had no fair play at the hands of their employer, whose senseless petulance sacrificed them as well as his own chivalry. The Genoese under Doria and Grimaldi, natives of a land in which military duty was, with the exception of the burgher troops, almost entirely performed by hired men, either foreigners, or indigenous, seem to have done their best as good mercenaries should do; but they were overmastered by a description of soldier, who looked upon himself, as I shall show hereafter, as superior in military consequence, not only to them, but to the knightly combatants themselves.

Enough has perhaps been said to establish the generality of the early practice, both in

France and England, of purchasing the services of soldiers, without quoting another instance incidental to this very battle, at which,—“The King of France was still expecting the Earl of Savoy, who ought to have been there with a thousand lances, as he had been well paid for them at Troyes in Champaign three months in advance.” (Froiss. 1. c. 126). In Italy the custom had been so well established, that the word *soldato* was a common term at the commencement of the 13th century, sanctioned doubtless by previous usage of no inconsiderable duration*; while in the wars of the period, we find constant mention of German mercenaries in considerable bodies, whose services were purchased for periods of from three to six months by the Florentines, Pisans, Siennese, or other of the constantly contending states, among which Northern Italy was divided. In the contest for the kingdom of Apulia and the Sicilies, between Charles of Anjou, Manfred the bastard of Germany, and Conradin his half brother, during the latter part of the 13th century, mercenaries of all descriptions took arms for pay under the several competitors. Manfred for instance took the field in 1265 with a large force of Germans and Apulians, his light troops consisting of the Saracens settled at Nocera, who with bows and crossbows flocked

* Villani. Istorie Florentine. B. vi. c. 2. c. 77.

to his aid as mercenaries "in large numbers." (Villani vii. c. 5. and 7.). Charles opposed him with a large body of French cavaliers, another of Provençals, Romans, and mixed nations, a third of Flemings, Brabanters, and Picards. After the battle of Grandella, in which Manfred lost his throne and life, Charles found his tenure of the newly acquired kingdom, supported by the opportune arrival of his cousin Don Henry of Spain, with eight hundred Spanish lances "most worthy folk, and handsome," (Villani vii. c. 10.) "who were gladly taken by king Charles into his pay." An army, however, also of mercenaries, was raised by Conradin, the third competitor, who, in 1267, made his appearance from Germany in Verona, "followed, it is said, so far, by close upon ten thousand men on horse and hackney;* but for want of money to pay so many men, the greater part of them returned to Germany: yet of the best he kept some three thousand five hundred German knights." (Vill. vii. c. 23.).

I will not multiply instances. We have sufficiently satisfied ourselves as to the early general use of paid troops in war, the first step to the formation of a military force permanently en-

* *Cavallo e ronзино*: the Italian editor (Milan 1802) of Villani looks on these terms as applying to a soldier's and civilian's horse respectively: a passage from Villani already quoted (by me c. iv.) disproves this.

tertained, the nucleus in times to come of a fully formed and regularly disciplined army. When, however, with reference to these early periods, we make use of the word *pay*, it would be wrong to understand, that this in all cases expressed the assignment of a regular stipend to the soldier in money. With the English it was so doubtless, as from the time of Henry II. beyond which no record exists, the rates of pay were issued for military services in money at so much *per diem* according to rank and armament. In the reign of Edward III., these rates were fixed more generally and accurately for all grades of persons attached to the army, and there was little alteration in them thence up to the reign of Mary.* This was however by no means the case with continental forces, and there is no doubt but that many soldiers, nominally so, were mere adventurers, who got perhaps a bounty or gratuity to cover the costs of their equipment, and followed the army in hope of pillage, or free quarters, the most oppressive mode of satisfying the soldier's demands, and one to which no people would have submitted, but those too poor to pay a tax. After the battle of Montlhery, and the treaty of Leige in 1465, the Count de Charolois (afterwards Charles the Bold) paraded his army, amounting to "upwards of twenty-eight thou-

* Grose. Vol. i. p. 352. On Military pay of the English, where the subject is treated with great care and research.

sand horse, not including the infantry which was very numerous, although many had returned home with leave, and without leave, in default of being regularly paid. When the army was then drawn up, the Count rode along the line, thanking most courteously all the Captains, and men at arms, begging they would hold him excused for having so badly paid them, for that, he could not now have avoided it, but that he would make them full amends by more regular payments, so that every one should be satisfied." (Monstrelet. B. III. c. 136.). One immediately enquires in what manner, such being the case, so enormous a body could subsist itself, and another cotemporary historian assists us in solving the mystery, writing as he does of the military economy of the Burgundian Dukes, incidentally to a disquisition on the faults and errors of princes.

"—— Nor do they take any care to restrain the licentiousness of their soldiers who are quartered up and down the countries without paying any thing; and commit all manner of insolencies, as every body knows; for not contented with the ordinary provisions of the farmer, who pays them their wages, they beat and abuse the poor country people, and force them to buy wine and other nice dainties that are to be bought in the market, on purpose for their eating: and if the good man's wife or daughter happens to be handsome his wisest course is to

keep them out of their sight: and yet where money is plentiful it would be no hard matter to prevent this disorder and confusion by paying them every two months at farthest, which would obviate their pretence of want of pay and leave them without excuse, and without any inconvenience to the prince, because they are paid punctually every year. I speak this in compassion to this kingdom, which certainly is more oppressed and harassed in quartering these men at arms than any in all Europe.”*

It seems to us extraordinary that such a state of things should have obtained in a country, almost one with that France, whence but in the previous reign the ancient enemies of the land had been driven out, after a partial occupation of near two hundred years, solely by the care its king had taken to organize, and to maintain a well paid army.† But, to follow out the ques-

* De Comines. *Mems.* b. v. c. 18.—It is remarkable enough to look at the contrast to the above state of things afforded by England, so early as the reign of Richard II. who, says Froissart, (B. iv. c. 64) “was nine months in Ireland at great expense, which, however, was cheerfully defrayed by his kingdom; for the principal cities thought it well laid out when they saw their king return with honour:—there were with this king four thousand knights and squires, and thirty thousand archers all regularly paid every week.”

† “The English from that moment (signing of the treaty of peace in 1461 between France and Burgundy) lost ground in France; and King Charles prospered so much that he reconquered from them the whole of his kingdom, with the

tion, and on the evidence of the same historian, still more strange does it appear that the troops of a country so overrun and oppressed by their number about the end of the fifteenth century, should, but a few years before, have been contemptible alike as to discipline, number, and equipment, proving still further the conclusion at which we have hitherto invariably arrived, as to the unmilitary character of the boasted time when every man was a soldier. At the battle of Montlhery (1465), De Comines says (B. i. c. 3.) :—"when they came near enough to use their

exception of Calais, Guines, and Hammes, which are situated on the confines of the Boulonois. After these conquests, he always kept on foot fifteen hundred lancers, and from four to six thousand archers, on regular pay :—namely for each man at arms, and three horses, fifteen florins, royal money, and for each archer seven florins a month. These sums were raised by taxes on the inhabitants of the good towns and villages, and in common, so punctually collected that there was scarcely any delay in the payments. The men at arms and archers were under such good discipline that no pillager nor robber dared to infest the highways for fear of them, or they were continually on the look-out and pursuit of such with the officers of justice. These men-at-arms escorted the merchants who travelled with their merchandize from place to place, so that every one was pleased with them; for before their appointment, those called Skinners, from their robbing all who fell in their way, were the sole guides of the merchants, whom they plundered." (Monstrelet—Chron. b. iii. c. 98.)

Herein we find the original of the *gens d'armes* of France, that celebrated police, which amid so many changes, has subsisted and continues to our day under its ancient appellation.

lances the Burgundian horse broke through the ranks of their own archers (which were the flower of their army) without giving them leisure to discharge one arrow. The whole number of our horse was not above 1,200, and of these scarce fifty knew how to manage a lance, not four hundred of them armed with back and breast, and very few of their servants with any arms at all; and the reason of it was because of the long peace, and because for the ease of their subjects, the House of Burgundy had not been used to keep any standing forces in pay; but since that time that country has not enjoyed any repose, but is rather grown worse than better at this very day," — as shown in the passage previously cited.

Who that reflects on such instances as these, of the alternate helplessness, and misery of a country, at one time destitute of defenders, at another ground to the dust under their exactions, but must acknowledge that one only remedy for these mighty evils is to be found, and that in the creation of a standing army, constitutionally governed, and raised by the fiat of the people. In England the first vestige of a permanent armed force, maintained in serviceable condition permanently, appears in the King's serjeants at arms. This body, raised originally by Richard the First, consisted but of twenty-four, and was termed, "the valorous force of

the king's errand." It consisted of persons of approved worth and not under the degree of a knight's son.* In the time of Edward III. their muster was as follows—"Sergeauntes at armes with their retinue. Standard bearers 4, Sergeauntes† 67, men at armes 3, archers on horse 7, archers on foote 9." The Yeomen of the guard, at one time a numerous body, and the band of Gentlemen Pensioners, were subsequently permanently attached to the royal household and formed the nucleus, the first named, in the opinion of Meyrick, more especially so, upon which in time arose the standing army of England.

We have now seen how material a share England has had in the introduction of a

* Grose, vol. i. p. 193.

† This word, technically used in the present day to express a particular military grade, as also in certain civil professions, is a mere barbarised rendering of the gothic latin term, *servientes*, those who do duty. Spelman, (Gloss. in voc.) thinks that it was applied in its original military sense to a half-armed soldier: there hardly appears reason for this. The term was convenient, and became largely given to various offices in which duties were discharged dependent on the crown, or any superior authority. The idea now attaching to it in our army may have had its origin in the consignment of raw levies of the *posse comitatus* to the charge of some experienced retainer (*serviens*) who thence found himself in the position of commandant of a small peloton; so placed, the term which had defined his subordinate station grew into the title which was to distinguish his new office.

rational principle, (the regular and permanent payment of the soldier for his services,) into the military constitution of the armies of more modern times. The patriotic feeling which leads the inhabitants of free countries to band together at their own cost for the defence of their fatherland, is in no way affected by the acknowledgment of the national soldier's right to his hard earned stipend. Let danger threaten his hearth, and his home, and every man in every land that has a home worth fighting for,—every free man that is,—becomes a soldier on the instant; but this is not the business of war, and the Englishman with his national plain sense, soon perceived that his ability to combat in his own soil, was no argument for his being taken beyond its limits to fight in his king's quarrel on foreign ground. He was one of the first among modern nations to assert the right of his free will in this as in all else that concerned the disposition of himself by others. Let us go on to see how this free spirit exhibited itself, in conjunction with that of other like nations, in working out the second of those two military revolutions, which we began by noticing,—the establishment of the real value of good infantry.

CHAP. IX.

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A FEUDAL CHIVALRIC ARMY AS
RESPECTS THE USE OF INFANTRY.

It will not, I trust, be supposed that while laying stress upon the lead taken by the English in common with the Italians and the Swiss, in establishing important changes in the military system of Europe, the writer is at all attempting to flatter the national vanity of his countrymen, or to make a case in favour of the skill and military sagacity of their forefathers. The attempt in either event would be an unworthy one, wholly at variance with the spirit in which these running comments have been conceived. The cursory examination into the military character of modern European nations, to which the reader will be hereafter invited, cannot fail to place prominently forward the faults and errors of our countrymen, and as there will be no attempt to gloss over, nor conceal any of these then, so let us not now do them injustice by failing to notice honestly those military merits, which History has proudly recorded, and the voice of Europe, tacitly or by acclaim, confirmed.

The extraordinary victories atchieved in such rapid succession by the armed force of the confederate Swiss cantons, on foot, over the chi-

valry, the trained mercenaries, and the well served artillery of Charles of Burgundy, had, as has been already observed, the effect of producing an entire change in men's opinions, as to the respective value of mounted men and infantry in the field. The Swiss have gained the credit of first inculcating the useful lesson; the Spaniards enjoy the reputation of first, in the creation of a national dismounted force of trained men, following it out; the very name, indeed, by which such troops are known is Spanish; but the real merit of understanding and appreciating the value of a body so composed, is exclusively and entirely English, and, let me add, Scotch. For centuries before the battle of Granson, the English had possessed a system of national tactics, which they invariably employed in all general actions; and this, the dismounting of their knights and their fighting on foot, was the strongest practical exposition of their idea of the value of a foot soldier. Nay, not only had they established this as their own practice,—they had even, by the example of their successes thus atchieved, induced its adoption among their continental allies, long before the Swiss halberdiers descended in arms from their fastnesses, and destroyed for ever the pride of mounted chivalry.

We have the remarkable testimony of De Comines to this fact, clearly proved by the

evident imitation of the English mode of disposing the force of archers, but still more strongly established by the historian's own admissions, made respecting an event which occurred eleven years before the action of Gran-son. The passage containing it is as follows: "The Count of Charolois's troops ranged themselves in order of battle as they marched up; and upon his arrival he found the Count de St. Paul on foot, and drawing up the rest of his army in the same order, all the archers being dismounted, and every man with a stake planted before him. Our first orders were, that every man should alight, without any exception; but that was countermanded afterwards, and most of the men at arms mounted again. However several persons of quality were continued on foot, and among the rest the Lord des Cordes, and his brother; the Lord Philip de Lalain was likewise on foot (for at that time among the Burgundians it was most honorable to fight in that manner among the archers), and there was always good store of those volunteers among them to encourage the infantry, and make them fight the better; which custom they had learnt from the English, when Duke Philip was confederate with them, and made war upon France for two and thirty years together without any cessation."*

* *Memoirs. B. i. c. iii.*

But direct as is this testimony, we have it in our power to establish the fact of the English ruling the tactics of the day from a period immediately subsequent to the battle of Crecy, upon information quite as definite. The Free Companies, banded to the number of sixteen thousand men, who defeated Lord James de Bourbon at Brignais (A. D. 1361), owed their success to their formation in the first instance; and in the second place, to the advance of their main body at a critical period of the action "in close order like a brush," to use Froissart's graphic term, "with their lances cut down to six feet or thereabouts,"* and of course on foot. At the battle of Cochérel not long afterwards, between the English and Navarrese under the Captal de Buch, and the French under Sir Bertrand du Guesclin, the latter again appear dismounted, no longer, as at Crecy, trusting to their mounted chivalry. "No one had ever seen a battle with the like number of combatants," observes Froissart, "so well fought as this was; for they were all on foot, and combated hand to hand." At the battle of Auray in Brittany (A. D. 1364) the same imitative disposition is observable among the French, again under Du Guesclin, opposed to the English and Bretons under the Earl of Montfort. "The French were in such close

* B. i. c. 215.

order that one could scarcely throw an apple among them without its falling on a helmet or a lance. Each man at arms, carried his spear right before him, cut down to the length of five feet ; a battle-axe, sharp, strong and well steeled was at his side, or hung from his neck. *—*—*. On the other hand the English were drawn up in the handsomest order."* Both in this action and at the previous fight at Cocherel, the French are represented as being so strongly armed (taught by the sad experience of Crecy) as to suffer but little from the English arrows. But this advantage only served to bring out the English archer as a fighting man. Their shot doing little execution, "upon this," says the chronicler, "they flung away their bows ; and being light and able men, they mixed with the men at arms of their party, and attacked those of the French who had battle-axes. Being men of address and courage, they immediately seized several of those axes, with which they afterwards fought valiantly, and successfully."†

* Froissart. B. i. c. 222.

† Froissart. B. i. c. 227. I may here mention that the value of the battle axe in a mêlée seems to have been held above that of the sword. Sir Reginald de Boullant who on a retreat struck down three of his pursuers with his sword, "had he had a sharp battle axe in his hand at every stroke would have slain a man," says the chronicle (B. i. c. 207.)

This incident puts us in possession of the reasons which induced originally the adoption of this method of fighting on foot on the part of the English knights and men at arms. The stamp and character of their foot soldiers constituted them the strength of the army. "I am of opinion," says De Comines, "that the chiefest strength of an army in the day of battle lies in its archers; but they must be strong, and very numerous, for few signify nothing:" then after remarking that for one single action raw soldiers are better than those that have been trained in the wars, he adds—"In this I am of the same opinion with the English, who without dispute are the best archers in the world."* But he with, the rest of the military writers of continental Europe seems to have been misled by an idea to which I have already alluded, that the English excelled by their skill as bow men, and not so much by their value as infantry; whereas the merit lay, not in the missile, but the man. The instance I have just cited is one of hundreds which might be brought forward to show that the English foot soldier, without his bow, was as formidable from his personal power, his courage and address, as when acting at a

* It is very remarkable that this opinion quoted as prevalent among us 350 years ago should have been so singularly corroborated by our last great continental victory.

distance from his enemy armed with his peculiar weapon.

There is no doubt, but that the reputation which our English infantry originally established, was intimately connected with their skill in the management of a missile weapon of great power, the effect of which was particularly formidable against cavalry. "Arrows," says Joshua Barnes (Meyrick vol. II.) "enrage the horse and break the array, and terrify all that behold them in their neighbour's bodies." But it is in all cases not the nature of the weapon which is permanently effective, but the nature of the man that wields it. It is not the true eye nor the firm hand, but the stout heart, which gives power in the field to any peculiar armament. The long bow was a weapon singularly well adapted for the English yeoman. It required great physical strength, and still greater acquired knack in its use to render the person who wielded it worthy of the name of an archer. The English yeoman, hardly and roughly nurtured,* but plentifully

* "Our fathers (yea, and ourselves also) have lien full oft upon straw pallets, covered only with a sheet under coverlets made of *dagswain* or *hopharlots* (I use their own terms), and a good round log under their heads instead of a bolster or pillow. If it were so that our father, or the good man of the house, had within seven years after his marriage, purchased a matrass or flock bed, and thereto a sack of chaff to rest his head upon, he thought himself to be as well lodged as the lord of the town; that, peradventure, seldom lay in

fed,† and overcome by no excessive toil, was able from his earliest days, to devote no inconsiderable portion of his time to the acquisition of a bed of down or whole feathers. As for servants, if they had any sheet about them it was well; for seldom has they any under their bodies to keep them from the pricking straws that ran it through the canvas of the pallet, and raised their hardened hides." Mr Ellis (English Poets, vol. i. p. 326), quotes this passage from Harrison's Description of England prefixed to Holinshed. *Dagswain* is interpreted to mean any *patched material*; the inconvenience of "the pricking straws" may be better understood when it is recollected that up to the end of the sixteenth century persons of all ranks slept entirely naked.

† The serfs or labouring poor fared poorly as Mr Ellis observes, (Eng. Poets. vol. i, On social condition of the English); but, quoting from Sir John Fortescue on the laws of England, he points out that at scarce any small village do you fail to find a knight and esquire, or substantial householder termed a frankleyne, "*all men of considerable estates; there are others called freeholders, and many yeomen of estates sufficient to make a substantial Jury*" (ch. 29.) Here we have fresh evidence of the substantial character of this class, of their number, and of their importance. As a sort of collateral proof that their value as material for troops, arose from their social position and physical as well as moral advantages, we may trace in the cotemporary condition of the French people of a similar rank, the cause of their inability to afford the element of a sturdy and determined infantry. Fortescue on Monarchy. (c. iii) as quoted by Mr Ellis, says, "The same commons be so impoverished that they may anneth (*scarcely*) live. They drink water: they eat apples with bread right brown made of rye. They eat no flesh, but if it be seldom a little lard, or the entrails or heads of the beasts, slain for the nobles, or merchants of the land. They wear no woollen, but if it be a poor coat under their outermost garment, made of great (*coarse*) canvas, and

sition of skill in the use of this difficult and formidable arm. If resident in, or near a forest district, he either had, nor took, the privilege of exercising his skill upon the wild deer of the neighbouring woods; if not, the village butts, the county prizes, gave him ample stimulus for the exercise of an art, which he well knew would constitute him, in the event of hostilities in his native land or beyond sea, one of the most valuable portion of the force that any of the contending parties could assemble. Excellence in the use of the long bow, upon the history and nature of which weapon I shall take occasion to observe more at length in the Part

they call it a frock. Their hosen be of like canvas, and passen not their knee, wherefore they be gartered and their thighs bare. Their wives and children gone barefoot; for some of them that was wont to pay to his lord for his tene-ment, which he liveth by the year a scute (*crown*) payeth now to the king over that scute five scutes. Wherethrough they be artyd (*compelled*) by necessity, so to watch, labour, and grub in the ground for their sustenance, that their nature is much wasted, and the kind of them brought to nought. They gone crooked, and are feeble, not able to fight." The English "so advantageously distinguished from other nations by a superiority in food and clothing," as Mr Ellis observes were singularly careless as to the comfort of their dwellings even up to the reign of Elizabeth. They were a hardy race, and the old author, already quoted (Harrison) writing in that reign, inveighs with bitterness against the "*tenderlings*," who seek to introduce chimnies and glazed windows. This carelessness of comforts made the English of those days naturally hardy soldiers.

II. of these remarks, was an heirloom with the English yeoman, handed down from father to son with jealous care, maintained and fostered by the legislature up to a comparatively late date, as many extant statutes prove.* The decline of archery, and the light in which it was viewed cannot be better illustrated, than by the citation of a passage from the sixth published sermon of Bishop Latimer; it has been often quoted, but I make no apology for giving it again, as cited by Sir S. Meyrick (*Ancient Armour*, vol. III.)

“The arte of shutyng hath bene in tymes past much esteemed in this realme; it is a gyft of God, that he hath given us to excell all other nacions wythall. It hath bene Goddes instrumente, whereby he hath gyven us manie victories agaynste oure enemyes. But nowe we have taken up horynge in townes instedde of shutyng in the fyeldes. A wonderous chynge, that so excelente a gyft of God should be so lyttle esteemed. I desire you, my Lordes, even as you love honoure and glorie of God, and intende to remove his indignacion, let there be sent forth some proclamacion, some sharpe proclamacion, for they not do thyr dutye. Justices now, be no justices; ther be many good actes made for thys matter already. Charge them upon

* Daines Barrington's *Practice of Archery in England*. *Archæologia*, v. vii, 4.

their allegiance, that thys singular benefit of God may be practised; and that it be not turned into bolling, and glossyng, and horing wythin the townes; for they be negligente in executyng these lawes of shutyng. In my tyme, my poore father was as deligent to teach me to shute, as to learn any other thyng; and so I thinke other menne dyd, their children. He taught me howe to drawe, how to lay my bodye in my bowe, and not to draw with strength of armes, as othyr nacions do, but wyth strength of bodye. I had my bowes bought me according to my age and strength, as I encreased in them; so my bowes were made bigger and bigger, for men shall never shute well, excepte they be brought up in it. It is a goodly arte, a wholesome kynde of exercize, and much commended in phisike. Marcilius Sicinus, in hys boke *De Triplici Vita* (it is a great whyle, sins I red hym now); but I remember he commendeth thys kinde of exercise and sayth, that it wrestteth agaynste manye kyndes of diseases. In the reverence of God, let it be continued. Let a proclamacion go forth, charging the justices of peace, that they see such actes and statutes kept, as were made for thys purpose."

It will be seen from the language of this energetic appeal, that the belief that Englishmen owed their superiority, not to themselves, but to their weapon, had favourers even in the island

itself, a fond idea dwelt upon by the lovers of our ancient national arm, who took not the trouble to study the actions of the men that bore it. The use of the bow went out with us, less on account of the introduction of fire-arms, than, as has been soundly remarked by an observant writer,* by reason of "the long interval of peace after the accession of the Tudors, during which time it fell into disuse." But, (to take instances of our military prowess when this weapon was in war almost extinct) the men that fought at Zutphen in 1586, or retreated through the Duke of Parma's army, but a thousand strong under the gallant Sir John Norris, did no whit worse when they made head against the best soldiers of the day in Europe, than had their predecessors in the British ranks when they defeated on foot the first chivalry, as it boasted, of the world. The material out of which troops are made continuing the same, we have in all time the making of troops as good as any that have preceded them. The English foot soldier, in whatever manner armed has, when well commanded, ever shown the same spirit; and, despite of change of armament, and tactics, in the same way, centuries ago as now; whether drawn up array to resist attack as at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, or dashing at a battery as at Dix-

* Southey's History of Brazil. Vol. i. note 51.

mude.* "The archers attacked the French camp though defended by a strong battery, poured a volley of arrows into the trenches, fell on the ground till the guns had been discharged, rose on their feet, poured in a second volley, and rushed precipitately in into the camp. Such was the resolution of these troops, that John Person of Coventry, having lost his leg by a cannon shot, continued to discharge his arrows, sitting or kneeling, "and when the Frenchmen fledde, he cryed to one of his followers, and saide, have thou six arrows that I have left, and folowe thou the chase for I may not."†

It is such troops as these that have ever been the hope, and pride of our army. They have stamped the memory of their value in our very language, by the proverbial term, *Yeoman's ser-*

* In 1489 under Lords Daubeney and Morley.

The use of the bow was acknowledged in our armies at late as 1643, when the Earl of Essex issued a precept, "for stirring up all well affected people by benevolence towards the raising of a company of Archers for the service of th-King and Parliament. In a pamphlet printed 1664, noting Montrose's successes against the Scotch, bowmen are frequently mentioned." (Grose, Vol. i., p. 149). I should think however that the Archers in this case were only to be found among the Highland clans, as instanced into Scot's novel, the Legend of Montrose.

† Walsingham in Meyrick, vol. ii.

vice,* as applied to the best and stoutest aid in time of need. The first of our poets has immortalised them as the military stand-by of his native land, while our national ballads speak in more homely language, to the hearts of the people, of their constancy, their valour, and their devotion. See how Shakespeare ranks the infantry of England in his exhortation to battle—

“ Fight, gentlemen of England !—*fight, bold Yeomen !*
Draw, archers, draw your arrows to the head—
 Spur your proud horses hard and ride in blood,—
 Amaze the welkin with your broken staves !” —

The address to the chivalry of the army being preceded by that to the commonalty;—and again—

—— “ And you, *good Yeomen*,
 Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture : let us swear
 That you are worth your breeding ; which I doubt not,
 For there is none of you so mean and base,
 That hath not *noble* lustre in your eyes.”

Hear again how, in the words of one of those plain old lays, the war stirring spirit of which poems, as Sir Philip Sidney said of Chevy Chase “ do move the heart more than a trumpet,” the nameless poet of the people has recorded the gallant deeds of Willoughby, and his nobly con-

* Thus in Hamlet—

“ I once did hold it as our statists do,
 A baseness to write fair ; but, Sir, now
 It did me *Yeoman's service*.”

fidest dependance on the handfull of infantry he commanded—

“ Stand to it, noble pike men,
And look you round about,
And shoot you right, you bowmen,
And we will keep them out :
You musket and caliver men
Do you be true to me,—
I'll be the foremost man in fight,
Says brave Lord Willoughby !”*

The detail of the action, as the ballad goes on to give it, has so singular a coincidence (like the attack at Dixmude) with the feats of arms of our modern infantry, that I cannot forego the pleasure of quoting further from a homely poem, which I have always read with singular interest :—

“ For seven hours to all men's view,
This fight endured sore,
Until our men so feeble grew,
That they could fight no more ;
And then upon dead horses,
Full savourly they eat,
And drank the puddle water
They could no better get.

When they had fed so freely
They kneeled on the ground,
And praised God devoutly,
For the favour they had found :
And beating up their colours,
The fight they did renew,

* Ballad of Brave Lord Willoughby. Percy's Reliques.
V. ii., xx.

And turning on the Spaniard
A thousand more they slew.'

* * * *

Then, courage, noble Englishmen,
And never be dismayd;
If that we be but one to ten,
We will not be afraid.—"

a sentiment, which the English soldier feels as strongly now as in the days of Willoughby, or of Erpingham.

To return to the infantry formation of our armies,—such being the constitution of its main portion, and such the successes it had atchieved, we can be but little surprised that it became "honorable to fight in this manner among the archers," as De Comines says; nor that the impression gradually gained ground that the dismounted man, provided with or supported by an efficient missile arm, constituted the real strength of troops in war. The dress and armament of our archers was exceedingly well adapted for effectiveness in the use of their peculiar weapon, as well as for service at close quarters. At the battle of Agincourt, they are thus described by Fabian.* "The yeoman hadde at those dayes thir lymmes at libertye, for their hosyn were than fastened wyth one point, and their jackes were longe, and easy to shote in, so that they myghte drawe bowes of great

* Grose, vol. i. p. 147.

strength, and shote arrowes of a yerde longe besides the hedde." The hose or nether garment being attached to the doublet by only one tie, or point, the jack, or coat of proof being long and loose, the freedom given to the body must have been complete. Thus attired, with his pointed stake* which every archer carried set firmly in the ground before him, so as to keep off the attack of cavalry, his sword and buckler, which he wore hung at the hilt, and his axe, or leaden mallet as his heaviest weapon, the bowman was equally prepared to overwhelm his enemy with the sustained shower of missiles at a distance, or meet him when he closed hand to hand.

The formation of archers was in the English army in the form (as at Crecy) of a *herse*, an oblong machine used in the defence of fortified places, being in fact a sort of bristled portecullis. In the battle above mentioned their front was of two hundred bowmen, ranked forty deep, this depth being, says Meyrick, less than usual. The bow it must be remembered was an exceedingly effective weapon, whether used in line or column, as the rear ranks could always shoot with success at a slight elevation over those before them. In this formation the men at arms and knights were sometimes, directly in their rear, as at Crecy; sometimes as at Navaretta in Spain (A. D. 1367) when

* These stakes are constantly mentioned as munitions in the arsenals of the time; see Grose and Meyrick.

our army was to take the initiative, the bowmen were stationed on the flanks of the men at arms.* The range of their shot was certainly effective at twelve score yards, when aim was taken at an object. "He'd clap ye i' the clout at twelve score" is the commendation Shakespeare uses for a good archer; but this was not the extreme range of the bow in his hands. Neade who wrote on the bow in the reign of Charles the 1st, gives, says Grose, a range of from sixteen to twenty score yards, and evidence is afforded by Daines Barrington (*Archæologia*, Vol. VII.), that the distance which he measured in 1737, between two of the still extant butts of the Finsbury company of archers was thirteen score and five yards. It is indubitable that the extremely formidable character of the English national weapon, and the rapidity with which in the hands of an expert man it could deliver its missile, combined with the physical power, and dogged bravery of our troops, rendered the English armies of old time, when once placed before their foe in position, as nearly assured of success as, considering the chances of war, can well be conceived. It is however interesting and instructive, with these facts before us, to watch in the pages of history, these troops of such acknowledged superiority, beaten in a succession of actions by the nation over which they had obtained the most signal victories on record, and eventual-

* Froissart, b.i. c. 241.

ly compelled to evacuate that France of which they had been virtually masters. Disunion and incapacity among their leaders brought about distrust and want of confidence among the troops, and the result was discomfiture and shame. There are, however, few occasions, on which, as in this signal one, the misbehaviour of English soldiers cannot be traced to the misuse of power, or the neglect of duty on the part of their leaders acting directly or indirectly upon them, either as sapping their moral force, or misdirecting their physical energies.

There is another nation, kindred in part with our own, and now fast bound to it by the ties of mutual interest, respect and affection, the military character of which is much too remarkable to be passed over, but whose ancient military constitution was so anomalous, that it has been found impossible to introduce an earlier notice of it. The Scotch exhibit the singular spectacle of a free nation divided into two races ; the one of a pure Celtic stock, the other a mixed people formed upon it ; the one occupying the mountains, the other the plain land ; the one retaining the ancient language, dress, and habits of the race, the other adopting the tongues spoken by the various emigrants which it received and affiliated, until a new dialect of the Anglo-Saxon was created, which became the national speech. The effects of poli-

tical and social constitution, which in England had so essential an influence in the formation of the military character and tactics of the people, were even more markedly observable in Scotland. If England can never be said to have been really feudalised, Scotland, while she adopted in part the armament and chivalric habits of Europe, transmitted to the lowland race through the Normans, refused to admit at all on her free soil the most onerous obligations of feudality. While the Highlands continued under the patriarchal dominion of their chiefs, the Lowlands were gradually studded with places of strength built by emigrants from England, Saxon or Norman, who "in the midst of the humble dwellings of vassals and husbandmen, resembled in appearance the Norman of England, whose strong castle commanded the cabins of his serfs. But between the real condition of the one and the other of these, the difference was great; for in Scotland the subordination of the poor to the rich man was not servitude. The latter did, it is true, bear the title of *lord* in the Teutonic tongue, and of *sire* in French; but as he was neither a conqueror, nor the son of a conqueror, he was neither hated, nor dreaded. A social familiarity might be daily witnessed between the occupants of the tower, and of the cabin; they well knew that their ancestors had not bequeathed to

them any mortal injuries and insults to revenge on either side.”*

The result of this freedom prevalent among the mass of the people was remarkable as it affected their military habits; for as the historian observes, the armies of the Scotch did not form two distinct bodies, “one clad in complete steel, the other forbidden to wear the spurs on pain of ignominious chastisement.” Each man armed according to his ability, and went to battle freely to fight for the freedom that was so dear to the whole nation. The meanest spearman in the ranks, had personally as deep a stake in the issue of the conflict as the proudest knight; and thence the fact, that infantry, always constituting the great majority of the Scottish force, appeared from the earliest occasion of a general action† between the Normans of England and the Scotch, to have been appreciated by the latter nation at its proper value. At this battle “the men of Galloway drove in the English infantry, and broke for a moment the Norman centre. “They burst the enemy’s ranks,” says old Brompton, “as if they had been spiders webs.” (Pictorial History of England.) Half-armed, and furnished with but offensive weapons as were most of the Scotch army, they held their own against the

* A. Thierry’s Norman Conquest, b. viii.

† Battle of Northallerton, 1183.

mailclad chivalry for two hours, and seem rather to have yielded to the effect of the dreaded English bow, after the archers rallied (Thierry Nor. Con. B. viii), than to the prowess of the knights and men at arms. In later days, when at Falkirk, the Scotch fought for the freedom of their country under Wallace, "the main force of this intrepid leader lay in his infantry, who were lightly armed and fought with long spears, besides short daggers and battle axes, which were used in close combat and hung at the girdle. * * They were divided into four circular masses called in the military language of the period, *schiltrons* ;—* * in these circles, says an ancient cotemporary historian, stood the spearmen with their spears turned obliquely outwards, joined or closely linked man to man, with their faces fronting the circumference of each circle, and, to use an expressive phrase of another old chronicler, "their backs togiddere set."* The whole force, with very few exceptions, was composed of Scottish peasants, marshalled and commanded by leaders, themselves but of the smaller gentry of the land ; and yet, though their archers were cut to pieces by a charge of cavalry, and died to a man, refusing to give ground,—though by the well-known de-

* Fraser Tytler's *Life of Wallace*. *Schiltron* is a Scotch word, and not a military term of the period, as Holinshed translates it, saying, "*schiltrons* as they termed them, but as we may say, round battailes."

fection of Comyn and the Scottish nobles, they were deprived of all support, the four circles remained unbroken, "standing up as strong as a castle walled with stone, with their spears point over point, so thick and close together that it was fearful to behold." It required again the fatal English bow to break gaps in this firm array through which the chivalry might penetrate the mass, and atchieve a victory, destined, bloody as it was, to fail in breaking the determination of a free people. But why multiply instances? From London-Hill to Bannock-burn, the whole course of Bruce's military successes were effected with this same infantry, aiding the English by painful experience in the establishment of a military truth, which they were destined to communicate the knowledge of to the rest of the nations of the West.

The Scotch have ever held a high military reputation throughout Europe. Froissart, who with his usual accuracy, describes the habits of their border troops,* speaks of them as "bold, hardy, and much inured to war," in a national sense. They became individually esteemed as soldiers, by their early practice of leaving their native land to seek service and fortune on the continent of Europe. From the days of Louis XI. of France to the Thirty years'

* B. I. c. 17.

war, the valour, coolness, and fidelity of the Scottish soldier continued to rise to higher and higher estimation in every land in which he took service ; and it is remarkable that in spite of the alledged national acquisitiveness, he has by his honourable conduct entirely escaped the reproach,* which has attached itself to another celebrated free nation, whose mercenaries have cut each other's throats hereditarily in every army in Europe for the last four centuries. Sir Walter Scott, who has so admirably, but satirically, sketched in the novels of *Quentin Durward*, and the *Legend of Montrose*, the character of his countrymen at those several periods, is I think, hardly just in his reflections as to the result of this habit. "The contempt of commerce entertained by young men having some pretence to gentility, the poverty of the country of Scotland, the national disposition to wandering, and to adventure, all conduced to lead the Scots abroad into the military service of countries that were at war with each other. They were distinguished on the continent by their bravery, but in adopting the trade of mercenary soldiers, they necessarily injured their national character."† I must own I have yet to learn that they did so ; for until it can be proved that they so conducted them-

* Point d'argent, point de Suisse.

† Introduction to *Legend of Montrose*.

selves as to earn the light opinion of those they served, or fought against, it will be well to let them continue in the estimation which foreigners to this day attach to soldiers of their nation.*

It is not however with the Scotch, as mercenaries, that we have now to do, but in the nobler character of a patriot soldiery. The example they afford is the crowning one in proof of the fact, that whereas the great element of military power lies in a disciplined mass of the people,—so can that people only display the spirit necessary for the full development of that power, when they are free;—nay more, we know that the freer the nation, the more decided becomes that development. Scotland gives the most remarkable and convincing evidence of this truth; next Switzerland; next our own country; and lastly the Free Towns of the Low countries. The people to the North of the Tweed, exhibit, says Augustin Thierry “a greater quickness of intellect, a stronger taste for music, poetry, and intellectual labour, a more marked disposition for all kinds of enthusiasm.”† This enthusiasm, which from the beginning of the 17th century took a religious bias, was in old

* In the despatch addressed to Napoleon reporting the action at Fuentes d'onor, it is said of a particular position, “here the enemy lost many officers, *and Scotch*.” Scotts *Life of Napoleon in loc.*

† Historical Essays. Ess. X.

times turned with all its energy, solely towards civil liberty, the proud privileges of which are sung by one of the earliest of the Scottish poets, in verse, rude may-be, but unequalled in energy and fire.

Ah, freedome is a noble thing,
 Freedome mayks man to haiff liking ;
 Freedome all solace to man giffis,
 He levys at ese that frely levys ;
 A noble hart may haiff nane ese,
 Na ellys nocht that may him plese,
 Gyff fredome faillyhe ; for fre liking
 Is yharnit our all othir thing ;
 Na he that ay hass levyt fre,
 May nocht knaw weil the propyrtè,
 The angryr, na the wrechyt dome,
 That is couplyt to foule thyrledome.*

A nation, whose popular poet, himself one of the mere people, could pour forth such vivid and such elevated sentiments, as to the value of liberty, and the rights of freemen, as early as the middle of the fourteenth century, must have been imbued from the earliest period of its social constitution, with an innate sense of the dignity of man, and the equal distribution of man's personal rights. But this is no uncommon, or isolated instance of the nature of Scottish popular opinion: the only memento the great Wallace could retain of his youthful

* These few lines precede, most worthily, Fraser, Tytler's Life of Bruce: they are from the 1st book of Barbour's poem of Bruce.

training under his uncle, an ecclesiastic, consisted of a couplet* in monkish latin, barbarous in style, but full of the vigour of freedom, insisting on it as the best of things, and enjoining on the listner a detestation of all servile impositions. This sentiment was deeply entertained throughout the country; and after our Edward the First had sworn, in the hall at Westminster, solemnly "to God, and to the swans,"† that he would take no rest till

* Dico tibi verum : libertas optima rerum ;

Nunquam servili sub nexu vivite, fili.

† I have not alluded in noting the fantastic practices of chivalry, to this habit of swearing, irreverently enough to, or by, a bird brought in at a banquet, for the performance of particular deeds. The peacock was the ordinary object adored, and oaths of chivalry sworn "before the peacock and the ladies," were thought very stringent. Thus in Monstrelet's 82d Ch. of his third book, we read how at Tours in 1497 when the Hungarian ambassadors were entertained by Charles VII, among the entries at table — "another gentleman arrived with a live peacock in a dish, which he also put upon the table, *in order that any who wished to make vows might then do so.*" Thus also the same chronicler informs us in his 63d Ch. of the same book, that on the occasion of the feasting after a solemn tournament given by Duke Philip of Burgundy, "Toison d'or, the duke's herald, entered with a pheasants finely roasted and adorned, and presented it to the duke as an *entremets*, saying such a dish *was appropriate to making vows.*" Our own Edward on the occasion above alluded to, at a magnificent entertainment in the great Hall of Westminster, given to celebrate the knighthood of the Black Prince, had produced "two swans covered with golden network, and bearing themselves proudly on an enormous plateau"

he had avenged on Bruce, the death of John Comyn, the traitor, the fierce power of the oppressor was as nothing compared with the sturdy independence which nerved the arms of those, destined, in the just cause of a free people, to scatter his chivalry, and humble the pride of his armament. Such was in Switzerland that indomitable energy of freedom, which drove the Austrians from the country, and encouraged the simple inhabitants of the cantons to brave the legions of the most powerful, in arms, of European sovereigns. Such was, with us, though perhaps less strikingly exhibited, the spirit which freed England from the unjust imposition of feudal liabilities. Such the turbulent vehemence of the men of Ghent, and Bruges, which, however, unreasonable, had yet its basis in the sense of their own free rights.

It is remarkable that the popular arrays above cited, were only unsuccessful as to the full attainment of their objects, in cases when the liberty they affected, was, as in that of the Free Towns, allowed to degenerate into license. Wherever the recovery of rights, or the assertion of their maintenance, is the cause of popular resistance or of popular aggression, we

(Trivet's annals in Tytler's Wallace), whereon as above mentioned he took that fatal engagement, which ended in his discomfiture.

see the strength of the mass exhibited invariably with success. War is best justified when men take arms to repulse attack from without, and vindicate the integrity of the land they own and live in,—and such is the warring of the patriot. The justice of war at large is best assured to him who from choice adopts its profession, when, serving a free power, he feels that his duty as a soldier, must be incompatible with wanton violence, or lawless oppression.

CHAP. X.

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF A FEUDAL-CHIVALRIC ARMY AS TO
INFANTRY IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE—OF BURGHES TROOPS.

The consideration of the relative value of the infantry of different nations, necessarily and indispensably brings with it an enquiry into national character ; and this more particularly so as to the period with which we are concerned, one, in which the perfection of discipline had not, as it were, supplied the soldier with an artificial habit, which assimilates men in the ordinary operations of the field. National character and national tactics had in former days more weight in war than can now be the case, when a similar armament prevails throughout the world, and the whole operations of hostile forces have undergone something like an approximation of system. Still, however, to use the words of a distinguished military writer,—“ Each nation has its character, its usages, its habits, and in accordance with these must they be managed. One for instance is dull, moves heavily, but perseveringly, and without a murmur : another is ardent, impetuous, and formidable at the opening of a campaign, but this vivacity cools down, if not maintained by some success : a third is brave, and even fiery, but has little knowledge of war : a fourth brave also, less impetuous, and more skilled in warfare : it is on

the knowledge of these facts that a good general should act."*

The pages of those historians who have written of the military operations which immediately succeeded the revolution in tactics to which allu-

* "Against the ardent and impetuous race," continues this writer, "general actions at the beginning of a campaign should be sedulously avoided, for the very reason that it is the interest of the general who is in command of its army to attempt to give battle as soon as he can. For it is a received axiom in war that you should ever do the very contrary of what the enemy would bring you to; only care is to be taken that you are not deceived as to his real objects. *—*—* Against the people, nationally brave, but unused to, and inexperienced in war, constant caution is requisite; although nevertheless, supposing as I do the army to possess that organization and discipline which an inexperienced foe never have, the advantage thus accruing, and which amounts indeed to marked superiority, authorises somewhat the incurring risk. Against the enemy alike brave and experienced, and who consequently is organized, the greatest circumspection must be exercised; nothing must be left to chance, while every opportunity that either occurs, or can be created, for bringing on an action with advantage, should be seized with extreme promptness: the enemy should not be dreaded, but distrusted; we should know how to yield to circumstance, and await till time affords what the moment to all appearance forbids our hoping for. It is in these circumstances that military genius is developed, that the mental resources of a good general show themselves, that he proves himself worthy of commanding his fellowmen, and manifests his right to be placed above them." *—*—* In order to command men one should know them, and that one may estimate men at their proper worth, one should know oneself." (Turpin de Crissè *Comment. sur Montecuculi*, vol. i. pp. 341—43.)

sion has been so often made, teem with the most interesting examples of the effects, and of the progress of that revolution. I allude more particularly to the wars which, beginning in 1490, ended in the ruin of Italy, and to the record of them left by him who has well been termed the Italian Thucydides, Guicciardini. It is not of course pretended that nationality of character in war pronounced itself definitively, only after the mass of the people, as infantry, began to bear the brunt of personal conflict, instead of knights, and nobles: we have the amplest evidence to the contrary.* All that I would maintain, is that the importance of its study becomes greater after this innovation; because the class of combatant, who now comes forward, is actuated by no constant personal stimulus, analogous to the chivalric, and only casually by the spirit of patriotism. He engages to fight, and performs his contract as a duty, which his self-respect and self-esteem urge him to go through with. He appears to most advantage as a na-

* "Of all the nations Froissart speaks of in his history there are but few whom he has not marked with odious epithets. According to him the Portuguese are passionate and quarrelsome; the Spaniards envious, haughty, and uncleanly; the Scots perfidious and ungrateful: the Italians assassins and poisoners: the English vain-boasters, contemptuous, and cruel. There is not one trait against the French: on the contrary this brave nation supports itself according to him to the vigour and strength of its knighthood."—(Mons. St. Palaye's Essay on Froissart.)

tional soldier, and in this position does his duty most honourably; but it by no means follows that as a mercenary, he should not be equally faithful, trustworthy, and obedient.

The people most remarkable in this capacity are, one need hardly mention, the Swiss, who from the time of Louis XI., began, as a nation, to sell their military services. They served his purposes so admirably in curbing the power of the Duke of Burgundy, that he pensioned the nation largely, allowing, says DeComines, forty thousand Rhenish florins to the cantons, and their Diet;—according to Guicciardini, sixty thousand francs. The former authority reckons that from the battle of Granson to the death of Louis, they did not receive less than a million of florins. The effect this influx of wealth produced upon the nation was singular. After Granson, they were so ignorant of the value of jewels, and of money, that some one of them sold the silver dishes he plundered in the Burgundian camp for two sous; another found the Duke's great diamond, threw it in its case under a waggon, picked it up again, and sold it for a florin, to a priest, who sent it to one of the leaders, and was rewarded with three francs; but, observes De Comines, their booty "has since taught them what fine things may be purchased for money"*; it indeed worked a change in their national character. In place of being

* B. 5, c. 1.

simple, sober, modest, and humble, their arrogance grew within a very few years excessive, their rapacity extreme, their venality and treachery disgraceful.* The immediate cause was the dependent condition of France as respects the peculiar arm which now asserted its real value in the eyes of Europe. Guicciardini says of the French in 1494, (by which time, however incomplete their army may have been in times past, one might have supposed a force of foot soldiers might have been created)—“The kingdom of France although most powerful, at that time, in cavalry, and admirably supplied with a large train of artillery, as well as possessed of the greatest skill in working it, was most weak in indigenous infantry,† because having restricted the use of arms, and military exercises to the nobility alone, the ancient valour of that nation was extinct among the commons, and men of the people, owing to their having long given themselves up to peaceful pursuits, and addicted themselves to mechanical and gainful arts : as indeed many of the French monarchs, dreading the attack of the people by reason of the conspiracies and rebellions which had occurred in that land, took occasion to disarm them, and divert them from military exercises : and hence the French, trusting no more in the courage of their own foot soldiers,

* Guicciardini, b. ix.

† See note to c. ix.

behaved in war with timidity, unless they had in their army some detachment or other of Swiss." The historian goes on to show how, having no jealousy or political distrust of these mountaineers as they had, at that time, of the Germans, they employed them in their Italian wars against the German mercenaries, who had adopted the Swiss discipline, and fought with like weapons. It was not until 1510 that misunderstandings arose between the French, and their allies of their mountains, owing to the exorbitant demands and overweening self-estimation of the latter, who desired an increase of their pension, and commenced overtures to the Italian powers on its refusal.

Guicciardini has epitomised (B. x) the customs of the Swiss as respects the hiring out their troops, and gives a very graphic sketch, but by no means a favourable one, of their cupidity, contumacious neglect of the orders of their employers, and of their internal animosities induced by jealousy and avarice. The Swiss by right engaged with only one power, under an officer selected by the Diet, and under the national banners; but as early as 1488 detached bodies appear in arms as mercenaries, independent of the Government of the Cantons; such at least would seem to be the eight hundred Swiss who fought under the Duke of Bretagne at the battle of St. Aubin in that year. Their character

as soldiers in quarters is not represented as good: they were impatient of privation (Guicciardini, B. II.) as is specially noted in the account of the siege of Novara in 1495 by that historian; while again their consenting (B. x.) to engage against Louis XII. of France in 1511 with the Venetians, and the Papal confederacy, at much less than their usual rate of pay, is particularly remarked as arising from their personal enmity to the French monarch, and inducing them "contrary to their habit, to submit patiently to so much annoyance." They were, however, in action excellent soldiers, and the retreat made by them through the Milanese to their own country in face of the French army in 1510, after their quarrel with Louis, is perhaps the most able military movement of the period. They had in this retreat neither cavalry, nor artillery, but were opposed to an army exceedingly well found in both. In spite of this disadvantage, they effected a junction of their whole force (about 14,000 men) at Varese, and thence retreated "in close order, and slowly, in masses of eighty or a hundred deep, with the matchlock men and arquebusiers in the rear files: so making their way, they valorously defended themselves against the French army, who kept flanking their march, and skirmishing on both their flank and front: then oftentimes would some hundred, or hundred and fifty Swiss go forth from the main body, and skir-

mish, advancing, halting, and retreating without the least disorder occurring in their array.”*

This discipline and coolness in the field appears about this period to have been their sole military virtue, for as early as 1495 they seem to have threatened to go over to the enemy† on the least delay in the receipt of their pay; while five years later at Novara, they coolly changed sides, going from the French army across to the enemy under Ludovico Sforza (Guicc. B. iv.); and then, there being troops of their nation on both sides, refused to engage, as unable to raise their hands against their brethren, they not carrying arms under leave and privilege of the Diet. The reader will call to mind the tragedy that ensued, when Ludovico Sforza and several other leaders endeavouring, on the reduction of Novara, to escape in the Swiss ranks, dressed like their soldiery, were by these very Swiss betrayed after a promise given to protect them, and delivered over to captivity.

I own a degree of satisfaction in seeing those misdeeds among many other such instances of mercenary profligacy, visited at last in 1515 by the bloody day of Marignano, when in the teeth of solemn oaths, and the terms of a new signed treaty, the ink of which was hardly dry, the flower of the nation attempted to surprise the French

* Guicciardini, B. 9.

† Guicciardini, B. 3. Under Montpensier.

army under Francis 1st, basely violating the compact they had just entered into. The two days' fierce engagement, and the fall of sixteen thousand Swiss under the fire of the French guns, the pikes of their German mercenaries, and the swords of their own volunteers (a force which shows the formation of a species of indigenous infantry), broke the spell which had for fifty years and more, attached itself to the military reputation of these much dreaded mountaineers. On this occasion no quarter seems to have been shown to this proud soldiery, and "the Lansquenets," says Monstrelet, meaning the German *lanzknecht*, "when they entered Milan put an end to the misery of their wounded in a strange and terrible way."* The Swiss were for the time much broken by this signal defeat, but they have not ceased to our own day to labour in their mercenary vocation; and even in the last great European war Swiss regiments opposed each other, marshalled in our ranks, or in those of our allies against their kindred and brethren, fighting under the *tricolor*. As a free people and a most brave one, these gallant mountaineers must always excite our sympathy; but as mercenaries they have, at various times, exhibited the type of almost every vice by which this description of troops could be supposed guilty, apart always a want of courage in the field.

* Monstrelet, B. iii. c. 242.

On the apparition in Italy of troops so formidable, aiding the aggressive and invasive projects of the French, it became necessary to obtain a description of force capable of opposing them. These men were found in the German footsoldier, or pikeman, the *lanzknecht*.* In 1494, no less than ten thousand of these soldiers are found on the muster roll of the Italian confederates under the Duke of Milan, who had "three thousand men at arms, three thousand light horse, a thousand of German cavalry, and five thousand Italian footsoldiers, but the main force of the army were ten thousand German pikemen (*lanzichenech*) to oppose to the Swiss : for there was none else, as the Italian infantry failed to support its name, having marvellously fallen off in reputation, and in daring since the arrival of the French." This German infantry was for the most part from the Tyrol. Italy had long been supplied with serviceable troops from Germany proper, in the shape of cavaliers and men at arms ; about the earliest mention that the writer has ever met with of the systematic employment of such soldiers occurring in 1270† in the war between the Florentines and Sienese. They appear‡ to have been accounted

* "*Lanzichenech*, so are the German foot vulgarly called"
—Guicciardini, B. xx. 2.

† Villani. Ist. Fior. B. 6. c. 72.

‡ Villani, B. 6. c. 73.

good and serviceable lances, but the character of the nation in a military point of view is unfavourably given in even this our first introduction to it. The Florentine exiles in Siena having one day had their German friends to dinner "drenched them well with wine, and made them drunken (*feciorli bene avvinazzare, e inebbriare*)," and then turned them out on an alert upon the Florentine camp in which these potvaliant combatants did much mischief, but were killed to a man. This untoward event did not, however, diminish the confidence of the Siennese, but the contrary; and, the service where such dinners were given seeming to have been popular with the Germans, they had no difficulty in obtaining a reinforcement of eight hundred excellent men at arms.

On the establishment of the superiority of infantry, it was of course facile to procure from the Tyrol a description of footsoldier, very analogous in his habits to the Swiss, and armed, as has been before observed, with the same weapons. The French, whose only infantry in Italy consisted of Gascons besides the Swiss, and of these not many, and who were disappointed in securing the services of the Grisons, and Wal-dese, on being deserted by the Swiss Cantons in 1510, employed the German infantry largely. In the year above mentioned, the French army in Verona consisted of three hundred Spanish

lances, a hundred more of Germans and Italians, four hundred only of French,* five hundred of the king's paid infantry, and four thousand Germans: to which motley force the Venetians opposed, eight hundred men at arms, three thousand light horse most of them Stradiots (Illyrian light troops), and ten thousand infantry with many country people, by whom the Germans were much detested. They seem to have been a harsh, and brutal soldiery if the Italian historians are to be trusted, and indeed whatever the amount of prejudice on their part, it must yet I fear be admitted that the general military character of the nation at this period is very far from favourable, as respects soldierlike forbearance. The German knights who with the Armagnac troops, that legion of masterful bloodshedders, fought in 1444 against the Swiss at St. Jacques when these mountaineers, though there annihilated, first publicly displayed their valour, evinced an inveteracy against their conquered foe disgraceful to the knightly character, slaying the wounded, and even those who had laid down their arms.† Froissart says directly that the German

* Guicciardini, B. 9. The lance included in this army five serviceable soldiers and a boy.

† De Barantes *Hist. des Ducs de Bourgoyne*. It is however just to state that they were not alone on this occasion in this unmanly ferocity. "Burekhardt Mönch arrived towards the end of the fight, and pranced joyously about the

knights were uncourteous, and at entire variance with the practices of other nations, for whereas the French and English not only entertained their prisoners admitting them to ransom, but even released them on parole,—“not so the Germans, who whenever they take a prisoner throw him into durance vile, loaded with irons, in order to gain a more considerable ransom.”*

With the knowledge of these facts before us, we are obliged to accept the statements of the Italian writers as respects the German military character as being not far from the truth. Cardinal Bembo remarks† of the twelve thousand German mercenaries who advanced with the French army on Trivigi and Sacile, that “the people had all much dread lest the country should be wasted with fire and sword by reason of the innate ferocity and cruelty of these people: which when they learned, using the

field of battle among the corpses of his enemies. One of the Captains of Uri, lay dying on the ground. ‘We shall sleep this night on roses,’ cried the knight to him. ‘Well then, eat this one,’ replied the dying man, mustering his last strength, and casting a stone which he had picked up near him. The stone struck Burckhardt right on the face and crushed in his eyes and the whole countenance,—he fell from horseback and was carried off—he died the third day after—such was the end of him, who had brought the Armagnacs into his own land.”

* B. ii. c. 135.

† Istoria Viniziana, i. xii.

fortune that favoured them, and all of them somewhat setting *their practice of behaving cruelly aside, &c. &c.*," Guicciardini uses constantly the same expression, "German cruelty" when speaking of these soldiers, and quotes more than one special instance of it.* The national bent of this people must have been certainly singularly stern in the Middle Ages to attract as it did, the attention of nearly all the chroniclers of the time; but in these Italian wars all parties seem to have been alike embittered, the natives of the land by fierce party spirit among themselves, and by in-

* Count Anhalt, who commanded the armies of Maximilian against the Venetians, is particularly singled out by this author as the type of his nation—'full of barbarous insolence, and German cruelty.' The address which he puts into his mouth, as made to the rebel Vicentines, Book 9, is indeed an epitome of the impression which all the Italian writers seemed to entertain of them. It was Anhalt's soldiers who after the taking of Vicenza, smoked above a thousand people to death, in the grotto of Masano; but alas! cruelty is of no country and of no time, for we have but too recently seen the same thing done in our own day. As is always the case in war, ferocity begot retaliation, and Guicciardini admits, Book 8, that after forcing the pass of Serravalle the Venetians imitated their German opponents in ferocity. The editor, (Milan 1803,) of the book I quote from, mentions in a note on the authority of Mocenigo, that the Germans made use of dogs to hunt out the women and children in the fields and caverns—'Thus with unwonted barbarity going to hunt Christians.' This appears an exaggeration; it is however an ascertained fact that the practice has obtained, as in the case of the Spaniards in Cuba.

veteracy against their invaders,—the mercenaries by constant retaliation of cruelties with the inhabitants and one another. When the head of the Christian Church could himself, as did Pope Julian, superintend the siege of a place of strength, “riding continually through the camp,” says the historian, “now here, now there, praying that the position of the guns in the batteries might be completed,”* part only having been planted owing to the rigorous weather,—when the French, who even then claimed to be the most polished of European nations, could sell for money the wretched women who had been victims of their lust,† it is hard to brand a single nation in those unhappy times with the impress of peculiar ferocity. The Germans of more modern days have at any rate well redeemed the stain which in times past has been allowed to fall upon their race ; and as the military instructors of Europe, they have devised that discipline, the maintenance of which is our only pledge against the abuse of victory, or the brutality of reckless license.

The military spirit of the French was so wholly chivalric that, as has been already observed, and largely instanced, they were destitute at the end of the fifteenth century of the element for

* Siege of La Mirandola in 1511. Guicciardini, B. 9.

† After the sack of Capua 1501, “many women were afterwards sold at Rome at the smallest prices (per minimo prezzo.”) (Guicciardini, B. 5.)

the construction of a national infantry. The Genoese who had in earlier days constituted their strength in this arm, were replaced by the Swiss and Spaniards, and it was some time ere the Gascons who seem to have set the example to their countrymen in asserting their excellence as foot soldiers, found that example generally emulated. I have already said that the military strength of a nation lies and lives in the mass of the people, at all time, and the history of the French arms most especially proves it. Let us take, for instance, those actions in which the chivalry of France took upon itself the right of upholding the national honour, and with a degree of arrogance as irrational as extravagant, rejected the aid of either their allies, or of their plebeian countrymen : in all these cases it was not the nation, but the nobles that were conquered. The impetuosity, and vehemence which form so striking a characteristic with the French, was carried by these rash and ungovernable men to the verge of recklessness. Their pride and self-esteem blinded them with a conception of their invincibility. It was according to them, themselves, and themselves only who were worthy to fight. At the fatal field of Nicopolis* when seven hundred lances of the best blood of France perished miserably, it was the result of their

* Against Bajazet in 1396.

own obstinacy and insubordination: they would take no orders, and listen to no counsel; but alone, and scorning the aid of their allies, the Hungarians, they contended with the whole of the Turkish army, an act of unparalleled bravery, but not less insane than intrepid. At Agincourt again—"What have we to do"—cried the Dukes of Bourbon, D'Alençon and the crowd of young French nobles, when they were urged to wait the onset of the commons, and burgher troops—"What have we to do with those shopkeepers? We are already thrice the number of the English!"* Shakespeare does but follow veracious chronicles when he represents them dicing for their prisoners,† or boasting—

—Let us but blow on them,
The vapour of our valour will o'erturn them,
'Tis positive gainst all exceptions, lords,
That our superfluous lackeys, and our peasants,—
Who, in unnecessary action, swarm
About our squares of battle—were enough
To purge the field of such a hilding foe.

It is a remarkable fact in proof of our position as to the popular character of national prowess, that the series of successes whereby the English were driven from France, commenced only with the organization of a ple-

* De Barantes. Hist. Ducs de Bourgoyne, B. iv.

† Holinshed. "Who will go to hazard with me for twenty English prisoners?" Henry V., Act iii.

beian army in the shape of the *francs archers* by Charles VII. It is not less striking, that until the popular spirit became embodied by the appearance of the Maid of Orleans, those successes were not of a character to assure the ultimate expulsion of the invaders. The inspiration of the martyr to her patriotic constancy was a real inspiration, in so far as the dominant idea went, that of impatience of foreign domination. Like Charlotte Corday, the Pucelle of modern history, who was "a republican before the revolution," she in the worst days of her native land was filled with the impression that France ought to be free, and that she, poor peasant-girl, was predestined to revive military daring in those who arrogated to themselves the exclusive rights of maintaining the integrity of their native land, and who at Agincourt and Verneuil proved unequal to the task.

It is idle to expatiate upon the military character of the most military nation in the world. Though composed, as it is, of a variety of races, Norman, Breton, Burgundian, Picard, Gascon, and others, which were long looked upon as separate, and which each possesses some peculiarity of character, the nation has not in any of the elements that compose it, one that is unmilitary. The people love a soldier's life; military distinction is the passion of their existence, and military prowess the pride of

their heart. The great mass of the nation, kept down by the nobles during the chivalric period as plebeians unworthy to share in the pastime and glories of war, remained long in the position of what may be called, servile soldiers. That they did not for that fight the less bravely, is due to the innate soldierlike spirit, with which when marshalled, as their country's main hope, and dependance,—its infantry, they worthily upheld the honour of France and their own. Still they were beneath an aristocratic influence, and it was not till the people broke loose, that their military capabilities were fully shown. The sons of those who had in old time boasted that they were the only safeguard of France, the emigrant nobles, returned in 1792 to the land they had deserted, as enemies, backed by the troops of those Prussians who had with them the *pré*stige of having but recently read a lesson in arms, to all Europe. The descendants of the defenders of the land entered their national soil aggressively, and its children, born of the *adscripti glebæ* of ancient days, plebeian patriots led by a *sans culotte* general, hurled back the foreign and domestic foe together, and gave another exposition of the great and universal truth;—it is not pride of blood that makes the soldier, nor the puppet-like exactitude of art, but, in the holiest of causes, defence of our rights and the land that we were born in, a stout indignant heart, and

a true sense of duty. As to the aggressive attitude which this nation has under peculiar circumstances so often assumed in the gratification of its military propensities, without ultimate success, it affords another comment upon the same text. A just cause and national combination are victory, let who will be the aggressor.

From the consideration of a military power, which has passed from serfdom to national soldierhood, superseding the military pretensions of a single class, and merging them in the common martial spirit of the people,—let us cursorily look at the condition of another set of kindred races, which have exhibited the exact converse in their history, the Italians. There is no need for recapitulating what has been said respecting their social condition during the feudal chivalric period, or the peculiar character, which the practice of arms had assumed among them, in consequence of the established prevalence of the employment of indigenous mercenaries. The military profession had become so much of a trade that, as has been shown by citations from cotemporary historians, war could hardly be said to be made in earnest by the Italian mercenaries upon one another. The real fighting portion of their armies lay in the Burgher troops, and gentlemen, the "*popolo e cavalieri*" of whom Villani speaks so constantly, which every town of every state in Italy afforded. These troops,

animated by that party spirit with which the land was distracted, and principally by the Guelf and Ghibelline feuds, took the field in the early days of the Italian republics at their own cost, together with the soldiers paid by the state, the wealthier citizens and nobles being classed in bands, (*cavallate*) as at Florence, and the paid troops serving under their leader (*condottiere, capo, capitano,*) who took service for them. Thus in 1288 the muster of the united Guelf force which assembled under the Florentine banner, including confederates, giving a total force of two thousand six hundred cavaliers, and twelve thousand infantry, contained "eight hundred cavaliers of Florence of the greater citizens, and eight hundred cavaliers (*cavalieri soldati*) paid by the state."* The same practice in case of difficulty or danger obtained in the Italian republics as late as 1509,† when "the flower of the noble youth of Venice with what friends and followers used to arms they could assemble," went to the relief of Padua and joined the Venetian army whose "captains and soldiers praised to the skies these youths, who unused to the fatigues and perils of service, preferred the duty they owed their country to life itself."

The states of Italy, vehement, vindictive, and ambitious in their policy, were, with rare in-

* Villani, B. vii. c. 119.

† Guicciardini. B. 8.

tervals, occupied from the period of their formation to that of which we treat, either in the internal warfare of parties, or else externally in mutual assault, now checking Papal encroachments—now resisting the pretensions of the Emperor in such manner as to allow us to assert that Italy was never, so to say, at peace. They were fond of war, and being rich, they could afford it. “The republic of Florence,” says the historian Varchi, “according to the accounts of Cristofano Landini, — from the year 1377 to 1406 spent in wars only, a sum equal to eleven million five hundred thousand golden florins, which,” adds the worthy writer, “is exactly two hundred and eighty-seven mule loads at four hundred pounds a load, of gold, which the Florentines spent in thirty years for four wars.”* The same author in another place is careful to explain wherefore in his opinion these Florentines, “whom some, because they are merchants, hold to be mean and plebeian” are capable, “when and where it is wanted, of such greatness of mind, and such high and noble thoughts; whereat,” says the worthy man, “I have many times strangely marvelled as to how this may be possible in these men, used from their early infancy to carry for the smallest wages bales of wool like porters, and fare in short like slaves the best part of the day.”

* Varchi. Ist. Fior. B. 9.

The love of freedom, and the spirit of independence which distinguished at one time the meanest of these republicans, made them, whenever their rights were to be defended, able and zealous soldiers; but the wealth by which they were enabled to pay professional fighting men, and the effects of party prejudice and party interest, alike interfered to corrupt the military spirit of the people; their indigenous mercenaries again 'played booty' with one another, in the conduct of pretended hostilities, so that when, as at Fornuovo, these troops met a foe who fought not in their own manner, they were beaten. But before this, as we have seen, foreign mercenaries had been largely employed in Italy, a wealthy land where the adventurer gleaned a rich harvest whether in pay or plunder, for the barter of life and limbs, and to which he therefore eagerly resorted. That this was allowed by the Italians themselves to have had an effect upon their military efficiency, might be proved by a hundred citations from cotemporary authors; whereof, however, I take one from the writer already quoted, Varchi, the steady panegyrist of his countrymen. It is from the speech supposed to be made by the Gonfaloniere of Florence, when threatened in 1529 by Pope Clement VII., and the Imperialists.—“ And even when our people had no foreign soldiers in pay, they possessed their own force of such valour, and

the place so furnished with munitions, that provided they were of one opinion as to the defence, they were certain of not being worsted by any force however strong and numerous." The passage is curious as inferring that the dependence of the state was no longer on its own troops, and that in even the best days of Italy, internal dissensions were at any time liable to interfere with her resistance to foreign aggression.

The military character of the Italians suffered deterioration not only from the use of foreign troops, but from the example of their license, and the abuse among themselves of the mercenary principle. Soldierhood with them gradually absorbed patriotism, and the profession of arms absolved in latter days him who followed it from the allegiance which he owed his native state.* It is true that civil discord must have paved the way for this unnatural result, by long accustoming the Italian states to see their

* Brantome, in his life of Fabricio and Prosper Colonna, cites, in his quaint way, an anecdote, which may fitly illustrate the state of warfare in Italy in the beginning of the 16th century and its results. "It was at this same siege of Milan that Mark Antony Colonna, a good partizan of the French, was killed by great mishap: for having there appeared with the army, remarkable above the rest for fine gilded armour, and high fine plumes, Prospero Colonna perceiving him, though without recognizing him, having himself laid and pointed a long culverin, and long aimed, and adjusted his sight, ordered them to fire, whence came it that the ball went so straight as to pass between Mons. de Pontdormy, and Camille

banished citizens turning their arms against the parent city; but between this, and an aiding in the subjection of Italy by foreigners, there is a material difference; the one crime exceeding the other as much as the sin of attempted parricide would that of strife against a brother. Banding with the French in Lombardy, or the Spaniards in the Neapolitan territories, the Italian merged patriotic feeling in private resentments, or professional indifference, and thus commenced the real downfall of his national military virtue. It was in the latter association of the two above noted, that he seems to have learned to practise upon his native soil, and among his own countrymen, that rigour of military oppression which he saw exerted by the invading mercenary. "Now even though," says Guicciardini, "in the olden times, in which military discipline was severely administered, the soldiery was always licentious and bore hard upon the people, things were not, however, so disorganized as yet, but that the soldiers lived chiefly on their pay, nor had their license grown intolerable: the Spaniards, however, first began in Italy to live entirely on the

Trivulzio to choose, as it were, this said Mark Antony Colonna, his very own nephew: and thereafter, learning that with his own hand he had slain his nephew, he was like to die of grief, and of despair. What mishap for the uncle, and what loss in the nephew for the French, for he was a right good partizan of their's and a good and valiant captain."—*Vie des Hommes Illustres*.

substance of the people, the cause and perchance the necessary cause of this, being that their king had not wherewith to pay them; but from this origin of abuses, since always an imitated sin outdoes its model, like as, on the contrary, a copied virtue comes not near it,—the evil increased, and these same Spaniards, and not less, the Italians, began, whether paid or unpaid 'twas all the same, so to comport themselves, that, to the deep infamy of the soldiery of our day, the goods of friends are no better assured from the rapacity of the troops than those of enemies."* The Papal troops were, it seems, the worst of all. The Italian historians constantly remark, Guicciardini repeatedly, that the Pope was always ill-served in war, a most just standing judgment upon his Holiness for ever making it.† But the best indigenous troops in Italy, those of the Venetians, were, as respects discipline, little better about this time than even those of Rome. In the war provoked by the Republic in 1508, its army comprehended among other troops "fifteen thousand infantry picked of all Italy, and in very truth the flower of Italian soldiery, not less for the worth of the

* B. v., A. D. 1405.

† Their infamy had in Guicciardini's days passed into a proverb: reckoning their value in the League of Cambray, (B. 9.) he says, "the troops of Holy Church, the very shame of soldierhood (*infamia della milizia*) according to the proverb in every man's mouth."

men, than for the skill and valour of their captains." (Guicciardini.) These chosen troops supported by five thousand cavalry, and fifteen thousand more foot soldiers, attacked the advanced post of the French in Trevi, and took and sacked the town. When the main body of the enemy endeavoured to pass the Adda, which river ran not far below the place, they were looked upon as delivering themselves up to certain defeat. "This day, oh ! most Christian king," cried Triulzio, "we have indeed gained the victory !" a feeling in which all the Venetian leaders concurred : "but for all that, never were they able, by their authority, by prayers, or threats, to get the soldiers, occupied with plunder, out of Trevi ; there being no other remedy, for which disorder, Alviano, to drive them out set fire to the town ; but this even was too late, for already had the French completely crossed in the utmost exultation, mocking at the cowardice and bad management of their opponents." (Guicciardini.) Cardinal Bembo gives another reason for the inefficient state of the army at this critical moment, but no more creditable one, — "many soldiers after the sack of Trevi having absented themselves on account of the spoil they had acquired."* Such at this period was the military discipline of the flower of Italian armies !

* Ist. Ven. vii.

It is right, however, to remark that disorderly as were these troops, and disorganised as was the social military system* of the country, the personal bravery of the Italians when properly stimulated, and their personal prowess, was not surpassed by that of any of their opponents. The men that sacked Trevi, stood out, unsupported by the cavalry, "three-fourths of which did not engage," says Bembo,—“and deserted by their main body, in bad ground, for three hours, and more, against the French men at arms, and Swiss,” at the subsequent battle of Ghiaradadda or Vaila as it is sometimes called. They were taken into action unprepared, and disunion of plans between their leader and the commandant-in-chief prevented any combination of movement: they were thus sacrificed, but fell like good soldiers. “Without turning their backs to the foe, nearly all of them lay dead on the spot.”† The imputation of a want of resolution began, however, to be thrown out against the nation at large, and more particularly so by the French. In spite of this, at the storming of Ravenna (A. D. 1512) Gaston de Foix employed three separate columns of Germans, Italians, and French, thus stimulating their national rivalry, and all seem to have borne themselves equally

* “The armies of Italy, without courage, discipline, reputation, leaders, the prestige of authority, nor even obedient to the wishes of their princes.”—(Guicciardini B. x.) A. D. 1511.

† Guicciardini.

well, though none succeeded, and that against Italians. It is moreover remarkable enough, that in 1503, when the Italians serving in the Spanish army of Gonsalvo, the Great Captain, against the French under the Duke of Nemours, maddened by the taunts of their adversaries, challenged them to fight at Barletta, thirteen to thirteen, for the national honour; the French champions were defeated, all being killed, or taken.* As, however, defeat did very commonly from this time forth continue to attach itself to Italian troops,—defeat induced by the process which we have been endeavouring to follow out in contradistinction to that observable in France,—degradation of the moral material, which is to constitute an army,—so has it become the practice to look upon Italy and the Italians as effete, thus visiting the country and its individual children with the reputation justly earned by the social corruption of the people as a mass.

It was left to Napoleon to afford us the practical disabuse of this mistaken impression as regards the power of a people,† and to Murat

* The thirteen Italians were from all parts of the country : 1 Capuan, 3 Romans, 1 Neapolitan, 5 Sicilians, and 3 Parmesans.

† In the account (Thiers. *Hist. du Consulat et de l'Empire*, vol. iii.) of the armament formed at Boulogne, for the invasion of England, special mention is made of a division of Italians forming the major part of the reserve, admirably

to exhibit the strongest refutation of the calumny in his person as an individual. Napoleon himself according to all rule of national affinities was more of an Italian, than aught else, while Murat, '*le beau sabreur*,' the ideal in our days of the dashing daring soldier, was so, wholly, and indisputably. The first head, and the first hand in an army which over-ran, and all but subdued, all Europe, were both Italian. Under them there rank, of the same nation, a host of names from the general-in-chief to the simple soldier, who in a succession of wars, the early semblance of which favoured the assertion of a spirit of freedom, nobly re-established the ancient reputation of their people. They were fighting at first, as they thought, for free institutions: subsequently another stimulus arose, enthusiasm for their great leader; this, with the intoxication of success, awakened and maintained the martial spirit of those who took up arms, Italians from the body of the people, in which, as I have so often said, exists the real military energy of every nation. No race of mankind that has once been characteristically distinguished for the good qualities of soldierhood can let the germ of them die out. No nation can *become* effete, that has in its institution, and vying in efficiency with the French, of whom Napoleon said that he was simply teaching them to know and respect themselves, in order to show the English what they had not seen since Cæsar's day, a Roman foe upon their shore.

tutions any thing approaching to freedom : a nation may be *made* so, but the act is compulsory, and on occasion, as we have seen in our own time, the true spirit must burst forth. It is a false estimate of human nature, which reckons with these facts before it, any nation as one of fiddlers and buffoons, because superficially buffoons predominate. It is the scum which rises to the surface : the substance is not seen, till, to carry out a homely metaphor, the waters have reached boiling point.

The period which we have been just considering with reference to the Italian States, ushers into notice the prowess of another great military nation, which in general enterprise and in the diffusion of its sway by force of arms alone, stands remarkable among the Powers of Continental Europe. The model infantry of the Continent was, to date from about 1520, for many years that of Spain. The Spaniard has, on many occasions, shown that he possesses the qualities that constitute the strength and power of infantry, including the national attribute of courage,—great perseverance when once roused, and a singular capacity for enduring privations. He is notoriously temperate in his habits, punctilious even to a fault in his ideas of honourable feeling, and he is imbued with an innate pride in himself, which has, according to the occasion and circumstance of the moment, at

one time proved a stimulus to him in his duty as a soldier,—at another degenerated into that illiberal jealousy which has ever made the Spaniard a doubtful and a dangerous ally.

Sprung from a Gothic stock, the Spanish nation has had in its social constitution, from the earliest days, a strong element of freedom. The Visigoths of Spain admitted for instance by law that no man should be taxed against his consent, acknowledged a representative assembly, and rejected, save in a very modified shape, the degrading practices of serfage. According to general and ordinary experience, a nation, strong enough in the first instance to have seized and taken possession, and wise enough to model its internal relations upon so free a scale, ought to have exhibited itself more obstinate, more determined, and more successful than were the early Spaniards, in repelling invasion. The anomaly can be best explained by the fact that freedom had been abused among them, that the country was destitute of a principle of unity of action, and that the severity with which the last Gothic King of Spain repressed and punished the license of his nobles, had created a class of traitors, who aided in the downfall of their national existence. In the course of but forty-five years (A. D. 710 to 755,) Spain was a province of the Caliphate, and the remnant of the Gothic population which

still clung to independence, were refugees in the mountains of the Asturias and Galicia. "Confined in that corner of the land which had become a country for them all, Goths and Romans, conquerors and conquered, strangers and natives, all united by the same misfortune, forgot their ancient feuds, aversions, and distinctions; there was but one name, one law, one style, one language: all were equal in this exile."* In this position they leagued with that ancient race, the Pyrenean people, whom the Romans even had ever failed to subdue, and commenced the task of winning back the land, inch by inch, bound together by a feeling of equality and fraternity. "It seemed as if all those who reconquered their native land were as sacred to one another; mutual respect, mutual pride, protected them; and the traces of this noble character are to be met with to this day in the pride of the peasant of Castile."†

Their mountainous fastnesses and their poverty, necessarily made the bulk of these patriot warriors, a mass of infantry, stamping this armament in the mind of the Spaniard with the prestige of success, for by it his earliest victories were effected; and at the same time teaching him practically its value. In the municipal institutions of the first towns, which the vic-

* Aug. Thierry. *Essais Histor.* xxvi.

† Aug. Thierry. *Ibid.*

tors formed on the site of their conquests in the plains, it was provided that whoso possessed a horse, and armour to correspond, should pay no taxes, the population being divided into *horsemen* and *taxables*, and knowing no other classification. This favoured, and wisely, the formation of an efficient cavalry; but the chivalry of Spain, vested with rights borrowed from the customs of other countries, was of much later origin. As a military force, it earned honour and experience in constant internal wars against the Arabs, and between the Christian Kingdoms into which the land was separated, but the main strength of the land continued to be in its infantry, a force the real merit of which was not known to Europe until the Spaniards appeared in Italy, and engaged in those long and bloody wars, in which was disputed the Spanish right to the Neapolitan succession. It was in this school that those troops were trained, destined to supply the conquerors of the new world, and form the base work of that terrible infantry with which Charles V. threatened to render Europe subservient.* The Spaniards

* "I would willingly," says Brantome, "speak of the valiant field officers, and brave captains of the Spanish foot soldiery, but I should never have done; for there are so very many of them that in reckoning them over my prolixity would rather annoy than gratify those who read me: the more so that their nation has always made worthy and great store by its infantry, as it has well set forth the justice of in the exploits which for

began, as Guicciardini specially and frequently remarks, to evince in these contests that singular perseverance, and patience in war, which, as instanced in their signal success under Gonzalvo, the Great Captain, on the banks of the Garigliano against the French in 1504, has continued to form a remarkable national cha-

this hundred years past it has performed: for ever in the most gallant actions, has it been their infantry, which found itself ready to execute them gallantly."

Vie des Hommes Illustres. Disc. 27.

After noting a list of some ninety-nine names, he goes on to say that "the men of the highest family in Spain thought themselves honoured in the command of a company of infantry," and that many of those distinguished captains he had named "of good and great houses, as I have myself seen, to do credit to their infantry, had entered it as private soldiers, bearing harquebuse with its furniture, pike, and corselet, and obedient even as the least, to military law; * *: whence their levies showed but the better seeing that noble blood mixed with valiancy sets off and multiplies its value. So hath this Spanish infantry for some hundred or six score years performed right gallant deeds, better far suited to this armament, than when its members sought to wield zagays (javelins) and mount light jennets (être gènitaires) like the Moors and Arabs, arms doubtless no whit so suitable to them as those of the infantry of the day." Brantome in his *Life of Philibert, Duke of Savoy* (Discours. 42,) "the nephew of the Emperor Charles mentions, that in his youth he took great pleasure 'mongst the Spanish soldiers, and was with them most generally, even bearing the harquebuse, and its furniture like them, and going out to skirmish; at which his uncle took the greatest pleasure."

The parallel between the English knights and nobles fighting with the archers, and the best blood in Spain joining its infantry will not fail to be observed, nor the results in both cases.

racteristic in their armies, since that period. Another striking proof given by these troops of coolness, discipline, and determination, may be found in the action before Ravenna (1512) where the French and Germans, with a numerous and well served artillery, failed, even although they won the day against the Papal and Spanish troops, to make any impression in the Spanish infantry, which "retiring rather than driven, from the field, undisturbed in any portion of their array, taking the road that led between the river, and the marsh, marching with one step, and with their front closed up, so that the French repulsed by the imposing strength of this force, began to hold away."*

There is something in this description that reminds us of the attitude which our own troops have not unfrequently assumed under like circumstances of disadvantage. A friend of the writer, a Spanish officer, who had served much with British troops, and who was a man of much intelligence and observation, was exceedingly fond of pointing out what he looked upon as parallel points in the character of the English and his own people. He insisted much upon the maritime predilections of both nations, and the maritime and colonial achievements by which both are distinguished, as showing similar determination, coolness, enterprise, and steady courage.

* Guicciardini. B. x.

The parallel is perhaps not quite a fanciful one, although it is to be remembered that the Spaniards rather adopted naval pursuits* from the Arabs and Genoese than created them for themselves. It is, however, very certain that the character of courage which all races of any national maritime celebrity exhibit in the field, is strikingly similar ; and that, as in the case of the Swedes, Danes, Dutch, and English, although

* I cannot help noticing, however cursorily, the influence exercised by this enlightened and polished people upon the ancient races of the Peninsula. It appears to this day in their language, their domestic manners, their ardent turn of mind. As respects maritime pursuits, the Spaniards certainly owed their knowledge of them to the mercantile habits of the Arabs, who, directly, permission was given them to go down to the sea in ships, furrowed the waters of the Mediterranean with their busy keels. They have bequeathed their first naval title, *Lord of the waters* (Ul ameer al ma'—almelante, or almirante—admiral) to the adoption of every nation in Europe. "When the Mussulmans achieved the conquest of Egypt, the Khaleef Omar Ibn'l Khattab wrote to his lieutenant Ameer Ibn'l' As for a description of the sea ; he answered, 'the sea is a mighty creation whereon a mean creature (dares to) ride, a maggot on a log.' (α) On this the Khaleef forbade the Moslems from navigating the sea, nor would an Arab dare to do so without his leave—*—*—*. This prohibition lasted till the time of the Khaleef Mu'awiyah who first allowed them to embark and sent out maritime expeditions." (6, xxxiv. Appendix, to Pascal Gayangos' translation of Ul Makkari's Spanish History ; it is an extract from a curious biographical work in the British Museum.)

(α) I have ventured to give a more literal version of the above remarkable phrase than that of the able translator.

unmilitary as a people, they often show themselves the most soldier-like of troops in the field.

The decadence of the military efficiency of Spain dates from the period when her ancient institutions were invaded, her privileges encroached upon, her free people reduced to suffer under "the flux and reflux of foreign successions."*

It is to the denationalization of the higher classes, that the ills of Spain are to be in no small part attributed, and to this must we look for the explanation of the strange military anomaly which the Spaniard has in our own day exhibited; now mustering in vast unmanageable multitudes, to flee without a shot fired, at the glitter of a French bayonet; now displaying the most undaunted heroism in the face of difficulties incredible; defying the attacks of disciplined armies, and laughing to scorn all alternative but success, or a grave. This brings us back to the position we have already so often arrived at, the popular character of all national military virtue. The Spaniard under the guidance of unworthy aristocrats, under the sway of an effete and imbecile monarchy, was incapable of any thing. It was not till the people rose against foreign invasion, and made the war *their's*, that the nation could assert its right to be descended, through the soldiers of Gonsalvo, and of the Albas, from those stern Iberians who wrung back the country bit

* A. Thierry.

by bit from a strange race so many centuries before. The work then commenced has gone on since, fitfully, and with much wrong and violence it is true—but still in a mode to elicit the energies of the popular military character of the Spaniard, and to rouse the nation to an attempt at resuming her dignity among the people of Europe. “Spain,” says, Thierry “has joined with a daring hand the broken thread of its ancient days of liberty and of glory: may no reverse crush its noble and perilous effort! *Esto perpetua!*”

At the risk of dwelling too long upon the subject, I must yet stop to notice very briefly the military character of another and cognate people with the Spaniards, the more so because our countrymen have been from a very early date more or less intimately connected with them, as allies in war. When in 1139 Alphonso at the battle of Ourique at once vanquished his Musulman opponents, and declared the independence of Portugal, he was aided in achieving this by a body of English and some French Crusaders. From that day to our own, the military connection of the English with the Portuguese has maintained itself with a degree of remarkably consistency. The Portuguese are well known as being, when well led, inferior to no Continental nation in the excellence of infantry. The national spirit, which exhibited itself, as with the

Spaniards, in daring maritime enterprises, and in the obstinate vigour with which foreign conquests were achieved and maintained, had, until lately as in Spain, been over-crowded by aristocratic influences, and the profligacies of a corrupt court. It remained for our own Great Captain to vindicate the honour of the nation, and to point out that the military decadence of Portugal lay in the dominant classes, and not in the people. The memory of past achievements to which the Portuguese so fondly cling* with the remedy of present abuses, may at any time stimulate a generous people to emulate the deeds done by its fore-fathers. We are at any rate assured by experience that in this case as in all others, the spirit lives embosomed in the mass, which might achieve as great things, were there but mind or energy in the leaders.

Having now run through the military review of the principal nations whose warlike reputation stood high, prior to the commencement of the sixteenth century, we are bound to take a glance at the military character of the English themselves. Their tactics, with those of the Scotch, have been duly considered, as also the influence their example tacitly produced upon the com-

* The writer has been informed that the Portuguese Cabinet, when urged by our own some years ago to the cession of its East India possessions, replied "the colonies are useless, but we cannot cede the memento of Albuquerque."

batants of Europe: we have examined their merits in the field,—let us now look at their habits as soldiers, and as military leaders in quarters.

Philip de Comines, who seems to have taken great pains in studying the English, has recorded many opinions regarding them in his day, too curious not to be cited at length. The first is favourable, partially,* but the same neglect and apathy as to military education, which requires our soldiers and our generals to be made invariably in the field, is perhaps nearly as rife now as ever: “though no nation is more raw and undisciplined than the English at their first coming over, yet a little time makes them brave soldiers, excellent officers, and wise counsellors.” (Book iv. c. 5.) He has, however, no great opinion of their talent, nor command of temper.

* Montluc shows us that even in his day the art of applying a corrective to national failings (which he repudiates) had begun to be studied: “Our nation,” says he, “cannot suffer long as the Spaniard and German can: yet is not the fault in the air of France: nor in the nature of the people, but in the Chief. I am a Frenchman impatient (as they say) and moreover a Gascon, who exceed the other French in choler and impatience and I think in valour too; yet have I ever been patient of all sorts of toil and suffering, as much as any other could be, and have known several of my time, and others that I have bred, that have inured and hardened themselves to all pain and travel, and believe me (you that command in arms) if you yourselves be such, you will make your soldiers the same in time; I am sure had I not done so, I had been killed or taken.”—Commentaries, Book i.

—“The English went more bluntly and ingenuously about their affairs, so that they were not so sharp at discovering the intrigues on this side the water: those English that have never travelled are naturally passionate, as the people generally are in all cold countries;” (Book iv. c. 6.) nor does he think highly of their prudence or discipline, for he observes of the transactions preceding the peace of Amiens in 1475, “upon the strength of the truce, several of the English came into the town where they behaved themselves very imprudently, and without the least regard to their Prince’s honour: for they entered the town all armed, and in great companies, so that could the King of France have dispensed with his oath, never was so handsome an opportunity of cutting off a considerable number of them;” but instead of this Louis caused tables to be set in the streets, the soldiers to be royally entertained “with wine, of which there was great plenty, and abundance of servants to wait on them, *but not a drop of water did the English call for.*” (Book iv. c. 9.) The chronicler finding it impossible to keep the English out of Amiens, goes himself to see to the matter, and being “sent with the Lord de Gié, we went together into a tavern where, though it was not nine o’clock, there had been a hundred and eleven reckonings to pay that morning: the house was filled with company; some sung, some laughed, some slept, and the rest

were drunk." (c. 9.) In spite, however, of the somewhat disorderly habits of the islanders and their simple* ingenuousness (with respect to which he says—"never was there any treaty between the French and English, but the French always outreached them") which seems to move the contempt of the Burgundian diplomatist, he quaintly winds up by observing—"Yet a man must be cautious, and have a care not to affront them, *for it is dangerous meddling with them.*"† Whether the national character, be much altered, is perhaps more doubtful, than that its habits are materially improved; we see in this old sketch of us, the shadow of much which care has been expended in obviating, and in amending. Whether Shakespeare intended to insinuate a useful satire upon his countrymen, when he put into the mouth of his French lords a sneer at the inconsiderate character of that bravery which our worst foes have ever admitted us to possess, is more than probable.‡ The English, in past days,

* Book iii. c. 8.

† Book iv. c. 9.

‡ *Rambouillet*. "That island of England breeds very valiant creatures, their mastiffs are of unmatchable courage.

Orleans. "Foolish curs! that ran winking into the mouth of a Russian bear, and have their heads crushed like rotten apples: you may as well say—that's a valiant flea that dare eat his breakfast on the lip of a lion."

Constable. "Just, just: and the men do sympathize with the mastiffs, in robustious and rough coming-on, leaving their wits with their wives; and then give them great meals of

are certainly supposed to have laid themselves open to the imputation of an overweening confidence, combined with a contempt of their enemy, in the undertaking of their enterprises ; and again when successful, to that of great pride,* and an undue depreciation of those with whom they came in contact. We cannot doubt but that, put the question with whatever flattering unction we may,—the stamp of national character must remain by us, for bad, or for good ; and that the first object of a people, forced often, as are the English, into hostile collision with foreign races, should be to temper the defects of their moral constitution,† in order that they may be in

beef, and iron and steel, and they will eat like wolves, and fight like devils.”—*Henry V. Act iii. Sc. 7.*

* “I, the author of this History, was at Bordeaux when the Prince of Wales marched to Spain, and witnessed the great haughtiness of the English, which are affable to no nation than their own.”—*Froissart. Vol. iii. c. 21.*

† Although belonging to a period posterior to that of which we have been treating, I cannot refrain from quoting the opinion the Marshal de Montluc has expressed of the English in his Commentaries. It shows at once what had been their reputation on the continent, and how, “raw and undisciplined at their first coming over,” they made but a sorry opposition to the veteran Gascons under their brave but vainglorious captain. It was at Calais in 1550 a short time before Boulogne was ransomed of us. I quote from Cotton’s quaint but correct translation made in 1674. “Being returned to the Fort of Outreau there was hardly a day past that the English did not come to tickle us upon the descent towards the sea, and would commonly brave our people up to our very canon, which was

a position to reap the fullest benefit from its excellencies.

within ten or twelve paces of the Fort: and we were all abused by what we heard our predecessors say, that one Englishman would always beat two Frenchmen, and the English would never run away, nor never yield." Montluc having however worsted the garrison of Boulogne some little time before, entertained a contrary opinion of the national prowess which he proceeded to test by drawing some of the troops in Calais into an ambuscade, when "they turned their backs with as great facility as any nation I ever saw;" and Montluc reports the following whimsical conversation as occurring: "I said, look you did I not tell you how it would be? We must either conclude that the English of former times, were more valiant than those of this present age, or that we are better men than our forefathers. I know not, which of the two it is. In good earnest, said Monsieur de Tais, these people retreat in very great haste, I shall never again have so good an opinion of the English as I have had heretofore. No, Sir, said I, you must know, that the English, who anciently used to beat the French, were half Gascons, for they married into Gascony, and so bred good soldiers: but now that race is worn out, and they are no more the same men they were. From that time forwards, our people had no more the same opinion, nor the same fear of the English, than before."—(Book ii.)

It is to be remembered, however, that these English were untrained soldiers armed with bows confronted with veterans equipped with the (then) new weapon, the arquebuse. We must also bear in mind that they were the troops of a king (Henry viii.) who let his Lord Chancellor lecture Parliament in his presence on the art of war, the three requisites for victory (!) being according to Chancellor Warham, that soldiers should walk in the way of the Lord, and in him alone place dependence: that every man should keep the post he was or-

The truth is that nationality of character is so inherent, as to yield to the power of no mutation other than that of radical change in a nation's social state, and is then even subject to revivification at any time. When the late king of Naples was pressed to accede to some proposed alteration in the colours of his soldier's uniform, he testily at last replied,—“Pah! dress them in yellow, or dress them in blue,—*they always run away!*”^{*} Yet these were the descendants of the men from among whom the Duke of Alba selected the commandant-in-chief (*couronnel commandant à tous* as Brantome has it[†]) of the famous Spanish tertias which composed his unrivalled army in the Low Countries; and these were the men themselves, who under a Murat vied with the war-tried veterans of the French Imperial army. It is impossible after considering the subject closely, but to become more and more im-

dered to: that each individual should be content with pay and avoid plunder.—(Speech, 4th Feb. 1514.)—*Lord Campbell's Lives of the Lord Chancellors*, ch. 36, p. 428.

^{*} “*Vestite gli di giallo, vestitegli di bleu, fuyono sempre!*” The writer had the anecdote from a British officer, long in the Austrian service, who vouched for its authenticity.

[†] “Ciappino Vitelli, a very great and experienced leader” —“Great matter was it however that the Spaniards should allow an Italian to hold such high command over them; but they placed him at their head as chosen by their brave general, and found him very able, gentle, and gracious, and one who know how graciously and gracefully to command them.” —*Brantome. — Vie des Hommes Illustres. Disc. 4.*

pressed with the importance in the science of war, of studying the moral causes which influence its operations for victory or defeat; and of these the first is doubtless the character of the actors in them. Whether it be the object of the general to understand his own men, or form an accurate estimate of the probable conduct under various contingencies of his opponents, the study of character is of equal consequence. Fanaticism may, we know, steel the heart of the fatalist or the martyr; despair and terror give birth in extremity to the courage of cowardice; or the ignorance of an overweening self-esteem simulate an uninherent hardihood, but these are casual, and fortuitous incidents. It is a safe rule to assume that troops will conduct themselves, for bad or good, in the field, in a manner not dissimilar to that of their countrymen in old time, and it is safe always to reckon that at any rate they *may* do so, and calculate accordingly.

I am much tempted to cite a singular instance in point. It occurs in the battle of Aljubarota, that great and decisive action in which (A. D. 1384), the independence of Portugal was finally determined, and John, master of Avis, proclaimed king. On the side of the Spaniards was the whole of their chivalry, twenty thousand, says Froissart, all well equipped knights, and an auxiliary body of two thousand lances from France and Bearn, " Gascons, Burgundians, French, Pi-

cards, and Bretons." The Portuguese on the other hand did not consist of more than ten thousand men, knights, and townsmen of Lisbon, and a body of English adventurers about five hundred in number, men at arms, and archers, and not a knight among them. They arrived at Lisbon from Bourdeaux, then our's, under the command of three squires, named Northberry, Morberry, and Hartsel, "adventurers who had nothing to lose," says the chronicler,* in search of service a short time before the battle, and were gladly added to the small muster of the patriot force of Portugal. The two armies were thus each composed in an almost proportionate ratio considering their relative strength, of indigenous and foreign troops, but the contrast of feeling in either was striking and eminently characteristic.

The Spaniards, jealous and haughty, were annoyed at the trust and confidence reposed by their king in his French and Bearnese allies, although many of them were men of the most exalted rank and eminent reputation. This feeling they manifested by private cabals, and discourteous conduct towards them in quarters, fit prelude to a line of conduct in the field, which could only have arisen from a deep-seated jealousy of the worst and most malignant description. It was

* See Froissart. B. iii. c. 13 to 17. Aljubarota is a village of Estremadura, four leagues from Leira.

the exact parallel of that same senseless obstinacy, whereby in the Peninsular war, the Spanish of our own time were wont to expose ourselves, their staunch and firm allies, to every description of annoyance to which an army actively occupied in the field, can be rendered liable. In 1384, when with a brutal and inhospitable violence, they intercepted and appropriated the supplies provided by their allies, they were actuated by the same Spanish spirit, which in 1809 and during the campaign, impeded the English, and that systematically, as to all facilities of availing themselves of the internal resources of the country. Four centuries ago, when they allowed the gallant French and Bearnese knights to sacrifice themselves to a man, unsupported, against the field works of Aljubarota,—what was this but the mere national prototype of the jealousies of Cuesta, and of Rosas? What but a shadowing forth, more fatally enacted, of that we were destined to experience at Albuera,—nay, at half a score of actions in which nothing but English constancy could have remedied the disastrous position induced by the jealous apathy of Spaniards!

The Portuguese, on the contrary, cordialhearted in the main, rather sullen than haughty, and whose national pride did not degenerate into the littleness of jealousy, received the English adventurers whom a lucky chance had guided to their shores,

with hearty good will as auxiliaries, and as soldiers with due respect and regard for their military talent. They were hospitably received in quarters, "dining in the palace of Lisbon," says Froissart, "and well lodged in the town, with their pay advanced to them for three months;" nor when in the field (for on their coming John of Portugal marched to meet his foe) was the distinction shown them less great. After reconnoitring the Spanish army, Northberry and Hartsel were called with others most experienced in arms, when they were asked their opinions as to the best mode of acting; for the enemy was advancing fast, in numbers such that they were more than four to one, such at least being the idea of the Portuguese. The Englishmen said, 'since we must have a battle, and they are superior to us in number, it is an unequal chance, and we cannot conquer them but by taking advantage of the hedges, and bushes: let us therefore fortify ourselves in such manner, and you will see they will not so easily break us as if we were in the plain.'

This sensible advice having been highly approved, the army took up its position at the monastery of Aljubarota, where they made an abattis with an entry to tempt the advance of cavalry, in front of the church and conventual buildings, and their force of crossbows and archers was so placed as to command this opening. In the whole

of the above arrangements we see a direct anticipation of the military relations of the English and Portuguese in the long struggle whereby the latter were freed from a foreign yoke. The Portuguese with a sensible confidence in the military skill of their auxiliaries, and a due appreciation of their habitual courage, apply to them in the first instance for advice as to the mode of risking an action, and according to the favourite system of English tactics, the enemy was awaited in position with "the men at arms on foot drawn up beside the church where the king was." This is in another shape, an exposition of the cheerful dependence with which in the beginning of this century the Portuguese troops followed, in default of their own, English officers into action and displayed in all the details of war a degree of intelligence, coolness, and courage worthy of their country's best days. It is characteristic of the English squires, and men at arms that when offered knighthood before the battle they all excused themselves, a very singular refusal however of a distinguished honour on the eve of a great battle. It is possible that being none of them men of family, but mere soldiers of fortune, their good sense suggested the incongruity of a title; or again, the which opinion I rather incline to, it was their national pride in themselves as a peculiar class of soldier, yeoman infantry and archers such as Europe could not produce the like of,

which made them look on knighthood, even at the hands of a presumptive monarch, as (for them) an empty and an idle distinction. I have in my own day seen English officers receive a foreign order, as if it had been rather an affront than a compliment.

The Portuguese being in position were reconnoitred by their opponents, who seeing them so placed as to render their strength uncertain, held a council of war to decide on the expediency of attack. In this assembly the Spanish knights, whether with sinister motive towards the French or not, gave certainly a sound opinion, saying that it was getting late in the day, that the enemy's position was imperfectly known, and that the action had better be deferred to the morrow. To this prudent advice, Sir Reginald de Limousin, a Bèarnese naturalised in Spain, and himself acting as the Spanish marshal, strongly demurred, and was in this supported by all the French and other gentlemen of Burgundy and elsewhere, who with their national impatience, called for immediate action. It was granted them, and they imprudently drew up in a separate body without asking the Spaniards to take a position in their array. This put the coping stone to the hatred and jealousy of these proud cavaliers, who forthwith said among themselves—"they are drawing up separately; well, we will do the same on our part, and by God, let them

combat and fight by themselves: have they not already boasted that they are sufficient to vanquish the Portuguese?"

It is painful to dwell on the disloyal treachery which ensued. The French advancing with their usual impetuosity, got entangled in the abattis, when their horses were shot down by the English archers, after which their riders almost to a man were killed or taken. Meanwhile the Spanish chivalry, holding back, assured the king of Castile that his vanguard was successful, and it was not until the defeat of the French was complete, that stragglers reaching the main body urged them to advance. It was then not far from sunset, and certain Castilian knights again urged delay till the morrow, but the king would not hear of it. He advanced with his main body on the Portuguese position, when prisoners being plenty there and fighting men to guard them few, the word was given to kill them all, as the enemy was at hand. In accordance with the merciless habits of the time, fourteen high lords, and knights of Bèarne, and three hundred squires with many French knights were slain in cold blood; their number and consequence may be estimated by Froissart's statement that one with another, their ransom "would have been worth four hundred thousand francs," a large sum in those days. "It was an event," he remarks, "very unfortunate to the prisoners as well as to

the Portuguese," a proposition with the self-evidence of which the prisoners at any rate must have been sufficiently satisfied. It is a sort of satisfaction to know that retributive justice was doled out to those who were the real causers of this defeat and massacre; their attack upon the Portuguese proving unsuccessful, owing to the strength of the position, and the efficiency of the archers. The army of Castile was worsted with signal discomfiture, and more knights and nobles lost than even at the fatal battle of Najara, where the Black Prince defeated Don Henry. A careful examination of the details of this great action, which I have here briefly epitomised, will afford an interesting exposition of facts confirmatory, I think, of the justice of the view that has been taken of this subject.

The mention of the city troops of Lisbon in the action of Aljubarota, and the gallant share they had in the achievement of that signal victory, may serve to introduce some notice of this description of soldiery, which, in the wars of the Middle ages, and in our own country, up to a comparatively recent period, occupied from time to time a prominent military position. The constitution of the burgher forces of Italy has been already casually noticed, and need not be again reverted to. That of free towns in other countries varied according to the social circumstances of the community. Thus in the kingdom of

France, the towns of Provence, and the countries on the right and left banks of the Rhone, retained something of the municipal freedom which had been their's, when ancient Gaul was a Roman province,* as particularly exemplified at Aix, Arles, Avignon, and Marseilles. These cities did not loose their liberty until about 1257, when, deserted by the chivalric party in the struggle with Charles of Anjou, the bands of the townsmen were reduced and defeated. Their military constitution may be supposed to have been not un-

* Guizot Hist. de la Civilisation on France. A. Thierry's Norman Conquest.

I have always looked upon it as a curious example of the durability of social impressions, that the republican movement in the first French revolution, should have received such enthusiastic support in the old republican towns of the South, Marseilles in particular. It was that town which sent the small party of "men who knew how to die," to use their own phrase (Carlyle's French Revl.), to Paris at a very early period of the insurrectionary epoch of that terrible struggle, in the violence of which these federates of Marseilles had so much to do, wreaking back on the descendants of their chivalric opponents, a dreadful revenge for the loss of their ancient free institutions. The same may be observed of Paris, the old spirit of whose citizens was roused to its former temper of fierce independence by the ill-advised manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick (Mignet's Rev. Française, c. v.) When the Hugonots first rose in arms in Guienne, Montluc who commanded there (Commentaries, B.V.) records the decided republican spirit of the people. "What king?" said the Hugonots of St. Mazard—"we are the kings: he you speak of we'll set to a trade to teach him to get a living as others do."

like that of the republican cities of Italy, to which in other respects they were very analogous. Other free cities again, which formed themselves, and, receiving a charter from the crown, afforded a check and counterpoise to the power of the feudal nobility, acknowledged, it is true, as Ghent, and the towns of the low countries did in relation to the Earls of Flanders and House of Burgundy, a liege lord. They however arrayed their forces after their own fashion, marshalling them by their guilds and companies, and obeying none but their syndics, or officers elected by themselves. The war waged by the men of Ghent and their partizans under Philip Von Artaveld in 1382, affords a familiar and interesting example of the prowess of such cities.

Other free cities, as in the case of our own capital, associated with them a knight or noble as their chatelain. This was sometimes hereditary, as with the Fitzwater family, the head of which was, as Stowe says, "Castilian, and Banner-bearer of London," by owing service to the city for his castle Baynard, which stood on the Thames bank. In time of war, it was his duty to appear at St. Paul's bearing the city banner, and there meeting the Mayor and Sheriffs, solemnly receive charge of it as the city's "banneret of fee, to bear and govern it to the honour and profit of the city, to his power."* Another

* Stowe's Survey of London. B. i. chap. xiv.

class again, which may be familiarly instanced in the case of Paris, were wholly independent of any chivalric influence, and customarily set it at defiance : " They said in Paris," Froissart tells us in chronicling the events of 1382, " when mustering their men, that they were sufficient in number and strength to fight their own battles, without the aid of the greatest lord on earth."* It was indeed no more than a necessary precaution in wild times when might was right, and the sword uppermost, for the inhabitants of wealthy towns to maintain themselves in a position to defend their property as well as their liberties; nor was it only the power of the crown, or of great feudatories that they had to dread. The people of the country, credulous and ignorant, were at any time liable to be excited to an outbreak† by designing persons, some of them perhaps citizens themselves, as in the case of the

* Vol. ii. c. 94.

† I have before me so curious an instance of this, that, occurring as it does in a rare book, I do not hesitate to append the passage. In the State papers, and original letters published by the editors of the *Excerpta Historica* is (No. II.) a confession by Sir Robert Welles of the motives which led him to head the popular rising in 1470, when the Earl of Warwick conspired to place the Duke of Clarence on the throne. The wretched people, ten thousand of whom were killed under this gentleman's command near Stamford, were got to take up arms by the promulgation of the following infamous falsehood. "The cause," says the confession, " of oure grete rising att this time was groundd upon this noise raisid among the peple,

risings under Tyler and Ball, when London but for the steady attitude of its armed townsmen, ran imminent risk of being plundered by the very force which political intriguers of the city had, to further their own designs, invited to its walls.

In large and wealthy towns, therefore, one is not to be surprised at finding, as says Froissart, at Paris, "thirty thousand rich and powerful men, armed from head to foot, and so handsomely arrayed few knights could afford to rival them. They had in like manner armed their servants, who had mallets of iron and lead for the bruising of helmets." Their mode of rendering the chivalric force useless was by hanging chains across the streets which made a charge impossible; but they by no means feared to emulate the daring of the Flemings, opposing Charles the V. or making a show of doing it, on the heights of Montmartre in the open field. The citizens of London were no whit behind hand in

that the king was coming downe wt. grete power into Lincolnshire. There the kinge jugge shuld sitte and hang, and draw grete noubre of the commons. Wherefore wt. as many as we might make be all meanes possible we com to Lincoln upon the Tuesday. 'Having made these ignorant men assume arms,' My Lord of Clarence svnt Walter that come to us to Lincoln, stured and moved often times oure hoost that att such tyme as the matir shuld com nerr to the point of batell they shuld calle upon my Lord of Clarence to be king." Such in those days was the real history of rebellions!

the care with which they equipped themselves, and the jealousy they exhibited in maintaining to a comparatively recent date, an independent military force of sufficiently formidable character. The dignity and consequence of the city were greatly insisted on, and it would even appear that in the time of Henry III. the Londoners "by reason of the dignity of the city, and antiquity of the citizens are used to be called Barons."* It provokes a smile in our day when we figure to ourselves aldermen in plate and mail, and doughty mayors in steel, but when every man had to keep his own by the sword, in town or country, it became the municipal authorities to head the city troops, which for the mere suppression of dangerous "uproars and mutinies," as Stowe has it, were often urgently required. "Wherefore watches of the citizens were, at a very early date, established: besides the standing watch," Stowe tells us, "all in bright steel, in every ward and street in this city, there was a marching watch that passed through the principal streets,—in number about two thousand men: part of them being old soldiers of skill to be captains, lieutenants, serjeants, corporals, and whiffers, drummers, and fifers, standard and ensign bearers, demilances on great horses, gunners with hand

* Matthew Paris in Stowe's Survey, B. i. c. 31. I should however remark that, as observed before, *Baron* was of old not a title, but signified as here, doubtless, a warlike and considerable person.

guns, or half hakes, archers in coats of white fustian signed on the breast and back with the city arms, their bows bent in their hands, with sheafs of arrows by their side ; pikemen in bright corslets, halberds, the like the billmen in almain rivets, and aprons of mail in great number.” (B. i. c. 29.)

The muster of these watches was taken at mid-summer “yearly time out of mind, until they are 1539, the 31st of Harry the eighth : in that year on the 8th May a great muster was made by the citizens at Mile-end,* all in bright harness, with coats of white silk or cloth and chains of gold, in three great battles (divisions) to the number of fifteen thousand, which passed through London to Westminster and so through the sanctuary, and round about the park of St. James, and so home through Holborn.” The practice was put down on account of the expense ; but in 1548, Sir John Gresham, being Lord Mayor, caused the marching watch to muster on the eve both of St. John, and St. Peter, and so it continued to do till 1569, when against the Queen’s wish, this

* The usual place for muster and exercise : as appears from a passage in *All’s well that ends well*. ‘*Parolles*. Faith, Sir, he has led the drum to the English tragedians,—to belie him, I will not,—and more of his soldiership I know not : except that in that country, he had the honour to be the officer at a place there called Mile-end to instruct in the doubling of files ; I would do the man what honour I can, but of this I am not certain.’

armed muster was finally put a stop to.* The Londoners, however, maintained this warlike reputation as a body, and the Trained Bands of the city, which in process of time grew to become the type of unwarlike soldierhood, were in the civil wars prior to the Protectorate, formidable alike for their valour, as for their devotion to the popular cause.

The establishment of standing armies has of necessity obliterated the existence of burgher troops as a separate and distinct body ; but the spirit which animates a community, dwelling in the possession of peculiar rights within a limited, and in some cases, privileged space, must always in the event of any actual or apprehended invasion of its rights, prove a valuable element in the preparation for a firm resistance. It has been the fashion, and I know not one more absurd or irrational, to sneer in England at citizen soldiers,

* In 1585, a pamphlet was addressed to Sir Thomas Pultison, Mayor of London, reckoning over the advantages of a marching watch for the city. "The artificers of sundry sorts were thereby well set on work, none but rich men charged, poor men helped, old soldiers, trumpeters, drummers, fifers, and ensign bearers, with suchlike men meet for the prince's service, kept in use, wherein the safety and defence of every commonweal consisteth. Armour and weapons being yearly occupied in this wise, the citizens had of their own readily prepared for any need ; whereas, by intermission hereof, armourers are out of work, soldiers out of use, weapons overgrown with foulness, few or none being provided, &c., &c., &c. Stowe's Survey, B, i. c. 29.

and at popular levies. The cry has readily been taken up on the continent, and recent writers, more particularly Monsieur Thiers in his History of the Consulate and Empire, have not failed to point out that the English armament, prepared to resist Napoleon's projected invasion of our country, *must* have proved inefficient, had the veteran French soldiers once effected a landing. When we take the trouble to remember that our first victories in the Peninsular war, were achieved chiefly by men so recently drafted into the line, that they had not had time to paint out the militia numbers on their knapsacks* ; and that the crowning action of a gigantic struggle, was won against the finest army in the world, by some five and thirty thousand Irish, Scotch, and English, two-thirds of whom had never seen a shot fired in enmity in their lives,—I cannot help looking with much contempt on the indigenous detractors from the value of our home armament, and with a smile of, I trust, not ill-natured pity on our good friends across the water, for having made so little, and that too on supposition, of a not originally overbright idea.

We shall in truth have followed out our enquiries up to this point to very little purpose, if the conviction have not possessed us of the supreme potency against aggressive movements, of a nation truly free, fighting for its rights, and its

* Napier's History of the Peninsular War.

existence. In such a struggle the free populace of burghs and towns, must inevitably, as is their duty, take a prominent and peculiar part, and it cannot, with the advantage of good leading, fail to prove also an efficient one.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE LINE OF MARCH, WAR CRIES, &c., &c.—OF THE
GENERAL APPLICATION OF MILITARY STUDY.

It requires the art of a more practised pen than the writer's, to make every reader so partake individual enthusiasm in a favorite subject, as to forget, or forgive, the diffuseness, which this, sometimes induces. After the lengthened exposition contained in the last chapter, I must content myself with noticing more briefly a few points which yet suggest themselves as affording interesting ground for reflection or research, not without regret at having been led to encroach upon the space which they would otherwise have occupied.

We have seen that the exigencies of active service had rendered necessary the appointment, in feudal armies, at a very early date, of officers, superior and subordinate, to controul and to array the motley mass. When the Constable, or Marshall did not accompany a force, a "commander and arraiour" was sometimes appointed under these titles to lead the army. Much, however, seems to have depended upon the whim of the reigning monarch. Edward II. of England, we find in 1322, and again at other dates, making appointments of arraiours;* while Edward III.

* Meyrick, ii. p. 186.

sent, as we have seen, his own son to the field as Marshall, although the Earl Marshall of England was in existence. The only conclusion we can come to is corroborative of all the results of our previous research. All was chance-medley; and the boasted armies of chivalric times were just what the temperament, more or less military, of the king by whom they were called together, made them. As respects that greatest test of discipline, conduct on the line of march, the English seem, when under a good soldier, to have adopted readily the habit of order and obedience, and we are naturally struck with the picture given (Froissart, B. I. c. 207) of Henry V.'s army* in

* The following gives, an idea of a royal progress two or three centuries previous to this.

"But after all, these cavalcades more resembled an Asiatic caravan toiling through the Desert, than a well ordered princely procession. Such was the case even at the court of Henry II, incontestably the richest and most powerful monarch in Europe. Peter of Blois, in one of his letters, gives a description of one of these royal processions, which is sufficiently startling to every idea of modern refinement. There were knights and nobles,—thronged of cavalry and foot soldiers,—baggage, waggons, tents and pack-horses,—players, prostitutes, and the marshals of the prostitutes,—gamesters, cooks, confectioners, mimics, dancers, barbers, pimps, and parasites,—and in the rising at morn of this tremendous medley to commence the march of the day, he adds, that there was such jostling, overturning, shouting, and brawling that you would have imagined hell itself, had let loose its inhabitants. Such was the real squalidness that lay beneath so much superficial glitter a kingly errand was but a mob, in which every thing pertaining to taste and order was unknown or dis-

its progress during his invasion of France in 1414; the maintenance of a distinct permanent force of pioneers, the provision made of munitions so as to avoid distressing the country,* and the order in which the separate divisions of the troops and artillery succeeded one another.

That this was not casual, but a permanent and regular† discipline is proved by our finding the

regarded.”—(*Pict. Hist. of England, Manners and Customs, book. 3, chap. vi. p. 643.*)

This description will strike any one who has marched with the camp of a native chief, as the exact parallel of what might now be written of it. I have often thought that a practical illustration of what feudalised Europe was, may be found in the study of the native states of India, and their relations, social and political.

* This prudent and provident system was soon imitated by the enemy. In 1412 we find Monstrelet, (b. ii. c. 263,) saying—“ At length the King marched from Toulouse—and for a truth when he, his great lords, and all the captains with their men were assembled, there were fourscore thousand horse, and carts, and cars without number to carry artillery, provision, and store of all descriptions.”

† The severity with which theft was punished by this monarch, (Holinshed recording his having hung a soldier for stealing a *pix*) has been happily seized on by Shakespeare, making as he does, Bardolph the culprit, or in ancient Pistol’s words—

‘ Fortune is Bardolph’s foe, and lowers on him,
For he both stolen a *pix*, and hanged must a’ be.’

Sacrilege, however, which the theft involved, was looked on with peculiar horror by even the rudest soldiers, and Froissart tells how a squire of Sir Peter Audley’s (b. i. c. 200) who carried off the sacred vessels from the village of Rouay, “ was no sooner got into the fields, than his horse began to caper, and to play such violent tricks that no one dared approach him ; after

same king six years later in his march on Troyes with the flower of his force, compelling his soldiers to temper their ration of the heady champagne wines with water ; and that it was not confined to the force under Henry's immediate command, but general throughout the army is shown in the action fought at Rouvrai in 1424 by six hundred English and some Parisian burgher troops under Sir John Fastolfe against a considerable body of French and Scotch knights and archers. Fastolfe, who was engaged in the difficult duty of protecting a valuable convoy, made such dispositions as enabled him to repulse the enemy, and bring off his carriages without loss in the face of the enemy. Yet the same officer, not five years afterwards in 1429, after the death of the military monarch whom he had before served so soldierly and bravely, caused the loss of the battle of St. Patay by his disgraceful cowardice, and by abandonment of his men, whom we have curious historical evidence to prove as having been already in a decadent state of discipline.*

many plunges they both fell to the ground with their necks broken and were immediately turned into cinders and dust. His companions seeing this made a vow they would never violate the sanctity of any church."

* "The men at arms who had been sent to reconnoitre, put up a stag which ran straight for the army of the English, — the English seeing the stag dash through them, set up a loud shout, which shout satisfied the scouts where they were." (Monstrelet, b. ii. c. 61.) The French meanwhile attacked the English whom they "had lately found very slack in their

The same chronicler who so describes them, represents them at a later period as progressively deteriorating. (B. II. c. 98.) Sir Thomas Kiriel, who was appointed by the Duke of Burgundy to command his vanguard on the advance into Artois in 1430, moved his men "in separate bodies without keeping any order on their march; or sending on scouts, as experienced men at arms always do. *—* On their march they put up many hares which they pursued with much hooting, and hallooing; for their captains were very inattentive in not preserving better order, and many of them had not even put on their armour, for which neglect they suffered severely, as you shall hear." The progress of disaster was of course proportionate with that of disorganization, proving that we were beaten out of our continental conquests quite as much by the results of our own negligence, and bad soldiership, as by the prudence and valour of our opponents.

The methods whereby different divisions were kept together, and the troops of contending armies distinguished, were in addition to the use of stand-defence," on foot in the English fashion. The result of the battle of St. Patay was the capture of lords Scales, Talbot, and Hungerford with many more, and the loss of eighteen hundred men killed, a disaster caused chiefly by Sir John Fastolfe, who rode off the field. Shakespeare has been said to have had this personage in his eye when creating the character of Falstaff, which is an idle supposition. Fastolfe appears himself in Act. iv. sc. 1. of the 1st Part of Henry VI.

"This dastard at the battle of Patay," — &c., &c., &c.

ards and pennons, that of war-cries, and badges. The words used were either national cries, or the name of the leader, or in some cases, his family war-cry, from which Sir S. Meyrick supposes armorial mottoes to have taken their origin. These calls served to animate and keep the men together in the field, and guide them in taking up their quarters after nightfall. It is easy to observe how from this habit arose in time the use of paroles and countersigns. The badge consisted ordinarily of a cross, originally used to designate the adventurers who went to battle in the Holy Land, and thence adopted as a common military distinction. The cross of the Crusaders was white, and was sometimes adopted in secular warfare, as by Simon de Montfort when he headed the barons against our Henry III., as emblematic of the sacred nature of the just cause in which the combatants professed to engage. The English national cross was red, and was ordinarily worn on a white cassock. As late as Henry VII.'s time, white was the colour used by our infantry as a uniform. The Bretons, who were assisted by a party of English troops under Sir Richard Wydeville, against the French in this reign, assumed at the disastrous battle of St. Aubin, white coats and red crosses like their allies.* Retainers under great houses, and burgher

* Bacon in Meyrick, ii. 231. The English perished to a man with 17,000 Bretons.

troops were distinguished occasionally by the arms or colours of the lord they followed, or the city they belonged to. Scarves were sometimes used as badges* but the use of national military uniforms was of course out of the question until the employment of a standing force. That of the Yeomen of the guard is the earliest instance with us, although some approach to uniformity of appearance seems to have been made by burgher troops wearing white as did the Londoners ; or the city colours, as in the case of the town colours of Paris, red and blue, which, with the addition of the Bourbon white, have formed the far-famed Tri-color.

As the use of mercenary troops became general, and that of armour discontinued, the array must have been most motley in appearance ; but as the soldiers, who had been successful in plunder, were fond of bedecking themselves in handsome dresses, the effect, though irregular, could not fail, in some armies, to have been imposing. "Thus," says Brantome, "the Spanish soldiers became so rich, so flush of money, when they quitted the town (Antwerp) on treaty that they should evacuate Flanders, and move on Italy, that they knew not how to carry their gold, and their riches : insomuch that the most part of them had their swords bedecked with gold, both hilt and guard, as also their pikes,

* See ordinances of Henry V. Appendix. *band of St. George.*

accoutrements, and other trappings, so did they abound in money.”* He elsewhere speaks in his life of the Duke of Savoy, of his brother’s troop “with very handsome cassocks of crimson velvet, all with broideries of gold and silver.” If any uniformity were attempted, it was apparently confined to a single troop or company, and depended on the caprice of the officer in command.† In our own army, scarlet or red seems to have been always a favourite colour, and partly perhaps owing to the English cross having been of this hue, partly owing to its being the livery of the Tudors (as shown in the uniform of the Yeomen of the guard, the same now as in the days of Henry the VIII.) it was established on the adoption of a uniform, as the national one. Mons. de Montluc, in his animated description of the camisade on Boulogne while in the possession of the English, says of their appearance :—“Some of the soldiers were clad in white and red, others in black and yellow, and a great many soldiers also without those colours ; but I soon understood that all those in liveries were pioneers ; because they had no arms as the others had

* Vie du Connestable de Bourbon.

† Thus Montluc tells us (Comment. b. ii) he covered his soldiers’ morions with yellow taffeta. As to a more extended notice of the subject of British uniforms, the reader will find it compendiously given with much detail on ancient armament in the treatise on British costumes in the Library of Entertaining Knowledge.

who defended themselves." One does not see the justice of the supposition, the garrison being surprised, and the men perhaps unable to reach their lodgings where their arms were. The general question of the uniform equipment of soldiery belongs to a period of our enquiry far posterior to that with which we have been occupied. It is necessarily dependent as a professional distinction, upon long established usage, and a very high state of general discipline.*

It would be endless to cite the particular points, on which by comparison with the constitution of armed forces up to the end of the feudal chivalric period, we might satisfy ourselves as to the inferiority of the then existing military system, and thence trace the gradual progress made towards a more scientific mode of carrying on hostilities, or maintaining an armed position of defence. One remarkable point, however, I cannot pass by as being most characteristic of the time, the carelessness evinced for the soldiers when sick, or wounded. The lordly and knightly combatants were, according to the ancient chivalric practice, tended by their ladies, many of whom professed, and pos-

* As late as in the commencement of the last century the military colour used still to be usurped by civilians. Addison says describing the squires of the West of England in 1711, "when they go a-wooing (whether they have any post in the militia or not) they generally put on a red coat."—(Spectator, No. 129.)

sessed, such a knowledge of the properties of simples as would suffice to apply a stiptic, or assist in procuring the cicatrization of a wound. The greater nobles had even leeches, or professional surgeons about their household, but those employed bore no proportion to the troops they were attached to, and the practice was comparatively modern. Thus in the muster rolls, still extant, of the armies of our Edward II. (Grose v. i. p. 274), there is *no* surgeon attached to the English troops, although the Welsh have to each band, an officer paid at 6d. a day, styled *medicus*, a curious vestige doubtless of the ancient skill which is said to have distinguished the Druid professors of surgery. The Norman and Teutonic races appear, from a very early date, to have considered the curative art as belonging to their women,* from whose uses the chivalric habit

* In that very ancient history of the Norwegian Kings. the Heimskringla by Snorro Sturleson (Laing's translation) the following curious passage occurs, showing the antiquity and eccentricity of feminine medical practice, Saga. vii. c. 248. "Thormod went out, and entered into a chamber apart in which there were many wounded men, and with them a woman binding their wounds. *—*—*. The girl said, 'Let me see the wound, and I will bind it. *—*—*', Thereupon Thormod sat down, and cast off his clothes, and the girl saw his wounds, and examined that one was in his side, and felt that a piece of iron was in it, but could not find where the iron had gone in. In a stone pot she had stirred together leeks and other herbs, and gave the wounded men of it to eat, by which she discovered if the wounds had

of the gentle dame tending the noble knight had its undoubted origin.

In the army of Edward III. before Calais, there was *one* surgeon for the king's household troops,—two surgeons and six doctors for the Welsh contingent. In 1415 Henry V. employed twelve surgeons for his army in France amounting to thirty-two thousand fighting men, and Edward IV. just the same number; the King's physician and surgeon being paid 2s. and 18d. a day, respectively, and the rest of the medical body 1s. each *per diem*. The strange disproportion between the troops employed and the persons engaged to attend to the injuries they received in action, is explained, when we find that the poorer soldiers, when much hurt, were dismissed with a small sum of money to find their way home as best they might.* How much ought not this to enhance, in our opinion, the estimate of those countrymen of our's, who, with such a prospect before them in the event of hurt or harm, spared neither life nor limb, to do to the very utmost, the duty they had engaged for; and that too in a foreign land, where, if wounded, they were unfriended, neglected, and alone. We cannot, however, much regret that penetrated into the belly; for if the wound had gone deep, it would smell of leek."

* Barnes (in Grose), says in his History of Edward III. that this was done after Poitiers. This is now the practice in native Indian armies.

these victims to the fortune of war did not find themselves cared for according to the army-surgical system of that day. Much dependance was, I should mention, placed upon the effect of simple applications, which the soldiers themselves were acquainted with, made simultaneously with the utterance of certain prayers and formulæ of words, intended to act as charms ; in these, the simples, and *first intention*, as surgeons say, did much ; and faith in the efficacy of the adjuration still more. Still, whatever the amount of their rude experience, the position of a soldier in the event of a dangerous wound must have been ordinarily dreadful ; and he was so little supposed to be entitled to surgical aid that it was not until regularly paid men were employed (between whom and the employer a contract existed) that the services of a surgeon could be purchased by a certain amount of stoppage out of the private's pay, in addition to the salary he received from the state.

Grose (v. i. p. 273) quotes from a medical work* written in 1536, whereby it would appear that on the Continent at that period, the ordinary dressing applied to gun-shot wounds was boiling oil, the treatment still adopted in native Indian armies. The party who describes his practice writes—"in the end my oyle failed me, so that I was constrained to use instead

* Treasure of Ancient and Modern Times : London 1619.

hereof, a digestive made of the yolk of an egg, oil of roses, and terebinth." The result of this compulsory innovation, which constitutes, as will be seen by the ingredients, an excellent stiptic, and soothing ointment, was such as to induce him to "resolve with myself, never to burn so cruelly the wounded patients by gunshot any more." The hundreds and thousands of wounded men that must have died after every considerable action from neglect and bad surgery, or no surgery at all, are incalculable, especially when we find the best surgeons of the day making use of such a panacea as the following.

"A famous chirurgion of Turin proposed a balm for gun-shot wounds as follows : two young whelps, one pound of earth worms, two pounds of the oil of lilies, six ounces of the terebinth of Venice, and one ounce of aqua vitæ ; in my presence he boiled the whelps in the said oil, until the flesh deserted from the bones : afterwards he took the worms having before killed and purified them in white wine, to purge themselves of the earth, which they always have in their bodies : being so prepared he boiled them also in the same oil till they became dry : this he strained thorow a napkin without any great expression : that doone he added thereto the terebinth ; and lastly the aqua vitæ, and called God to witness that this was his balme, which he used

in all wounds made by gunshotte, and in others which required suppuration, withall praying me not to divulge his secret." (Treasure of Ant. and Mn. Times). It will be observed that the citation is made from a work published at a later date than the last portion of the period which we have been considering; but this has not been done undesignedly. The writer has unfortunately no longer by him specimens of the charms employed of old to aid in curing hurts in action, but he feels he cannot supply the loss better than by putting forward an instance of the military medical treatment of a more recent period. The sympathetic salve,* planetary influences on medicines, and the astrological follies of Jupiter ascendant, or Mars combust, cannot, as acting on moral impressions and belief, be more absurd than physical cures undertaken by the virtue of essence of dogwhelp, or extract of earthworm. Such strange methods of procuring a simple oleaginous salve, were used as part of the mystery of science, and to impose on weak, and uninstructed minds. Italy first supplied surgeons and anatomists capable of dealing scientifically with the serious injuries to which the soldier is liable on actual service, and the first essay on the treatment of

* See for a familiar explanation, notes to 3rd Canto of Lay of the Last Minstrel. Charms to staunch wounds Scott mentions are quoted in Reginald Scots Discovery of Witchcraft.

gun-shot wounds ever written, was printed in 1514 by Antonio Ferri, physician to Pope Paul III.* The Italians in fact usurped at this time throughout Europe, the first place in medical and physical science, and, as is ever the case, a race of quacksalvers, and barber surgeons sprung up on the strength of the national reputation, whose strange and quaint prescriptions were more acceptable to a credulous and ignorant people, than the simple dicta of the truly scientific physician. The once well known *Eau d' Arquebusade* is perhaps the only one of their specifics, which has held its ground to our day.

In taking a general view of the position of the soldier during the period of which we have been treating, nothing can be more revolting than the picture of savage, selfish, indifference to human suffering exhibited by his leaders,—nothing more pitiable than the state of the curative arts :—nor more contemptible than the half-heathen superstitions whereby their defects were ignorantly supposed to be remedied. One inclines to the belief that the lower orders had, in those days, in addition to the hardness produced by their harsh nurturing, a decided fatalist bias, and little appreciation of the value of life. Such a race might make better shift than our-

* Tiraboschi Hist. of Italian Literature. *Scrittori de Chirurgia* 1500 a 1550 : the treatise is called *De Sclopetorum sive archibuserum vulneribus*.

selves without the aid and comfort of medical assistance, feeling that each individual that composed it was born to suffering and endurance, and accepting in melancholy patience the necessity of evils, for which man as yet knew no alleviation.

The real worth and value in the above instance as in all others, of aught which is, can never be appreciated nor understood, save by comparison with its like which has been. It is on the application of this principle that the course of study and enquiry suggested in these pages, has been made to embrace so wide a field; and yet, wide as it seems, the subjects treated, have been most cursorily and imperfectly touched upon; while the most interesting portion perhaps, to many, of military history up to the commencement of the sixteenth century, remains yet wholly unnoticed. Such, and so great, is the material of instruction, so to say, with which the study of the profession of arms presents us. We have not yet approached what is ordinarily called the scientific part of the subject;—yet who will say we have not been treating of a science,—ay, and a great one, involving the study and knowledge of mankind, nationally, and individually.

The dignity and importance of the profession of arms rises, instead of diminishing, with the advance of knowledge and civilization.

Arms, and their exercise, so long as equivalent to no more than the amusement of kings, and the occupation of nobles, are but suggestive of cruelty and devastation in the prosecuting some aggressive ambitious policy, or of the brutal wanton blood-shed of a gladiatorial combat; but it is far other when we see them in their true character, as the safeguard of nations, as the corrective of anarchy, and the preservative of social order. I take my ground then in utter opposition to those false philosophers, and pseudo-politicians, who cry out on soldiers and on armies, as things useless, unnatural, and unchristian. That wars in good time will cease, we earnestly hope, but it is a utopian dream to speak of their cessation in our day. While there are on earth despots looking to the aggrandisement of their dominion;—or nations, restless and pugnacious, greedy of military glory,—or within the social body of the state, demagogues and malcontents ready to subvert the established order of things with the strong hand,—we must for our defence and protection cultivate military science, and endeavour to perfectionize our military system. An army raised for the protection of the people is a constitutional force, the members of which deserve to be cherished and honoured; for their profession, sneered at as *the trade of fighting*, is in fact the very reverse. It is their

duty to fight when called on, but their trade, to use the silly phrase, is to overawe, by their state of efficient preparation, internal and external foes, and obviate the occurrence of tumults or of hostilities. It is the trade of *not* fighting, and I know no more noble a profession.

It is a question whether many do not enter this profession, with but a vague appreciation of its character, and of the position they occupy. If there be indeed any room for the sneer, which the anti-military party, so very numerous in England, are ever anxious to attach to the army, let individuals, and not the body at large, bear the gibe. Such carping must be silenced when all the members of the profession understand* and act up to the dignity of the body in which they have enrolled themselves; such carping cannot apply to the working portion of a body of men called upon in the ordinary routine of duty to perform military service in every climate of the globe, from the regions of Canadian snows to the rocks and sands of Aden, and the deadly heats of Sindé. The discussion, however, of such a point is out of place in a treatise like this, and the matter is but incidentally alluded to for the better application of our object.

Study and enquiry expand and elevate the

* See two excellent articles which have recently appeared in the Quarterly and Westminster Reviews on the social condition of the soldier.

mind, quicken the apprehension, make men fertile in expedients, rapid in decision, liberal in ideas, and, by their fruits, win honour and respect. Now as the profession of arms is essentially an honourable one, as opposed to the nature of ordinary callings which are followed for profit, so does it ensue that every means whereby the greater honour, credit, and personal distinction can be procured for the members of that profession, should be by them carefully and perseveringly cultivated. The soldier in adopting arms, makes, as a member of the community, many sacrifices. He bids farewell to the liberty of free action; he segregates himself in a manner from society to become one of a select and separate body governed by a rigid system peculiar to itself; he renounces in most instances all chance of accumulating wealth, and accepts as an equivalent the modest livelihood of a gentleman, supported by the proud sense of duty, and cheered by the hope of distinction. As has been said by* one who knew the soldier well, historian of his acts, and poet-celebrator of his prowess—

The sword is no plough, the sword is no spade,—
 Who would delve with it tries but a sorry trade.
 It grows us no crops, and it gives us no seed;
 For homeless the soldier must lightly speed,
 And stray o'er the surface of broad-bosomed earth,
 Nor hope ever to warm him upon his own hearth;

* Schiller—Wallenstein's Lager—scene xi.

He must pass unmarked the city's sheen,
 The hamlet's meadows, so joysome, and green :
 The vintage-clusters, the harvest-wreath,
 From afar on his march the soldier but see'th.
 Say what mark or what substance hath he in the land,—
 What earthly good hath he at command—
 On what as his own can he lay his hand—
 Unless for his own Honour the soldier stand ?

It is consonant with the genius and spirit of his profession therefore, that he should be at pains in order to procure, and even command, the respect and esteem of the community at large, as well as that of his comrades, and there are no means surely more effective to that end than the establishment of a reputation for acquirements, which make him the ornament of society, as well as the pride of his profession. The world at large will ever speak of arts before arms, and more readily sympathise with the soldier who studies the one while making them subservient to the practice of the other. Even the Arabs, that race of would-be-dominant warriors agree in this. "Two things," says their proverb, "rule the world,—the sword and the pen ; but the pen rules the sword."

It is superfluous to speak of the gratification of study, of the weary hours it beguiles, of the tedium of life it relieves, the sorrows it assuages, and the wrongs it deadens, or casts to oblivion. Study is a friend that fails not, and, next to religion, is man's best consolation. Now

as no profession is more subject to occasional periods of inaction whether as to the details of duty, or the excitement of active service, than that of the soldier, to no one ought such occupation as books give to be more welcome, than to him. History and the acquisition of languages offer as has been attempted to be shown, an ever varying source of interest and instruction, in connection with military studies; nor are the more scientific branches of the profession itself, less productive of profit and of pleasure to every one who follows in any shape the calling of arms. It is I know often objected that the modern division of armies, which assigns different and distinct duties to separate descriptions of troops, has obviated the necessity of the general acquaintance with all the practices of war which were of old requisite for the formation of a good Captain. The argument is only good, however, as a palliative for idleness, and, as such, it is one a soldier should never use. If, to come to a familiar instance, the line regiment be more efficient which is also competent for the duties of light infantry—or the individual private of it more useful, who has been also instructed in the rudimental duties of the sap, or the battery, surely the services of the officer who professes in a higher degree an analogous share of general military knowledge, are of double and of treble value. The man, who knows not only

how to hold an outpost, but how to make it tenable, will be seconded with additional confidence and alacrity by those under his command, feeling as they must do, that they can place dependance on his individual skill, and rely fully on his mental resources.*

* In the excellent commentary by a modern military writer upon the memoirs of Montecuculi, there are observations which bear so much upon this question that I am tempted to quote them. They occur in connection with the 2d article ch. i. b. ii. of the work of that great captain in which he takes a masterly view of the constitution of artillery in his day, an arm which it was not known he possessed the knowledge of. The observations I extract are as follows. "I am always surprised that those persons who are destined to the profession of arms, do not endeavor to make themselves acquainted with every part of the Art of war. One selects the Infantry, as his sphere of service—another, who may possess greater wealth, endeavours to obtain a troop of cavalry, others serve in the Artillery, and in the Engineers; but neither the one nor the other make it their business to ascertain more, than the use and peculiarity of the arm, to which they are attached: yet among the number of these, there are some who attain to superior grades and become general officers; it is therefore very essential both for themselves, and for the state, that they should be instructed, in all that relates to war on a large scale, and of all the several parts, which must be put in motion, in the grand movements of an army: in fact it is to be desired, that all officers, whether infantry, cavalry, artillery or others, should not limit themselves to the mere knowledge of the use and properties of the arm to which they more immediately belong, but should further study the uses of those which they may consider as foreign to their calling." (Turpin de Crissè)

The preponderance of tactical rules in modern days, and the rigid exactitude of prescribed manœuvres have had their share perhaps in producing an overestimate of acquired proficiency in them, and in causing it to be mistaken for something better. Many therefore may have been misled into looking upon military knowledge as being solely comprised in the accuracy of formations and combinations of troops, and, under this erroneous impression, into caring to know no more. As to the study of general literature as applicable to military purposes, there may have been again in some cases, a corresponding error produced by a not dissimilar cause. To be familiar with tactical works, and deep in Dundas and Torrens, has perhaps not unfrequently constituted the idea of the scope of a soldier's lore. General literature, therefore, it only beseemed him to take up as amusement, learning in *mufti* being left to the book worm, or the pendant. At the risk of being thought, like Captain Fluellen, "a little out of fashion," the writer would yet suggest, in the somewhat eccentric phrase of that worthy formalist, that "you would take the pains but to examine the wars of Pompey, the great,—for the ceremonies of the wars, and the cares of it, and the forms of it," convinced that in no age can the soldier add to his efficiency more thoroughly than by uniting scholarship to tactical knowledge, than

by re-establishing the once admitted fact that the perfect practice of his profession is greatly facilitated by the pursuit of liberal study, and by vindicating the character of that study, the literature termed military, as to its variety, and extensiveness. One of the most careless daring soldiers that ever braved a breach, Montluc, the type of that Gascon character which some conceive to be not dissimilar to the Irish, thus speaks, three centuries nearly ago, upon this subject. "I would advise all persons of condition, who have the means to do it, and design to advance their children by arms, the rather to bestow some learning upon them; if they be called to command, they will often stand in need of it, and will find it of infinite use to them; and I believe a man who has read much, and retained what he has read, is much more capable of executing great and noble enterprises than another."* Nor is this all; the union of high cultivation of mind with the gentlemanlike ease which characterises the wellbred soldier, has been pronounced by authority, standard as regards sound observation and judgment of character, as resulting in the most agreeable of combinations. "There is no sort of people whose conversation is so pleasant as that of military men, who derive their courage and magnanimity from thought

* Commentaries of Blaize de Montluc, Marshal of France.
B. vi.

and reflection. The many adventures which attend their way of life makes their conversation so full of incidents, and gives them so frank an air in speaking what they have been witnesses of, that no company can be more amiable than that of men of sense who are soldiers."*

I have attempted, and that in but a very loose and superficial manner, to shadow out the general application of that system of enquiry, the expediency of which it is supposed the preceding pages may have suggested. Its particular adaptation is something wholly apart, and belongs simply to the practical soldier. Still, if I might venture an opinion in the sense of those already expressed, it would be to the effect that mental cultivation in the higher grades, as respects the general study of the profession, would be necessarily followed by an improvement in the intellectual tone and temper of the subordinate ranks. This is, I conceive, the object at which the chief authorities of our own army have been for years aiming, in the expectation that the establishment of its character on the footing it merits, would be followed by a reaction in popular opinion, and that, as among continental troops, the ranks might be not sparingly recruited with young men of family and education, entering as private soldiers with a semi-certainty of gaining their commission by steadiness and good conduct.

* Steele.—*Spect.* No. 152.

Nothing perhaps would tend more thoroughly to overcome the distaste entertained by a great majority of the English peasantry to the life and profession of a soldier, than the seeing it embraced by a class of men, whom they know to be their superiors in breeding, intelligence, and knowledge.

But attempts are now made to enhance this distaste by a particular class of persons calling themselves philosophers, philanthropists, and professors of religion; and as has been before observed, the profession of a soldier is by them denounced as unnatural and unchristian. The meaning of the first of these epithets, I have never been able to explain to myself as here applied; for if to be armed be unnatural, and to be prepared to repel aggression be unnatural, then self-defence is unnatural. But perhaps some confusion of ideas has transferred the use of the term from the object of the soldier's alledged occupation, war, to himself, the agent in it; and it is perhaps meant that wars are unnatural. Would they were so! but alas! from the day the first blow was struck in strife some six thousand years ago, the world has been filled with contest and with slaughter; the very Chosen People of God were sent forth on a mission of extermination; and He even that preached peace and good will to men inculcated the divine doctrine with a sad warning that he brought, not peace, but a sword.

Wars are incidental to man, and are, I fear, only too natural; and so must they remain till it be God's will to make us other and better than we are.

But the profession of arms is unchristian. What does this mean? If it be intended to imply that soldiers are professionally irreligious, Sterne's corporal Trim had, I thought, silenced the foolish slander some half century ago.* The meaning however, is perhaps not this, and it is merely intended to stigmatise the profession in it's constitution, as opposed to the principles of Christianity. I go, as is the best plan in such cases, direct to the fountain head for an interpretation of this position, and I find in the records of our religion many admirable reproofs to the rich, the worldly, and the covetous, to casuists who twist the law to their own ends, to separatists in religion who despise other men, to persons who follow usurious trade, and who desecrate holy places in the greed of gain; but I do not find the centurion rebuked for his profession, but on the contrary encouraged for his faith. I also see another centurion in the days of the early church "with a devout soldier of those who were continually about him," and others, soldiers doubtless, or at-

* "A soldier, an' please your reverence, said I, prays as often (of his own accord) as a parson;—and when he is fighting for his King, and for his own life, and for his honor too, he has the most reason to pray to God of any one in the whole world."

tached to the army, made the objects of a special and peculiar blessing, and I cannot find that their profession is alledged as a reason for their not being admitted as Christians, or that they were at all called upon to renounce it. But is it yet unchristian? Here is my reply.

‘ See yonder land rescued but some forty years ago from anarchy and desolation, when her fields were waste, and her cities tenantless,—her people ploughing with the sword by their side, and reaping beneath the walls of towers and forts within the protective range of wall-piece or of match-lock:—See how peace has filled her garners and peopled her towns,—how security has dismantled her forts, and how her fields, rich with a teeming harvest, are safe as if compassed by the walls of a strong city ; all is order, plenty and content.

But look again,—there are those at hand, whose forefathers helped to lay that land desolate, not as *they* were, rude bands of half armed horsemen but a mighty army, trained to war, and confident of success, with weighty guns such as no European nation would dream of taking into action,—lawless, desperate, cruel, uncontrollable, bent on destroying that land utterly, and its people, swearing to smite them hip and thigh, and carry desolation, and destruction, on and on, even till the sea should stop their progress.

But see,—they are met, though but by a fourth of their own number,—they are checked, they are

thwarted, they are hurled back on the place whence they came, beaten, discomfited, dismayed, without guns, or arms, or means,—their power of oppression, of violence, and of blood-guiltiness taken from them—their threats against the peaceful inhabitants of a rich and happy land vain as the wind from hence for evermore,—and not that only, but the place which they had so long vexed with murder, robbery, and strife, delivered out of their hands, and blessed with peace.²

I say no more.—I could find no better closing to this work than such an exposition of the soldier's worth, of the holy character of a good cause, and such an instance of the might and justice of the God of Battles.

APPENDIX.

 OF THE EARLY MILITARY HISTORY OF THE BRAHMINICAL
CONQUERORS OF INDIA.

The nations alluded to in Page 27, are the old Medo-Persic race, anterior to the Persepolitan, and the Brahminical conquerors of India. The early records of the former ancient people have, so to say, almost totally perished, and we at present only know by the remains their descendants have left, that they were a warrior race, having a peculiar armament, that is making use of both cavalry and chariots, in which they differed from the Egyptians. Of the great and mighty people who subdued and settled in this country we know much more, their ancient literature subsisting, and furnishing us with no inaccurate estimate of the progress they had made in arts, and arms. They also differed from the Egyptians in a double employment of the horse, and by their use of the elephant, whom they found indigenous in the land of their adoption, and had the skill to tame, and train for warlike purposes.

Before proceeding to speculate upon the evidences of original connection between the Egyptians and the Hindoos, or of their subsequent collision in the early and as yet imperfect settlement of the latter on the confines of India, it may be as well to prove by reference to ancient Sanscrit authorities, that the skill in arms of the Brahminical race was really such as to render them no

contemptible opponents to troops as highly disciplined as were those of Egypt. The Institutes of Menu,* which in their present shape, must have been in existence, according to Sir William Jones' calculation, 880 years before our era, contain in their seventh chapter definite instructions not only as to the policy of war, but as to its detail, prescribing the seasons for military operations (vii, Sloka 182), the division of the army employed (vii, Sloka 185), "elephants, cavalry, cars, infantry, officers, attendants;" and the formations in which the troops should advance into action or adopt on the line of march. (vii, Sloka 107). These were various, such as line, column, wedge or double wedge, rhomboid with far extended wings, with other formations (v. Wilson's Dictionary,† *vyuha*,) involving the establishment of reserves

* Jones' Works, vol. iii.

† Under this word, equivalent to *array*, several fanciful formations are mentioned, the car-shape, and flag-shape, and the *macara*, or shape of the sea-monster. It is curious to find this formation reproduced (Raffles' Java, v. 1, p. 281) in an island colonised beyond a doubt from this country under the slightly altered form of *mengkara*; and it shows the nationality of the early conquerors of India, and their decidedly military character, that they should carry with them, and so firmly establish the use and practices of their system of war among their descendants as to lead them to believe, not only that *they* invented these, but that the scene of the great actions recorded in the military epic of the *Mahabharat*, fragments of which exist (Raffles' Java, v. 1, Sp. 411) among the Javanese, lay in Java, and Madura. Sir S. Raffles's description of the military character of the Javanese, and more particularly of their adherence to their ancient system of tactics up to a comparatively recent period (the Matarem war about A.D. 1600,) is a sort

of tried men "distinguished by known marks, who are, excellent both in sustaining a charge and in charging, who are fearless and incapable of desertion" (vii, Sl. 190). Nor was moral influence on the soldier forgotten. The third chapter of these Institutes ordains, writing of purification, (Sl. 98.) "By a soldier discharging the duties of his class, and slain in the field with brandished weapons, the highest sacrifice is in that instant complete; and so is his purification: this law is fixed."

In the Hitapodesa (ch. 3.)* a similar degree of military arrangement and precaution is inculcated, and it is curious that in this work we should find the centre of the position occupied by the foot soldiers, as if to them were entrusted the maintenance of the main array. "In both wings let the cavalry be stationed; by the horses, chariots; by the chariots, elephants; by the elephants, infantry." Infantry again it is remarked are useful at all seasons, while horses and elephants are not so, and it is among the footsoldiers the King is to be in action; "let the sovereign place the infantry before him and take his station." It is however said, that "the elephant is the chief of the forces," and "the horse the strength of armies." The author emphatically establishes, that—"a small army, if excellent, is a great one," an admitted military axiom the truth of which has been singularly lost sight of by more modern eastern nations, with whom number has been ignorantly identified with strength.

of collateral testimony to the soldierlike qualities of the ancient race whence they (Sansk. Yavana, *wanderers*) are undoubtedly descended. See Prichard's Physical History of Man, vol. ii, p. 221.

* Sir W. Jones' Works, vol. vi.

Both in this work and the Institute of Menu, rules are given in the chapters from which I have already quoted, for the selection of strongholds, the latter recommending that the King should reside (vii, Sl. 70.) "in a capital having by way of fortress, a desert of about twenty miles round it," or else in one of the five order of fortresses, viz., of earth, of water, of trees, of men, or of mountains, whereof the last is preferable.

There is a generosity of feeling manifested in the war-like practices of this early time, which bespeaks a singular elevation of sentiment: thus the brahmin, we evidently learn, took no advantage in the field of that sacred character, which if violated "by a blow even with a blade of grass" (iv, Sl. 166) given intentionally, condemned the striker "to twenty-one transmigrations in the womb of impure animals." If even the blow be struck in ignorance of the law "so as to shed blood (vi, Sl. 167.) from the body of a brahmin, *not engaged in battle*," a very heavy, though indefinite, punishment is assigned for it. There is again a very manly and humane spirit in the following provisions:—(vii. Sl. 90.)—"Let no man, engaged in combat, smite his foe with sharp weapons, concealed in wood, nor with arrows mischievously barbed, nor with poisoned arrows, nor with darts blazing with fire."—(Sl. 91.)—"Nor let him in a car or on horseback, *strike his enemy alighted on the ground*; nor an effeminate man: nor one who sues for life with closed palms; nor one whose hair is loose and obstructs his sight; nor one who sits down fatigued; nor one who says, I am thy captive." (Sl. 92.) "Nor one who sleeps, nor one who has lost his coat of mail; nor one who is naked; nor one who

is disarmed; nor one who is a spectator, but not a combatant; nor one who is fighting with another man." (Sl. 93.) "Calling to mind the duty of honourable men, let him never slay one who has broken his weapon; nor one who is afflicted with private sorrow; nor one who has been grievously wounded; nor one who is terrified; nor one who turns his back." It is impossible for any code of the most exalted chivalry to exceed in generosity the noble temper of these prohibitions, and we must acknowledge that the people among whom such laws were current must have attained a very high degree of civilization.

The great Sanscrit epic of the Mahabharat abounds in expositions of the armament, and tactical arrangement of the early Hindoos.* It contains, with many

* By the assistance of a Sanscrit scholar of eminence Baboo Neel Rutna Holdar, and of a very able and intelligent pundit, Sarodha Prashad, long employed by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, I have been able to prepare the following translated instances of what is stated above from the Sections of the poem, termed *Bishma* and *Drona Parva*.

"O! great King, now the hero (Arjuna) formed on both wings a disposition called *Sringataka* (the shape of a triple-peaked mountain) which was very strong and capable of breaking that of the enemy.

On either horn of the array were placed Bhema Sena and Satyaki, the great charioteer, with many thousand of cars, horses, and infantry.

Within the double-boat-shaped force stood the King of men, Arjuna, whose horses were white, and whose flag distinguished by (the symbol of) the monkey; in the centre the Raja, Yud'hesthira, and the two sons of Madri (Nokula and Sabadeva)."—Vol. ii. (Calcutta Ed.) p. 465. *Bishma Parva*.

"By Bharadwaja (Drona) was formed a disposition in the

episodes on various subjects, an account of the struggle for domination between the lines of Pandu and

shape of a car with wheels which extended twelve coss in length, and five in breadth.

This array was formed by Drona himself with a number of different valiant Rajas, who were placed therein, in different positions, and with numerous cars, horses, elephants, and infantry.

In rear of this disposition, drawn in the shape of the lotus, was formed a central array which was entirely impenetrable. In the centre of the formation shaped like the unblown water lily, was also formed another under cover of it.

O! Chief of Kshatriyas, numerous elephants, footsoldiers, Rauthino, (a) and horses appeared like (the meshes of) hundreds of thousand nets.

Warriors equipped with these shining weapons, bows, swords, scimitars, maces, javelins, and spears—were posted amidst these armies.

Scimitars clear as the serene firmament, as well as shields made of the bull hide, and studded with hundreds of moons—glittered bright.

O! great King, I have seen many elephants who were without their riders (lying in the field) like mountains, exceeding faint under the shafts of Bhishma"—Vol. ii. p. 643 Drona Parva.

"At mid-day, oh! great King, a furious battle took place, between Bhishma and Somaka, occasioning loss of lives.

I saw hundreds and thousands of horses of different countries, adorned with golden ornaments, running with the fleetness of the wind.

I also witnessed the horsemen running with their wounded horses, and causing their followers to run in all directions on the field of battle, with scimitars in their hands.

The elephants grappling with other elephants quickly came up to the infantry and horse. Then King Duryodhana

(a) Those that ride in cars.

Kuru, two branches of the Lunar race of Indian sovereigns. The epoch of the history of the Mahabharat,* has been fixed chronologically at about fourteen centuries before our æra; its scene is laid in the country about Thanetur in Sirhind, a tract which has been the great battlefield of India from time immemorial to our own days. The combatants were six Gangetic monarchs, those of Hastinapura, Muthura, Panchala, Benares, Megadha, and Bengal, as well as Krishna who reigned in Guzerat. The tide of Hindoo domination had not extended itself beyond the boundaries of Ar-yaverta, or in other words, further South than the Nerbudda river, even so late as the days of Menu, who after defining this region (ii. Sl. 22.) as the tract proper to civilized men, proceeds with a remarkable expression which I never remember to have seen quoted with any reference to its force, to declare what country is holy. (ii. Sl. 23.) "That land, on which the black antelope naturally grazes, is held fit for the performance of sacrifices; but the land of the Mlechas, or those who speak barbarously, differs widely from it."†

sent ten thousand of valiant horsemen to resist the Pandavas"—Vol. ii. Bhishma Parva.

* Mr Prichard in his iv. volume of the Physical History of Man has so massed together all authorities and opinions on this most interesting question (see p. 101. *et seq.*) that in place of referring to detached writers, I would earnestly recommend a perusal of his clear and compendious view of the subject, to all who feel any desire to imbibe definite ideas on a point of history, long either utterly obscure, or in the highest degree uncertain.

† For a notice of the Indian aboriginal races, see Prichard's Phys. His. vol. iv.

Now as the grazing ground of this antelope is confined to wide and open plains, and the land of the Mlechas is put forward in contradistinction to it, the natural inference is that the Hindoos were as yet masters of no more than the open country, proving them by this evidence to have been a race of immigrant conquerors, imperfectly established in the land. The region whence they came, and the period at which they first appeared on the confines of India, are the subjects of enquiry which next suggest themselves, and chronologers going on the base of the ascertained date of the Great War, and with the aid of the Raja Taringini or Annals of Cashmere, the only Indian history of any chronological authority, assign in the one case, 2256 before Christ, as the date about which the first Hindoo colonies appeared on the confines of India, and in the other, 2666 B. C. as the year of the commencement of the history of Cashmere, in which the first Brahminical settlement appears to have been formed. Col. Tod, and Professor Wilson are severally the authors of these views. So much is certain, that Menu himself points to a northern origin (ii. Sl. 17, 18), and that the Great War itself was, as Mr Prichard observes, (vol. iv. p. 105.) an invasive movement southwards, "the first invasion of the Dekhan by the sovereigns of northern Hindostan," indicative of its being no more than a sequel of similar aggressions whereby the new sovereigns of Northern India, had established themselves in the possessions they then held. In the case of a people, so marked as the Hindoos by rigid adherence to ancestral habits, one may read their doubtful history

inferentially ; we know what was their onward progress of conquest after the age of the Mahabharat, and knowing them to be strangers in the land they then occupied, may come to an easy conclusion as to the similarly aggressive progress by which they got there.

All authorities almost seem to admit that the great plateau of central Asia,* must have been the point whence the Brahminical conquerors first marched,—that *officina gentium* whence in the darkness of a time far beyond the limits of history, peoples and races have come forth to take possession of the earth ; some, as the speakers of the Zend, the Pehlevi, and the Sanscrit tongues, cognate as to language but dissimilar in social habits : others exhibiting “ a striking and even surprising analogy in social regulations, divisions and subdivisions of hereditary castes, the distribution of offices, the privileges and restrictions of different orders in the community,†” while in language they have no affinity whatsoever, as in the remarkable instance of the Egyptians, and the Hindoos. “ Human nature,” observes Mr Prichard, “ assumes similar aspects under similar conditions, and that undoubted fact will sufficiently account for broad outlines of resemblance between nations which have existed without intercourse in countries, situated alike with respect to climate, and local circumstances. But no person who fully considers the intimate relation and almost exact parallelism that has been traced between the Egyptian and the Hindoos, will be perfectly satisfied with such a solution in that particular example.” They appear as separate nations as far as history allows

* Heeren Res. v. iii. c. 2, says simply—“ from the North.”

† Mr Prichard's Physical Hist. of Man, vol. ii. 193 ; *et seq.*

us to investigate, but beyond that, conjecture is free to suppose, as Mr Prichard suggests, a connection in the earliest ages of the world between the ancestral races, which will account for similarity of habits without inspiring surprise at the dissimilarity of tongues. The military customs of the Brahminical conquerors, in the remarkable point of discipline, and tactical arrangement, and the use of the war chariot, are identical with those of Egypt. Their use of the horse for the saddle "is characteristic of what they were when first they became subjects of history, nomads—a migratory people seeking out a fixed abode which one account* would make them have attained the confines of about coterminously with the subjection of Egypt to a single king, 2320 B. C.† The Egyptians had certainly fixed themselves in the Nile valley as a settled nation for some time before that date: the state of the arts in an immediately succeeding reign (that of Suphis) in which the great pyramid was built, proves this, and shows that whatever of nomad habit the Asiatic race which peopled Egypt may have had, it soon wore off under the influence of soil, circumstance, and a fixed abode. The Brahminical conquerors were in fact about establishing themselves in their conquests, at the time that the greatness of Egypt began to dawn, and when the kings were preparing, after the peaceful reign of Osirtasen I. (B. C. 1720), to employ the wealth of the land, and the spirit of its people, in schemes of foreign domination.

In the reign of Thothmes III. (B. C. 1495)—"one of the most remarkable," says Mr Wilkinson, "that occurs

* Colonel Tod's.

† Wilkinson's *Man. and Cust.* v. I. c. 2.

in the history of Egypt," these schemes were carried out with great vigour, and the paintings of that reign represent the sovereign as complimented with the tribute of the "*Pount*," the "*Kufa*," and the "*Rot-n-no*," as the names of the vanquished people are read from the hieroglyphs, all tributary nations subdued by Egyptian prowess (v. l. c. 2, p. 53). The last named race are thus described by the accurate and careful historian of ancient Egypt.

"The Rot-n-no, supposed by M. Champollion to be Lydians, were a nation with whom the Egyptians waged a long war; commencing at least as early as and perhaps prior to the reign of the third Thothmes. Their white complexion, tight dresses, and long gloves decide them to have been natives of a much colder climate than Egypt or Syria, and the productions of their country which they bring as tribute to the victorious Pharaoh, pronounce them to have lived in the East. These consist of horses, and even chariots, with four spoked wheels, very similar to the Egyptian curricule, rare woods, ivory, elephants and bears, a profusion of elegant gold and silver vases, with rings of the same precious metals, porcelain, and jars filled with choice gums and resins used for making incense of, which a greater quantity was derived from their country than from any other tributary to Egypt. Their features were regular without the very prominent nose that characterises some Eastern people represented in the sculptures; and they were of a very light color, with brown or red hair, and blue eyes. Their long dress usually furnished with tight sleeves, and fastened by strings round the neck either closed or folded over in front and was sometimes se-

cured by a girdle. Beneath the outer robe they wore a kelt: and an ample cloak, probably woollen, like the modern heram or blanket, of the coast of Barbary, was thrown over the whole dress, the head being generally covered with a close cap, or a fuller one bound with a fillet."

The colour and the eye proclaim these people northern;—the gums, the resins, and rare woods bespeak an eastern habitat, of which the elephant and bear fix the location:—it is India, or her immediate confines. The horse betokens the nomad; but, says Mr Wilkinson there are "even chariots" among them; so that this people bear evidence of uses, not less civilised than those of the Egyptians in this respect, while they at the same time adopt the equestrian habits suggested by a roving and unsettled life. The long sleeve glove represented in the paintings as worn by them,* is evidently a piece of defensive armour used as the succedaneum for a shield which they do not carry: it seems welted, or stuffed, and braced from elbow to wrist with a piece of wood or iron; the more artificial steel armguard with its welted gauntlet that still is worn in India, is called to this hour, though it encircles the arm, and covers the elbow, *a glove*: the "kelt" is, if any thing recognizable as a garment, a *dhotee*, the national Hindoo costume. The time at which they appear in the Egyptian paintings ("in Thothmes III.'s reign or a little before it"), would, their habitat being fixed on the confines of India, make their position tally exactly with that in

* Woodcut 62, Wilkinson, vol. i. It should be mentioned that they appear in arms and not as prisoners, but willing tributaries.

which we should expect to find the Hindoos about this period. But the name they give themselves, or which is given to them in the hieroglyphs, is, if there be any value in vocal coincidences, the most remarkable point of all, Rot-n-no being pure Sanskrit,—*rauthino*, रथिना, “those that ride in cars.” The just, and jealous severity of the modern rules of critical philology would reject this singular coincidence, if urged singly, as being merely phonetic, and as not bearing with itself any thing like *proof* of the identity of a people deduced from their language. When, however, it is accompanied by so many other points tending to establish identification—when we find a people, northern, and seminomad, as marked by their uses of the horse; located in the East, and by no possibility elsewhere than in India, or its confines; remarkable by a regularity of feature which affords another clue to their origin; acquainted with arts and manufactures, and the use of the precious metals; and moreover, with a chariot similar to that of Egypt,—a circumstance which may have surprised the ancient inhabitants of the Nile valley, as much as it seems to have done their modern commentator;—when we find that people coming into contact with the Egyptian forces on the occasion of an Eastern expedition about the very period when by the chronological calculations of Indian historians supported in this instance by the annals of Egypt, the Brahminical conquerors must have been resting in their early settlements, some two hundred years before the Great War,—we may be so far convinced that we have identified these Brahmins in the Egyptian tributaries, as to admit that their conquerors may have adapted to them nominally a title of which we

know they were proud,* and have called them, with reference to their peculiar equipment, in their own language, *the charioteers*. This is the more probable in that we know by similar decyphering of the hieroglyphs, that the Egyptians accepted and adapted the names of other nations, as the *Shari* (Assyrians) and *Sheta* (Scythians). The known epoch of this collision helps us perhaps at last to a true date, and explanation of the mythological expedition of the Egyptian Bacchus to India; while the collision itself may give a clue to the motives which brought about, not long afterwards, that invasive war, described in the Mahabharat. In all the great immigrations of mankind, nations have wandered on when pressed by aggression, themselves aggressive in search of rest and safety.

The blue eye, and the rufous or xanthous complexion of the Rot-n-no, does not the less bespeak them true Hindoos; for without referring to the light complexion of the Brahmins generally, more especially in the N. W., we may note that Mr Prichard's general researches have satisfied him (v. iv. p. 91, 228), that climate, location and the degree of exposure, regulate the colour, and the texture of the skin of human races, a fact which residents in India have too ample means of corroborating to need that it should be here enlarged upon. The gradual extinction of the red hair and blue eye among Affghan tribes settled in India is a familiar instance in point. In their recent settlements, as that of the Pathans in Rohilkhund, the peculiarity continues marked, but it has elsewhere for the most part disappeared.

* "Satyaki, the great charioteer."—*Mahabh.*

This note has run to greater length than I anticipated, but it would surely have been wrong to have published aught on military history in this land, without touching, in speculation, upon that of its ancient conquerors, or treating of their connection or collision with the fathers of military science in the Western world.

The early military history of another ancient nation, the Chinese, may be conveniently taken up hereafter in connection with the discovery of gunpowder in which it has been said they forestalled the nations of the west.

(*From Excerpta Historica. p. 28. Lond. 1831.*)

ORDINANCES

MADE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMY BY KING
HENRY THE FIFTH, AT MAUNT, IN JUNE OR JULY 1419;
AND BY JOHN TALBOT, EARL OF SHREWSBURY, IN THE
REIGN OF HENRY THE SIXTH.

Independently of the interest with which these Ordinances must be read, from their affording information as to the discipline and economy of the English army in the reigns of Henry the Fifth and Sixth, they are indispensably necessary to understand the history of the various military expeditions of the period. The Chroniclers, in describing the proceedings of the troops in France, continually refer to circumstances which, in ignorance of these Ordinances, appear to have occurred on those occasions only, whereas they arose from the general system by which armies were regulated. This assertion will be proved by two memorable instances. Henry the Fifth is well known to have hung a soldier for robbing a church of a pix; and these Statutes shew that this sacrilegious offence was not only a violation of the laws of all countries, but also of the first and second provisions of what may be termed the "articles of war." The biographers of Henry also state, that on invading France in 1415, he issued a proclamation forbidding sacrilege, and insults from being offered to women, or to priests; and that on another occasion, he threatened that certain breaches of his orders should be punished, if a gentleman, by the loss of his horse and harness, and if a groom or page, by the privation of one of his ears. From being considered as solitary instances, the King's humanity and severity have been equally commented upon; and the fact, that there was nothing unusual in either command, has been hitherto unknown.

It is not forgotten, that these Ordinances were promulgated four years after the events referred to ; but the Statutes for the Army, made in June 1386 by Richard the Second, which have been lately printed from the Harleian MS. 1309 agree very nearly, so far as they extend, with the following ; and in some places they form valuable notes to them.

Few observations, besides the notes, are necessary to render these Ordinances fully understood. The article relating to "Thirds," may be thus explained. It was part of the agreement, confirmed by indentures, between the "Lords, Captains, or Masters," and the Men at Arms in their retinues, that if either of the said men at arms took any prisoner, his lord was to have the third part of the ransom, and also of all other advantages whatever which might arise in the war, the amount of the ransom being fixed according as the lord, man at arms, and prisoner might agree. The "Band of St. George" was the red cross on a white ground, which was worn by Englishmen to distinguish them from their enemies, a practice adopted also by the French, who wore a white cross on a red ground. In the Regulations made by Richard the Second, this badge was ordered to be "large both before and behind." Children under the age of fourteen were not, it seems, allowed to be taken prisoners, unless they belonged to persons of rank, because, it may be inferred, they could pay handsomely for their ransom ; and there is some humanity in the protection given to women in childbed. The law forbidding jeerings and reproaches on account of a difference of countries was politic, and its existence proves that quarrels frequently sprang from this source.

The Ordinances made by the renowned Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, appear to have been intended to apply to the state and situation of the army under his command, rather than to have been part of the general military code.

The stakes which he ordered to be made in case of a battle, were, like those used by the archers at Agincourt, to form a defence against cavalry. Faggots were employed in sieges as

bulwarks or screens against the enemy's shot; the ladders with fifteen rungs or steps each were to be in readiness for an assault; and pavises were a very large kind of shield, placed before the archers whilst preparing their bows, and from behind which they took aim. The penalty of forfeiting "horse and harness," or in modern language their armour, was in reality a heavy pecuniary fine; for as they were furnished by the men at arms themselves, and, particularly the armour, were very valuable, the loss of them was no trifling punishment.

These Ordinances, which occur in a MS. in the College of Arms, marked L. 5. into which they were copied in the reign of Elizabeth, are also remarkable for many obsolete words, which have not been found elsewhere. A copy of the Statutes made by the Earl of Shrewsbury also exists in the Additional MS. 5758, f. 209, in the British Museum.

THESE BE STATUTES AN ORDENANCES MADE BY THE RIGHT NOBLE
PRINCE KINGE HENRY THE FIFTE AT TRETY AND COUNSELL OF
MAUNT.

Obeysaunce

First that all maner of men of whatsoever nacion estate or condicion soever he be, be obbeisaunt to our Sovereigne lord the Kinge and to his Constable and Marshall, upon payne of as moche as he may forfeite in bodey and in goodes

For Holy Church

Also that no man be so hardy, of lesse that he be prest, to touche the sacrament of Godes bodey, upon payn to be drawen and hangede therfor; nor that no maner man be so hardy to touche the box or vessell in the whiche the precious sacrament is in, upon the same payne aforesaide

For Holy Church

Also that no maner of man be so hardy to robbe, ne to pille Holy Church of no good ne ornament that longeth to the Church, ne to slee no man of Holy Church, religious, ne non other, but if he be armed, upon payne of deathe. Neither that no man be so hardy to slee, ne enforce, no woman upon the same payne; And that no man take no woman presoner, man

of Holy Church, ne other religious, but if he be armed, upon payne of enprisonament, and his bodey at the Kinges will*

For Herbergage

Also that no man be so hardey to go to fore in the bataill† undre the baner or penon of his lorde or master, excepte herbergers, the names of whome shalbe delyvered and take to the Constable and Marishall by their said lordes and masters, upon this payne, he that otherwise offendeth shalbe put from his hors and harnes bothe unto the warde of the Constable and Marshall unto the tyme that he that offendeth have made his fyne with the saide Constabell and Marishall, and fonde surties that he shall no more offende

For Herbergage

Also that no man take non herbergage, but if it be by the assignement of the Constable and Marishall or of the herbergers, and that after tyme that the herbergage is assigned and delyvered, that no man be so hardy him self to remove ne to disaraye for any thinge that maye falle, without comandement of him that hathe power, upon payne of hors and harnyes to be put in areste of Constable and Marishall to the tyme they have made fyne with theim, and more over his bodey at the Kinges wille

For kepinge of Wacche and Warde

Also that every man be obeysaunt to his capitayn to kepe his wacche and warde and forye, and to doe all that longeth a souledeour to doon, upon payne of his hors and harnes to be put in the warde of the Marishall unto the tyme that he that in this offendeth hathe agreede with his capitayn, after the warde of the courte

For takinge of Prisoners

Also be it at Bataille or other dede of armes wher that pre-soners be take, he that furst may have his say‡ shall have him for his presoner, and shall not nede to abide upon him to the

* "Upon pain of hanging." Statutes of Richard the Second's Army, A° 1386.

† "To goo before, but abide in his bataill."—*Ibid.*

‡ Sic. Query "fay" i.e. faith. See a subsequent note.

ende of the Journey; and none other shall more take him for prasoner but if that it be that the saide prasoner be founde for his defendaunt

For Robinge of Marchantes come yng to the Market

Also that no man be so hardy to pille ne robbe non other of vitaille, ne of noe other lyvelode the whiche they have by beinge, upon payne of deathe; and that no man robbe no vitiller ne marchant, ne non other persone come yng unto the marke, vitillers, or other marchandies, for the refreschement of the oste, upon the same payne; ne that no man robe from other horsemen or manes mete, ne non other thinge that is gotten of enemyes goodes, upon the payne his body to be arested at the Kings will

For Barteteurs*

Also that no man debate for armes, prisoners, lodging, ne for none other thinge, so that no riott, kontek, ne debate be in the oste; ne that no man make him partye in assemblye of the people, ne non other wise, and that as well of pnapall as of other parties, upon payne of lesinge their hors and harnes till they have made fyne with the Constable and Marishall, and their bodies to be arestede at the Kinges will, and if he be grome or page he shall lese his lifte† eare therfor, and if any man fynde him greved let him shewe his grevance to the Constable and Marishall, and right shalbe done

For Debate

Also that no man make no debate nor kontek for any hate of tyme past, ne for tyme to come,‡ for the whiche hate if any man be dede for suche kontek or debate, he or they that be encheson or pateners of the deathe, shalbe hanged therfor; or if it hape that any man escrye his owne name, or his capitayne, lord, or master, to make a risinge of the people, by the whiche any affraye myght fall in the oste, he that in suche wise asketh shall be drawn and hanged therfor

* Barrator or Barretor, a common mover, exciter, or maintainer, of suits and quarrels.

† "right eare."—*Ibid.*

‡ "Of old greves, nor for non new."—*Ibid.*

For them that crye Havoke

Also* no man be so hardey to crye havok upon peyne that he that is founde begynner to die therfor, and the remeaunt that don the same, ther hors and harnes to be put in the warde of the Counstable and Marishall unto the tyme they have made fyne with them, and their bodies in preson at the Kinges will till they have found surties that they shall no more offende

For unlawfull Seryes

Also† that non escrye, the whiche is called mount, ne non other unresonable escrye be in the oste, upon peyne that he that is fonde begynner of suche unresonable escrie be put from his hors and harnes, and his bodie in areste of Counstable and Marishall to the tyme he have made his fyne with them, and his bodye at the Kinges will and his life; and he that certifieth the whoe is the begynner shall have an Cs for his labor of the Counstable and Marishall.

For Mustres

Also when it liketh the Kinge to take mustres of his hoste, that no man be so hardy to have other men at his musters than thoo that be with him self witholde for the same viage, without fraude, upon payne to be holde fals and reproved, and also to lose his wages and payment that shulde longe to him

For Prysoners

Also if any manner dede of Armes be, and if any man be borne to the earthe, he that first so hathe borne him to the earthe shall have him to prysoner; but so be that a nother

* “Also that non be so hardi to crie havok, upon payne to have their hedde smeten off; and that he or they that be begynners of the said crie shal have also their hedys streken of and their bodies to be hanged by their armes.”—*Ibid.*

† “Also that non be so hardi to crie to horsebak in the hoste for the great parell that myght falle to all the hoste, whiche God defende, and this on payne to lese his beste horse of he be a man of armys or archer on horsebak, and if he be a archer on fote or other boye or page, he shall have the right ear cut off.”—*Ibid.*

cometh after, and takethe the fey* of the saide presoner, then the smyther down shall have the one half, and the taker of the feith* the other half; but he that taketh the feith* shall have the warde of the presoner, making sufficient suertye to his partyner for the other half.

For Prysoners

Also if that any man take a prisoner, and any other man come unto him askinge parte, manatyng ellst that he wolde slay the saide presoner, he shall have no parte though he so bee that partie have been graunted him; and if he slaye the presoner he shalbe arested by the Marishall, and put in warde without delyverance till he have made a fyne after the awarde of [the] Counstable.

For the paynge of Thyrdes

Also that every man pay his thirde to his capitayne, lorde or master, of all maner wynnyng by wares, and that aswell thoo that be not in soule but longyng under the baner or penon of their capitayn, upon payne to lose his parte of his foasaid wynnyng to his capitayn, and his body to be in warde of the Marishall unto the tyme he have agreede with his forseide master.

For them that maketh themselves Captaines to withdraw men from the Hoste.

Also that no man be so hardy to rese baner or penon of Sinte George, ne of no other, to drawe together the people, and

* The words in the Manuscript are "sey," and "seith;" but they have been altered on the authority of the following passage, and from its being obviously a mistake:

"Yf any maner of reconterying of ennies be, and in the same any enemy be overthrowen, thow he that hath borne him doune goth forth and foloweth the chace, and another cometh and taketh the *faith* of the said enemy, he shall have the halfe of the raunsom of the said prisoner; and he that overthrew hym, hym the other halfe, so that he that hath his *faith* shall have the keepyng of the prisoner, gevyng suretie to his partener."—*Ibid.*

† i. e. Menacing else.—"have parte in thretenyng or elles will kille him."—*Ibid.*

to with drawe theim out of the oste to goe to eny other partye upon payne of theim that in suche wise make theim self Capitaynes to be draw and hanged; and they that him sue or folow to have their hedes smyten of, and all their goodes and haritage forfeited to the Kinge

A statute for theim that bere not a bande of Seint George.

Also that every man of what estate [or] condicion that he be, of our partie, beare a bande of Seint George sufficient large upon the pille if he be wounded or dede in the fawte therof, he that him wondeth or [sleyeth] shall bere no payne for him; and that non enemye bere the saide signe of Seint George, but if he be presoner and in the warde of his master, upon payne of deathe therfore

For theim that Assaute without leve of the Kinge

Also that no manner assault be made to Castell ne to Strength by Archer ne by non other of the Comons without the presence of a man of astate; and if any assault be and the King, Constable, or Marshall, or any lorde of the office, sende to distourbe the saide assaulte, that no man be so hardy to assault after; and if any man do it, he shalbe presoned and lose all his other profett that he hathe wone by the forsaide assault, and his hors and [harness] in the warde of the Counstable and Marishall

For to bringe in presoners in to the Kings knowledg,

Counstable, and Marishall

Also if any man take any presoner, anon right as he is come into the oste, that he bringe his presoner unto his Capitayne or master, upon payne of losinge of his parte to his forsaide Capitayne or master; and then that his saide Capitayne or master bring him within viijdayes to the King, Counstable, or Marshall, or as sone as he may, so that he be not ladde non other waye* upon payne to lose his parte to him that

* "So that he may be examyned of the newes and conveyance of th' enemyes, upon payne to lose his thirde to hym that can firste geve knowledge to the cunstable or marshall; and that everi man kepe or cause to be kepte with' hismen his pri-

shall doe furst the Counstable, and Marishall havyng witing therof; and that every man kepe or do kepe his prisoner that he ride not, nor goo at large in the oste, ne in lodgynges, but if warde be had upon him, upon payne of losynge of the same prisoner; reservyng to his lorde or master his thyrdes of the houle if he be not partye of the defaulte, and the ij parte to him that first shall accuse him, and the iijde parte to the Counstable and Marishall: also more over, his bodye arreste to the Kinges wille; also that he suffer not his prisoner to go out of the oste for his ransom, ne for non other cause, without sauf conduyte, upon the payne aforsaid

For kepinge of Wache

Also that every man kepe duley his wache in the oste that with as many men of armes and archers as to him shalbe assigned, but if he have a cause resonable; and to bide upon his wache and warde the terme to him lymytied, nor departing from the wache no way be it by thassignement or lycence of him by the whiche the said wache is made, upon payne of smytynge of his head that otherwise departeth

For the gyving of Saufecondute or Conges and for to breke theim

Also that no man geve no saufecondute to prysoner, ne to non other, nor lycence to non enemye to come nor to go owte of the oste, ne into the oste, upon payne to forfait all his goodes to the Kinge and his body in areste at the Kinges wille, excepte our liege lord the Kinge, Counstable, and Marishall; and that no man be so hardy to breke our liege lorde the Kings saufecondute upon payne to be drawen and hanged,

soner, that he rideth not forth with the battailes, nor to goo abrode to see the lodgynges without havyng good watching upon him, so that he not espie the privetes of the hoste, upon payne to lese his said prisoner, reservyng the thyrdes of the houle to his said lorde or maister if he be not founde in the fault."—*Ibid.*

and his goodes and heritages forfayte to the Kinge, nother the Constable and Marishall saucondute upon payne of deathe*

For the withdrawing mens Servauntes from ther Masters

Also that no man be so hardey to take no servant of other, the whiche is in covenant with him for the viage, aswell soul-diour, man of armes, archer, grome, page, after tyme he is kende or chalanged by his master, upon payne his body to be arested to the tyme he have agrede to the partye complaynant after the warde of the courte, and his hors and harneys to the Counstable and Marishall till he have made his fyne

For departing from the Oste without leve

Also that no man departe from the stale without leve and licence of his lorde or master, upon payne that he that otherwise departeth to be arested and in the warde of [the] Marishall and at the Kinges wille of his life; and also to lose all his wynynge of that day, reserved to his lorde or master the thirdes of his wynynge, and to the lorde of the stale surplus of the same wynynge wone by him that same day, and so from day to day till the ordynance be kepte

For Scryes made by the enemyes in the Oste

Also if any ascrye fall in the oste when they be logged, that every man drawe him to the King or the chiefteyn of the battail wher he is lodged, levinge his lodging sufficiantly kept, but if the enemyes fall on that side ther as he is lodged, and in this case the said Capitayn shall abide therin himself and all his men

For kepyng of the Countre

And if any Countrey or lordeship be wonne other by fre wille offered unto the Kinges obeysaunce that no man be so hardey

* "To have their hedes smytyn off." *Ibid.*—The following occurs after this article :

"Also if any man take a prisoner that he take his faith, and his hedde pece, or his right gauntelet of hym in a gage, and in token that he hath so taken hym, or elles to leve hym in kepyng with some of his men, upon payne that if he do not as ys said, an other cometh after and taketh hym, if he be owte of kepyng as ys said, other hedde pece or gauntelot in gauge, he shall have the said prisoner, how be it thow the firste have his faith."—*Ibid.*

to robe or pille therin after that the peas is proclamyed upon payne of deathe; and if any man of what degre soever he be come unto our saide lordes obeysaunce, that no man take him, robe him, nor pille him, upon the same payne, so that he or they that this wille obeye bere a token of our soveraigne lorde the King

For them that Raunsom their Prisoners or sell without leave of ther Lordes or Capitanes

Also that no man be so hardey to raunsome or sell his presoner without especall licence of his capitayn, the whiche indenteth with the King under his letter and seale; and that upon payne that he that doeth the contrarye therof to forfaitte his parte in the presoner unto his capitayn, and he to be under areste of the Marishall to the tyme he have aggred withe his capitayn, and that no man by no suche presoner upon payne to lose the golde and money that he paieth for him, and the presoner to be arested to the Capitayn aforsaide

A statute for Children within the age of xiiij yeres

Also that no man be so hardey to take no childerne within the age of xiiij yere, but if he be a lordes sonne, or els a worshipfull gentlemans sonne, or a capitayne; and that as sone as he hathe brought him into the oste or in to the gernyson where he is abyding that he brynge him to the lorde, master, or capitayn, upon payn of losing hors, harneys, and his part of the same childe, reservyng unto his lorde, master, or capitayn his duety, so that they be not consentant unto the defaulte; also that the saide lorde, master, or capitayn bryng him unto the King or Counstable within viij dayes upon

For Wemen that lye in Gesem*

Also that no maner of man be so hardy to goe into no chamber or lodging wher that any woman lieth in gesem, her to robbe ne pille of no goodes the whiche longeth unto her refressheing, ne for to make non affray wher through she and her childe myght be in any disease or dispere, upon payn that

* In childbed. Gesine, "Etat d'une femme en couche, accouchement." Gesir, "Etre couché, accoucher, enfanter," &c.—Roquefort's *Glossaire de la Langue Romaine*.

he that in suche wise offendeth shall losse all his goodes, half unto that acuset him, and halfe unto the Counstable and Marshall, and himself to be dede but if the King geve him his grace

For the resisting of Justice

And if any man be juged to the death by the Kinge, Counstable, Marishall, or any other Juge ordynarye, or any other office lawfull, that no maner man be so hardy to sett hand on the condemned to resiste the Kings judgement, upon payn that, and the saide condemned betraytour, he that is the chif to have the same death that unto him belongeth; and all those that be participant or consenting to have their hedes smeten of; and if it be any other cause criminall, the causer of the resistinge to have the same deathe that the saide jugged shuld have, and the remenant at the Kinges wille

For them that fortifie places without leave of the Kinge

Also that no man be so hardye to edifie nor to strengthen no maner of place disappered by the King or his Counseill, without especiall comaundement of them that have power; and also that no man compell the countrey, the whiche is in the obey-saunce or appatysede* unto our soveraigne lorde the Kinge, to come unto the donage, repacon, wacche or warde, of the saide place, upon payne of losynge his hors and harneys and to restowr ayen or make satisfaccion unto the countrey wher that he hathe offended the costes and damages, and mor over his bodey at the Kinges wille

For them that Robbe and pille Lodginges

Also that no man be so hardy to robbe nor pille non others lodginge after tyme it is assigned by the harbyngers, ne to lodge ther within without leave of him the whiche the lodginge is assigned to, upon payne of emprysonament after the warde of the Counstable and Marishall

A statute for them that lette Laboures and men
goinge to Plough

Also that no maner of man be so hardy to take fro no man

* "Appatisser. Contraindre les habitans d'un pays à nourrir destroupes." *Roquefort*.

going to the plough, harowe, or cart, hors, mare, nor oxe, nor non other beste longinge to labour within the Kinges obey-saunce without louing and bedinge, and grede the partye, upon payne of deathe; and also that no man geve none impedymēt unto no man of labour, upon payen of empresonament unto the tyme he have made a fyne after the awarde of the Counstable and Marishall

For them that geve men Reproche

Also that no maner man geve no reproche to non other by cause of the countrey that he is of, that is to saye, be he Frenche, Englishe, Welshe, or Irisshe, or of any other countrey whens that ever he be, that no man saye no vilony to non other, through the whiche vilony saynge, may falle sodenly man slaughter, or risinge of people, all suche barvators shall stand at the Kinges wille what death they shall have for ther noys making

For them that taketh Traytours and put them to Raunsom

Also if any man take any enemye the whiche hathe ben shorne and had billet, or any man the whiche outhe ligeaunce unto our liege lord the Kinge, that is to witt, Englishe, Welshe, Irishe, or any other, that as sone as he is comen in to the oste or elswher that he be brought into the warde of Counstable and Marishall upon payne to have the same death that the saide traytour or enemy sholde have, and he that any suche bryngeth in shall have an C.s. of the Kinge, Counstable, or Marishall, for his travell

For them that breketh the Kinges Areste

Also that every man obey unto the Kinges sergauntes porters of place, or any other officers made by Counstable, Marishall, or by any other officers commandant, that no man be so hardy to breke the Kinges areste, upon payne to lose hors and harnes and his body at the Kinges wille, and if he mayne them or hurte to be dede therfor

For Bornynge

Also withouten comandement speciall of the Kinge that no man bourne upon payne of death

For Wache within Lodgings

Also both daye and nyght that every Capitayn have wache within his lodginge, upon payne his body to be arestede till he have made fyne and raunsom with the Kinge and at the Kinges wille

For them that be wastours of Vitaille

Also if any man finde wyne or any other vitaille, that he take himself therof as muche as him nedes, and that he save the remenant to other of the oste, without any discencion, upon payne his hors and harneys to be areste till he have made fyne with the Counstable and Marishall

For a Copie to be had of the Premyssees in the Oste

Also theis articles afor written the whiche that thinketh the Kinge be nedefull to be cryed in the oste, he wolde that the copie be geven to every lorde and governor of men in the forsaide oste, so that they may have playne knowlege and enforme ther men of ther forsaiide ordenances and articles

For makinge Rodes

Also that no man make no rodes by day nor by nyght but by licence and knowlege of the chefteyns of the warde, so that the chefteness may knowe what way they drawe theim that they maye have soucour and helpe, and nede be, upon payne of theim that offendeth of their body and goodes at the Kinges wille

For Rodes

Also that no Capitayn of no warde graunte no rodes without licence of our soveraigne lorde the Kinge

That no man disaray him in the Bataille for no serie that cometh in the Oste

Also that for no tydinges, ne for no maner of serye that may come in the oste, that no man move him in disaraye oute of the bataille if they ride, that by leve of the chefteyne of the bataille, upon payne that he that offendethe shalbe put fro his hors & harneys to the warde of the Counstable and Marshall unto the time that he have made his fyne with theym, and founde surtie that he shall no more offende; and more over, his body to stand at the Kinges wille

OTHER ORDINANCE MADE BY THERLE OF SHREUSBERY AND
OF PERCHIE LORDE OF MOUNTHERMER, AT HIS SIEGES IN
MAYNE AND OTHER PLACES*

For the Countre appatised†

First that no maner man of armes, ne archer, ne of what estate condicon, or nacion, that ever he be, that they abide not, nor hold them under the coloure of our saide soveraigne lorde therle, but that their capitayn be in this present assemble and company and they be mustred and mustre at all tymes that they be required; and also that they lodge them under the standarde of ther capitayn and in suche lodging as is delyvered them by the harbengers, upon payne of losynge hors, and harness, and ther goodes; more over ther bodies at the Kinges will

For foreyinge the said Countre appatised

Also that no man forale in the countre appatised but if it be haye, ottes, rye, and other necessary vitailles, nor that no man geve unto his hors no wheate, nor to gader non but if it be only to make brede of; and if the said foraiers take any bestaill for ther sustenance that they take resonably, and to make no waste nor for to devoure nor destroye no vitailles, upon payne of losinge hors, and harness, and goodes, and ther bodies at the Kinges wille; and also that the saide forainours‡ take nor slee no great oxen ne no mylche keene, but smalle bestaill, and that they accorde with the partie upon the payne aforesaide

For them that bye or selle pylage in the saide Countrey, or
take

Also that no maner of man, souldiour, or marchaunt, using the warre, by no pilage, nor take non within the grounde appatised, upon payne of deathe; and if so be that any man have any of the enmyes goodes whiche he will selle, that he bringe it in to the comon marchaunt market, and proclaime it by an officer of the marchalcey, or els of the market, upon payne the byer to be arrested of the Marshall to the tyme he have made a fyne with the Counstable and Marshall, and to lose all his mony or golde

* Collated with the Additional MS. 5758. f. 209.

† "Appatisser. Contraindre les habitans d'un pays à nourrir des troupes." *Roquefort*.

‡ Sic in both MSS.; query foraiuours.

that he hath paid for the same pylage, and the seller to lose hors and harnys, and his bodye at the Kinges wille

For them that destroyeth Vines and other Tres beringe frute

Also that no maner of man bete downe howsinge to borne, ne non apletres, peretres, nottres, ne no other tres beringe frute, nor that no man put no best into vynes, nor drawe up the stakes of the same vynes, for to destroye them, upon payne to lose their said beastes and them self in warde unto the tyme that he have made a fyne withe the Counstable and Marishall for the defalte

For to bery Careyn and other Coropcions in seging

Also that every lorde, capitaynes, or governor of people, do compell ther servants and meny, to berye ther careyn and bowelles abowte ther lodgings and within earth, that no stynch be in ther lodgings wher thorough that any pestelence or mortalite myght fall within the oste, upon payne to make a mendes at the Kinges wille

For the takinge of Presoners of men Bulleted *

Also that no man take no presoner of that saide grounde patised, nor no man nor childe having bullet, *upon payne to lose hors and harnes and ther bodies at the Kinges wille

For dryving away the Bestaill oute of the Oste

Also that no souldiour of what estat soever he be, goo fro the oste with no bestaill, upon payne that he that is founde in defalte shalbe presoned and lose the saide bestaill, notwithstandinge what place soever he hath taken them; and he that him taketh or aresteth shall have the half dele of the saide bestaill and the Kinge the other half, but it be so that he have leve of the Counstable and Marishall, of the whiche leve he shall have a billet under the Counstables signet and also that he present up the number of the bestes which he dryveth

For to make Stakes ageyns a Bataill or Journey

Also that every Capitayne doe compelle ther yogmen, every man in all haste, to make him a good substanciall stake of xj foote of length for certeyne tydings that lordes have harde, and on payne to be punessed as therto longeth

* Sic in both MSS ; query billet.

For making of Fagottes at siges for bolewerkes & diches

Also that every man make him a good substanciall fagott of xiiij foote of length without leaves ayens day next comynge upon payen of losing a monethes wages ; and that as welles the marchantes whiche cometh unto the market, as other soulders ; and also that every capitaine doe ley his fagottes aparte to that entent that it may be sene whether he have his number of fagotes after the compaign the whiche he ledeth

For Holy Church

Also that no man take from no hous of religion, ne non other place having sauward, no maner of goodes, ne vitall, without accordinge and wille of the wardens of the same place, upon peyne to be arested and at the Kinges wille of his life

That no man speke with theim in the Castell or in the Towne after that they be charged

Also that no maner man be so hardy to speke with theim of the towne or of the castell from hens forth upon payne to be chastised at my lordes wille

Ordinances for foraiers in places dangerous

Also that no maner man goe for no forage but it be with a stale * the whiche shall fowrth twice a weke, that is to witte day and day upon peyne to be chastised at my lordes wille

For ladders

Also that every vij gentellmen, or men of armes, make theim a goode sufficiant ladder and a strong of vx rongs, and that it be redey betwixt this and day upon payne to be chastised at my Lordes wille

For pavises

Also that every ij yomen make them a goode pavise of bordes or of pap, in the beste maner they cane best devise, that on may hold it, whiles that other dothe shete, upon the payne &c

For them that Sault or Renners to make them boty

Also that all men make them boty, vij or v to gader, that alway iij of the vij, or ij of the v, be assigned to wayte, and not to departe from the standers, upon payne to lose all the wyngynge

* Sic in both MSS.

that may be wonne by him as that day, or by the feliship of him, half to the Kinge, and half to him that accusethe him, and his bodey in presone at the Kinges wille; and that every capitayn geve by day all the names of his men as they be made in their botye, certifying by name which be those that shall abide withe the standerdes, and whiche shall doe ther avauntage

For Wemen that usen Bordell the whiche lodge in the Oste

Also that no maner of man have, ne holde, any comon woman within his lodging, upon payne of losing a monthes wages; and if any man fynde or may finde any comon woman lodginge, my saide lorde geveth him leye to take from her or theim all the mony that may be founde upon her or theim, and to take a staffe and dryve her oute of the oste and breke her arme.

Et sic finis.

END OF PART I.


ERRATUM.

Page 292. For "*the knighthood of the Black Prince*," read
"the knighthood of the Prince his son."

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Title Remarks On The Scope And
Uses Of Military Literature.

Author

Calcutta, W. Thacker.